SERGIO MONTELIER CHAVIANO v. PAMELA BONDI, et al.
CASE NO. 25-22451-CIV-DAMIAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
June 23, 2025
MELISSA DAMIAN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Case 1:25-cv-22451-MD Document 32 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/23/2025
Petitioner,
v.
PAMELA BONDI, et al.,
Respondents.
ORDER ON AMENDED PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS [ECF NO. 4] AND EMERGENCY MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER [ECF NO. 17]
THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Petitioner, Sergio Montelier Chaviano‘s (“Petitioner“), Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed May 31, 2025 [ECF No. 4], and Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction Staying Credible Fear Proceedings, filed June 8, 2025 [ECF No. 17 (“Emergency Motion“)].
THE COURT has considered the Petition and Emergency Motion, the record, and relevant authorities, and the Court had the benefit of oral argument from the parties, who appeared, through counsel, before the undersigned on June 12, 2025.
In short, Petitioner seeks an Order from this Court staying the ongoing credible fear proceedings in which Petitioner is presently involved and directing the release of Petitioner from the custody of the Immigration authorities while his removal proceedings proceed. For the reasons set forth below, this Court denies the relief Petitioner seeks.
The facts set forth below are drawn from the parties’ submissions and, unless otherwise indicated, are undisputed.
A. Petitioner‘s Initial Entry Into The United States And Apprehension By Immigration.
Petitioner is a native and citizen of Cuba. See Am. Pet. [ECF No. 4] ¶ 22. On February 7, 2022, Petitioner entered the United States by crossing the border at or near Eagle Pass, Texas, without inspection. Id. He was immediately apprehended by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (“CBP“) Officials and placed in civil detention. Id.; Resp. [ECF No. 23] at 2. Petitioner admitted he unlawfully entered without valid travel documents, and CBP determined Petitioner was inadmissible. See Am. Pet. at 5, n.4; [ECF No. 23-1 (Form I-213, Record of Deportable/Inadmissible Alien)]. As indicated in the Record of Deportable/Inadmissible Alien, dated February 10, 2022, Petitioner advised Immigration authorities that he was seeking asylum based on credible fear. See ECF No. 23-1.
On February 10, 2022, CBP initiated removal proceedings, pursuant to
B. Petitioner‘s Removal Proceedings.
On April 14, 2023, Petitioner filed a Motion to Administratively Close Removal Proceedings before an Immigration Judge in Miami, Florida, so that he could pursue adjustment of status under the Cuban Adjustment Act.1 See ECF No. 23-4 (Motion for Administrative Closure). In that Motion, Petitioner argued that his release qualified as “parole.” Id. at 3-4. On April 17, 2023, the Immigration Judge in Petitioner‘s Removal Proceedings entered an Order stating that, after consideration of the facts and circumstances, Petitioner‘s Motion to administratively close his removal proceedings was denied. See ECF No. 23-5 (“Order of the Immigration Judge“). The Immigration Judge specifically indicated: “[Petitioner] is not yet prima facie eligible to adjust status as he has not been ‘paroled’ into the United States pursuant to
C. Petitioner‘s May 22, 2025 Detention By Immigration Authorities.
Immediately after that May 22, 2025, hearing, authorities with Enforcement and Removal Operations (“ERO“), a division of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE“), encountered Petitioner and detained him pursuant to
The Record of Sworn Statement indicates that Petitioner was given an opportunity to provide a sworn statement in the proceedings but that he refused to do so without his attorney. [ECF No. 23-9]. ERO detained Petitioner at the Broward Transitional Center (“BTC“). See ECF No. 23-10 (“Detention History“). On May 30, 2025, ERO referred Petitioner‘s case to the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS“) for a credible fear interview
On June 3, 2025, Petitioner filed an appeal of the Immigration Judge‘s May 22, 2025, Dismissal Order with the Board of Immigration Appeals. See ECF No. 23-11. Petitioner‘s appeal remains pending, as does a decision from USCIS as it relates to the May 30, 2025, credible fear interview. See Valcourt Decl. ¶ 14.
D. Petitioner‘s Proceedings Before This Court.
On May 29, 2025, Petitioner initiated these proceedings by filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to
After this Court issued an Order to Show Cause [ECF No. 13] directing an expedited Response to the Amended Petition, on June 3, 2025, Respondents’ counsel entered a Notice of Appearance, and on June 10, 2025, Respondents filed a Response to the Order to Show Cause.2 [ECF No. 23].
On June 12, 2025, the parties appeared, through counsel, before the undersigned to be heard on the pending Amended Petition and Motions. See ECF No. 26. At the hearing, the undersigned directed counsel for Respondents to provide a status report informing the Court of the anticipated timing of Petitioner‘s upcoming third credible fear interview and any other
II. PETITIONER‘S CLAIMS FOR RELIEF
As indicated above, there are presently two substantive matters pending before this Court: (1) Petitioner‘s Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus [ECF No. 4]; and (2) Petitioner‘s Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO“) and Preliminary Injunction Staying Credible Fear Proceedings [ECF No. 17]. This Court separately denied Petitioner‘s Motion to Produce the Body of Petitioner [ECF No. 21]. See ECF No. 31. These are discussed below, but the claims for relief in these pending filings are summarized here.
In the Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Petitioner claims Respondents lacked the authority to arrest and detain him because he has been in the United States for more than two years before the determination of inadmissibility and that he is statutorily exempt from expedited removal as a parolee. Am. Pet. at 14. Petitioner further claims that he is entitled to habeas review under the Suspension Clause of the United States Constitution. Id. at 17-18. Petitioner requests that this Court assume jurisdiction over the matter, set it for
In the Emergency Motion for TRO and Preliminary Injunction, Petitioner requests the Court stay his ongoing credible fear process in order to preserve the status quo while Petitioner proceeds with his habeas proceedings before this Court. See generally Emer. Mot.
In their Response, Respondents contend that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to review Petitioner‘s claims, that Petitioner was not paroled but was properly placed in removal proceedings, and that he has been given the process he is due under Congress‘s existing framework. See generally Resp. [ECF No. 23].
Petitioner filed a Traverse, or Reply, in Support of the Amended Petition on June 12, 2025. [ECF No. 29].
These matters are ripe for adjudication.
This Court begins its analysis, as it must, with a consideration of whether this Court has subject matter jurisdiction over Petitioner‘s claims.
III. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION AND THE INA
Respondents argue that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider Petitioner‘s claims for relief. “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (internal citations omitted). Nowhere is this principle more rigorously applied than in immigration cases, where Congress has plenary authority to define the contours of judicial review. See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (citations omitted). Thus, federal courts are under a continuing obligation to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists. Cadet v. Bulger, 377 F.3d 1173, 1179 (11th Cir. 2004). If a federal court determines at any time during the litigation that it lacks subject-
Respondents’ primary basis for arguing a lack of subject matter jurisdiction is the significant limitations Congress has placed on the power of federal courts to review expedited removal orders. See Resp. at 6 (citing United States v. Herrera-Orozco, No. C-11-542, 2011 WL 3739160 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 23, 2011) (citing Brummer v. INS, 275 F.3d 443, 447 (5th Cir. 2001))). Specifically, Respondents aver: “[T]hrough his habeas petition, Petitioner challenges his detention, which arose precisely from the expedited removal process. Based on the plain language of Congress‘s amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA“) in 1996, federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to hear any claims ‘arising from’ or ‘relating to’ the expedited removal process established by Congress under
The undersigned agrees with Respondents.
A. The INA‘s Limitations On Review Of Expedited Removal Orders.
Petitioner, as all parties here agree, is the subject of an expedited removal order pursuant to
In the Petition before this Court, Petitioner seeks judicial review of determinations made under
This Court agrees with Respondents that the jurisdiction-stripping provisions of Sections 1252(a) and (e)(2) apply to bar Petitioner‘s habeas petition.
Likewise, because Petitioner‘s detention arises from and is related to the expedited removal order, review of his challenge to his detention is also foreclosed by Sections 1252(a)
Thus, this Court agrees with Respondents that under the plain language of Sections 1252(a) and (e), this Court does not have jurisdiction to review any of the bases upon which Petitioner seeks this Court‘s review.
B. The Suspension Clause.
Petitioner argues that the narrow scope of habeas review provided by
1. Petitioner‘s Challenges to Respondents’ Determination That He Qualifies For Expedited Removal.
First, insofar as Petitioner‘s challenges to whether he qualifies for expedited removal are concerned, this Court finds that these challenges fall within the Supreme Court‘s Opinion in Department of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103 (2020), in which the Supreme Court rejected a claim that
and effective to test the legality of the petitioner‘s detention (or removal).” Id. at 445 (citing Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 739). For the reasons explained herein, this Court finds Petitioner does not get past the first step under the circumstances presented here. See Diaz Del Cid, 394 F. Supp. 3d at 1347.
Likewise, to the extent that Petitioner here complains of the Respondents’ determination that he qualifies for expedited removal, under Thuraissigiam, the suspension of his right to seek habeas review of that determination does not implicate or violate the Suspension Clause.
2. Petitioner‘s Challenge To His Detention.
The next issue, then, is whether the statute‘s bar to habeas review of Petitioner‘s detention violates the Suspension Clause. The undersigned agrees with Petitioner that the Thuraissigiam opinion does leave room for a Suspension Clause challenge to the limitation of habeas review of issues involving detention. However, Petitioner‘s challenge to the statute nevertheless does not present a Suspension Clause violation as applied to him.
The Supreme Court‘s analysis in Thuraissigiam is again instructive. In Thuraissigiam, the petitioner, who was in expedited removal proceedings, did not seek release from detention but, instead, sought a change in his status based on a claim of credible fear so that he could remain lawfully in the United States. As the Court points out, Thuraissigiam did not dispute that “confinement during the pendency of expedited asylum review, and even during the additional proceedings he seeks, is lawful.” Id. at 118. As the Court further points out, “Nor could he.” Id. That is, because he was apprehended in the very act of attempting to enter this country, he was inadmissible because he lacks an entry document (citing
As the Court explained in Thuraissigiam, the determination of whether the statute violates the Suspension Clause is made based on the scope of the writ of habeas corpus at the time the Suspension Clause was adopted. 591 U.S. at 116. And, as the Court further explained, the traditional function of the writ was to secure release from “illegal” custody. Id. at 117 (citing 3 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 137 (habeas was a means to “remov[e] the injury of unjust and illegal confinement“); 3 Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 1333, p. 206 (1833) (Habeas “is the appropriate remedy to ascertain ... whether any person is rightfully in confinement or not.“); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973) (“It is clear ... from the common-law history of the writ ... that the essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that custody, and that the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody“); Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 79 (2005) (similar); Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 693 (2008) (similar)). In short, the writ was meant to provide for review of whether custody is illegal.
Here, Petitioner does not dispute nor does he challenge that detention is authorized in expedited removal proceedings, “pending a final determination of credible fear of persecution
In other words, although the suspension of the right to seek habeas review of the legality of detention may implicate the Suspension Clause, that is not what Petitioner seeks review of by way of his habeas Petition. He seeks review of the Respondents’ determination that he qualifies for expedited removal because, if he does, he is being legally detained. But, based on the Court‘s opinion in Thuraissigiam, the suspension of the ability to seek habeas review of the Respondents’ determination does not violate the Suspension Clause. Therefore,
The authorities relied on by Petitioner in support of his claim that the statute violates the Suspension Clause are unavailing. In Ibrahim v. Acosta, No. 17-cv-24574, 2018 WL 582520, at *5-6 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 26, 2018), the court did find that it retained limited jurisdiction under the Suspension Clause, but the court stressed that its ruling was based on the “unique circumstances” of that case – none of which are presented here. To the contrary, Petitioner‘s circumstances are not exceptional, and his presence in the United States for the last three years while in removal proceedings does not change that. See, e.g., Cabrera v. U.S. Dep‘t of Homeland Sec., No. 24-cv-3079, 2025 WL 1009120 (7th Cir. Apr. 4, 2025) (affirming dismissal of petition challenging expedited removal despite the petitioner‘s claim of two years’ physical presence). Cf. Osorio-Martinez, 893 F.3d at 166 (children granted Special Immigrant Juvenile (“SIJ“) status); Agarwal v. Lynch, 610 F. Supp. 3d 990, 1004 (E.D. Mich. 2022) (petitioner lived lawfully in the United States for nearly 10 years and reentered with a valid visa). Here, Petitioner has not offered anything about his circumstances that distinguishes him from the cases in which courts consistently find a lack of subject matter jurisdiction to review determinations by Immigration authorities in expedited removal proceedings. Accord Quintero v. Field Off. Dir. of Miami ICE Field Off., No. 25-cv-22428-CMA, ECF No. 25 (S.D. Fla. June 23, 2025).
Accordingly, Petitioner has not shown that
Petitioner also asserts that he is entitled to due process and that his detention violates his due process rights in light of the fact that he has resided in and established ties in the United States for the last three years.
This Court agrees that Petitioner does have due process rights. As discussed herein and on the record at the hearing before this Court, Petitioner does not deny that he is presently here illegally and that he has been afforded hearings before the Immigration Court as well as at least two credible fear interviews thus far. Petitioner has not provided any authority that demonstrates that his detention for the last month, approximately, pursuant to
Taking into consideration all of the circumstances presented here, this Court finds Petitioner has not shown a basis for finding that his due process rights have been violated as the result of his detention.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, based on
Further, this Court cannot grant the injunctive relief sought by Petitioner under the circumstances presented because the dispute in this case concerns the Respondents’ determination of whether Petitioner is subject to expedited removal, and, therefore, this Court is precluded from review of that determination. See
Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:
- Petitioner‘s Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus [ECF No. 4] is DISMISSED.
- Petitioner‘s Emergency Motion [ECF No. 17] is DENIED.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers in the Southern District of Florida, this 23rd day of June, 2025.
MELISSA DAMIAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
cc: Counsel of Record