MONACO v. HOME-OWNERS INSURANCE COMPANY
Docket No. 329214
317 MICH APP 738
November 15, 2016
Submitted November 9, 2016, at Detroit. Decided November 15, 2016, at 9:10 a.m. Leave to appeal denied 500 Mich 1002.
Plaintiff, Laura Monaco, as personal representative of the estate of her daughter, Alison Monaco, brought an action in the Huron Circuit Court, challenging the denial of personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits by defendant, Home-Owners Insurance Company (HOIC). Covenant Medical Center, Inc., and Mary Free Bed Rehabilitation Hospital intervened in the action, seeking reimbursement for costs associated with providing medical care to Alison, who sustained severe injuries when she lost control of a vehicle that she was driving when she was 15 years old. The vehicle was owned by plaintiff, customarily driven by plaintiff‘s partner, and insured by HOIC. Alison had a permit to drive, but under
The Court of Appeals held:
Affirmed.
INSURANCE — NO-FAULT — PERSONAL PROTECTION INSURANCE BENEFITS — UNLAWFUL TAKING OF MOTOR VEHICLES — UNLAWFUL USE OF MOTOR VEHICLES.
Serafini, Michalowski, Derkacz & Associates (by Phillip S. Serafini) for Laura Monaco.
Miller Johnson (by Thomas S. Baker and Christopher J. Schneider) for Covenant Medical Center, Inc., and Mary Free Bed Rehabilitation Hospital.
Warner Norcross & Judd LLP (by John J. Bursch, Matthew T. Nelson, and Conor B. Dugan) and Willingham & Coté, PC (by David M. Nelson and John A. Yeager), for Home-Owners Insurance Company.
Before: JANSEN, P.J., and MURPHY and RIORDAN, JJ.
I. BACKGROUND
In July 2012, plaintiff‘s daughter Alison, then 15 years old, sustained severe injuries when she lost control of a vehicle that she was driving and crashed into a roadside ditch. At the time, Alison had completed and passed a driver‘s training course and obtained a permit to drive, but only if accompanied by a licensed parent, guardian, or 21-year-old, and she was not so accompanied when the accident occurred.2 The motor vehicle was owned by plaintiff, customarily driven by plaintiff‘s partner, and insured by HOIC. The medical providers treated Alison‘s extensive injuries and assisted in her rehabilitation.
Plaintiff filed a claim with HOIC for PIP benefits. In a recorded statement, plaintiff told HOIC‘s insurance adjuster that Alison did not have permission to drive the vehicle when the accident took place. HOIC thus denied coverage under
Plaintiff, then acting as Alison‘s next friend, filed suit challenging HOIC‘s denial of PIP benefits. The medical providers, aligning themselves with plaintiff, intervened in the action, seeking reimbursement for costs associated with providing medical care to Alison. HOIC filed a motion
Plaintiffs responded that Alison had taken the vehicle lawfully, citing the deposition testimony of plaintiff, her partner, and Alison, which indicated that Alison had permission to take and drive the car on her own at the time of the accident. Plaintiffs further asserted that Alison‘s lack of a driver‘s license that would have allowed her to drive on her own was irrelevant with respect to whether she took the car lawfully, arguing that HOIC was conflating unlawful taking with unlawful use. The trial court denied HOIC‘s motion for summary disposition, concluding that there was a factual issue regarding whether Alison had permission to take the vehicle and that the law supported plaintiffs’ proffered distinction between “taking” and “using” a vehicle for purposes of
At trial, plaintiff testified that her initial statement to the insurance adjuster was not truthful and that Alison actually had permission to take and use the vehicle on the day of the crash. Plaintiff admitted that she feared criminal liability for allowing her daughter to drive when she gave the statement to HOIC‘s adjuster. Plaintiff‘s partner testified that Alison had permission to take and use the vehicle on the day of the accident, and Alison indicated that she frequently drove the vehicle with plaintiff‘s knowledge and consent.3 Plaintiffs additionally produced witnesses who testified that they saw Alison driving the vehicle alone on several occasions, and one witness claimed that he observed plaintiff‘s partner at times giving Alison the car keys. HOIC in turn elicited testimony from witnesses who questioned the credibility of plaintiffs’ witnesses, and one of HOIC‘s witnesses testified that the partner had stated that he told Alison not to take the vehicle.
At trial, HOIC renewed its summary disposition arguments in moving for a directed verdict at the close of proofs, and the court again rejected them. HOIC and the medical providers had stipulated before trial to the amount of damages (outstanding medical charges plus penalty interest) should there be liability for PIP benefits, leaving the jury to resolve the issue of liability. And the jury concluded that HOIC had failed to meet its burden of showing that Alison took the car without permission, effectively rendering HOIC liable for the stipulated sums. The jury, of course, reached the same conclusion on liability relative to plaintiff, and the jurors made additional findings in regard to the nature and amount of allowable expenses and interest to which plaintiff was entitled. A judgment consistent with the jury‘s verdict
II. ANALYSIS
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND GOVERNING TEST FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION AND DIRECTED VERDICT MOTIONS
“A trial court‘s decision regarding a motion for summary disposition and a motion for a directed verdict are reviewed de novo,” Lewis v LeGrow, 258 Mich App 175, 192; 670 NW2d 675 (2003), as are questions of statutory interpretation, Krohn v Home-Owners Ins Co, 490 Mich 145, 155; 802 NW2d 281 (2011). The test with respect to a motion for summary disposition brought under MCR 2.116(C)(10) is essentially the same in regard to a motion for a directed verdict, “namely, whether reasonable minds, taking the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmovant, could reach different conclusions regarding a material fact.” Skinner v Square D Co, 445 Mich 153, 165 n 9; 516 NW2d 475 (1994).
B. PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
The Michigan Supreme Court in Whitman v City of Burton, 493 Mich 303, 311-312; 831 NW2d 223 (2013), set forth the well-established principles governing statutory construction, observing:
When interpreting a statute, we follow the established rules of statutory construction, the foremost of which is to discern and give effect to the intent of the Legislature. To do so, we begin by examining the most reliable evidence of that intent, the language of the statute itself. If the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the statute must be enforced as written and no further judicial construction is permitted. Effect should be given to every phrase, clause, and word in the statute and, whenever possible, no word should be treated as surplusage or rendered nugatory. Only when an ambiguity exists in the language of the statute is it proper for a court to go beyond the statutory text to ascertain legislative intent. [Citations omitted.]
C. DISCUSSION
HOIC contends on appeal that Alison necessarily took the vehicle unlawfully given her age and restricted license, precluding entitlement to PIP benefits pursuant to
“The Michigan no-fault act requires that owners and registrants of automobiles carry personal protection insurance to cover an insured‘s medical care arising from injuries sustained in an automobile accident.” Krohn, 490 Mich at 155, citing
A person is not entitled to be paid personal protection insurance benefits
for accidental bodily injury if at the time of the accident any of the following circumstances existed:
(a) The person was using a motor vehicle . . . which he or she had taken unlawfully, unless the person reasonably believed that he or she was entitled to take and use the vehicle. [Emphasis added.]
This provision was subsequently amended pursuant to 2014 PA 489, but it still generally bars the recovery of PIP benefits by a person who operated a vehicle that he or she had “taken unlawfully.” The first level of inquiry when applying
In construing the language “taken unlawfully,” our Supreme Court in Spectrum Health Hosps v Farm Bureau Mut Ins Co of Mich, 492 Mich 503, 516-517; 821 NW2d 117 (2012), observed:
In determining the Legislature‘s intended meaning of the phrase “taken unlawfully,” we must accord the phrase its plain and ordinary meaning, and we may consult dictionary definitions because the no-fault act does not define the phrase. The word “unlawful” commonly means “not lawful; contrary to law; illegal,” and the word “take” is commonly understood as “to get into one‘s hands or possession by voluntary action.” When the words are considered together, the plain meaning of the phrase “taken unlawfully” readily embraces a situation in which an individual gains possession of a vehicle contrary to Michigan law. [Citations omitted.]
The Spectrum Health Court further held that “any person who takes a vehicle contrary to a provision of the Michigan Penal Code[,
The “authority” referred to in the joyriding statutes is obviously the authority of the owner of the vehicle. Accordingly, for purposes of
MCL 500.3113(a) , a vehicle is “unlawfully taken” if it is taken without the authority of its owner. . . . Therefore,MCL 500.3113(a) does not apply to the lawful owner of a vehicle, even if that person drives it under a circumstance that renders him or her legally unable to operate a vehicle. However, driving while legally unable may have implications underMCL 500.3113(a) for a person who has taken a vehicle unlawfully because as a matter of law, one cannot reasonably believe that he or she is entitled to use a vehicle when the person knows that he or she is unable to legally operate the vehicle. [Id. at 518 n 25 (citation and quotation marks omitted).]
The distinction between unlawfully taking a motor vehicle and unlawfully using a vehicle was recognized in Rambin v Allstate Ins Co, 495 Mich 316, 331; 852 NW2d 34 (2014), wherein the Supreme Court stated that “the unlawful use of a vehicle . . . is not relevant under the unlawful taking language in
HOIC argues that it was unlawful for plaintiff to give Alison permission to drive the car under the Michigan Vehicle Code (MVC),
III. CONCLUSION
All of HOIC‘s arguments are unavailing because they ultimately conflate the unlawful use or operation of a motor vehicle
Affirmed. Having fully prevailed on appeal, plaintiffs are awarded taxable costs under MCR 7.219.
JANSEN, P.J., and RIORDAN, J., concurred with MURPHY, J.