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Jeffrey Moldowan v. Maureen Fournier
578 F.3d 351
6th Cir.
2009
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*1 351 “A drug quantity only ry need be range, Guidelines it is entitled to a presumption rebuttable by a preponderance established of the evi reasonableness. ” Id. dence, and an estimate will suffice.... Anderson, 319, United States v. 526 F.3d Warman asserts that his sentence is un- (6th Cir.2008). reasonably evi “[T]estimonial “excessive” but he fails to offer any support for that coconspirator may dence from a claim. Given be suffi identify Warman does not any particular cient to determine the amount drugs factors that the district court did not con- coconspirator which another should be sider, argument his amounts to nothing held accountable.” United States Swan more than a “bald assertion that the dis- (6th Cir.2004) 622, berg, 370 F.3d trict court should have reached a different Hernandez, (quoting United States v. conclusion.” United v. Wright, States No. (6th Cir.2000)). 686, F.3d drug The 07-4085, (6th 2009 WL at *7 Cir. quantity estimate “errs on the side cau 2009). May 26, Regardless, the record likely tion and quantity underestimates the clearly also shows clear that the district drugs actually attributable to the defen court did not select Warman’s sentence Anderson, dant.” 526 F.3d at 326. Given arbitrarily, base it impermissible fac- our previous findings that both the hear tors, give weight unreasonable any say Walters, testimony of accounting for 3553(a) pertinent § factor in deriving it. grams, grams 3977.55 and the 392 of co Tate, Thus, See 516 F.3d at 469. Warman pottery caine found Hannum’s shop has failed to rebut the presumption that trial, properly were admitted at Warman’s his sentence is substantively reasonable. argument fails.

III. CONCLUSION foregoing reasons, For the we AFFIRM 3. substantively Warman’s sentence is judgment of the district court. reasonable procedural addition to rea sonableness, we must determine that a

sentence substantively reasonable. Webb,403 F.3d at 383. A may sentence be Jeffrey MOLDOWAN, Michael substantively unreasonable “where the dis Plaintiff-Appellee, trict court select[s] the sentence arbitrari ly, impermissible bas[es] sentence on

factors, pertinent fail[s] consider WARREN, Ingles, CITY OF Donald Mi 3553(a) giv[es] factors or an unreason (07-2115); chael Schultz Alan War able amount of weight any (07-2116); nick pertinent Maureen Fournier (07-2117), Tate, Defendants-Appellants. factor.” United States v. 516 F.3d (6th Cir.2008) (citing United 07-2115, 07-2116, Nos. 07-2117. (6th Ferguson, States v. United Appeals, States Court of Cir.2006) (alteration (internal original) Sixth Circuit. omitted)). quotation marks Sentences Argued: Jan. 2009. properly within a calculated Guidelines Decided Aug. and Filed: 2009. range are afforded a presump rebuttable Caver, tion of reasonableness. 470 F.3d at Rehearing Rehearing En Banc Williams, 247 (citing United Denied Oct. States v. (6th Cir.2006)). Because

Warman’s sentence falls within the adviso- *11 Rochkind,

ARGUED: Garan Rosalind Miller, Detroit, P.C., Michigan, Lucow Bri- Richtarcik, Associates, Chapman an J. & P.C., Hills, Michigan, Bloomfield Sarah R. Prout, Aid, Huron, Lakeshore Port Legal Michigan, Appellants. for R. Michael Dez- si, Fieger, Fieger, Kenney, Johnson & Gir- oux, Southfield, Appellee. Michigan, Rochkind, BRIEF: Jami E. ON Rosalind Leach, Miller, P.C., Detroit, Garan Lucow Richtarcik, Michigan, Brian Ronald J. W. Associates, P.C., Chapman Chapman, & Hills, Michigan, Bloomfield Sarah R. Prout, Knight, Lakeshore William R. Le- Aid, Township, Michigan, for gal Clinton *12 Susselman, spiring Marc M. Dennis Appellants. together rights his civil —violated Detroit, Dettmer, by fabricating him, Michigan, Appel- against A. for evidence failing evidence, to disclose exculpatory pur- lee. and suing prosecution his and retrial without MOORE, CLAY, Before: and probable cause. KETHLEDGE, Judges. Circuit After discovery, the Defendants moved for summary judgment on thirty-six all CLAY, J., opinion delivered the counts asserted in Moldowan’s Third court, MOORE, J., joined. in which Complaint Amended raising various immu- KETHLEDGE, 401-07), (pp. J. delivered nity defenses. After dismissing certain separate opinion concurring in the against counts Ingles, Detective City judgment part and in dissenting part. Warren, of and the Depart- Warren Police SECOND AMENDED ment, OPINION dismissing and all against counts Christian, Officer the district court denied CLAY, Judge. Circuit Defendants’ summary motions for judg- action, Jeffrey this Plaintiff Moldow- ment in all respects. other These three (“Moldowan”) asserts a number of interlocutory appeals followed. For the claims under U.S.C. 1983 alleging herein, reasons set forth we AFFIRM IN rights Fourth, violations of his under PART and IN REVERSE PART the Fifth, Amendments, and Sixth Fourteenth judgment of the district court. as well as Michigan claims under state law. arrest, Moldowan’s claims arise out of his I. conviction, prosecution, criminal and retri- Moldowan’s Third Complaint Amended al for the 1990 abduction and brutal sexual thirty-six asserts against claims nine coun- (“Fournier”). assault of Maureen Fournier ty, municipal, and individual defendants. light After new evidence came to and a All claims arise out arrest, of Moldowan’s key prosecution witness recanted her testi- prosecution, conviction, criminal and retri- mony, Michigan Supreme Court re- al for the abduction and assault of Mau- versed Moldowan’s conviction in 2002. reen Fournier. Moldowan, People 466 Mich. (2002). retrial, N.W.2d 570 On Febru- Background A. Factual ary acquitted Moldowan was all On the morning August released, charges having nearly and served (“EMS”) Emergency Medical Service years prison. twelve badly injured found Fournier lying release, After his the street in the City Moldowan filed the of Detroit. EMS transported Fournier asserting instant civil action to St. John’s Hospi- various claims tal. Warren, completed The medical forms against City on her the Warren admission to hospital, as well Police as subse- Department, County, Macomb quent medical reports testimony from County Macomb Prosecutor in official his doctors, her bear witness to the extreme Warnick, capacity, Dr. Alan Warren Police brutality of the crime. The deter- Ingles, Detective Donald Warren Police mined Fournier had been abducted Christian, Officer Mark and Fournier. City Warren, from brutally assault- subsequently Moldowan amended his com- raped, ed and and left on a street in De- plaint to assert claims Warren Po- troit. lice Officer Michael Broadly Schultz.

speaking, Moldowan alleges that the De- Because Fournier had been abducted acting separately Warren, fendants —both and con- from the matter was turned over (“De assaulting he was her. Four- Department Police arrested to the Warren that, pri- nier and both testified her sister assigned the case was partment”), and attack, to the had Moldowan been abu- Given extent of Ingles. Detective *13 sive and toward Fournier threatened her. wait injuries, officers had to Fournier’s assault, In describing the Fournier testi- they could her days two before interview walking that fied had been on 11 Mile she then, Even the ex regarding the attack. pulled along- Road in a van Warren when injuries tent of forced Detective Fournier’s that side her. Fournier testified Moldow- board, aon and Ingles questions to write van, her, got grabbed an out of the and During in kind.1 the responded Fournier van, where dragged her into the she interview, reported that she had Fournier raped. a result the beaten and As night on the been abducted from Warren assault, significant inju- Fournier suffered males, 8,1990 August by four Caucasian ries that extensive abdominal sur- required all of knew. Fournier stated whom she gery. that, walking down the while she was at the hearing, Corcoran also testified Moldowan, street, approached she was stating a call an that she received from ex-boyfriend, thrown into a who was her 9, 1990, August male on the unidentified van, brutally white and light-colored or Detroit, day inquir- Fournier was found raped by beaten three the four and ing as to Fournier’s whereabouts. Corcor- identified attack assailants. Fournier her immediately recognized an claims that she Cristini, Cristini, Tracy as Jim ers Michael caller the as Moldowan. Corcoran testi- Tapp (“Tapp”), and Moldowan. Fournier’s that, fied she knew although that her sis- sister, (“Corcoran”), con Colleen Corcoran lied hospital, ter was in the she and told firmed Fournier’s claims that Moldowan Moldowan that her sister was at home previously assaulted and threatened had her, with and that Moldowan then ex- Fournier. “No, claimed: she’s not.... She’s at the investigation, After their the completing (J.A. 839.) morgue.” Corcoran also testi- charged police arrested and all four indi- fied that called Moldowan had her home police subsequently dropped viduals. The Fournier, previous day the for looking and Tapp alibi charges against based on his that that Moldowan had stated “he was days had in Texas for he been several 841-42.) (J.A. going get her.” assault, prior to the had not returned to examination, At the conclusion August until the Michigan evening of court dismissed Jim Cristini a defen- 8, and spent night the rest of with his dant, but Moldowan Mi- bound over and girlfriend. Tapp’s girlfriend confirmed his chael A jury Cristini on all counts. trial alibi. May 10, April was held from 30 to 17-18, On September the Macomb during which Fournier and of- Corcoran County held a preliminary Circuit Court substantially testimony fered the same examination determine whether suffi- they provided during preliminary ex- cient proceed evidence existed to to trial. amination. Fournier also testified that she During hearing, Fournier testified had never in the Detroit neighbor- been assault, prior to the she had dated her, hood and where EMS found that she and for lived with Moldowan more than crack frequented had never house in the year relationship their when area. before ended form, Ingles subsequently signed.

1. Detective later transcribed which she responses Fournier's to witness statement Warnick, D.D.S., addition, degree. sentencing, Dr. Alan first After court requiring entered order that “[a]ll and consultant odontologist forensic custody evidence of the Warren Wayne County Examiner’s Of- Medical Department, County Police the Macomb County, fice and a consultant Macomb Prosecutor’s Office the Macomb and Coun- County, Michigan Monroe State Court[,] ty Circuit whether admitted into Police, testimony offered expert bite [,] preserved evidence or not ... be from neck were consistent marks on Fournier’s this date forward until further order of the with taken from Mol- impressions dental Court, Circuit Court of Michigan Appeals, dowan, marks on bite Fournier’s (J.A. 2613.) Michigan Supreme Court.” right right arm and were consistent side *14 trial, private investigator After a hired with Michael dentition. In Cristini’s de- family witness, Moldowan’s located a conclusions, scribing Dr. his Warnick testi- Jerry Burroughs, reported that, who are ... 2.1 fied the “chances billion to morning of August he saw four 1 that can make another individual those African-American standing males around a (J.A. 2544.) same marks.” naked white female who was in lying defense, In presenting their Cristini and street, and that he saw the four men leave Moldowan offered alibi witnesses who tes- light-colored in a Burroughs van. further togeth- tified that the were not defendants that, approximately recounted one week evening question. er on the in The de- assault, after the he overheard two of delivery fense also pizza introduced tickets talking those same men about the incident pizza location of the which documented the bragging they participated and had in night deliveries made the of Cristini had the assault. also Burroughs indicated that 8, 1990, August seeking to show that Cris- he had seen that neighborhood Fournier in part of kidnap- tini could not have been several times that frequenting summer presented ing. testimony The defense also crack in house the area. from a witness who claimed she ob- evidence, In addition new to this Dr. in the served several males street where Hammel, being approached after several found, Fournier was and that the males years appellate later Moldowan’s coun

were and African-Ameri- both Caucasian sel, testimony. also recanted her Dr. expert can. The defense offered testi- also explained initially Hammel that she had mony odontologists from its own forensic matching trouble the defendants’ denti countering testimony Dr. con- Warnick’s body, tions to the bite on Fournier’s marks cerning the bite-mark evidence. that Dr. had reassured her but Warnick that Dr. Norman Sperber, highly re rebuttal, prosecution On called Dr. spected odontologist, forensic had re Hammel, D.D.S., a colleague Pamela of Dr. viewed the evidence and confirmed Dr. Warnick, testimony who corrobo- offered Warnick’s After subsequent conclusions. Dr. rating supporting and Warnick’s con- ly determining Sperber Dr. had never clusions. case, any reviewed in the evidence Dr. May 10, 1991, jury On convicted Dr. Hammel surmised that Warnick “had kidnaping, Moldowan and of as- Cristini deceptive in to mislead been order [her] murder, sault with intent to commit and testifying support into of his conclu 2 (J.A. 2568.) affidavit, two counts of criminal sexual conduct in sions.” In sworn disputes Dr. nick Hammel Dr. Warnick Hammel’s claims also denies that Dr. ever ex- pressed any pri- her and denies that he ever told Dr. Hammel that doubt about conclusions Sperber. he or to had consulted with Dr. Dr. War- Moldowan’s 1991 trial. operative Complaint, known Third Amended had she Hammel stated Dr. juncture: at this pleading that Dr. representation Dr. that Warnick’s (Third evidence was complaint had reviewed the Plaintiffs current Sperber agreed February have untrue, Complaint “would never filed she Amended 2006) of counts support alleges total of 36 testify a rebuttal witness 2568.) (J.A. City groups of several of defendants: conclusions.” Dr. Warnick’s Warren; City Department Police evidence basis this new On the (WPD); County of Macomb Warren again testimony, Moldowan discredited capacity; Prosecutor in his official its The review of his conviction. sought and official and sued their individual eventually re- Michigan Supreme Court Alan con- capacities: [forensic Warnick conviction, and re- versed Moldowan’s sultant], detective], Ingles Donald [WPD trial. the matter for a new manded detective], Mark Christian Mi- [WPD Supreme Court particular, Michigan sergeant charge [WPD chael Schultz prosecutor’s expert “the two found that room], the evidence and “other Pres- respect evi- with to ‘bite-mark’ witnesses Former ent and Members Warren *15 testimony have either recanted dence the Department office of Ma- Police and marks on the which concluded bite County yet uniden- comb Prosecutor made the defendant victim were tified,” individually: and sued Maureen has now presented opinion evidence which crime The [the victim]. Fournier case Moldowan, discredited.” been currently exceeds 200 docket entries The at 570. court also noted N.W.2d discovery disputes numerous ... with simply that “it prosecutor the conceded discovery appeals. and Extensive has say that or defen- not fair to the defendant depositions lengthy been conducted— known about dant’s counsel should have interrogatories taken and and numerous evidence problems the with the bite-mark produce exchanged. to requests prior trial. The same can also be said complaint federal alleges The violations the alibi regard with later-discovered plaintiffs of civil and constitutional bite-mark evi- witnesses.... Without the during prosecution, rights his criminal the wit- and with additional alibi dence including as well as state claims inten- nesses, result of have the trial could tional infliction of emotional distress Id. at been different.” her in against Ms. Fournier for conduct retrial, in Moldowan February On prosecution. Relevant to second all released. acquitted charges of and plaintiffs instant motion are claims told, nearly All twelve spent Moldowan City and the against of War- Warren years prison. respect Department. ren Police With defendants, alleges a plaintiff these con- History B. Procedural of spiracy between and Warnick members the Instant Action (Counts V, VI, VII, of the Warren Police January brought On Moldowan VIII), and between conspiracy Ms. action numerous claims asserting this civil and of the Fournier members Warren Michigan (Counts XVI, state XVII, under U.S.C. 1983 and Department Police XIX). three ultimately XVIII, Moldowan filed law. Plaintiff also contends an ear- complaints. resolving liability part amended that there discovery, the dis- Police regarding City lier motion of De- Warren and Warren summary training following inadequate offered for partment trict court and/or regarding of supervising claims asserted Moldowan his officers rights of County the constitutional citizens as a matter of law and (Count XXIV), and for the actions of certainly there many questions are of ma- Ingles policymak- defendant as the final (J.A. jury terial fact for a to determine.” (Count conducting investigation er in 3041.) As to the Warren Defendants’ mo- XXV). Additionally, plaintiff claims lia- tion, the district court concluded that bility City of against the Warren and the “[tjhere many are far too questions of fact Department for the Warren Police de- (J.A. 3020.) here.” As to Dr. Warnick’s of a struction evidence violation motion, the court concluded that the mo- court order. He also claims “[tjhere tion “has to be denied” because Department City Police and the Warren many are too facts at issue here even as to liable, are along Warren with Macomb qualified immunity grant summary County and for prosecutor, its the con- (J.A. 3065.) judgment.” As to Fournier’s prosecution tinued of plain- seizure “[tjhere motion, the court concluded that probable tiff cause in the second without here, are innumerable partic- issues fact trial violation of his constitutional ularly simply as to whether Fournier lied rights under the Fourth Amendment or not. And the Court will instruct ... (Count XXVII), rights and his to sub- that this was an intentional infliction or the process stantive due under the Four- jury is to decide whether there was an (Count XXVIII), teenth Amendment intentional infliction of emotional distress. rights procedural process his due un- I do find that the elements have been (Count der the Fourteenth Amendment (J.A. 3090-91.) met.” The court also de- XXIX). He claim also has state *16 nied partial Moldowan’s motion for sum- imprisonment false in connection with mary judgment. (Count XXXV). prosecution the second The district subsequently court entered Warren, City Moldowan v. 2006 WL three stating written orders merely that (altera- 3106090, (E.D.Mich.2006) at *2-3 Defendants’ summary motions for judg- tions in original). ment were “denied for the reasons stated discovery, After extensive Defendants (J.A. 328.) 323, 326, on the record.” The summary judgment, filed motions for as- district court’s written order as to the serting qualified various and absolute im- motion Warren Defendants’ also dismissed munity opposed defenses. Moldowan those against “all claims City of Warren partial motions and cross-moved for sum- Police Department ... for the reason that mary judgment. Based on concessions City Department Warren Police is response made Moldowan in his to De- legal entity capable not a being sued.” motions, fendants’ the district court dis- (J.A. 326.) XXV, XXVII, XXVIII, missed Counts and XXIX City as to the of Warren and the interlocutory These three appeals fol- Department, Warren Police all dismissed lowed. Christian, against

claims Officer and dis- II. missed Count XXXII Detective In- gles. Before turning to the merits of Defen- appeals, dants’ we first must determine receiving briefing parties

After from all juris- whether and to what extent matter, we have hearing argument on the diction to consider interlocutory appeal district court denied Defendants’ motions parties. as to all the issues raised remaining claims. The district On De- 3, 2007, County’s court denied the motion on the cember Moldowan moved this grounds filing that appropriate “[t]he Court to dismiss each of the three interloe-

368 (2006) Aqueduct Rico (quoting trial Puerto arguing that utory appeals, Inc., Eddy, & constitute final or- and Sewer Auth. orders do not court’s Metcalf 139, 144, 684, § under U.S.C. 1291 506 U.S. 113 S.Ct. appealable ders (1993)). Jones, collateral under the L.Ed.2d 605 Johnson v. appealable and are not 27, March By order dated 132 L.Ed.2d doctrine. S.Ct. order (1995), panel of this Court referred clarified prior Court for reso- panel motions to this Moldowan’s these elements as follows: consideration, hereby we Upon lution. underly- requirement The that the issue deny Moldowan’smotions. “effectively ing the order be unreview- on, example, able” later means under the Collateral

A. Jurisdiction immediately may failure to review well Order Doctrine significant require- cause harm. The Although 1291 vests 28 U.S.C. ment that the district court’s order “con- jurisdiction appeals over this Court with clusively question means determine” only from “final decisions” of the district likely appellate review is needed courts, “a decision ‘final’within the mean requirement avoid that harm. The necessarily mean ing §of 1291 does not from separate the matter be the merits in a possible the last order to be made that review o'f the action itself means Steel Gillespie case.” v. United States likely appellate is less to force the now Corp., 379 U.S. approximately court consider (1964). A L.Ed.2d 199 decision also is (or similar) very matter more same if “that appealable it falls within small once, likely than and also seems less finally class which determine [of orders] (for, delay trial if the proceedings court from, collat right separable claims of collateral, truly proceed- matter is those to, action, in the .too rights eral asserted ings might appeal continue while the review and too important be denied pending). independent require itself to cause (citations omit Id. appellate consideration be deferred ted) The (emphasis original). *17 adjudicated.” until the whole case is Co particular also has noted that “some value Corp., hen v. Indus. Loan 337 Beneficial a in high order” must be “marshaled 541, 546, 1221, 69 93 L.Ed. 1528 U.S. S.Ct. in support avoiding of the interest trial.” (1949). That “small class” of decisions is Will, 352, 126 Thus, 546 U.S. S.Ct. granting denying limited to orders collateral advantage to take order effectively be vindicated claim “cannot doctrine, interlocutory party pursuing trial v. after the has occurred.” Mitchell appeal satisfy must these three basic ele 511, 525, 2806, 472 105 Forsyth, U.S. S.Ct. ments, as well as demonstrate that (1985). L.Ed.2d 411 86 “ challenged ‘imperil[s] order substantial ” requirements bringing The an public Kelly interest.’ Seneca Great appeal under Cohen's collateral order doc (6th 944, Corp., Fin. 948 Cir. trine “have been down to three distilled 2006) Will, (quoting 126 U.S. conclusively conditions: that an order ‘[1] 952). S.Ct.

rate from the merits of the solve an determine the important disputed question, issue completely sepa action, and [3] [2] re B. Jurisdiction Immunity in Claims the Context jurisdiction to effectively appeal Whether we have consid- be unreviewable from ” Hallock, interlocutory appeal er an issue on thus judgment.’ a final Will v. 345, 349, requires 163 L.Ed.2d us to consider the three basic U.S. qualified immunity. case, well as whether the denial of elements as such a summary judgment implicates “substantial there -willbe in nothing subsequent case, interests.” In this that re- public course of the proceedings the district quires impli- us to consider the interests court that can alter the court’s conclu- denial of by cated the district court’s De- sion that the defendant is not immune. immunity and absolute qualified fendants’ Alternatively, judge may the trial rule claims in the context which those de- only that if the facts are as asserted fenses have been asserted. plaintiff, the defendant is not im- trial, mune. At plaintiff may Qualified 1. Defendants’ proving succeed in his version of the Immunity Claims facts, and the may defendant thus es- Generally speaking, the rationale so, cape liability. Even the court’s deni- underlying qualified immunity doctrine al summary judgment finally and con- legiti “where an official’s duties clusively determines the defendant’s mately require clearly action which es right claim of not to stand trial on the rights implicated, tablished are not plaintiffs allegations, because public may interest be better served are no simply steps “[there] further independence action taken ‘with and with can be taken in the District Court to ” consequences.’ out fear of Harlow v. avoid the trial the defendant maintains 800, 819, Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 102 S.Ct. “Cohen’s, barred,” it is apparent that (1982) (quoting Pier 73 L.Ed.2d 396 requirement fully threshold of a consum- 547, 554, Ray, son 87 S.Ct. mated decision is satisfied” in such a (1967)). 1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 “Unless the States, Abney case. v. United plaintiffs allegations a claim of state viola 651, 659, 52 L.Ed.2d 651 law, clearly tion of established a defendant (1977). pleading qualified immunity is entitled to Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 105 S.Ct. 2806. dismissal before the commencement of dis Thus, Mitchell, pursuant to appel- “federal Mitchell, covery.” 472 U.S. at jurisdiction late courts have to hear inter- immunity, S.Ct. 2806. Like absolute locutory appeals considering legal ‘the qualified immunity privilege par entitles question qualified i.e., immunity, wheth- ty “immunity than a suit rather from a given clearly er set of facts violates liability,” mere defense to and thus “is ” established law.’ Farm Labor Org. effectively lost if a erroneously case is Patrol, Highway Comm. v. Ohio State permitted go (emphasis to trial.” Id. (6th Cir.2002) original). (quoting Mat- *18 Park, City 515, tox v. Forest 183 F.3d of interests, light In of these the (6th Cir.1999)); 519 Dickerson v. McClel- Supreme Court has concluded that the de lan, 1151, (6th Cir.1996). 101 F.3d 1157 nial of a defendant’s qualified assertion of In considering the denial of a immunity “easily meets” the Cohen re qualified defendant’s claim of quirements: immunity, however, jurisdiction our is limited to re Such a decision “conclusive” in is either solving pure questions of law. See cases, of In respects. may two some it Mitchell, 530, 472 at U.S. 105 S.Ct. 2806 represent the trial court’s conclusion (addressing qualified denial of a claim of by that even if the facts are as asserted defendant, immunity, only but “to the extent that it the the defendant’s actions law”). an clearly ju violated established law and are turns on issue of We lack therefore scope not within the of the risdiction to consider “a district court’s 370 (6th Mullins, 581, v. 287 F.3d 585 order as that Sheets

summary judgment insofar Cir.2002) (“In circuit, it is well the this estab- pre- whether order determines that, jurisdiction to lie ‘genuine’ appellate a issue of lished for forth trial record sets Johnson, 313, interlocutory appeal, an 515 at over defendant trial.” U.S. fact for 2151; seeking qualified immunity willing must be Berryman Rieger, v. 150 (6th Cir.1998) (“A alleged by concede the facts as the defen- 563 F.3d legal only the qualified immunity plaintiff and discuss issues dant who is denied case.”). by raised “Once defendant’s interlocutory appeal with this the may file an legal argument purely from the into appeal if that involves the ab- drifts only Court begins contesting of the the factual realm and legal issue whether pure stract or jurisdiction really happened, a what our plaintiff constitute alleged facts law.”). proceed In ends and the case should trial.” clearly established violation of limitation, (finding jurisdictional Berryman, “a 150 F.3d 564 lack of light of this jurisdiction appeal to consider defendants’ court’s determination that there district of “attempt[ed] a triable issue fact cannot be extent that defendants exists basis, interlocutory their appealed persuade on an even to us to believe version of facts”); Ash, of finding when the arises the context v. 539 Harrison F.3d (6th Cir.2008) immunity.” qualified (“Thus, an of assertion extent Louisville, City Gregory qualified immunity v. that of denial of Cir.2006). (6th an permit To dispute, based on a factual such denial appeal in- in such circumstances “would jurisdiction falls outside of the narrow of terject appellate Court.”). review into a district this determination the evidence is court’s Harris, In Scott v. trial, adjudication for a nonfinal sufficient (2007), 167 L.Ed.2d howev for Id. at purposes of 28 U.S.C. 1291.” er, recognized ap Court Johnson, therefore, a 743. “Under deter- jurisdictional parent exception to this limi of given mination that a set facts violates rejected tation when it considered reviewable, law is clearly established summary district of judg court’s denial while a determination an issue though ment even the district court had ‘genuine’ fact is is unreviewable.” See genuine as to found issues existed material (6th City Elyria, 502 F.3d conclusion, In reaching facts. Cir.2007). jurisdic addressing without the issue tion, jurisdictional found that a video of the This limitation Court requires disputes plaintiffs if “the defendant incident rendered the version of story, utterly version of the the de the facts discredited plaintiff’s “so jury nonetheless to record could willing fendant must be that no reasonable have 380, 127 the most favorable view of the believed him.” Id. at S.Ct. 1769. concede plaintiff trying to the to reconcile Scott with the purposes facts Su Johnson, 563; appeal.” Berryman, preme edict in this F.3d Court’s “ City Memphis, has ‘where trial Meals concluded (“[A] (6th Cir.2007) subject court’s that a fact is 726-27 defendant determination *19 argument blatantly required ques dispute to limit her and de reasonable false, monstrably appeals may on facts in the a court of premised tions of law taken ”3 so, say interlocutory appeal.’ light plaintiff.”); most favorable to the even on Wysong, plain- the district this Court found that the warranted reversal of court's deposition finding disputed material facts. Fed. tiffs admission in his that no factu- of exception Appx. within at dispute al existed fell this 853-54. Heath, Wysong Fed.Appx. qualified Unlike immunity, the de (6th Cir.2008) (quoting Blaylock City nial of a defense of absolute witness im of (3rd 405, 414 Philadelphia, munity 504 F.3d Cir. generally is not immediately ap 2007)). pealable because the “lack of interlocutory appeal from denials of immunity witness that a important It also is note ‘imperil does not public [a] substantial in denying stated basis for an district court’s ” Kelly, terest.’ Despite F.3d at 949. immunity necessarily claim “does not fore acknowledging that immunity testimonial jurisdiction par close this Court’s over [a “strengthens the public substantial inter ty’s] City Elyria, at appeal.” 502 F.3d of having est witnesses come forward and 490; Christophel see also v. Kukulinsky, testify truthfully,” we con nevertheless (6th Cir.1995) (“A 61 F.3d defen cluded in Kelly the denial of such right appeal quali dant’s the denial of imperil claims does not that overarching immunity turn phras fied does not on the interest because “private individuals ... order.”). ing Rather, of the district court’s “ witnesses, appear most, will at only a ‘regardless the district court’s reasons few times in their lives.” Id. On that denying qualified immunity, may we basis, we reasoned that permitting suit jurisdiction exercise over the ... appeal to proceed against “private individuals” questions the extent it raises of law.” implicate does not the same interests as Mehra, Williams v. 689-90 appeal an from public the denial of official (6th Cir.1999) Dickerson, (quoting immunity, where the relevant interest 1157) Williams). in (emphasis F.3d at significant official, more given that “the reviewing After Defendants’ vari spending more time than necessary to de claims, qualified immunity ous we conclude action, fend himself or herself in an would appeals predominantly while these spend less time on the tasks for which he questions capable raise of law are or she was hired and cost the public addi appellate juncture, review at this they also tional money defending suit present some issues of fact that Johnson should have been dismissed.” Id. beyond scope juris dictates are of our parties diction. Where the Unlike the ask us to re defendants before us in Kel- however, disputes, ly, solve factual we set asserting those issues the defendants testi- aside for resolution the trial immunity court. See monial this case are a (“To Gregory, officer, F.3d at 742-43 the ex consultant, a forensic and the vic- appellant interlocutory tent that an ap Moreover, tim of a brutal crime. each peal argues ap issues of fact and law on immunity asserts on testimony based de- peal, only this Court will pure entertain livered the course of a prosecu- criminal law.”). issues factors, In light tion. of these we conclude that the balance of interests issue this

2. Defendants’ Absolute case dramatically differs from the interests Immunity Claims implicated by the denial of immunity in Warnick, Detective Dr. Ingles, Kelly. Kelly Because does not dispose of challenge Fournier also question here, district court’s presented must we de- denial of their claims of absolute testimoni- termine whether the denial of absolute al or immunity, they witness which immunity assert witness claim asserted under in response to those arising particular claims out of these imperils circumstances (or on) in part testimony based their public substantial interest. We conclude trial. that it does. *20 based on investigators to suit Ingles and Dr. forensic Detective

As to of their Warnick, implicated testimony they part deliver as interests testimonial denial of their the state court’s and on behalf of district official duties sufficiently akin to claims are immunity ability their to ex undoubtedly implicates public of by the denial implicated those in potentially ercise their discretion interlocutory immunity support official their performing from hibits them Kelly. in noted As the Court review. in before us parties Unlike the duties.4 immunity protect seeks Official against po Kelly, 1983 lawsuits “[s]ection discre an official to exercise ability of witnesses, like lawsuits officer lice and to accomplishing public in tasks tion expected ‘could be against prosecutors, time spending from the official prevent officers frequency.’ some Police with actions that are rea defending in court every year, testify in scores of cases legal. sonably thought to be Without resent often will transform defendants from district court interlocutory appeal allegations being convicted into ment official, by immunity, denials of official wit by the State’s perjury of necessary to time than spending more LaHue, 460 U.S. nesses.” Briscoe v. action, in an or herself defend himself 325, 343, 75 L.Ed.2d 96 103 S.Ct. the tasks for spend less time on would Pachtman, (1983) (quoting Imbler hired and cost the which he or she was 47 L.Ed.2d money defending a additional public (1976)). Furthermore, De because dismissed. that should have been suit repre and Dr. Warnick Ingles tective resolution of the speedy The lack of un Michigan of sented State the official’s deci claim also threatens proceedings against criminal derlying taking action while the action siveness Moldowan, exposure to suit also their to trial. proceeding injury to the continuing cause a “would (citation omitted). Those at 949 447 F.3d every interests addition dignitary State’s where, are at stake as same interests day al that must remain [its officials] here, court denies the absolute a district at 949. Kelly, court.” federal of a officer or fo- immunity claim Fournier, we also conclude As on behalf investigator rensic who testifies of that the denial of her assertion absolute prose- of a criminal part of the state as as it immunity warrants immediate review Shaw, cution. See Vakilian public interests. imperil would substantial (6th Cir.2003) (considering 515-16 undoubtedly “pri Although Fournier from the denial of interlocutory appeal official, public vate individual” and not in- government immunity asserted implicated of interests here police officers and the balance vestigator). Exposing immunity Ingles' with re- Among things, tive assertion of Moldowan claims other claims, jurisdiction De- spect Brady lacks to consider the dis- this Court to Moldowan's Ingles’ appeal Ingles because is now Brady tective implicitly trict court concluded Moldowan, however, au- offers no retired. against police support a claim officer could thority support that this is a his contention exculpatory materials to who fails to disclose Moreover, Moldow- relevant consideration. office, question prosecutor’s Ingles arise out claims Detective an’s lay claims. That law at the heart of those testimony Ingles delivered as an active obviously implications has conclusion Depart- Police police officer with the Warren unique beyond the circumstances reach official in the course of his duties. ment jurisdic- Accordingly, this Court has this case. Consequently, granting motion Moldowan’s Ingles’ appeal. See Detective tion to consider obviously much further than the will resound Elyria, City 502 F.3d at 489-90. Indeed, by denying Detec- limits of this case. *21 significantly from in potentially differs those issue re-exposes them significant to Kelly against because the claims her arose emotional trauma. As Fournier’s brief to testimony out of she delivered as a victim this succinctly Court frames the “If issue: in the witness course a criminal trial. a woman who sodomized, has been beaten permanently and left disabled can be sued Extending interlocutory review to the subjected and to an endless retread of the immunity denial of testimonial claim in brutalization against her through deposi- this context serves important pub- several tion discovery, and jus- the entire criminal obviously, lic interests. immunity Most system tice put at risk.” Fournier Br. prevents from suit witness intimidation at 22. agree. We self-censorship. Declining and interlocu- tory review under these circumstances Moreover, as the expose testify would victims of crimes who noted, has it is “the right and privilege” proceedings criminal to including suit— individuals “to aid in the execution of the discovery, trials, depositions, hearings, laws of his country by giving information proceedings and other that attend civil ac- proper authorities of violations of thus tions—and would create a substantial laws,” those and that right “may properly disincentive for victims to come forward to be said to be secured the Constitution concern, identify them attackers. That and laws of the United States.” Motes v. turn, implicates the effective administra- States, 458, 462-63, United justice system, tion of the criminal which is (1900). 44 L.Ed. 1150 undoubtedly a weighty public interest. reasons, For these we hereby DENY Briscoe, See U.S. at Moldowan’s motions to dismiss. The col (recognizing absolute testimonial im- lateral order doctrine is satisfied here be munity for police officers because their cause Defendants’ absolute qualified and testimony, among things, provides other immunity only claims not would be irre significant judicial “contribution pro- to the trievably lost if this proceed case were to cess”). trial, but also subjecting because these This concern is all significant the more particular Defendants to proceedings civil particular in this context because Fournier implicates public substantial interests. assault, was the victim of a brutal sexual however, Again, may we consider Defen and thus the being dragged threat of appeals only dants’ they the extent that through rigors of a civil suit based on pure Johnson, raise questions of law. See of, her testimony identification and 313-18, 115 atU.S. S.Ct. 2151. against, alleged her attacker would create a tremendous emotional hardship her. III. Declining to consider ul- appeal Fournier’s We review the district court’s timately significant would create a disin- novo, summary judgment denial of de us rape centive for other victims of and sexu- 56(c) ing the same Rule standard as the al testify assault to come forward and district court. See White v. Baxter crimes, their attackers. Victims of (6th Corp., Healthcare especially types of crimes that oc- Cir.2008); Williams, here, curred must feel cooper- secure that Summary judgment proper “if ating expose with the will not them pleadings, lengthy discovery and disclosure proceedings. invasive civil file, materials on immunity imperils any The denial of affidavits inter- show est subjecting genuine because victim witnesses there is no any issue as to proceedings litigation attendant to civil material fact and that the is enti- movant

374 evidence, evaluating the S.Ct. 2505. a matter of law.” judgment tied in the 56(c). of all inferences genuine A issue court must draw Fed.R.Civ.P. are “dis- when there nonmoving par- fact exists to the material most favorable light affect the out- might that Matsushita, 587, over facts putes 475 at 106 S.Ct. ty. U.S. governing law.” under the come of the suit a of mere existence of scintilla 1348. “The Inc., 477 U.S. Liberty Lobby, Anderson [non-moving support of the evidence 2505, L.Ed.2d 202 242, 248, 91 106 S.Ct. de- [to will be insufficient party’s] position However, tak- (1986). the record “[w]here summary judgment]; for feat a motion a rational not lead a whole could en as jury on which the be evidence there must non-moving find for the of fact to trier [non-moving find for the reasonably could ” issue for trial.’ ‘genuine is no party, there Anderson, 252, at 106 party].” 477 U.S. v. Zenith Ra- Elec. Indus. Co. Matsushita S.Ct. 2505. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. Corp., 475 U.S. dio motions for That Defendants’ (1986) 1348, (quoting First L.Ed.2d 538 claims were based on summary judgment Co., Serv. Bank Arizona Cities Nat’l of immunity does qualified of absolute and 1575, 88 S.Ct. 391 U.S. ap of that affect the standard review (1968)). L.Ed.2d at Gregory, 444 F.3d plies. See summary judgment At to abso is entitled defendant Whether initial moving bears the stage, party liability immunity from qualified lute or parts those identifying burden legal question 1983 is under U.S.C. the absence of that demonstrate record novo. Id. at that this reviews de Court material fact. Celo any genuine issue of 737, 742. 317, 323, Catrett, 477 Corp. v. U.S. tex (1986). If the 91 L.Ed.2d 265 S.Ct. IY. on summary judgment moving party seeks juris- that we have Having determined it does not bear an issue for which interlocu- to consider Defendants’ diction trial, however, mov at proof burden of settled the standard of tory appeals and by showing burden ing party may meet its applies, we now turn to review an absence of evidence “that there is First, claims. we merits of Defendants’ Id. nonmoving party’s case.” support the immu- and absolute qualified consider the moving at 2548. When S.Ct. 07-2115, No. burden, nity claims raised Case oppo “its has carried this party Warren, City Detective simply appeal than show nent must do more as to the metaphysical doubt Ingles, is some and Officer Schultz. there Matsushita, 475 at facts.” material Qualified Immunity A. non-moving par 1348. The allega mere ty may upon also not rest its perform officials “Government party’s the adverse tions or denials of are discretionary generally functions ing specif but rather must set forth pleadings, liability damages civil from for shielded showing genuine there is ic facts conduct does not violate insofar as their 56(e)(2). Id.; for trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. issue statutory constitu clearly established person rights of which reasonable tional present have parties After the Harlow, 457 U.S. would have known.” evidence, judge’s “the function is ed their purpose 2727. “The central 102 S.Ct. and de weigh the evidence not himself immu affording public qualified officials matter, truth of the but termine the them ‘from protect suit is to nity from genuine there is a issue determine whether duties and Anderson, interference with their 106 undue trial.” fied, “occasionally” gone this disabling threats of liabili has potentially from ” “ 510, 514, Holloway, 510 U.S. ty.’ plaintiff Elder v. to determine ‘whether the of (1994) 1019, 127 L.Ed.2d 344 evidence to indicate fered sufficient *23 Harlow, 806, 102 at S.Ct. 457 U.S. (quoting allegedly objec what the official did was 2727). tively light clearly unreasonable in of the ” rights.’ established constitutional Dro Mehra, supra, In v. Williams (6th gosch Metcalf, 557 F.3d “tripartite” proce articulated a this Court Cir.2009) (quoting Estate Carter v. City of im evaluating qualified claims of dure for (6th Detroit, n. 2 408 F.3d of munity: .2005)). Cir First, whether a constitu- we determine occurred; second, we de- tional violation — Callahan, In Pearson v. right the that was vio- termine whether -, 129 S.Ct. 172 L.Ed.2d 565 clearly right established of lated was (2009), Supreme recently the Court recon person would have which reasonable mandatory the inqui sidered nature of the known; finally, we determine whether Saucier, ry forth in concluding set facts, plaintiff alleged the has sufficient sequence “while the forth set there is often supported allegations the suffi- it appropriate, longer regard should no be evidence, to indicate that what the cient mandatory.” ed as Id. at 818. Acknowl objectively un- allegedly did was official edging sequence several drawbacks to the clearly in the light reasonable estab- Saucier, required under the Court rea rights. constitutional lished judges soned that of the district “[t]he Dickerson, (citing at 691 101 F.3d 186 F.3d appeals courts and the courts of should be 1157-58). in step inquiry, at The first our permitted to exercise their sound discre then, ques the “threshold is to consider in deciding prongs tion which of the two whether, in the most light tion” “[t]aken analysis qualified immunity should be injury, party asserting favorable to the in light addressed first of the circum alleged the officer’s con do the facts show particular in at stances case hand.” right?” duct violated a constitutional Sau mandatory Although rejecting Id. na Katz, 194, 201, 121 cier v. 533 U.S. framework, ture of the Saucier Court (2001). 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 “If no con recognized applying nevertheless right stitutional would have been violated framework “is often beneficial.” Id. established, allegations were the there is Pearson, then, are light we still re necessity inquiries no for further concern quired questions address the same ing qualified immunity.” If a violation Id. qualified immunity analy our conducting could be made out on a favorable view of sis, but now we are free to consider those submissions, however, we parties’ must questions appropriate in whatever order is right then consider whether in light of the issues before us. “clearly inquiry, “This it established.” is note, vital to must be undertaken in light qualified immunity “Once the de case, specific context of the aas raised, plain fense is burden is on the general proposition.” Id. “The

broad rele tiff to demonstrate that the officials are vant, dispositive inquiry determining qualified immunity.” not entitled to Sil clearly a right whether established is City Dayton, berstein whether it would be clear to a reasonable (6th Cir.2006) (citing Barrett v. Steub officer that his was unlawful in the conduct Schools, City enville Finally, situation he confronted.” Id. (6th Cir.2004)).

only if are these first two elements satis- Immunity necessary to examine the substantive B. Absolute Moldowan’s re- rights underlying each of certain- application, “More limited but Baker, relief. maining requests for See immu- ly is absolute protection, broader (“The first 443 U.S. 99 S.Ct. has held nity, which the any § “to inquiry in 1983 suit” is isolate of certain func- applies performance to the precise constitutional violation with integral functions are tions when those charged.”). That [the which defendant] judicial functioning of our adversarial Moldowan asserts claims under various system.” Gregory, (citing 444 F.3d at 738 1108). Briscoe, provisions does not control constitutional *24 im- defining scope Rather, In absolute inquiry. question our the critical doctrine, munity has underlying “legal is whether the norms” func- employed a functional test: “Those clearly implicate those claims established ‘intimately tions more associated with the Mitchell, rights. constitutional See 472 are judicial phase process’ of the criminal 528, 2806. For that U.S. S.Ct. likely more to merit careful consideration reason, group we and address Moldowan’s contrast, immunity. In for absolute those according the conduct at claims issue ‘investigative’ in nature— functions more legal norms that underlie his various searching for ‘clues and corroboration’— claims. judicial pro- are more removed from the only qualified immunity.” merit cess and X, XI, IX, 1. Counts XII— Fitzsimmons, (quoting Buckley

Id. v. Brady (Ingles) Claims 259, 269, 2606, U.S. 113 S.Ct. 125 L.Ed.2d Moldowan asserts number of claims (1993)). Fourth, Ingles under the against Detective qualified immunity, Unlike “[t]he Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments immunity seeking official absolute bears Ingles’ alleged based on failure to disclose showing immunity that burden such exculpatory particular, evidence. In Mol justified question.” for the function in Ingles required dowan contends that 269, Buckley, 509 U.S. at 113 S.Ct. 2606. exculpatory to disclose statements from Burroughs, including Burroughs re Analysis C. seeing called four African-American males complaint, In his Moldowan standing morning Fournier on the around recovery seeks under U.S.C. 1983 for that she was discovered in Detroit and that alleged various violations of his constitu Burroughs later overheard two of those “ 1983, however, rights. tional ‘is Section discussing men their involvement in the rights,’ not itself a of substantive source assault.5 merely provides but ‘a method for vindicat ” allegations, although Moldowan’s assert- ing rights federal elsewhere conferred.’ provisions, ed under various constitutional Connor, 386, 393-94, Graham present Brady Maryland, claims under (1989) 104 L.Ed.2d 1194, 10 373 U.S. 83 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 215 McCollan, (quoting Baker v. (1963). Brady, In the Court held that 144 n. 99 S.Ct. 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979)). suppression prosecution “the of evi- Consequently, determine dence favorable to an accused ... violates Moldowan asserts violation of a whether clearly right, process established constitutional it is due where the evidence is material Therefore, Although Ingles disputed dispute 5. Detective does not affect our below purely Burroughs, authority legal ques- whether he ever interviewed he to consider purposes appeal. concedes the issue for of this tions at issue here. irrespec gations solely prosecutor on the punishment, despite or to guilt either to acknowledging faith faith of the good or bad “no one doubts that tive Id. at prosecution.” police investigators sometimes fail to in- we confront here is whether question The prosecutor they form a of all know.” alleged suppression of Ingles’ Detective Kyles, 514 U.S. at 115 S.Ct. 1555. Burroughs’ statements violated same rule, however, This well-established does underlying process the due norm” “legal whether the police resolve have con- recognized Brady. We hold violation duty comitant or derivative under the con- that it does.6 potentially exculpatory stitution to turn argues that Moldowan Ingles Detective fact, material over to prosecutor. that the Due Process cannot demonstrate acknowledges duty Moldowan that the police clearly imposes on the Clause exculpatory “disclose” materials to defense exculpa- obligation to disclose established alone, prosecutor rests on the counsel but tory Superficially, argu- information. maintains that nevertheless have To the extent that appeal. ment has some analogous, just an but as constitutionally- obligation on the state Brady imposes significant, obligation to turn such materi- *25 exculpatory evidence to the de- to disclose prosecutor’s als over to the office. Under- fense, consistently courts have determined lying argument Moldowan’s is the valid duty prose- falls on the squarely that this concern if the have no police constitu- cutor, police. Giglio v. the See United tional in obligation regard, this then the States, 763, 150, 154, 405 92 S.Ct. 31 U.S. sidestep constitutionally- state could its (1972) (“[W]hether L.Ed.2d 104 the non- obligations by mandated disclosure main- negligence disclosure was a result of or unstated, taining an per- but nevertheless design, responsibility prose- it is the of the vasive, separation wall of between the cutor.”); Lindsay Bogle, Fed.Appx. v. 92 prosecutor’s police office and the with re- Cir.2004) (6th 165, (stating 170 that “the gard potentially to the existence of excul- Brady obligation applies only prosecu- to patory Ignoring evidence. the burdens tors”). 419, Whitley, In Kyles v. 514 U.S. places police that the Constitution on the 1555, (1995), L.Ed.2d 490 115 S.Ct. 131 very in context also this creates serious instance, explained the that police risk officers who conceal or prosecutor,” “the individual who Brady’s withhold evidence that falls within undisclosed, “alone can know what is must ambit will never be held accountable for assigned consequent responsibility be the any independent “deprivation rights, the gauge likely to the net effect of all such privileges, or immunities secured the evidence and make disclosure when the Constitution,” 1983, U.S.C. their probability’ point ‘reasonable conduct causes. 1555; 437, reached.” Id. at 115 S.Ct. see correctly As the concurrence Greene, 263, 281, also Stickler U.S. notes, however, the Supreme Court al (1999) 1936, 144 119 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 286 ready has addressed the first of these (recognizing special played by “the role concerns, extent, at least to certain prosecutor American the search for trials”). imposing prosecutor duty “a to fact, truth in criminal In the Su- any favorable to learn of evidence known preme placed responsibility Court has acting government’s on the manage the state’s disclosure obli- the others be- However, reject attempt procedural process due 6. we Moldowan’s stood as violations. 1194; pro- Brady, at claims as substantive due See 373 U.S. construe these claims, Graham, they properly 490 U.S. at 109 S.Ct. 1865. cess more are under- ferent, case, police.” significant but no less role including half in the 1555. Kyles, 514 U.S. at S.Ct. for truth in criminal trials.” state’s “search words, obli though the state’s Strickler, other even U.S. S.Ct. Brady managed by gation under prosecutors rely Because so heavi office, obligation “applies prosecutor’s ly and other law police on the enforcement hands of the to relevant evidence authorities, obligations imposed under prosecutors whether knew police, if Brady largely would be ineffective those not, suppressed it they it or whether about prosecution other members team not, the ac intentionally and whether no to inform responsibility prose had for it or not.” Harris cused asked cutor about evidence that undermined the (6th Cir.2009) Lafler, 553 F.3d preferred theory of state’s the crime. As Strickler, (citations omitted); 527 U.S. at then, practical Brady’s matter ultimate 280-81, 119 (Brady “encompass S.Ct. ensuring concern for that criminal defen only police investi ‘known es evidence ” trial, “fundamentally receive a fair” dants (quot to the gators prosecutor’ and not v. Bagley, see United States 1555)). 438, 115 Kyles, 514 ing (1985) 675, 105 S.Ct. 87 L.Ed.2d 481 Contrary Ingles’ sugges to Detective (explaining “purpose” that the of the Bra tion, however, imply this does not that the dy miscarriage rule is “to ensure that a play ensuring no police have role occur”), justice does not demands that obligations un complies the state with its “Brady’s protections also extend to actions Brady, or that the cannot com der other law enforcement officers such as analogous mit a constitutional violation *26 officers,” investigating McKinley, White v. in deprivation recognized Brady. the See (8th Cir.2008). 806, Although 519 F.3d 814 Dretke, 668, 675-76, 124 Banks v. 540 U.S. yet directly this Court has not addressed (2004) 1256, S.Ct. 157 L.Ed.2d 1166 issue, (“When sup the a number of our decisions police prosecutors sig or conceal See, port e.g., Gregory, this conclusion. nificant or exculpatory impeaching materi 444 possession, ordinarily (dismissing appeal al the State’s it is F.3d 743-45 from on the immunity incumbent State set the record qualified denial of in the context added)). straight.” (emphasis On the con Brady against police claims officers and trary, although prosecutor the is the examiners); Spurlock forensic medical representative state’s “official ... in the (6th 995, Satterfield, 167 F.3d 1005-06 Cir. case,” prosecution of recog the we have 1999) (relying Brady to conclude that police play[ nized that the “also an active ] plaintiff police had raised claims prosecution.” role the Hilliard v. clearly implicated officer that established (6th Williams, 1344, 1350 Cir. rights); constitutional Sutkiewicz v. cf. 1975), 961, part, 424 96 vacated in U.S. County Sheriff, 110 Monroe F.3d 361 on re L.Ed.2d aff'd (6th Cir.1997) (finding depart sheriffs mand, (6th Cir.1976); see F.2d patently exculpatory failure to turn ment’s Lockhart, also Walker v. prosecutor information over to the resulted Cir.1985) (8th (“Police are treated as an injustice” in “substantial which warranted Brady arm of the prosecution pur trial). a new poses.”). prosecutor’s Because the office In practical addition this generally investigative lacks its own ma justification, it is that the constitu evident chinery, entirely prosecutors often are de Brady principles recognized ap tional pendent police on the to turn over the ply just equally similar conduct on investigation. fruits of their a result of As police play support and thus our interdependence, part police, this dif- the police part The are also of the prosecu- can commit recognizing police tion, deprivation analogous and the taint on the trial no less constitutional by withholding recognized Brady they, Attorney, if rather than the State’s exculpatory material. suppressing guilty were of the nondisclosure ... The Process Clause of the the Due “Under state, duty to is that of disclose Amendment, prosecu- criminal Fourteenth ordinarily through prose- which acts prevailing with notions comport tions must attorney; but if cuting he too is the fairness.” of fundamental California police suppression victim of of the mate- Trombetta, 479, 485, 104 S.Ct. information, rial the state’s failure is not (1984); Lisenba v. 81 L.Ed.2d 413 on that account excused. 219, 236, 62 S.Ct. California, 314 U.S. words, Id. at 846. other because the (1941) (“The aim of the re- L.Ed. 166 police just are as much an arm of the state not to quirement process of due exclude prosecutor, police as the inflict the evidence, pre- but to presumptively false hide, injury they same constitutional when in the use vent fundamental unfairness conceal, withhold, destroy, or even fail to false.”). evidence, true or The whether exculpatory disclose material information.7 “overriding defining concern” in the con- While concurrence is cor obligations of the state’s disclosure tours rect that the Court has held Clause, therefore, Due Process under the technically speaking, the government’s justice finding must be “the ” obligations “disclosure fall to and must Agurs, 427 guilt.” United States v. U.S. managed by prosecutor, be Kyles, 514 97, 112, 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (emphasis S.Ct. 1555 add (1976). con- As far as the Constitution is ed), argument overlooks cerned, equally a criminal defendant is de- also Court’s decisions make clear that the process rights of his or her due prived underlying Brady than the constitutional concerns prosecutor when the rather because, broadly preclude evidence reach more suppresses exculpatory gov other case, impact on funda- making in either ernmental “authorities” from of the defendant’s trial is mental fairness “calculated effort to the disclo circumvent *27 the same. requirements by Brady sure established [ ] Trombetta, progeny,” and its 467 U.S. at prosecutor the un Although 488, Judge Murnaghan 104 S.Ct. 2528. As doubtedly a role” in “the plays “special succinctly explained in his dissent in Jean trials,” search for truth in criminal Strick (4th Cir.2000) (en Collins, 221 F.3d 656 ler, 281, 1936, 527 U.S. at the banc): unique significant and police play also a course, prosecu- the manner in which Of process, in that and thus also are role Bra- police comply tors and officers with government’s bound the constitutional different, dy reflecting is their different obligation miscarriage to “ensure that a of justice system. functions the criminal occur,” justice Bagley, not at does Police officers do not disclose evidence 675, 105 S.Ct. 3375. As the Fourth Circuit directly. to criminal defendants In- explained in Barbee v. War persuasively stead, den, police Penitentiary, the accumulate evidence Maryland 331 F.2d 842 Cir.1964): (4th ministerially and then deliver it to the police jeopardize Although acknowledges that the conduct of the can the concurrence the fundamental concern of the Due Pro- that just the fairness of a criminal trial as much as cess Clause is to ensure "the fairness of crimi- prosecutor. that of the trials,” 402, sight Op. the fact nal it loses certainly preclude police then makes must from prosecutor The

prosecutor. judgment about discretionary legal concealing that exact same information material and defense, whether the evidence is prosecutor, from the and Brady compels such that its exculpatory, Why police else would the be re- courts. disclosure to the defendant. they if quired preserve such evidence obligation no attendant to reveal its police prose- and had Although Id. at 664. process, Brady different roles in this and Trombetta would play cutor existence? differentiation ... should functional if the impose obligations “[t]his hollow indeed Brady that creates a not obscure the fact preclude police did not also Constitution duty, prose- which singular constitutional concealing the officers from same evidence capable are police cutors and officers they destroy permitted that are not factually ways.” Id. breaching different prosecutor required that the is to disclose. justifica- practical In addition to these argues that police The concurrence considerations, the tions and constitutional obligations cannot share in the state’s un turn police’s obligation to over material Brady Brady duty der because “the is inex- exculpatory evidence also follows uniquely prosecutors” tailored to in that it orably recogni- from the Court’s requires exculpatory the disclosure evi police tion that the have a constitutional “material,” constitutionally that dence duty preserve such evidence. Trom- requires judg and thus the exercise of “a that Supreme Court observed betta> officers, prosecutors, police ment that “[wjhatever duty imposes the Constitution Op. are trained to make.”8 at 402. This evidence, preserve on the States to argument point. agree misses the We duty be limited to evidence that must determining particular whether a might expected play significant be role “material,” piece of evidence is as defined suspect’s defense.” 467 U.S. at Bagley, U.S. S.Ct. recognized 2528. The S.Ct. generally requires legal the exercise of duty in Youngblood, same Arizona v. judgment prosecuting attorney that the 102 L.Ed.2d 281 trained, posi better not to mention better (1988), confirming that the Constitution tioned, Kyles, to make. See 514 U.S. at imposes at “obligation” least limited However, im 115 S.Ct. 1555. police preserve “to ... evidence [that] only plies prosecutor that the should be could form exonerating the basis for assigned responsibility determining defendant.” Id. at 109 S.Ct. 333. If ultimately what evidence should be dis imposes “duty” the Constitution and “ob- defendant; ligation” it preserve imply, on the such closed to the does not *28 evidence, limited, duty, that no matter how colleague suggests, police as our that the making argument, quiring police In this the concurrence officers to evidence disclose heavily Judge relies Wilkinson's concur- prosecutors require to does not technical Collins, ring opinion in Jean v. but does not legal expertise essentially because the act is attempt Judge even to wrestle with Murna- ministerial, discretionary. police The ghan's persuasive response argument: to that duty officer's is not to determine whether is a strawman that This observation confus- exculpatory. the evidence is material and presupposes es the crucial issue. It that duty simply His to collect the evidence police when a officer discloses evidence to prosecutor, and to disclose all of it to the prosecutor, functionally a the act is identi- discretionary legal who then makes the discretionary legal judgment cal to the material, judgment exculpatory about its at- prosecutors disclosing make when evidence tributes. directly reality, to criminal defendants. J., (Murnaghan, dissenting). the two acts are incommensurable. Re- 221 F.3d at 669 (“The 1992) satisfy police obligations their recognize to and deter- expected be cannot Brady preserved they exculpa should be when turn over mine what evidence under prosecutor. On the Geter turned over to the tory prosecutors.”); evidence to the already has (5th contrary, the Fortenberry, 882 F.2d Cir. concluding much in that the as 1989) assumed qualified immuni (affirming denial constitutionally-significant have a police ty police respect for officer defendant with ... that evidence “duty” “preserve to plaintiffs to claim that the officer failed to significant expected play to might be evidence); Jones v. exculpatory disclose Trombetta, suspect’s role in the defense.” (7th City Chicago, 856 F.2d 488-89, (holding U.S. at Cir.1988) (“Brady Maryland does not police obliged pre- were not that require police keep written records “exculpatory evidence because the serve activities; investigatory of all their but “appar- evidence was not value” of the circumvent the rule of that attempts ent”). expected can be police If the by retaining case records clandestine pre- be what evidence must recognize deliberately prosecu concealed from files served, certainly it is not too burdensome tors and defense counsel cannot be tolerat they simply turn that same to demand ed.”). indicates, litany this of cases As office. prosecutor’s over to the information rejected consistently courts have the no we most of the same reasons For police play have no role to tion that the here, virtually every other laid out have constitutionally- out the state’s carrying police either circuit has concluded obligation's in this area. Al mandated Bra obligations in the under share state’s though prosecutor’s pri office bears on the dy, or that imposes Constitution mary responsibility' carrying out the recog to those obligations analogous police obligations state’s actual “disclosure” un Dill, See, Brady v. Brady.9 e.g., nized bear, Brady, Eighth as the police der (“One (1st Cir.1999) 104, 114 187 F.3d it, put equally important an Circuit- has' provide function is to infor police standard responsibility to turn “Arod2/-derived” courts. prosecutor to the and the mation potentially exculpatory over evidence to Thus, may police officer' sometimes be White, office. 519 F.3d at prosecutor’s apprise prosecutor if liable he fails aside, quibbles there is no 814. Semantic exculpatory judicial officer of known police just capable that the are doubt O’Brien, Hart v. information.”); of a funda depriving criminal defendants Cir.1997) (“[A] (5th plaintiff 446-47 mentally by suppressing exculpa fair trial police claim states a section 1983 tory evidence. who, learning ‘patently ex officer after Having determined evidence,’ deliberately fails to culpatory Bra process guarantees recognized due (citation prosecutor.” disclose it to the dy or derivative impose analogous also Johnson, omitted)); McMillian v. police, on the we next must de obligation Cir.1996) (“Our (11th case law obligation termine whether that an due clearly established accused’s the date of “clearly established” as of De when the process rights are violated *29 of that Ingles’ alleged tective violation exculpatory impeachment or evi conceal dence.”) duty. determining right whether a City v. cases); In Walker (collecting (2d York, 293, established, clearly “may rely we on deci- New F.2d 299 Cir. "[Wjhile City Fighters Fire analogous our Ass’n Cleveland decisions from sis- 9. Cleveland, 545, (6th n. 6 binding, repeated- 502 F.3d Cir. we have ter circuits are not 2007). persuasive authority.” ly recognized their See Court, her, Supreme sions of the decisions of of the men kick and that shortly circuit, this court and courts within this thereafter he away saw the men drive instances, limited on decisions of light-colored from the scene in a van. Spurlock, other at circuits.” Burroughs also testified that he later over- 1006; Employees Ohio Civil Serv. Assoc. heard two of the standing men he saw (6th Seiter, 1171, 858 F.2d Cir. body talking around Fournier’s about the 1988). law, evaluating In the relevant case incident claiming involvement in the we must whether right determine has assault. Burroughs testified that he re- been “in a recognized particularized, more ported officer, this information a police relevant, and hence more sense: The con but the “just say- officer acted like I[was] right sufficiently tours of the must be clear (J.A. 2157.) ing nothing.” Although Bur- that a official reasonable would understand roughs could not remember the name of that what doing right.” he is violates that spoke, officer with whom he Moldowan 635, 640, Creighton, Anderson v. claims that it must have been Detective (1987). 3034, 107 S.Ct. 97 L.Ed.2d 523 In It Ingles. question is without that Detec- words, other “the unlawfulness must be Ingles report any tive did not such infor- apparent.” Id. Prosecutor, mation County to the Macomb Decisions from recognizing other circuits or to defense counsel for that matter. type “Brady-derived” claims that Construing light these facts in the most Moldowan here asserts date back as far as Moldowan, favorable to it is evident that Barbee, 1964. See 331 F.2d at 846. Burroughs’ statements cast serious doubt fact, at least circuits recognized prior three on, discredit, entirely if not Fournier’s 1990, August possible the earliest date identification of Moldowan as one of her Ingles’ Detective involvement attackers, an issue that undoubtedly was case, that right clearly this estab- one of the important most elements of the See, id.; Geter, e.g., lished. 882 F.2d at state’s case. Burroughs’ statements thus 171; Jones, Although our should have been disclosed to the defense recognition of type this of a claim is more they undoubtedly “would tend to excul- recent and specific, less the overwhelming pate” Moldowan. Brady, See U.S. number of decisions from other circuits 88, 83 S.Ct. 1194. recognizing type this of claim satisfies us that any police reasonable that, officer would Defendants contend even if we know suppressing exculpatory evi- were to legal conclude that the norms un- dence awas violation of the accused’s con- derlying Brady support can analogous stitutional rights. officer, derivative claim against prevail Moldowan cannot pre- the facts

Having determined that Moldowan’s sented here because he cannot show that claims Ingles implicate Detective Ingles Detective withheld these statements clearly right, established constitutional we in “bad faith.” In particular, Defendants next whether, must taking determine Cannon, argue in Davidson v. true, facts alleged by Moldowan as Mol- U.S. 106 S.Ct. 88 L.Ed.2d 677 dowan can make out a violation of this (1986), Williams, and Daniels v. retrial, right. At Jerry Moldowan’s Bur- (1986), 106 S.Ct. roughs 88 L.Ed.2d 662 testified he witnessed four Af- Court held that standing rican-American males the Due Pro- street body “triggered by around Fournier’s cess Clause is not early lack of morning August officials, Daniels, hours of 1990. Bur- due care” government roughs also testified that he witnessed one 474 U.S. at and thus *30 merely possession is of -other evidence in their government a official “where proce- inference, no causing injury, in the contradicts which this state negligent constitutionally compensation is deception only dure are practicing officers Davidson, required,” Attorney on the State’s but on the court 668. defendant. lies and the ‘The cruelest police told in If the are often silence.’ not addressed Although this Court has reports as to the existence of the silence 444 F.3d at directly, Gregory, see the issue from than negligence resulted rather 743-44, two of sister circuits at least our deception damaging. guile, the is no less to assert in order suggested have police, at least a claim the such Barbee, F.2d at 846.10 1983, defendant-turned-plaintiff § under question The we have before acted in police that the must demonstrate one, with, a difficult the concur us is See, White, e.g., faith.” Porter “bad out, rightfully points significant poli rence Cir.2007) (11th (“hold[ing] that F.3d cy implications job on both sides. But our Brady impos- standard of care the no-fault craft the policy is not to law to fit our in habeas the criminal or prosecutors es on views, it to is determine what the law place damages § context has no requires. Notwithstanding the concur against a law enforcement official action argument contrary, to the rence’s the a violation of plaintiff alleges the which clearly cases in this area establish that Wilhoit, 368 Villasana v. process”); due taken police actions in bad faith are not (8th Cir.2004) (“[T]he recov- only species police that can the conduct damages § ery requires proof deprive criminal of the due defendants other than the a law enforcement officer process guaranteed by the Constitution. the defen- deprive intended prosecutor courts, acknowledge that We a number of trial.”). a fair At least one other dant of Court, including Supreme the have held however, circuit, no previously held that showing required that a of bad faith is showing required: of ba.dfaith is such on a claim prevail police deprived that the ma- police of the to reveal such Failure process due by concealing a defendant of possession is terial evidence their withholding only “po or evidence is to a equally harmful defendant whether But, tentially police useful.”' the where negli- is or purposely, the information pos are aware that the in their evidence no gently, withheld. And it makes dif- exculpatory, the session if officials withholding ference the Court’s decisions this area indicate prosecutor. police other than the The police duty pre have absolute part prosecution, are also and disclose The serve that information. they, the trial is if rather taint on no less in determining critical issue whether bad guilty of Attorney, than the State’s were required faith is thus whether the is not allow police the nondisclosure. If the withheld Attorney prosecutor evidence is produce evidence State’s him pointing guilt informing police, exculpa- without but rather whether the required bad It is unclear whether the rule announced and asserts that faith is in this good context, ("[I]t in Barbee remains law after Jean Col imper- id. at 660 see would be Because the en banc Fourth Circuit was lins. pro- to hold liable for due missible Jean, per "equally it issued divided''.in they under cess violations 1983 where have affirming judgment of curiam order faith.”), good position did not acted in opinion. court without See 221 F.3d district support garner majority of the en Although Judge concur at 658. Wilkinson’s Circuit. banc Fourth ring opinion ignores holding of Barbee *31 tory “apparent” Brady’s value of the evidence is or flected holding sup- “the not. pression by prosecution the of evidence favorable to an ... accused violates due instance, Agurs, for the Court held process where the evidence is material ei- prosecutors required are to turn over guilt punishment, irrespective ther to that was “so clear- to the defense evidence the faith good prosecu- faith or bad of the ly supportive of a claim of innocence that it (em- 87, tion.” 373 U.S. at 83 S.Ct. 1194 gives prosecution duty the notice of a added). phasis Although both request. Agurs and produce” even without a defense Brady process involved due at 96 S.Ct. 2392. The Court violations U.S. that the violation explained prosecutor constitutional rather than police, gov- not of the title of the arose because critical lesson of those decisions is that the ernment official withheld the evi- constitutional violation arose because of dence, but rather because the failure to evidence, the nature of the not the state of turn “deprived over such evidence the de- Strickler, mind of the state actor. See fendant of a fair trial.” Id. at 96 S.Ct. (“[U]nder U.S. at 119 S.Ct. 1936 Bra- explained: 2392. As the Court “Nor do dy an inadvertent nondisclosure has the obligation we believe the constitutional impact same on the pro- fairness of the culpability, measured the moral or the concealment.”). ceedings as deliberate willfulness, prosecutor. sup- If the Notwithstanding the reasoning underly- pression of evidence results constitution- ing Agurs Brady, the concurrence error, al it is because of the character of contends that process Moldowan’s due evidence, pros- not the character of the claim should be evaluated under the “bad- ecutor.” Id. at 96 S.Ct. 2392. faith standard” set forth in Arizona v. words, In other critical is Youngblood, which the concurrence insists in determining sue government whether “requires proof that engaged the officer conduct deprived a criminal defendant of a ‘a conscious effort to suppress exculpatory fair trial is the nature of the evidence that ” Trombetta, Op. evidence.’ (quoting withheld; it emphatically is not the 2528). 104 S.Ct. This mental state of the government official heightened justified, standard is the con- who suppressed the evidence. That the argues, currence because extending Bra- process due inquiry is concerned with the dy’s duty” “absolute to law enforcement nature of the evidence rather than the enjoy officers who do not immuni- absolute good or bad faith of the state actor re ty will “unleash” a flood of lawsuits “that flects, as the Court emphasized, the Due very stop will be difficult to short of trial.” Process “overriding Clause’s concern with Op. respectfully at 403. disagree. We justice of finding guilt.” Id. at 2392; 96 S.Ct. Napue accord v. Illi However, Youngblood does not nois, 264, 270, impose requirement a bad faith any (1959) L.Ed.2d 1217 (holding that and all process due claims brought knowing perjured testimony use of violates against police officers. On contrary, the Due Process Clause even when “the just Brady Agurs, like the Court’s attorney’s district silence was not the re decision in Youngblood confirms guile sult of or a prejudice desire to ... same, where impact exculpable its “material preventing, was the evidence” is did, concerned, it a trial any govern that could in the mental state of real sense (citation omitted) be termed fair” (empha ment official withholding that evidence is added)). sis That reasoning same is re- determining relevant whether a

385 488 cate that the evidence could form a violation has occurred. basis process due 57-58, In discuss- exonerating 109 S.Ct. 333. the defendant. U.S. at duty pre- to ing police’s of the scope the (citations 57-58, at 109 Id. S.Ct. 333 omit- evidence, the the Court contrasted serve ted). words, Youngblood In other con- “ma- obligation to absolute disclose state’s that the the firms “reason for difference” its much exculpable evidence” with terial nature applicable in the standards is the of “po- obligation preserve limited to more issue, at the evidence not the title of the evidence,” that a holding tentially useful government official or whether the chal- faith to show showing required of bad lenged conduct relates to the state’s failure only violation in the latter constitutional to disclose evidence that its rather failure 57-58, Al- Id. at 109 S.Ct. 333. context. Fisher, it. See preserve Illinois v. 540 correctly the concurrence though, as 544, 549, S.Ct. 157 L.Ed.2d out, rejected the bad- points the Court (2004) (explaining applica- that “the in of due requirement faith the context bility requirement of the bad-faith in in process guarantees interpreted “as depended Youngblood ... on the distinc- phrase that turn of not bear Brady,” does ‘materially tion between exculpatory’ evi- it. colleague places the that our weight evidence”); ‘potentially dence and useful’ in suggesting Far from that the difference v. Wright, United States job the turns on the applicable standards (6th Cir.2001) (“Separate applied tests are government official who de- title of the government’s to determine whether the ques- in stroyed or concealed the evidence preserve failure to evidence rises tion, Youngblood in the Court’s decision process of a due in level violation eases actually explained: where material evidence is exculpatory Part of the reason for the difference accessible versus ‘potentially cases where is found in the observation treatment accessible.”). useful’ evidence is not Trombetta, made the Court Unlike destruction or conceal “[wjhenever potentially exculpatory evi- merely “potentially ment of useful” evi lost, face permanently courts dence dence, “materially loss of exculpatory” im- divining task the treacherous directly evidence threatens the fundamen are port of materials whose contents trial, of a tal fairness criminal and thus and, often, very disputed.” unknown undoubtedly implicates Due Process unwillingness it stems from our Part of cases,” In “that class of Young- Clause. fairness” re- to read “fundamental says, justice” simply “the blood interests Clause, Due quirement of the Process higher actors, impose a burden on state imposing police on the an undifferentiat- including police. duty absolute to retain and to ed and That regardless is true preserve might all material be of asserting a whether the defendant is fail in a evidentiary significance conceivable or ure-to-preserve a failure-to-disclose particular prosecution. think We claim, regardless of whether the claim bad faith requiring defendant to show against being prosecutor asserted police part on the both limits Branch, police. See United States police’s pre- obligation extent of the (6th Cir.2008) (stating, F.3d bounds and serve evidence reasonable police of a against the context claim it to that of cases where confines class officer, preserve failure to ma justice clearly “[t]he re- the interests most it, i.e., exculpatory violates the those in which the terial evidence de quire cases right regardless process themselves their conduct indi- fendant’s due the government of whether acted in bad should be irrelevant once the last two faith”); Wright, 260 (stating, parts shown, of the Jobson test are be- the context of a claim a fire investi- cause the expressly Court has *33 gator, that destruction of “[t]he material held that the determination good or bad exculpatory process evidence violates due materially faith is irrelevant for exculpato- regardless government of whether the act- evidence.”). ry As explained the Court faith”). ined bad Youngblood, presence or “[t]he absence of by bad faith the police purposes for of the Indeed, only way the to make Due necessarily Process Clause must turn passage sense of this critical from Young- on the police’s knowledge of exculpato- the phrase blood is to read the police’s “the ry value of the evidence at the time it was obligation” in the last sentence as refer destroyed.” *, or lost Id. at n. ring to the statement from previous S.Ct. 333. regarding police’s sentence “undiffer duty.” given entiated and absolute When a By distinction, overlooking critical this proper reading, Youngblood thus confirms misinterprets concurrence the nature police that the have “an undifferentiated process of the due inquiry required under duty and absolute preserve” to retain and Trombetta, these circumstances. In evidence, certain but that “[absolute] obli Supreme suggested, explained as gation” is limited to “those cases which above, government run “authorities” the police by themselves their conduct in afoul of the Constitution when they make dicate that the evidence could form a basis “a calculated effort to circumvent the dis- exonerating for the defendant.”11 closure requirements by established Brady Maryland v. progeny.” its Simply put, where the evidence at 104 S.Ct. 2528. The Court also destroyed by police withheld or falls observed in that case that “[t]he into that more record category, serious the defen contains no required allegation dant is not any to make official animus further showing respondents towards regarding the mental or of a conscious state of the ef- (Gil police. Wright, suppress See at fort exculpatory F.3d evidence.” man, J., (“Thus, concurring) part Emphasizing the first Id. these scattered state- of the good ments, Jobson or bad faith— argues concurrence that a test — reading Youngblood (9th Our sup Cir.2006) also finds (only requiring 1212-13 port in the case law of showing our sister circuits. In of bad faith when the evidence is Spencer, (1st "potentially 466 F.3d 47 exculpatory, Olszewski Cir. opposed appar- 2006), instance, Carver, ently the First exculpatory”); Circuit declined Bullock v. issue, (10th to resolve Cir.2002) ("A this but observed that "[a] defen- variety of other circuits have considered the dant can obtain relief under the Due Process relationship Young- between Trombetta and Clause when he police can show that a de- (1) blood and have partment concluded that destroyed the de evidence with 'an excul- ‘apparently exculpatory' struction of patory evidence apparent value that was [it] before require Where, showing however, does not destroyed.’ of bad faith but police ... (2) only 'potentially if the evidence is only preserve 'potentially failed to useful’ evi- useful,' showing required.” bad-faith might is Id. dence exculpatory, have been (citing 109 S.Ct. 333 prove United police States defendant must that the acted in Moore, (5th Cir.2006)) 452 F.3d (inter- destroying bad faith the evidence.” ("impermissibly omitted)). withheld evidence must be nal Although citations the deci- (1) (2) Fifth, Ninth, exculpatory either material and only sions of the and Tenth Circuits useful, potentially binding, they combination with a are not strong support lend showing part of bad gov interpretation faith on the our passage Young- of this from ernment”); Estrada, United States v. blood. materiality’ of the any the ‘constitutional evi- asserting process due § 1983 plaintiff itself.”). required to dem- dence police claim If the faith. concurrence bad onstrate imagined by policy The risks than anything faith” more means “bad concurrence from this also stem fundamen exculpa- aware that the were of the “absolute” misunderstanding tal na issue, howev- tory of the evidence value Brady obligation.13 Bagley, ture of the er, disagree. respectfully then we prosecutor that “the explained the Court overlooks is What the concurrence required deliver his entire file to only involved evidence that was Trombetta counsel, only to disclose defense but evi defense, to the not evi useful potentially *34 that, dence to the accused if favorable demonstrably exculpator was dence that deprive the suppressed, would defendant 489, 104 (concluding S.Ct. 2528 y.12 Id. at 675, at 105 of a fair trial.” 473 U.S. S.Ct. question in not satis that evidence did the 3375; 108, Agurs, see 427 at also U.S. 96 requirement fy “materiality” the because (“But S.Ct. 2392 to reiterate critical not “apparent value” was “exculpatory its prosecutor the not have point, will violated destroyed”); was see before the evidence duty of disclosure his constitutional unless 60, at 488 U.S. 109 S.Ct. Youngblood, also significance his omission of sufficient is (“In (Stevens, J., concurring) Trombet 333 in the result denial of the defendant’s right ta, process no due viola found this Court trial.”). words, a fair In the other Due extremely tion ‘the chances [were] because “absolute imposes duty” Process Clause an would samples low preserved [breath] that regard prosecutor only on the with to cer ” Trom exculpatory.’ (quoting have been evidence, exculpatory tain “material i.e. ev 2528) betta, 489, 104 at S.Ct. 467 U.S. Youngblood, idence.” 488 See U.S. at (alterations fact, the original)). in 109 S.Ct. 333. makes in Trombetta even Court’s decision all of The central lesson of these cases is materiality” clear the “constitutional that the critical factor determining simply the “more withheld evidence obligation whether the state’s is “absolute” police the importante than whether acted ]” turns on nature of the at the evidence 488, 104 good bad faith. 467 U.S. at or issue, destroyed suppressed not or the who 2528; Youngblood, see also S.Ct. justification for imposing evidence. The (Blackmun, J., at 109 S.Ct. 333 dissent (“The duty an absolute where material and excul- ing) Trombetta that determination clear patory enough: evidence is at issue is prosecution good the acted faith and or preserve the failure to disclose such practice merely pref normal according to the inquiry, directly aced which centers on evidence threatens “fundamen- primary Eighth highly skeptical 13. We also the decisions from Circuit are concur- Even 12. relies evi- warnings rejecting on which the concurrence involved rence's dire the bad- only potentially See dence that useful. will faith standard in this context increase White, ("Brady’s protections F.3d at 814 significantly against the number of lawsuits other also extend to actions of law enforce- police given already that this circuit has investigating as ment officers such officers. rejected required that bad faith is notion However, investigating failure to officer’s process to assert due claims other preserve potentially useful to the ac- evidence police, including alleging po- claims that the their failure to disclose such [sic] cused or exculpatory preserve lice failed material constitute denial of due evidence does not Branch, 589; F.3d at evidence. See faith.”); process in the absence of bad Villa- Wright, 260 F.3d at 570. sana, (observing F.3d at 979 exculpatory at issue "had neither documents value”). impeachment nor tal criminal police fairness” of defendant’s trial. cern that cannot be held ac Youngblood, See 488 U.S. at 109 S.Ct. failing countable for to divine the material 333; Trombetta, U.S. ity every possible scrap of evidence.15 Lisenba, 2528; 62 S.Ct. Youngblood, See 488 U.S. at 280. Because that concern for fundamen- however, imply, It does that the just strong tal fairness is where a de- police entirely liability are shielded from police destroyed fendant claims that the unless a defendant shows “bad faith.” evidence, Branch, suppressed material see exculpatory Where the value of a piece of 537 F.3d at there is no constitutional- evidence is “apparent,” police have an ly-supportable applying basis for a differ- unwavering duty pre constitutional requiring ent standard and in- courts to ultimately serve and disclose that evid quire into the mental police. state of the fulfill ence.16 The failure to that obli gation violation, constitutes a process due only The difference in req regardless of the whether a criminal defen inquiry uisite where the are plaintiff dant or can show concerned, the “exculpatory value” of the evidence was destroyed or concealed in evidence must be “apparent.”14 Trombet *35 “bad faith.” The reason no ta, show 489, 467 U.S. at 104 S.Ct. 2528. This further ing of animus or bad faith burden, however, required is merely additional re materiality police posses flects that where the have in their legal question is a make, that police the are not sion that they trained to evidence know or should thereby and accounts for practical “might the con- know expected play be to a signifi- Youngblood, suggested In the 'acquitted that defendants are 14. or convicted on the this additional burden was satisfied where basis of all the exposes evidence which police ”) States, "the (quoting themselves their conduct indi- truth' Alderman v. United 165, 175, 961, cate that the evidence could form a basis for 394 U.S. 89 S.Ct. 22 L.Ed.2d 58, exonerating (1969)). the defendant.” 488 U.S. at considering perspec- 176 After both tives, 109 S.Ct. 333. policy we conclude that the consider- approach ations favor our providing because prosecutors picture a colleague's To whatever limited extent fuller our the evidence in 15. policy justified, any given are will concerns we think that the case allow them to make more police ultimate result is not that informed decisions about will be whether to disclose often, evidence, § particular piece held liable under or withhold a 1983 more but rath- police simply undoubtedly er that the which opt goal will is a to turn over that should be 439, encouraged. Kyles, prosecutor's more information to the See office in 514 U.S. at 115 means, ("This attempt potential S.Ct. expo- naturally, minimize their 1555 that a prosecutor sure Agurs, tacking to such suits. See anxious 427 U.S. at about too close to ("Because 96 dealing piece S.Ct. 2392 we wind will disclose a are favorable standard, (citation inevitably imprecise with an evidence. This is as it should be.” omitted)). significance because the of an item of evi- predicted accurately dence can seldom be un- complete, til the entire prudent record is Contrary predic- to the concurrence's dire 16. tions, prosecutor questions will resolve imposing doubtful obligation police this on the disclosure.”). Although policy favor of significant, con- does not create a al, or even addition- decision, siderations do not factor into our we contrary, burden. On the the Court al- note that this is an outcome that ready should be has concluded that it is reasonable to encouraged given prosecutors, expect police recognize not the pre- can police, making should be the decision about "might serve evidence that expected be what play evidence must be significant disclosed to the de- a suspect's role in the de- Leon, Trombetta, fense. See United States v. 468 U.S. fense.” 467 U.S. at 104 S.Ct. 897, 900-901, 104 S.Ct. Asking L.Ed.2d 677 simply 2528. to disclose (1984) (recognizing overarching "goal” of prosecutor es- that same evidence to the is no tablishing "procedures great under which criminal burden. defense,” duties, formance ar- suspect’s Trom of her [defendant] cant role betta, 467 U.S. at 104 S.Ct. of fact guing disputed issues to this Court. of that evi or concealment destruction argu- We cannot entertain [defendant’s] “in good can never done faith and dence be going disputed ments issues material practice,” with normal Kil in accord their interlocutory appeal.”). fact on this 231, 242, States, U.S. v. United lian Ingles suggests also that Mol- Detective (1961). 302, 7 L.Ed.2d Conse S.Ct. Brady dowan on his claims prevail cannot or requiring a criminal defendant quently, prejudice. because he cannot demonstrate plaintiff to show “conscious” Striekler, 263, 281, See such evi suppress “calculated” effort to (1999) (“[S]trictly 144 L.Ed.2d 286 superfluous.17 would be dence speaking, ‘Brady there is never a real event, if were any even we violation’ unless nondisclosure was so faith inclined to believe that bad was re probabil- serious that there is reasonable we still would not conclude quired, ity suppressed evidence would summary Ingles is entitled Detective verdict.”). produced have a different That read Because we must the rec judgment. issue, however, disputed also involves is- light in the most favorable Moldow ord beyond sues of which are fact our reach an, Burroughs’ testimo we conclude that Johnson, juncture. this 313- whole, provides sufficient ny, taken 2151; Gregory, 444 F.3d at claims to survive evidence Moldowan’s could summary judgment jury because reasonably Ingles that Detective conclude *36 no Although in bad there is acted faith. XIII, XIY, 2. Counts Ingles Detective acted direct evidence that Perjury (Ingles) XV — exculpa these

intentionally withholding in also claims Moldowan asserts statements, testimony, at tory Burroughs’ Fifth, Ingles Detective under the light when in the most favor least viewed Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments based Moldowan, provides to sufficient evi able allegation during Moldowan’s claim to for survive dence Moldowan’s trial, first Ingles perjury “committed summary Despite Detective judgment. prepared he had testifying that statements contrary, lack insistence to the we Ingles’ that any evidence was relevant regarding his that jurisdiction to consider claim fact, case, when, to the he failed to had any such Burroughs made state never Burroughs!’] exculpatory reduce Mr. state Gregory, 444 police. ments to See 293.) (J.A. report.” ment a written (“By arguing at 744-45 the evi F.3d negligent responds that he is enti- per- Ingles at most Detective dence establishes Parratt, aspects expressly any justification imposing for it left undisturbed 17. Nor is there of Daniels, higher § because Moldowan asserts holding burden Parratt's as to 1983. See § process 329-30, in the 1983 context. ("In his due claim at 106 S.Ct. 662 Parratt 527, 534, Taylor, v. Parratt 451 U.S. See Taylor, granted we certiorari ... to decide (1981) ("Nothing L.Ed.2d negligence support will a claim whether mere language § 1983 ... limits the stat- of § for relief under 1983.... We concluded deprivations solely to consti- ute intentional of counterpart, § unlike its criminal rights.”); at also id. tutional see contains no state-of-mind U.S.C. ("[Section] 1983 a civil S.Ct. 1908 affords requirement independent necessary of federally remedy protected deprivations for of underlying state violation of constitu- requirement any express rights ... without right. tional We adhere to that conclusion.” mind.”). particular Although state of omitted)). (internal quotations and citations Daniels overruled other Court's decision in immunity any dicial at proceedings.” Gregory, to absolute testimo- tied F.3d agree. he We ny offered at trial. 738. perjury Because are Moldowan’s claims government

Although officials based entirely Ingles’ on Detective trial enjoy only immunity as to qualified their testimony than rather conduct related to conduct, “all of pretrial witnesses — witness,” his role as the “complaining In- absolute lay ficers as well as witness—are gles liability based on is entitled to absolute ly immunity. immune from civil This judicial testimony proceed trial regardless their true whether previously he Briscoe, ings.” signed the complain- arrest warrant as the A witness is entitled to testimonial 1108. ing Ingles witness. Detective therefore is egregious how immunity “no matter summary judgment entitled to as to testimony perjurious alleged XIII, XIV, Counts and XV. Spurlock,

have been.” 167 F.3d at 1001. Moreover, 3. Count fact that XXXI —Malicious plaintiffs “the mere (Ingles) may allege a Prosecution conspiracy render false testimony, opposed simply alleging as XXXI, In as Count Moldowan falsely trial, person that one testified serts a claim against state law Detective testimonial does waive absolute immu Ingles prosecution. for malicious Under nity.” Ingles Id. Detective Accordingly, law, Michigan order to state a prima immunity entitled to absolute for the testi prosecution, case of malicious Mol facie mony he That protection, offered at trial. prove: dowan “must 1. Prior proceedings however, to Ingles’ does not extend non- present terminated in favor of the plaintiff; conduct, “despite any testimonial connec probable Absence of cause for those might tion these acts have to later testimo Malice, proceedings; 3. defined pur as a ny.” Gregory, 444 at 739. pose other than that of securing prop complaint, his well as claim; er adjudication A and 4. Court, before this Moldowan asserts that special injury directly that flows from the Ingles Detective cannot assert absolute prior proceedings.” Payton City De *37 immunity testimonial because he is the troit, 375, 233, 211 Mich.App. 536 N.W.2d “complaining Although witness.” there is (1995) 242 (citing Young City v. Motor a well-established to the doctrine exception Ltd., Apartments 671, 133 350 Mich.App. immunity of absolute testimonial “insofar (1984)). 790, N.W.2d 792 Because Mol performed [an as the function official] of a obviously dowan’s 2003 re-trial terminated witness,” Fletcher, complaining Kalina v. favor, in his the first element is satisfied. 118, 131, 502, U.S. 522 118 S.Ct. 139 probable As to issue of (1997); L.Ed.2d 471 see also Malley v. cause, consideration that gener element 335, 340-41, Briggs, 475 U.S. ally disputes involves factual that extend 1092, (1986), 89 exception L.Ed.2d 271 that beyond scope jurisdiction of our not testimony does extend to delivered at interlocutory appeal. The Michigan Court Vakilian, (dis trial. See F.3d at 516 335 however, that, of Appeals, has made clear tinguishing between an officer’s role as a law, as a matter of “[f]ailure include “complaining and a “testifying witness” all exculpatory adequate facts witness”); Spurlock, 167 F.3d at 1003-04 sustain a prosecution.” suit for malicious (distinguishing between testimonial and Nevertheless, conduct). Payton, at 242. 536 N.W.2d pre-trial any witness, with As “ for police enjoy immunity prosecu officers because malicious ‘[a]ctions absolute for ” any testimony ju- “at adversarial tion regarded jealousy,’ delivered are law with

391 Court, Michigan Court of 431, of the Circuit Mich. 72 N.W.2d Hoyt, 343 Roblyer v. (1955) Michigan Supreme Sant Court.” 126, (quoting Appeals, Van 128 Co., 2613.) 931 (J.A. Express American (3d Cir.1946)), courts have held Michigan XXIII, In Moldowan as Count “ an action only which ‘the situation statutory claim under 18 U.S.C. serts properly would prosecution malicious for however, provision, provides § That knowingly officer is where lie justice penalties criminal for obstruction complaint, in a with- facts to false swears corrupt conduct and threats of through ” probable no cause.’ there is out which force; a civil claim for provide it does not Arbic, Mich.App. 406 159 King v. Nor does violation of damages. monetary (1987) Belt v. (quoting 858 N.W.2d give rise to a claim for provision Ritter, Mich.App. N.W.2d damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983 because (1969)). “rights-creating explicit it does not contain prosecution malicious asserting In his Detroit, City language.” Johnson Moldowan Ingles, against claim Detective (6th Cir.2006) (holding that “failed, the com- Ingles as alleges only that merely ‘benefits’ “statutory language witness, full and fair to make a plaining specific rights- putative plaintiffs without facts and allowed of the material disclosure is insufficient to confer a creating language ... to continue without prosecution right enforceable under personal federal 313.) (J.A. Although cause.” probable Doe, (citing Gonzaga § 1983” Univ. v. conclusory vague and makes a Moldowan 273, 282, 153 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. complaint criminal allegation (2002))). Accordingly, Officer Schultz on the ... false him “based summary judgment entitled to Ingles,” by Defendant provided evidence XXIII. Count “false evi- any such he never identifies 314.) (J.A. only sub- Moldowan’s dence.” claim in constitutional Moldowan’s claim support of this allegation stantive hand, XXII, on the is a more Count other “deliberately failed Ingles is that Detective safeguard “To a defen question. involved to the convey [Burroughs’ statements] a com right present process dant’s due 313.) (J.A. County Prosecutor.” Macomb defense, has de plete all of Mol- accepting even Consequently, loosely be called the veloped might ‘what true, conclude allegations as we dowan’s access constitutionally guaranteed area of a claim for malicious Payton, under ” 260 F.3d at 570 Wright, to evidence.’ lie under these cir- does not prosecution Trombetta, 485, 104 467 U.S. at (quoting cumstances. 2528). Trombetta, instance, *38 that the Supreme recognized Court the XXII and XXIII— 4. Counts duty may impose a on the Constitution of Evidence Destruction preserve “to evidence” where such state (Schultz) expected play “might evidence be XXIII, Moldowan In XXII and Counts defense.” suspect’s role the significant claims statutory and constitutional asserts 488, 104 at S.Ct. 2528. U.S. on the de- Schultz based against Officer even again argue Defendants introduced at Mol- of evidence struction that the fail- recognized Trombetta though undisputed It is that first trial. dowan’s may give rise preserve ure to evidence destroyed in contraven- this evidence violation, summary judg- a constitutional that explicit court’s order tion of the trial because is warranted ment nevertheless preserved was to be all such evidence bad faith cannot demonstrate Moldowan until further order “from this date forward part officers, on the In Ingles investigating Officer Schultz. defin tive and other ing the “area of contours of this constitu there is no evidence in record that evidence,” tionally guaranteed any access to Schultz knowledge Officer had whatso however, Supreme ever about has devel the nature of the evidence that oped separate destroyed. tests “to determine According whether he to Officer government’s preserve undisputed testimony, failure to evi Schultz’s he was as dence rises to the level of a due process signed entirely ministerial task of violation cases where material exculpa sending inquiries out annual to the detec tory accessible, case, evidence is not in charge versus tives of each asking wheth [merely] ‘potentially cases where useful’ er the detective wanted the being evidence Wright, evidence is not property “held, accessible.” 260 held destroyed room (citations omitted). at 'As we released.” Schultz testified he had explained in regard case, above to Moldowan’s no involvement in the Moldowan had against claims Ingles, supra Detective see no knowledge type of what of evidence was IV.C.l, Part room, being Court has rec held in the property and was ognized suspect’s that the state violates a not aware of the requiring court order process rights, regardless due of the bad evidence from preserved. the first trial be actor, faith of the state where material Even read in the light most favorable to exculpatory Moldowan, evidence is not preserved. simply there is no evidence Trombetta, See at 104 S.Ct. any Officer Schultz had idea that the 2528. Accordingly, the more burdensome destroyed evidence he “could form a basis faith requirement bad apply does not exonerating for Young the defendant.” exculpatory blood, where material evidence was 488 U.S. at 109 S.Ct. 333. We destroyed. Wright, lost or See 260 F.3d therefore reverse the district court’s denial (“The at 571 destruction of material excul summary judgment as to Count XXII. patory evidence violates due.process re 5. Counts XXIV and XXVI—

gardless of government whether the acted Municipal Liability (City faith.”); in bad see also Monzo v. Ed Warren) wards, (6th Cir.2002) (discussing bad faith requirement only in Moldowan also asserts various claims evidence). potentially terms of useful City of Warren and the War- ren Department. Police Because the dis- light In tests, of these distinct Moldowan trict court Department dismissed the would as a need to only demonstrate bad faith defendant and Moldowan appeal if the did not evidence at issue merely “poten- that ruling, only City’s tially susceptibility useful.” stage, however, At this we XXIV, suit is before us. In cannot resolve that Count disputed issue Mol- of fact. Johnson, dowan 313-18, City See claims that the is liable under 2151; Gregory, failing adequately F.3d at 744-45. train its Nev- ertheless, assuming regarding even officers .the evidence constitutional rights issue was materially of criminal exculpatory, Mol- defendants. Count XXVI, dowan still would required be Moldowan claims that City show that *39 the “exculpatory value” of the liable evidence because unidentified individual “apparent” destroyed. before it was with “policy-making authority” ordered the Trombetta, 489, 467 at U.S. 104 S.Ct. 2528. destruction of evidence in contravention of the trial court’s order.

Although the record indicates that materiality was, the of this evidence or at qualified immunity Because been, least should apparent have § to Detec- unavailable 1983 claims a mu-

393 Pearson, training on of the adequacy [the] 129 822 must be see S.Ct. nicipality, Lewis, partic- 523 in relation the tasks the program Sacramento v. to County (citing of 1708, 390, 5, 140 perform.” officers must Id. at n. 118 S.Ct. ular (1998)), ar- City instead 1197. involved a Although 109 S.Ct. Harris L.Ed.2d mu- establish Moldowan cannot to train to gues city’s that failure its officers deter- be- liability any on of these claims nicipal required whether a detainee medical mine underlying establish an he cannot care, Supreme cause more spoke Court As right. a constitutional deprivation of that that in broadly, noting may happen “it above, however, that we find explained assigned specific of the duties to offi- light claims failure-to-disclose' Moldowan’s employees need for more or cers Ingles implicate do against Detective obvious, training is and the different so rights. clearly process established due likely in the viola- inadequacy so to result Moreover, sys- a recognize courts “[t]he rights, poli- of constitutional that the tion ade- to train officers police tematic failure city reasonably can be cymakers can lead policy as custom or which quately deliberately to have been indifferent said 444 F.3d at 753 city liability.” Gregory, to need.” Id. noted that to the The Court Harris, Canton v. 489 U.S. (citing City of liability theory this of is an issue “on which L.Ed.2d Appeals agreed,” of have all the Courts (1989)). consistently has rec This Court collecting array cases of areas. broad mu plaintiff may establish ognized that 6,109 n. Id. at 388 & S.Ct. 1197. “a of liability by showing policy nicipal already Because we have determined training or includ inadequate supervision,” police duty preserve that the have rights ing tolerating of federal policy “a prosecutor to the turn over evidence that neverthe violations is unwritten but [that] recognize exculpatory police having as City Chat Thomas v. less entrenched.” of exculpatory where the value value or Cir.2005) (6th tanooga, apparent, evidence is Harris dictates County, 103 F.3d (citing Doe v. Claiborne City corresponding has obli that Cir.1996)). (6th this light In adequately train its officers in gation to authority, we conclude controlling (recognizing See regard.18 id. at 390 taken as allegations, when Moldowan’s city may failing be that a liable true, City’s sufficiently establish that the “in adequate training light of the provide adequately train its offi alleged failure assigned specific officers or em duties violated potentially his constitutional cers Brady, (noting at 114 ployees”); rights. Supreme As the Court consistent handling exculpatory evi properly “a liable ly recognized, city can be has function”). dence is a “standard inadequate training of its 1983 for under Harris, employees.” XXVI, also As to Count we must estab whether Moldowan can determine municipal the deci liability theo- lish based on discussing the “failure-to-train” fi having an unidentified ry sions “individual municipal liability, authority.”19 In policy-making that “the focus nal Monell explained Harris argues beyond scope interlocu- City record does of this 18. The also that the issues tory appeal. support liability § 1983 in this case be- cause, Gregory, City evi- introduced unlike demonstrating developed vigorously argue 19. Defendants even dence it has true, allegations adequate training taking implemented for its all of his Moldowan disputes adequacy prevail Count will not be able XXVI. Moldowan officers. appeal. De- Resolving disputed argument does have some such factual This this effort. *40 City Department government v. New York Social policy respecting activity such Services, 2018, 436 U.S. 98 S.Ct. municipality before the can be held liable.” (1978), Supreme L.Ed.2d 611 Id. at 106 S.Ct. 1292. government held that local units could be Pembaur, therefore, Under § deprivations held liable under 1983 for City may § be held liable under 1983 for rights, of federal but concluded the failure to disclose exculpatory evi support § respondeat superi- 1983 did not dence and the destruction of evidence liability, reasoning that “Congress did trial, from Moldowan’s first though even municipalities not intend to be held liable pursuant those actions were not taken pursuant unless action to official municipal And, overarching policy. contrary to policy of some nature caused a constitu assertions, Defendants’ municipal “policy tional tort.” Id. at 98 S.Ct. 2018. In maker” liability clearly has been estab Cincinnati, City Pembaur v. lished at least since Pembaur was decided (1986) 89 L.Ed.2d 452 in 1986.20 (plurality however, opinion), the Court policy” clarified that this “official require Because we conclude that Moldowan’s preclude ment did not municipal liability against City claims are based on claims single “for a decision municipal policy implicate clearly established constitu- appropriate makers under circumstances.” rights, tional we affirm the district court’s 480, 106 Id. at S.Ct. 1292. denial summary judgment as to these claims.

Although recognized Pembaur policy-maker liability, the Court made V-VIII, XVI-XIX, 6. Counts clear that every “not decision municipal Conspiracy Claims XXXIV— automatically subjects officers the munici Moldowan’s Third Amended Com pality liability.” Id. at plaint also asserts alleg numerous claims Rather, S.Ct. 1292. municipal liability ing Defendants, that the ways, various only “attaches where the decisionmaker conspired together possesses to violate his authority final constitu to establish mu tional nicipal policy rights. with respect conspiracy to the action or Moldowan’s words, dered.” Id. In other claims are against the official asserted Defendants In must “responsible Fournier, be for establishing gles, final and Dr. acting Warnick spite discovery, yet extensive Moldowan has have believed him.” 550 U.S. at identify responsible the individual for or- S.Ct. 1769. dering the destruction of evidence. Moldow- any an also has not introduced evidence of an disagree 20. We also with the notion that Mol- policy directing official officers to withhold dowan cannot make out a claim exculpatory prosecutor. evidence from the City under Count XXVI because he cannot alleged persistent Nor has he a "clear and any show part constitutional violation on the Doe, pattern” of such conduct. See Although of Officer Schultz. Officer Schultz fact, City points deposition 508. In did not violate Moldowan's constitutional testimony and suggesting sworn statements evidence, rights by destroying the case Mol- pattern that no such or custom exists. Never- may dowan nevertheless be able to show that theless, alleged whether Moldowan has facts "the policy-making individual with final au- satisfy sufficient to elements of claim for thority who directed ... the destruction of the municipal liability beyond scope of this materiality evidence” was aware of the interlocutory appeal. The evidence on which evidence, not, and thus did violate Moldowan’s rely Defendants does did the record Scott, rights Youngblood. under Trombetta evidence before the Court in Thus, least, utterly stage "so at this ]” Moldowan's asser- we are not inclined discredit jury

tions such that "no grant summary judgment reasonable could on that basis. *41 1539; Jaco F.2d see also claim.” 826 as with unnamed as well together concert (6th Bloechle, Cir. Depart- Police Warren of the members 1984) County (affirming conspiracy Prosecu- dismissal of Macomb and the ment merely alleged “complaint Office. claim where tor’s language void conclusory negligence broad circuit, is well-settled “[i]t In this necessary to allegations factual with pled must be claims conspiracy that conspiracy theory”). Accord support a vague that and degree specificity some appropriate summary judgment ingly, unsupported conclusory allegations and conspiracy nine of Moldowan’s as to each sufficient to will not be material facts Gardner, Spadafore v. claims. See § 1983.” Gutier a claim under state such (6th Cir.2003). F.3d 853-54 (6th Lynch, 826 rez v. Cir.1987). of Mol reviewing each After Imprisonment XXXV —False 7. Count claims, it is evident conspiracy dowan’s XXXV, as these claims In Count Moldowan plead failed to that he has V, In Count specificity. Michigan claim under the Constitu requisite with the serts a instance, merely asserts Moldowan City for for false tion Warren Ingles, Detective and that Dr. Warnick continued with imprisonment and seizure members of the other unnamed along with Specifically, Moldow probable cause. out “conspired to Department, Police Warren that, Dr. after Hammel recanted alleges violating purpose of illegal for the gether Michigan Supreme testimony and the her (J.A. 287.) To support rights.” civil [his] his conviction reversed claim, only offers one sub Moldowan that “probable cause to longer there no that “Defen allegation, factual stantive crimi had committed the [he] believe photograph arranged] ... for dants that Defendant Fournier accused nal acts and on Ms. Fournier bite marks ing of the of,” being “[b]y and virtue of him Mr. molds of Moldowan’s making probable under house arrest without held (J.A. 287.) Mol dentition.” Mr. Cristini’s cause,” “unlawfully he was restrained.” of acts allegations other makes no dowan 319-20.) (J.A. asserts that this Moldowan conspiracy. of a in furtherance taken the Michi liberty on his violated restraint allegations, any further offering Without ultra and constituted gan Constitution “prior incorporates these then Moldowan which was not within vires conduct VI-VIII, serially allegations” Counts author governmental Defendants’ scope of constitu claim as different recasting this City that it is appeal, the contends ity. On takes the Moldowan violations. tional immunity under M.C.L. entitled conspira other in all of his approach same 691.1407(1), of whether Mol regardless claims, more than one offering nothing cy inten that Defendants acted alleges dowan claim in in his first conclusory allegation tionally. series, repeatedly recasting then clear, constitutional as different howev allegation Michigan law makes er, immunity violations. is not “[g]overnmental alleged that the ... it is available where Gutierrez, allega- a review of inAs a right violated conferred state has in Moldowan’s various tions contained Burdette v. State Michigan Constitution.” “they are claims evinces conspiracy Mich., 421 N.W.2d Mich.App. motion for to withstand insufficient (1988) Dep’t (citing Smith they] ... summary judgment [because Health, 540, 410 N.W.2d 428 Mich. Pub. speci- facts and material requisite lack the (1987)). Although governmental conspiracy necessary to sustain ficity *42 396 313-18, 2151;

immunity Gregory, 444 F.3d recognized in 691.1407extends 115 S.Ct. “intentional torts” are “committed at 743-44. therefore affirm dis- We the governmental scope the of a func within immunity trict court’s denial of as to Count tion,” that does not immunity extend to XXXV. in this case

Moldowan’s claims because badge “intentional use misuse of a of or V. authority for a governmental purpose un the Dr. by Next we turn to claims raised the by authorized law is not exercise of a (Case 07-2116). Warnick’s No. Dr. appeal Smith, governmental function.” forensic odontologist Warnick is the who Michigan at N.W.2d 780. As the Court of Appeals in expert opinion, held Burdette: “defendant testified in his the claim where immunity plaintiff cannot the conclusively bite-mark evidence linked alleges that has defendant violated its own Moldowan to attack. Dr. Warnick’s rights Constitutional serve constitution. testimony undoubtedly played major role government restrict conduct. These it Moldowan’s conviction as confirmed rights purpose would never serve this if testimony that Fournier’s Moldowan was governmental immunity the state could use one of her assailants. Moldowan asserts to avoid constitutional restrictions.” 421 various claims Dr. Each Warnick. N.W.2d 186-87. This conclusion is not of these claims is considered turn. Michigan affected trial court’s de termination, trial, prior to Moldowan’s first Fabricating A. Counts Evidence I-IV — probable cause existed. Hinch Cf. Withholding Exculpatory Moore, (6th F.3d man 202-03 Evidence Cir.2002) “a (holding finding proba of I-IV, In Counts Moldowan asserts viola- prior ble cause criminal proceeding Fifth, Fourth, tions of rights his under the in a plaintiff subsequent does bar Sixth, maintaining Amendments, civil action from a claim alleg- and Fourteenth prosecution malicious under Michigan Warnick, law ing intentionally that Dr. “either where the claim is based on a offi or with deliberate indifference with and/or supplying cer’s false information to estab reckless of the truth disregard probable (citing City lish cause” Darrah v. constitutional rights, [Moldowan’s] fabri- (6th Park, Oak 255 F.3d Cir. cated impeaching evidence and withheld 2001))). and exculpatory evidence from Ma- County comb Prosecutor and from [Mol- Nor are we persuaded Defen (J.A. 284.) defense counsel.” In dowan’s] arguments dants’ that we should resolve response, argues Dr. Warnick that he is disputed factual underlying issues probable question. summary judgment cause Whether entitled to proba on these ble cause exists to arrest and detain a claims because Moldowan’s complaint suspect generally question is a of law that identify allegedly failed to unconstitu- may we review de novo. See United tional conduct. Dr. argument Warnick’s (6th Combs, States not well taken. Cir.2004) Hill, (citing United States v. Qualified immunity gov shields (6th Cir.1999)). Because of acting ernment within scope officials however, posture appeal, of this we their official from civil liability duties inso jurisdiction disputed lack to consider the clearly far as their does not conduct violate issues fact that are critical to resolving Harlow, rights. claim there established See Moldowan’s was a want of Johnson, 817-18, probable cause. clarifying See U.S. at immunity inqui- holding exculpatory the existence of foren qualified scope of the fabricating stated Mitchell: forensic evi ry, sic evidence Relying Spurlock, at 744. dence. Id. reviewing the denial appellate An court *43 immunity expert that a forensic Gregory claim of reaffirmed the defendant’s “ of the seriously the correctness ‘cannot contend that need not consider defendant facts, nor even plaintiffs [investigator] version not know a reasonable would allega- plaintiff’s whether the determine inappropriate were that such actions All it need actually state a claim. tions in of an performed violation individual’s ”21 of lave whether question is a determine ... at 744 rights.’ constitutional Id. by allegedly violated legal norms 1005) (alter at (quoting Spurlock, 167 F.3d at clearly established were defendant Gregory). Gregory’s ation in reliance on or, challenged actions the time of the significant is because we deter Spurlock district court has de- where the cases norm legal mined that case this was summary judgment for the defen- nied clearly early established at least as that even under the ground on the dant 998-99, May April or of 1990. F.3d the de- version of the facts defendant’s 1006. clearly estab- fendant’s conduct violated challenges Dr. Because Warnick law, clearly pro- the law whether lished allegations the factual he fabricated actions the defendant claims scribed the evidence, however, manipulated we he took. jurisdiction lack to consider Dr. Warnick’s (emphasis appeal summary judg from the denial of added). Accordingly, we need not deter- ment as to Counts I-IV. stage at this whether Moldowan’s mine relief states a claim on which complaint Negligence B. Count XXXIII —Gross whether, only may granted, but assum- be XXXIII, Moldowan, In by Count Moldowan facts as asserted ing the by the de- allegedly gross negligence violated asserts a claim of under “legal norms law, at the clearly Michigan were established Dr. fendant state law. Under War- action.” Id. challenged statutory immunity time of the enjoys nick from liabil ity to the extent his conduct that ex Gregory, we reasoned scope of his duties as the State’s within “act an investi pert forensic examiners 691.1407(2). § expert. forensic M.C.L. they interpret and gatory fashion when plainly Because Dr. Warnick’s conduct evidence,” and thus we physical document duties, scope of his Mol falls within that “the intentional fabrica determined demonstrate that Dr. dowan must War- report” subject to the tion of a forensic “gross nick’s conduct rises to the level to the inten applied considerations same negligence.” Payton, See 536 N.W.2d at by of evidence tional fabrication negligence stat 242. Gross defined at 740. prosecutor. officer “conduct so reckless as to demon framework, ute as concluded Gregory Under lack of for subject strate a substantial concern expert may be that a forensic deliberately injury § whether results.” M.C.L. 1983 for with- suit under engaged prior taking suggestion, edly the witness Contrary Dr. Warnick's subsequently ("Subsequent testified as to these fact that he 444 F.3d at 738-39 tes- stand. liability. him from As issues does not insulate timony previous can not insulate fabrications Gregory, clear in absolute testimoni- we made testimony merely re- of evidence because immunity not "relate backwards" to al does evidence.”). lies on that fabricated any alleg- protect activities he a defendant 691.1407(7)(a); see also Tallman v. Court has excluded scope pro from the Markstrom, Mich.App. tections offered the doctrine of absolute (1989). N.W.2d 618 Moldowan argues that immunity any conduct taken as the “com Dr. Warnick’s conduct rises to the level witnesses,” plaining such as where a police gross negligence and that Dr. Warnick officer submits a support false affidavit in intentionally exculpatory withheld evi- of an arrest application. warrant See Mal dence and support fabricated evidence to ley, 340-41, 475 U.S. at 106 S.Ct. 1092. law, his Michigan conclusions. Under “the record, however, The plainly shows that 691.1407(2) immunity provided by MCL Fournier, Ingles, Detective functioned *44 an apply by does intentional tort an complaining in submitting witness governmental individual employee.” August 1990 criminal complaint Taylor, Walsh v. Mich.App. (J.A. 2238.) against Moldowan.22 The (2004). however, N.W.2d Again, complaint criminal identifies only Fournier because Dr. Warnick does not concede the (J.A. as the “victim complainant.” or allegations factual underlying Moldowan’s 2238.) claim, jurisdiction we lack to consider this This is no mere formal distinction. issue on interlocutory appeal. Fournier did not submit an affidavit to warrant, secure the arrest nor did she take

VI. any other actions to initiate Moldowan’s Finally, we address whether Fournier is prosecution arrest or previous- courts entitled immunity as to the various ly have found critical in applying the com- (Case claims against Moldowan asserts her plaining exception. witness Although 07-2117). No, Fournier’s identification of Moldowan as one her Immunity certainly A. attackers Absolute Testimonial was critical to Detective Ingles’ decision to file a crimi- matter, As an initial we note nal complaint against Moldowan and the to the extent that Moldowan’s claims County Macomb Prosecutor’s decision to against rely allegations Fournier pursue prosecution, Moldowan’s her state- perjured trial, she offered testimony at only broader, ments were part of a inde- Fournier is entitled immunity. to absolute pendent investigation. As the record Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 103 S.Ct. 1108. shows, also were led to Moldow- Fournier is immunity entitled to regard sister, statements from Fournier’s less of conspired whether she to deliver prior arrests, Moldowan’s and other evi- incomplete false testimony. See Alioto fact, dence. In City (6th v. Shively, Ingles Detective 835 F.2d testified Cir.1987) (“The speak he did not doctrine to Fournier until enunciated two days assault, Briscoe v. LaHue also shields from after the liabili during which time ty alleged conspiracies give false and his investigation proceeded without her as- incomplete testimony judicial proceed By sistance. the time Ingles Detective ings.”). Fournier, already interviewed he had iden- tified Moldowan as a likely suspect.

Moldowan argues that Fournier is not entitled to Given Fournier’s immunity testimonial limited role leading up under Briscoe because she arrest, was the “complaining Moldowan’s in light of above, witness.” As noted independent inquiry po- conducted fact, In Moldowan's Third Amended complaining Com- charging Jeffrey witness Mol- plaint explicitly acknowledges that "Defen- (J.A.275.) dowan with four felonies.” Ingles signed Complaint dant [the] as the Finally, the nexus test that of the state. lice, complaining witness ex- extending the sufficiently run requires relationship in this case would close to Fournier ception (i.e. must analysis regulation we or con- through to the state counter functional Holloway tract) context. See private in this apply between the state and the Cir.2000) (6th Brush, 220 F.3d may actor so that the action be attrib- (“Absolute by a immunity is determined the state. uted to looks to ‘the nature analysis that functional (6th Garbarino, Ellison identity not the performed, function of the omitted). Cir.1995) (citations Moldowan ” (quoting it.’ performed actor who concluding any offers no basis for 2606)). 269, 113 S.Ct. Buckley, 509 U.S. at infor- applies Providing these tests here. police, responding ques- mation to the § 1983 B. XVI-XIX— Count crime, offering tions about a witness Conspiracy Claims testimony at a criminal trial does not ex- XVI-XIX, Moldowan Counts pose private liability individual to Four claims under asserts taken “under color of law.” See actions citizen, nier, alleging that she private *45 Briscoe, 329, 460 103 S.Ct. 1108 U.S. Fourth, Fifth, his to violate conspired (“[Section] recovery does not allow 1983 rights Sixth, Amendment and Fourteenth damages against private party a for testi- withholding ex fabricating evidence or mony judicial proceeding.”); in a see also being addition culpatory evidence. Gunnell, 615, Benavidez v. 722 F.2d 618 IV.C.6, supra see Part inadequately pled, Cir.1983) (“We (10th in know of no case main that Moldowan cannot we also hold report which the of a state crime is action against § Four tain an action under § under color of state law under and she is not a “state actor” nier because information to furnishing po- The mere act “under color law.” See did not joint lice officers does not constitute action (6th Proctor, Tahfs Cir.2003) (“A a under color of state law which renders may proceed plaintiff §§ or private citizen liable under private party § ‘no under 1985.”). discriminatory wrongful’ or matter how Am. party’s (quoting summary conduct.” thus entitled to the Fournier Mfrs. Sullivan, XVI, XVII, XVIII, Mut. Ins. Co. v. judgment as to Counts (1999))). 143 L.Ed.2d 130 and XIX. recognizes circuit three tests This XXX —Malicious C. Count private conduct is determining for whether Prosecution public to the state: fairly attributable sustain Moldowan also cannot test, test, compulsion the state function prosecution against a claim malicious and the nexus test. law, Michigan plaintiff Fournier. Under “requires function test public The may prosecu maintain a claim of malicious entity powers exercise which private where the “against private person” tion exclusively traditionally reserved are per plaintiff “proof private offers that the are typical examples The the state....” prosecu or maintained the son instituted domain. running elections or eminent prosecutor acted on the tion and that proof compulsion requires test The state pri submitted basis of information encouraged significantly state proba not constitute person vate that did private party, or somehow coerced v. Blue Cross & ble cause.” Matthews par- overtly covertly, take either Shield, 456 Mich. 572 N.W.2d really Blue action so that the choice ticular (1998). law, however, claim Michigan plaint, rests on Fournier’s al- recognizes prosecution leged that a criminal conduct “outside the courtroom with also (J.A. in respect prosecution.” “is initiated the sole discretion to the second 321.) is critical prosecutor.” Id. 605. This But Fournier’s role the second because, Michigan Supreme as the prosecution testifying. limited to Matthews, intervening explained nothing suggest There is the record to “independent prosecutorial exercise anything Fournier did “outside the discretion establishes that the de- private leading up courtroom” to the trial second prosecution.” fendant did not initiate the support that would claim. Ac- Moldowan’s Thus, Id. at 613. if the or the cordingly, Fournier is entitled to absolute prosecutor prosecution initiate the immunity as to Count XXXVI. Bris- See through basis of their evidence obtained coe, 342-45, 460 U.S. at 103 S.Ct. 1108. independent investigation, own the com- VII.

plaining liability. victim is insulated from (“ Id. at 613 n. 28 ‘The exercise of the above, For all of the reasons set forth officer’s discretion make's the initiation of (1) hereby: we jurisdic- hold that we lack prosecution protects his own and from interlocutory tion to consider Defendants’ liability the person whose information or appeals summary from judg- the denial of accusation has led the officer to initiate the (cid:127) I, II, III, IV, ment as to Counts ” proceedings.’ (quoting 3 Restatement XXXIII and thus DISMISS Defendants’ “Thus, Torts 2d cmt. g)). Michi- claims, appeals as to those but DENY gan, prosecutor’s exercise of his inde- Moldowan’s motions to dismiss with re- *46 pendent initiating discretion in and main- (2) Counts; spect to all other REVERSE taining prosecution a complete is defense judgment the of the district court and to an action for prosecution.” malicious V, grant summary judgment as to Counts added). (emphasis Id. VI, VII, VIII, XVI, XVII, XVIII, XIX, and ground XXXIV on the that Moldowan

That precisely the case here. to plead conspiracy failed his claims with above, As noted although Fournier’s iden (3) requisite specificity; the REVERSE tification of Moldowan as one of her at judgment the of the district court and certainly tackers was critical to the Ma- grant summary judgment as to Counts County comb Prosecutor’s decision to XIII, XIV, XV, XXII, him, and XXXVI on the prosecute only her statements were ground that broader, Defendants are entitled to part of a independent investiga (cid:127) (4) claims; immunity as to RE- tion. these controlling Michigan Under authori judgment ty, the VERSE the of the district court independent judgment exercise grant summary part judgment and discretion on and as to police the of the and Counts XVI, XVII, XVIII, prosecutor the precludes, ground as a matter of and XIX on the law, § prosecution malicious claim 1983 cannot against support against claim Fournier, individual, Fournier. a private under these (5) circumstances; judg- REVERSE the D. Count XXXVI —Intentional ment of grant the district court and sum- Infliction of Emotional mary judgment as to Count XXIII on the Distress ground § that 18 U.S.C. 1503 does not XXXVI, provide a private right Count Moldowan of action and can- also support asserts state law intentional infliction of not a civil claim un- damages for (6) 1983; emotional against distress claim Fournier. der judgment REVERSE the According to the Third grant summary Amended Com- of the district court and police unprece- officers would be both ground the XXX on as to Count judgment a claim support not dented and unwise. Michigan law does a victim against prosecution malicious for Brady imposes doctrine “The abso circumstances; these under complainant duty prosecutor produce on the all lute (7) of the dis- judgment the REVERSE materially in favorable evidence the State’s summary judgment grant and trict court Wilhoit, possession.” Villasana v. ground XXXI on as to Count (8th Cir.2004). terms, By its support a claim law does not Michigan therefore, Brady applies prosecutors, In- against Detective prosecution malicious course, itself, police Brady officers. (8) circumstances; and these gles under all, did not involve conduct at but of the district judgment AFFIRM concerned a criminal defendant’s rather summary judgment as to denying court upon a new trial attempt obtain based XXVI, XI, XII, XXIV, IX, X, and Counts prosecution’s suppression of evidence that Moldowan’s grounds on the XXXV In granting Brady par favorable to him. clearly established implicate allegations conviction, from his tial relief that Defendants rights and constitutional suppression by prosecu held “that the immunity as to these entitled to are not of evidence favorable to an accused tion claims. upon request process violates due where guilt the evidence is material either to KETHLEDGE, Judge, Circuit punishment, irrespective good judgment part, concurring prosecution.” faith or bad faith dissenting part. added). (emphasis U.S. at 83 S.Ct. 1194 many on his puts labels Moldowan duty, Brady Thus the as stated claims, Ingles his claim Officer but Court, Brady imposed prosecu on the disclosed, essentially that he should have tor; since, cases “[t]he fact and prosecutor, to the presumably imposed Court has never this absolute alleged state- Jerry Burroughs’ contents of duty on law enforcement officials other majori- I Ingles. agree with ment to *47 Villasana, prosecutor.” than the 368 F.3d the standard of ty’s conclusion under Collins, 979; also Jean v. 221 F.3d at see here, Moldowan is enti- applicable review (4th Cir.2000) (en banc) (Wilkin 656, 660 But I that claim. proceed tled to with C.J., son, concurring judgment) the majori- how the respectfully disagree with (“The always defined Supreme Court has ty gets there. duty as one that rests with the Brady the I. prosecution”) (collecting Supreme Court cases); Lindsay Bogle, Fed.Appx. v. A. (6th Cir.2004) (“the 165, Brady obli caveat, majority the significant aWith gation applies only prosecutors”). to re- by extending the no-fault gets there imposition of that same absolute The 83, Brady Maryland, v. 373 U.S. gime of officers, therefore, duty police would (1963) 1194, at 10 L.Ed.2d 215 83 S.Ct. —or Brady an extension of that the represent functionally “analogous” to something least not made in the Supreme Court itself has it, Maj. police at officers. The Op. 379—to I it the decision. years since rendered below, caveat, may prac- a discussed as as think is fortuitous. do not the omission insignificant the differ- tical matter render terms, by also its only Not its but majority’s approach the ences between content, however, Brady duty uniquely is tai- the to my important, own. I think it applies It to excul- regime prosecutors. lored to why extending Brady the explain ” “material”; Stricklen, prosecutor.’ to at that is and the the 527 U.S. patory evidence 280-81, says Kyles evidence Supreme (quoting “[s]uch S.Ct. 1936 proba- ‘if Whitley, there is reasonable 514 U.S. 115 S.Ct. is material (1995)). that, had the evidence been disclosed But bility 131 L.Ed.2d 490 it is the defense, proceeding themselves, the to the result prosecutor, police not who is, trial] the criminal would have been duty to it. In [that bears absolute disclose ” Greene, deed, Strickler 527 U.S. solely in police even as to evidence different.’ 263, 280, 1936, 144 119 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 286 possession is the kind of evidence —which (1999) (quoting Bagley, States v. United spe at issue here —the Court has 667, 682, 87 cifically impose Brady duty refused to (1985)). a particular L.Ed.2d 481 Whether directly saying that to upon police, do changed have piece of evidence would ... change so “would amount to a serious trial, course, of a criminal is a result Brady of course from the line of cases.” judgment prosecutors, police offi- Kyles, 514 at cers, Eighth make. The are trained to Instead, comply Brady, to with “the indi- in refusing so observed to extend Circuit prosecutor duty vidual has a learn of Brady police officers: any favorable evidence known to the oth- logical impose Brady’s

It is absolute acting government’s ers on the behalf in duty government on the official who will case, including police.” Id. lie., present the State’s case at trial added). (emphasis any 115 S.Ct. 1555 And prosecutor], expected who can be duty, diligent breach of no matter how gather material evidence from law en- efforts, prosecutor’s crimi- entitles the agencies, forcement who trial; nal prosecu- defendant to new “the position best to evaluate whether evi- responsibility failing tion’s to disclose be dence must disclosed because it is only police], known to the favorable [even materially favorable to the defense. im- rising evidence to material level of Villasana, too, portance inescapable.” Id. at 979. And so Moreover, below, extension, S.Ct. 1555. rejecting plurali- the same did a as discussed ty disputes already no one of the en banc Fourth Circuit: officers an independent duty though have not a Brady duty

The is framed the dic- — Brady duty materially to conceal ex- adversary system tates of the and the —not Thus, culpatory faith. evidence bad prosecution’s legal Legal role therein. matter, practical extending Brady po- terms of art define its bounds and limits. accomplish lice officers would little with prosecutor lawyer’s The must ask such *48 respect to the of criminal fairness trials questions as an whether item of evi- already that current law does not accom- “exculpatory” “impeach- dence has plish. ment” value and whether such evidence inappropriate is “material.” It would be What extension accomplish, that would charge police answering to with these rather, a significant is increase in lawsuits questions, job gather- same for their against police enjoy officers. Prosecutors ing quite evidence is different from the immunity absolute for actions taken in

prosecution’s evaluating task of it. capacities, their official see Imbler v. Jean, (Wilkinson, C.J., 221 F.3d at 660 Pachtman, 409, 413-16, concurring judgment). in the (1976), police whereas L.Ed.2d 128 officers, therefore, officers do not. Police unnecessary.

The extension is also The object Brady already “encompasses special rule evidence would become the of atten- only investigators ‘known criminal who believe police and not tion from defendants time, that allegedly exculpatory present exculpatory pic- evidence should but an been, not, disclosed to their so, have but arranged just ture after the fact when prior respect to trial. And in this counsel grounds would be for a suit. target. present large would police unleashed, Once these suits would be officers, Ingles particularly ones like Police very stop difficult short of trial. For in field, investigate violent crime

who refuge qualified these cases the immuni- great deal of information obtain ty Qualified illusory. immunity would be investigation. of an Some of what course requires “clearly the officer violate obtain, they casings, tangible, like shell is rights established” constitutional lia- to be it, things they may much of like have but ble, definition, being with the idea or heard in the course of their activi- seen liability usually such is limited to officers ties, matter, an practical is not. As who knew or should have they known were preserve, pass officer cannot and thus Katz, violating law. See Saucier v. sees, prosecutor, everything to the he 194, 202, 150 L.Ed.2d hears, investigat- in the or learns course (2001). But it an does officer little He has to exercise ing crime. instead good to aware be of the existence of a important what seems and judgment about if, generic duty, when acting good faith not. But if an officer bears an what does duty materially excul- and to the of his ability, absolute disclose best he is not evidence, information patory all of the breaching aware that he is it. And be- judgment, even thus filtered officer’s absolute, Brady duty cause the is a erimi- faith, purest good potentially be- nal-defendant-turned-plaintiff would need the basis of a him. comes lawsuit prove not that the officer knew—or even an excul- recognize An officer’s failure any reasonable officer would have clue, example, pass and thus to patory duty known—that the officer had a to dis- prosecutor, it would be a viola- on to particular close the information at issue. That the tion of the Due Process Clause. Foreknowledge illegality would be be- merely negligent, officer was or even thus, point; practical side the as a could have under- no reasonable officer matter, qualified immunity would no be time, significance the clue’s at the stood immunity at all. defense; Brady duty no would be if the clue could have absolute. So B. changed the result of the criminal defen- reason, then, good appel- For no federal trial, dant’s first the defendant would not Brady’s late court has extended no-fault one; enti- only get a second he would be regime officers. Two circuits pay the officer him for his tled to have directly; have addressed the issue troubles as well. pointedly both of them refused to make only from exposure This would arise White, the extension. In Porter v. considered in isolation. We must evidence (11th Cir.2007), F.3d 1294 the court “h[e]ld cumulatively in consider evidence deter- Brady that the no-fault standard of care materially it mining exculpatory whether *49 in imposes prosecutors on the criminal or purposes Brady, Kyles, for of see 514 U.S. § in place habeas context has no a 1983 at 115 so an officer’s fail- S.Ct. damages against action a law enforcement dots, exculpatory ure to connect the as plaintiff alleges official in which the a vio- well, him damages. would render liable for at process.” lation of due Id. 1306. The Two, of, any pieces of or indeed number information, negligent court thus concluded that “a act unim- might have seemed provide cannot for investigator to a at the or omission basis portant reasonable 404 revealing heavy is Moldowan’s

liability seeking compen- in a 1983 action Still more major- liberty for of occasioned reliance—and to a lesser extent the sation loss ity’s' at in in Hilliard v. Brady violation.” Id. 1308. And our decision —on (6th Villasana, Williams, Cir.1975), held that a F.2d Eighth Circuit 516 1344 apply likewise 424 part, “bad faith standard should vacated in (1976). that law 729 The failure- process to due claims enforcement L.Ed.2d preserved officers evidence favorable to to-disclose claim there was asserted it.” against prosecutor, the defense but failed disclose defendant Williams, officer, police F.3d at 980. not defendant (“Williams id. at 1349 withheld Clark. See majority None of the cases cites indicating F.B.I. report an there was Brady’s duty of actually imposes absolute jacket”). [plaintiffs] no blood on The Su- upon police disclosure officers. Most of preme vacated our decision as to liability precisely for them instead find that claim on direct review. The other give sort of bad-faith conduct would case, Clark, claim the Officer liability virtually any under rise to stan- upon “deceptive was based his and mis- See, City Chicago, v. e.g., dard. Jones ” leading testimony at criminal Hilliard’s (7th Cir.1988) (finding 856 F.2d added). (emphasis trial. Id. Which is to liability “retaining for records clandes- say, a police-disclosure Hilliard was not deliberately pros- tine files concealed from Moreover, Clark, at all. as to we case counsel”); ecutors and defense v. Hart thought plain “it that a law enforcement (5th O’Brien, Cir.1997) 127 F.3d evasive, knowingly gives officer who mis- §a (permitting “against po- 1983 claim leading, deceptive testimony during who, learning patently lice officer after escape criminal trial cannot civil liabili- evidence, exculpatory deliberately fails to ty[.]” holding Id. That too has since been (internal prosecutor”) it to the disclose Supreme invalidated Court. See omitted). quotation marks LaHue, 325, 328, Briscoe v. Spurlock Nor do our own decisions (1983) (“all 75 L.Ed.2d 96 wit- (6th Cir.1999), Satterfield, 167 F.3d 995 police lay officers as well as wit- nesses— Louisville, Gregory City absolutely ness—are immune from civil lia- (6th Cir.2006), provide im- support for bility testimony based on their trial posing duty upon police such absolute judicial proceedings”). Hilliard is thus an Spurlock officers. was not a failure-to- decision, empty husk of a which did all, disclose case at but instead involved present the issue before us in the first claims of fabricated evidence. See place, and which possibly support cannot Gregory F.3d 1005. And we decided extending Brady officers. emphatically jurisdictional grounds. (holding See 743-44 be- C. argu- cause the defendant officer’s “sole ment with the district court’s denial of

qualified immunity goes today, majori- to whether there The issue before us as the observes, genuine ty correctly exists a issue of fact for trial ... is one of law rather jurisdiction this Court lacks to entertain than And I it policy. would decide appeal from the I apply— [the officer’s] district such. The standard that would qualified immunity Eighth court’s denial of and the one the and Eleventh Cir- violations”) (em- claim Brady apply Plaintiffs cuits the one that the —is added). phasis always applied Court has so far to deter- *50 in liability imposed prosecutor, officer the “area of consti above” that on the mine id. 56, 333, evidence”: at tutionally guaranteed by failing preserve access to 109 S.Ct. Young that, v. namely, bad faith. Arizona evidence. And the Court held blood, 51, 55, 333, violation, Youngblood 488 U.S. 109 S.Ct. establish such a had (1988) (quoting prove police destroyed United States that the L.Ed.2d the evi- Valenzuela-Bernal, 858, 867, 58, in 458 U.S. dence “bad Id. at faith[.]” 109 S.Ct. (1982)). 3440, 73 L.Ed.2d 1193 333. requires proof This standard that the offi holding But that does mean in engaged sup cer “a conscious effort to police violate a due-process defendant’s press exculpatory evidence.” California when, rights faith, in the absence of bad Trombetta, 479, 488, 104 S.Ct. U.S. they preserve fail to materially or disclose (1984). 2528, L.Ed.2d 413 That re exculpatory contrary, evidence. To the as limits the extent of the quirement “both the Youngblood Court’s reiteration of the ... to reasonable police’s obligation clear, Brady duty makes the failure to it to that class of bounds and confines provide such evidence to the defendant justice the interests of most cases where merely would amount to a violation of the it, ie., clearly require those cases in which prosecutor’s duty absolute to disclose such by their conduct in police themselves Kyles, evidence. See also at form a basis dicate the evidence could (“the S.Ct. 1555 prosecutor 115. individual exonerating Young defendant.” a duty any has to learn of favorable evi- blood, 488 U.S. at 109 S.Ct. 333. dence known to the acting others on the government’s case, in Notwithstanding plain language, including this behalf this added). majority Youngblood police”) (emphasis reads to mean that Nor does required no bad faith is to the in showing holding Court’s Trombetta process by impose police a violation of due an duty establish officers absolute preserve police exculpatory materially “where ‘material evi- or disclose exculpa- tory Instead, Maj. Op. dence’ is at 385. evidence. the Supreme concerned[.]” “rejected Youngblood quite say argument But does not that. Court [Trombetta’s] reasons!,]” Youngblood says Due for several “[t]he What the “first” of which “ Process of the Fourteenth Amend- was that ‘the acting Clause officers here were ment, interpreted Brady, good makes the and in accord with their nor- faith ” good practice[.]’ Youngblood, or bad faith of the mal State irrelevant 488 U.S. at Trombetta, (quoting when the State fails to disclose to the 109 S.Ct. 333 2528) exculpatory (emphasis defendant material evidence.” U.S. at 104 S.Ct. omitted). added; (emphasis quotation 109 S.Ct. 333 internal marks added). impose Youngblood That statement does not That the Court discussed the duty upon police po- absolute officers—as bad-faith standard connection with above, tentially police exculpatory merely shown there was no conduct evidence re- in Brady merely issue is instead flects the fact had the evidence there —but prosecutor’s materially exculpatory, restatement of the absolute been there would duty materially exculpatory have been police disclose evi- no need to discuss duties place. dence to the defendant. The evidence at the first Because in that event prosecutor Youngblood only “potentially” issue in would have violated his however, duty exculpatory, Brady. id. at under scope so it fell outside the prosecutor’s duty Brady. absolute under question

The Court therefore considered whether There remains the whether duty claim can against Ingles pro- had violated a “over and Moldowan’s *51 3. stan- Youngblood’s under bad-faith ceed upon Ingles’ That claim is based dard. agreement suggests, that bottom-line As convey prosecutor to to the failure majority may my disagreement with the In- Burroughs’ statement of substance prove larger theory practice. in than in aspects Burroughs’ of testimo- gles. Two suppres- To establish officer’s conscious First, view, he ny, my are critical. materially exculpatory evidence- sion of heard two personally testified that he had must plaintiff and thus his bad faith-a Moldowan— of whom was men—neither things, police’s other “the prove, among rape standing Fournier’s while discussing That exculpatory next to his house. value of the knowledge outside house (as be) in testimony, when it must viewed the criminal defen- evidence at the time” Moldowan, light most favorable to says it have been disclosed. dant should interpreted meaning could be *,n. Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 56 essentially admitted their involve- two men ground And therein lies the common Second, Burroughs in the crime. ment my approach and that of the ma- between “my story” Ingles. testified that he told jority. Notwithstanding its rather extend- reference, in that same That when viewed imposing duty an absolute of ed defense light, encompass could be understood to officers, upon police and its re- disclosure Burroughs’ story regarding the all of jection a in this con- of bad-faith standard crime, including the two mens’ admission “ text, ‘Brady cre- and its declaration Thus, on the sidewalk next door. when duty, which singular ates a constitutional light in the most favorable to Mol- viewed prosecutors police capable officers are dowan, whole, Burroughs’ testi- and as breaching factually different to mean that he told mony could be read ” Jean, Maj. ways[,]’ Op. (quoting at 380 essentially Ingles that two other men had J., (Murnaghan, 221 F.3d at 656 dissent- committing Ingles the crime admitted credit, ing)), majority, to its does not investigating. Brady’s duty extend absolute simply Ingles There is no direct evidence that majority to police disclosure officers. The Burroughs’ withheld statement bad recognizes “practical instead concern wary I think faith. And courts should be that the cannot be held accountable faith from the fact of inferring bad mere failing materiality to divine the of ev- evidence, an officer’s failure to lest disclose ery scrap Maj. Op. possible of evidence.” practice the bad-faith standard become in majority at 388. And the thus holds that a I an absolute one. But think under duty of police officer does not breach his here, jury present the circumstances ” “ ‘exculpatory disclosure value’ unless Ingles’ could infer bad faith from failure to “ ” ‘apparent’ of the undisclosed evidence is Burroughs’ disclose statement —whose ex- Maj. Op. him. (quoting Trombet- istence, fair, Ingles disputes to be the—to 2528). ta, When course, jury prosecutor. Of would be applying that rule to Moldowan’s claim inference, part to make that free not Schultz, majority against Officer they might because choose to understand agree holds—and I Schultz was enti- Burroughs’ testimony light in a less favor- —that summary judgment tled to because “there Moldowan, it at able to or not to believe is no evidence in the record” that he “had review, howev- all. Given our standard of na- any knowledge whatsoever about the er, agree we are not so free. I therefore destroyed.” of the evidence that he ture proceed with that Moldowan is entitled Maj. Op. at 392. against Ingles. his claim *52 end, Thus, majority extends in the Douglas Sr., al., et LINDSAY duty po- disclosure to

Brady’s absolute Plaintiffs-Appellants, officers, scope but limits the lice materially exculpa- whose duty to evidence particular known to the tory value was YATES, Brent In his individual approach I think the better officer sued. al., capacity, and official et apply simply would be Defendants-Appellees. rule, rather than a modi- Court’s bad-faith designed rule fied version of absolute No. 08-3633. however, prosecutors. practice, for Appeals, United States Court of probably operate latter rule will Sixth Circuit. equivalent functional of the former.

Argued: June 2009. D. Aug. Decided and Filed: one I otherwise concur exception, With majority’s disposition of the remain-

ing exception claims the case. The con- 26, in

cerns Count which Moldowan claims City §

under 1983 that the is liable destruction of evidence. “A mu-

Schultz’s ... be

nicipality cannot liable under

§ underlying 1983 absent an constitutional

violation its officers.” Blackmore v. (6th County,

Kalamazoo

Cir.2004). above, As discussed Schultz did

not violate Moldowan’s constitutional

rights disposed when he of the evidence City

from Moldowan’s first trial. The

therefore cannot be liable under 1983 on

this claim. reasons, partially

For these I concur judgment, respectfully dissent in

part.

Case Details

Case Name: Jeffrey Moldowan v. Maureen Fournier
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Date Published: Aug 18, 2009
Citation: 578 F.3d 351
Docket Number: 07-2115, 07-2116, 07-2117
Court Abbreviation: 6th Cir.
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