Mitchell v. Mid-Ohio Emergency Servs., L.L.C.Mitchell v. Mid-Ohio Emergency Servs., L.L.C.
Rendered on December 23, 2010
Wiles, Boyle, Burkholder & Bringardner Co., LPA, Michael L. Close, and Dale D. Cook, for appellant.
Wickens, Herzer, Panza, Cook & Batista Co., Matthew W. Nakon, and Rachelle Kuznicki Zidar, for appellees Mid-Ohio Emergency Services, L.L.C., John Drstvensek, M.D., InPhyNet Hospital Services, Inc., and Acute Care Specialists, Inc.
Roetzel & Andress, LPA, Stephen D. Jonеs, and Jeremy S. Young, for appellees Grant-Riverside Methodist Hospital and Suzanne DeWoody.
APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.
{¶1} Appellant, Geoffrey C. Mitchell, M.D. (“appellant“), filed this appeal seeking reversal of a judgment by the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas finding that appellant violated
{¶2} Appellant filed this action against appellees, claiming that he had been improperly terminated from his position as an attending physician due to his criticism of an arrangement under which MOES undеrtook management of the emergency practice groups at Grant-Riverside.1 Appellant argued that his termination violated Ohio public policy.
{¶3} The trial court ultimately granted summary judgment against appellant on his claims, finding that appellant‘s termination by MOES was not based on his criticisms, and that Grant-Riverside was entitled to judgment because it was not appellant‘s еmployer, and had not taken any adverse action against him. We affirmed. Mitchell v. Mid-Ohio Emergency Servs., 10th Dist. No. 03AP-981, 2004-Ohio-5264.
{¶4} On April 29, 2005, appellant filed a pro se motion seeking relief from the trial court‘s judgment pursuant to
{¶5} MOES filed a combined motion seeking to strike a number of the documents included in the appendix filed by appellant with his motion and for a finding that MOES was entitled to an award of sanctions pursuant to
{¶6} The trial court rendered a decision denying appellant‘s motion to vacate, finding that appellant had neither presented a meritorious defense nor shown the existence of any of the grounds set forth in
{¶8} Also during this time, appellant filed a number of pleadings purporting to set forth supplemental authority in support of his memorandum contra the motions for sanctions. These supplemental pleadings included, among other things, information regarding the Securities and Exchange Commission‘s civil action against Richard Scrushy and information about the conviction and subsequent resignation from the practice of law of MOES’ corporate counsel as a result of theft from a client. Each of these pleadings resulted in the filing of a motion to strike.
{¶9} On June 11, 2007, appellant filed a motion seeking leave to file a second
{¶10} Throughout this period, voluminous pleadings were filed with the court involving appellant‘s claims regarding the purported fraud. These pleadings included additional discovery requests, motions seeking protective orders from the court, as well as continued arguments that appellant should be sanctioned for his conduct. On
{¶11} During the years this litigation was pending, appellant had attended law school. During the process of seeking admission to the bar, a heаring was held before the Board of Commissioners on Character and Fitness (“Board“) to consider whether appellant‘s conduct in this case should result in appellant not being allowed to sit for the bar exam. Citing appellant‘s repeated accusations about alleged unethical conduct of appellees’ counsel in this case, the Board found that there was no basis for appellant‘s allegations. Based on this conclusion, the Board recommended that appellant not be allowed to sit for the July 2008 bar examination, but that he be allowed to reapply for the February 2009 examination. The Supreme Court of Ohio adopted the Board‘s findings of fact, as well as its recommendation regarding appellant‘s application to take the bar examination. In re Application of Mitchell, 119 Ohio St.3d 38, 2008-Ohio-3236.
{¶12} On March 19, 2009, a hearing on the pending motions for sanctions was held in front of a magistrate. At the beginning of the hearing, the parties’ counsel entered a stipulation regarding the evidence that had been presented at the hearing before the Board. Under the stipulation, the parties agreed that the testimony and exhibits from the hearing would be entered into the record for this case, and also stipulated to the Board‘s findings of fact.
{¶13} The magistrate heard testimony from Matthew Nakon, counsel for MOES, and Stephen Jones, counsel for Grant-Riverside. Each testified regarding appellant‘s ongoing efforts to obtain relief from the trial court‘s summary judgment, including the
{¶14} The magistrate issued a decision concluding that aрpellant‘s conduct had violated both
{¶15} Appellant filed objections to the magistrate‘s decision, arguing that the magistrate‘s decision constituted an improper adoption of the Supreme Court‘s decision on appellant‘s bar admission because the issues in the two cases were not the same. The trial court overruled appellant‘s objections and adopted the magistrаte‘s decision.
{¶16} Appellant then filed this appeal, and asserts four assignments of error:
I. The trial court erred in adopting the conclusions of law from In Re Mitchell as a primary basis for its decision on the motion for sanctions thus failing to independently weigh the evidence.
II. The trial court erred in finding that Dr. Mitchell‘s conduct was merely to harass or maliciously injure defendants.
III. The trial court erred in finding that Dr. Mitchell‘s 60(B) motion lacked evidentiary support and were [sic] not warranted under existing law.
IV. The trial court abused its discretion in finding Dr. Mitchell violated Civil Rule 11.
{¶17} In his first assignment of error, appellant argues that the magistrate and trial court improperly “adopted” the findings of the Board and the Supreme Court in In re Mitchell, when it found that appellant had engaged in frivolous conduct аnd violated
{¶18} We do not agree that the magistrate‘s decision can bе properly characterized as adopting the conclusions of law from In re Mitchell. In his decision, the magistrate specifically recognized that the Supreme Court had not determined that appellant engaged in frivolous conduct, but had focused solely on whether appellant‘s conduct showed the requisite character to be allowed to sit for the bar examination. The magistrate then considered whether appellant‘s factual conduct as determined in In re Mitchell constituted sanctionable conduct for purposes of
{¶19} The facts found in In re Mitchell that were cited by the magistrate included the Board‘s conclusion that appellant made multiple meritless accusations that appellees’ counsel intentionally withheld or concealed evidence from appellant, as well
{¶20} Thus, it is clear that the magistrate applied the facts as found in In re Mitchell and as stipulated to by appellant to the specific definition of frivolous conduct set forth in
{¶21} Consеquently, appellant‘s first assignment of error is overruled.
{¶22} In his second assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court erred when it concluded that appellant‘s conduct in seeking to vacate the summary judgment granted against him was for the purpose of merely harassing or maliciously injuring appellees. By this assignment, appellant challenges that pоrtion of the trial court‘s decision finding that he engaged in frivolous conduct as defined in
{¶23} Appellant first argues that his conduct was motivated by a good faith belief that evidence of fraud had been concealed in his case. Appellant also argues that as a pro se litigant, he should have been afforded some latitude in asserting his claims.
{¶25} With regard to appellant‘s argument that his actions were motivated by a good faith belief that his assertions were correct, we note that “[t]he finding of frivolous conduct under
{¶26} Furthermore, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in concluding that appellant‘s conduct served to merely harass or maliciously injure appellees. The sheer volume of filings appellant made in support of his contentions, as well as the inflammatory nature of the assertions made against appellees’ counsel, are sufficient to support the trial court‘s conclusion that appellant‘s conduct was for the purpose of merely harassing or injuring appellees. This is particularly the case with respect to appellant‘s attempts to obtain relief from the judgment in favor of Grant-Riverside, which was based on the determination that Grant-Riverside was not appellant‘s employer, and had not taken any adverse action against him.
{¶27} As for appellant‘s contention that he should have been afforded some latitude in his conduct of the case based on his status as a pro se litigant, the mere fact that a party is acting pro se does not shield that party from a finding of frivolous conduct.
{¶28} Consequently, appellant‘s second assignment of error is overruled.
{¶29} In his third assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court erred in concluding that his claims lacked evidentiary support and were not warranted under existing law. Our disposition of appellant‘s second assignment of error arguably renders this assignment of error moot, since only one basis for a finding of frivolous conduct is necessary to support the trial court‘s decision. Nevertheless, in the interests of justice, we will address the assignment.
{¶30} The parties disagree regarding the standard of review to be applied to а trial court‘s finding of frivolous conduct as defined in
{¶32} Consequently, appellant‘s third assignment of error is overruled.
{¶33} In his fourth assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court erred when it found that he violated
{¶35} Consequently, appellant‘s fourth assignment of error is overruled.
{¶36} As a final matter, throughout his brief, appellant argues that the trial court failed to idеntify which of the attorney fees were necessitated by his conduct. Because appellant did not separately assign this as error, we decline to address the argument.
{¶37} Having overruled all of appellant‘s assignments of error, we affirm the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.
Judgment affirmed.
TYACK, P.J., and KLATT, J., concur.
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