Mitchell L. JACKSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Ron HERRINGTON, Freddie Rowland, Anthony Willett, Patty McCuiston, Nathan Francis, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 08-5613.
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
Aug. 31, 2010.
391 Fed. Appx. 348
Before: GUY, BOGGS, and SUTTON, Circuit Judges.
IV.
As we have consistently rejected Stephens‘s argument that the Michigan crime of fleeing and eluding in the third degree is not a “crime of violence” within the meaning of the Guidelines, we find that the district court did not err in characterizing Stephens as a career offender. As the district court‘s analysis of the 3553(a) factors, while brief, was sufficient, we also find that the district court did not err in sentencing Stephens and that Stephens‘s sentence was not procedurally unreasonable. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court‘s sentence.
Plaintiff Mitchell L. Jackson, an inmate in an Indiana jail who was temporarily incarcerated in a Kentucky detention center, brought pro se
I.
Jackson is an Indiana state prisoner who was temporarily incarcerated at Henderson County Detention Center (HCDC) in Kentucky during a period from mid-November 2005 until early February 2006. Upon his arrival at HCDC, Jackson was subjected to a strip search, along with the other transferred inmates. Approximately a week later, on November 24, 2005, Jackson‘s front tooth was knocked loose when Deputy Nathan Francis accidentally hit him in the mouth with a cell door.1 The next month, Jackson brought claims against five employees of the HCDC under
Jackson‘s pro se, in forma pauperis complaint indicated, by way of checked boxes on the form, that he was suing the five defendants in their official capacities. His complaint asserted that (1) HCDC‘s “rule book” violated its own grievance procedures, as well as Jackson‘s civil rights, because it gave no explanation of official policy or rules for searches or strip searches; (2) his strip search by Lieutenant Anthony Willett was done for the sole purpose of degrading, dehumanizing, and sexually harassing Jackson; (3) Jackson did not consent to the transfer to HCDC, and was in fact under a “court order” for Clark County (Indiana) jurisdiction; (4) his grievances were not responded to in the proper time frame; (5) Sergeant McCuiston denied him access to her superior; and (6) he was denied dental repair treatment for his tooth. He reiterated many of these claims in an attachment to the complaint, adding an assertion that he was wrongly accused of involvement in a “physical altercation” with another inmate.
Jackson‘s complaint was dismissed in its entirety upon the district court‘s initial screening of the complaint under the Prison Litigation Reform Act and McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 127 S.Ct. 910, 166 L.Ed.2d 798 (2007). Jackson secured counsel and moved for reconsideration, requesting that the district court (1) infer his intention to sue the defendants in their individual and official capacities; (2) construe his statement about his tooth being knocked out as an allegation of a negligent personal injury claim; and (3) infer the claim of a blanket policy of unconstitutional searches by HCDC and, concerning his tooth, a policy of refusal to provide medical care.
The district court rejected Jackson‘s request to interpret his complaint as being alleged against the defendants in their individual capacities, because Jackson had clearly checked only the boxes indicating the suit was against the defendants in their official capacities. The district court thus construed the action as one brought against “the governmental entity for which [defendants] work,” citing Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989). Determining that negligence suits are not authorized under
Jackson then filed an amended complaint on January 6, 2007. The amended complaint asserted four counts, entitled: (I) Negligent Personal Injury, against the defendants in their individual capacities; (II) Neglect of Need for Treatment for Serious Personal Injury, against defendants in their official capacities; (III) Strip
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss Count I of the amended complaint under
The parties filed numerous cross-motions for summary judgment addressing Counts II–IV. The district court resolved these motions in a series of orders, concluding with its April 30, 2008, 2008 WL 1926873, order granting defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment on Count II of the amended complaint. Judgment was entered for defendants the same day. This timely appeal followed.
II.
This court‘s standard of review for a district court‘s dismissal of a claim under
We also review the district court‘s entry of summary judgment de novo. Moldowan v. City of Warren, 578 F.3d 351, 373 (6th Cir.2009), cert. denied, U.S. —, 130 S.Ct. 3504, — L.Ed.2d — (2010). Summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
A. 12(b)(6) Dismissal
The district court dismissed Jackson‘s negligent injury claim on defendants’ motion for dismissal made under
In making this ruling, the district court relied in part on the case of Lovelace v. O‘Hara, 985 F.2d 847 (6th Cir.1993). In Lovelace, the plaintiff was permitted by the district court to amend her complaint, after it found that “the language of the original complaint was broad enough to give O‘Hara notice that he was being sued in his individual capacity.” Id. at 849. Determining that the officer was not time-
When a plaintiff seeks to amend a complaint to allege a claim that would otherwise be barred by the statute of limitations, the amended pleading is considered to relate back to the date of the original, timely pleading when:
(1) relation back is permitted by the law that provides the statute of limitations applicable to the action, or
(2) the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, or
(3) the amendment changes the party or the naming of the party against whom a claim is asserted if the foregoing provision (2) is satisfied and, within the period provided by Rule 4(j) for service of the summons and complaint, the party to be brought in by amendment (A) has received such notice of the institution of the action that the party will not be prejudiced in maintaining a defense on the merits, and (B) knew or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought against the party.3
Id. at 849 (quoting
Like the original complaints in [the cases of Lovelace and Ling v. Herrod, 445 F.Supp.2d 892, 895 (W.D.Tenn. 2006)], the original complaint here explicitly stated that the officials were being sued only in their official capacities. Additionally, there was no other language in the complaint which should have put the Defendants on notice that they were facing individual liability for negligence related to the Plaintiff being accidentally hit by a door. Unlike the original complaint in Moore, the original complaint here did not reference any state law tort claim, but only a claim for inadequate medical treatment. The Defendants could not have known they
Dismissal of this claim on the basis of notice, as in Lovelace, was improper. We found that dismissal in Lovelace was required under
Rule 15, it is true, requires that defendants receive notice of the suit “within the period provided by Rule 4(m) for serving the summons and complaint,” and Rule 4(m) generally requires service “within 120 days after the filing of the complaint.” See Krupski v. Costa Crociere S.p.A., — U.S. —, 130 S.Ct. 2485, 2493, 177 L.Ed.2d 48 (2010). Jackson did not file his amended complaint until January 6, 2007, over 250 days after the 120-day period expired in April 2006. But Rule 4(m) also states “if the plaintiff shows good cause for the failure, the court must extend the time for service for an appropriate period.” Unlike the district court, we see no reason for incorporating Rule 4(m)‘s 120-day baseline into Rule 15 without also incorporating Rule 4(m)‘s good-cause baseline exception. See
Jackson qualifies for the good-cause exception. Rule 4 requires plaintiffs to serve each defendant with a summons and a copy of the complaint. See
B. Summary Judgment Rulings
(1) Strip Search
[2] Jackson alleged that the strip search he experienced upon transfer to HCDC violated both the Fourth and Eighth Amendments of the United States Constitution. In ruling on the Eighth Amendment claim, the district court relied on our unpublished decision in Adams v. Rockafellow, 66 Fed.Appx. 584, 586 (6th Cir.2003), and determined that because plaintiff alleged no physical injury resulting from the strip search, the claim was not cognizable under
Section 1997e(e), a part of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, provides that “[n]o Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner ... for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury.” In Adams, the plaintiff was required to undergo strip searches due to his membership in a religious group designated as a security threat under Michigan Department of Corrections policy. See id. at 584. We affirmed the district court‘s entry of summary judgment for defendant Rockafellow on the basis that the plaintiff had not claimed anything but mental or emotional injury as a result of the searches. See id. at 586. Similarly, the plaintiff‘s claim was dismissed under § 1997e(e) in Harden-Bey v. Rutter, 524 F.3d 789, 795 (6th Cir.2008), for failure to state a claim, where the plaintiff did not allege that his administrative segregation resulted in any physical injury.
Although Jackson repeatedly asserts that his larger “action” contains allegations of a dental injury, and implies that this meets the injury requirement, our precedent demonstrates that, absent injury related to the strip search, his Eighth Amendment claim is not cognizable under § 1997e(e).6
Concerning Jackson‘s Fourth Amendment strip-search claim, the district court properly found the search to be constitutional under Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 558, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979) (holding that routine strip searches of pretrial detainees and convicted prisoners, conducted after contact visits, were constitutional).7, 8 Defendants acknowledge
Although plaintiff suggests that Masters v. Crouch, 872 F.2d 1248 (6th Cir.1989) supports his argument, Masters presented a very different scenario. In Masters, the plaintiff was arrested—erroneously, as it turns out—for missing a traffic court date, and was strip searched at the jail. Id. at 1250. We determined that the strip search of a person arrested for a traffic or other non-violent violation, where the officer(s) had no reasonable suspicion that the individual was concealing a weapon or contraband, was not reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 1257.
Unlike Masters, and more like the instant case, we determined a strip search was reasonable in Dobrowolskyj v. Jefferson County, Kentucky, 823 F.2d 955, 958 (6th Cir.1987), which we distinguished in Masters. In Dobrowolskyj, we were considering a policy providing for strip searches of newly admitted inmates “immediately prior to the movement of the inmate to rear security, female section or other areas of the Department.” Id. at 956. That is similar to the case at bar, where we are examining a policy of strip-searching inmates who were moved from another institution.9
It is clear that “particularized searches where objective circumstances indicate such searches are needed to maintain institutional security” remain permissible under Bell. Masters, 872 F.2d at 1253–54. The policy in question requires strip searches under various circumstances, including “transport from or through an area to which the public may have access,” as upon transport from one detention facility to another. Where, as here, the plaintiff has provided no evidence of any specific unreasonable action taken by defendants in the strip search context, we find this is an objective circumstance under which the institution may set security procedures including strip searches of the transferred inmates.
Jackson also claims that, even if the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit strip searches upon intake as a general rule, Lieutenant Willett violated his Fourth Amendment rights by conducting the search in a “degrading” and “sexually harass[ing]” manner. That may or may not be the case, but Jackson sued the defendants in their official capacity with respect to this claim, so he must point to a policy or custom requiring or encouraging degrading or sexually harassing searches. See Swint v. Chambers County Comm‘n, 514 U.S. 35, 43, 115 S.Ct. 1203, 131 L.Ed.2d 60 (1995). Nothing in the record suggests such a policy or custom exists.
(2) Due Process Claim
In his brief on appeal, Jackson asserts that the district court gave “short shrift” to his due process claims. He now asserts that he should not have been denied the
(3) Eighth Amendment Dental Care Claim
In this claim, Jackson asserts that needed medical care for his tooth was unreasonably delayed or denied altogether in violation of the Eighth Amendment. While the district court recognized that dental problems could constitute a serious medical condition, citing Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1243–44 (11th Cir.2003) (holding 15-month delay in providing dentures to a prisoner who had only two teeth and suffered from bleeding gums and weight loss presented a jury question on deliberate indifference) and Harrison v. Barkley, 219 F.3d 132, 140 (2d Cir.2000) (holding that summary judgment for defendant officials on the basis of qualified immunity was improper, given officials’ indefinite refusal to treat plaintiff‘s cavity), the court entered judgment for defendants. In making this ruling, the court found that plaintiff had not offered evidence as to the effect of the asserted delay or as to his “serious medical need” for a partial dental plate. On appeal, Jackson asserts that he did demonstrate, with evidence, both his pain and the effect of the lack of treatment by defendants. In re-
sponse, defendants assert that they were not required to provide a replacement tooth for a prisoner who came in with a pre-existing injury to that tooth and who, at worst, experienced further loosening through the incident with the door.
The Eighth Amendment requires the government to “provide medical care for those whom it is punishing by incarceration” because a failure to do so may result in death or, “[i]n less serious cases ... may result in pain and suffering which no one suggests would serve any penological purpose.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976). Making a claim of deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment requires that the plaintiff demonstrate both objective and subjective components. The objective component is satisfied when the evidence shows that the failure to provide medical care is “sufficiently serious.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994). The subjective component requires demonstration of a “state of mind more blameworthy than negligence.” Id. at 835. As we wrote in our en banc decision in Williams v. Mehra, the standard to apply is whether officials “kn[ew] of and disregard[ed] an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” 186 F.3d 685, 691 (6th Cir.1999) (quotation marks omitted).
In this case, although plaintiff asserts he had a serious medical need, requiring additional attention, he has presented no evidence in support of his claim. Plaintiff himself acknowledged that he first injured his tooth while incarcerated in Indiana. He offered no evidence that immediate treatment could have improved the situation, or about the particular effect of the asserted delay in treatment during his relatively brief stay in Kentucky.10 More-
When a prisoner has received some medical attention for a medical issue and the dispute centers on whether the treatment was adequate, “federal courts are generally reluctant to second guess medical judgments and to constitutionalize claims that sound in state tort law.” Graham v. County of Washtenaw, 358 F.3d 377, 385 (6th Cir.2004) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). That proposition applies here. Although a more serious dental problem or delay, with demonstrated detrimental effects, might have changed the analysis in this case, the facts presented here do not give rise to an Eighth Amendment violation. We find no error on the part of the district court in entering summary judgment for defendants on this claim.
The district court is AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and the matter is REMANDED to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.