Miller v. Regions BankMiller v. Regions Bank
Plaintiff Jackie Miller sues her former employer, Defendant Regions Bank (Regions), for alleged violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). (See Doc. 1). Specifically, Miller alleges that Regions: (1) violated the ADA by failing to provide her with a reasonable disability accommodation (Count I); (2) violated the ADA by retaliating against her for requesting disability accommodations (Count II); and (3) violated the FMLA by retaliating against her for taking protected leave (Count III). (Doc. 1-1 at 16–18). This case is before the court on Regions Motion for Summary Judgment, (doc. 19), which, for the reasons stated below, the court GRANTS.
On March 27, 2017, Regions hired Plaintiff Jackie Miller as a Compliance Specialist. (Doc. 21, ¶ 1). In October 2018, Miller’s title was changed to Business Unit Compliance Administrator. Id., ¶ 2; (Doc. 23, ¶ 2). In this role, she was responsible for understanding rules and regulations, training others in her assigned areas, performing administrative duties, and advising on compliance issues. (Doc. 21, ¶ 3). Miller was required to prepare reports for Regions relating to her supervisory monitoring and testing functions. Id.
In early 2021, Miller began reporting to Amanda McMinn, the Business Unit Compliance Manager, who served as her manager from February 2021 to August 2022. Id., ¶ 4. In May 2021, Miller discussed with McMinn her desire to focus only on projects and not perform any monitoring and testing functions. Id., ¶ 5. McMinn told her that, for the foreseeable future, everyone, including Miller, would have to continue performing monitoring and testing functions. Id. In December 2021, McMinn and Miller met and created a list of priorities to help Miller better manage her tasks, which Miller suggested would be helpful. Id., ¶ 6. McMinn also offered to help Miller manage her deadlines by setting internal deadlines before the external ones. Id., ¶ 9.
In Miller’s 2021 performance review meeting, McMinn and Miller discussed ways Miller could improve her performance, including better prioritization and time
In April 2022, McMinn and Miller met again to discuss Miller’s performance. (Doc. 21, ¶ 15). At that meeting, which Miller recorded, Miller told McMinn that a log or spreadsheet would help her prioritize projects. Id. In that same meeting, McMinn made it clear to Miller that there would always be some level of monitoring and testing duties necessary as part of Miller’s administrator job. Id. McMinn also placed Miller on a performance improvement plan. (Doc. 21-1 at 168). Miller’s plan listed seven expectations that would, if met, improve her performance: (1) Communicate in an effective manner which includes written and verbal
The plan also listed five activities/behaviors that Miller should adopt: (1) In all meetings (in person or virtual), allow others the opportunity to speak without interruption and maintain awareness of the purpose of the meeting to remain on topic; (2) Per previous conversations, desk procedures were to be completed as of 12/31/21. There are currently 10 incomplete desk procedures. These should be completed and saved on the Surveillance shared drive by 4/22/2022; (3) Recurring monitoring/testing activities should be completed [in accordance with the designated schedule]; (4) Completion of Miller’s then-currently assigned projects; and (5)
Finally, the plan listed McMinn’s commitments to help Miller improve her performance: (1) Continue our bi-weekly 1:1 meetings and make myself available and respond timely at any other time I am needed; (2) Assist on setting micro-deadlines for any ongoing projects; (3) Assist in prioritizing tasks that have been assigned; and (4) Provide timely feedback if communication issues are witnessed. Id. at 171. The plan also warned Miller that [f]ailure to meet expectations outlined in this plan as well as failure to maintain all other standards of performance associated with [her] role could result in disciplinary action. Id.
In Miller’s feedback on her performance improvement plan, she referenced the fact that she has ADHD. Id., ¶ 16. In response to the request that she stop interrupting others and remain on topic in meetings, Miller agreed this was an acceptable expectation of her Manager. Id. However, she notes that she was diagnosed with ADHD in 2003 and was prescribed medication at that time . . . which she ingest[s] daily and that her medication was changed in March 2022 after almost 20 years. Id. Regions’ human resources group contacted Miller to remind her how to request an ADA accommodation should she feel the need for one. Id., ¶ 17. Miller did not request any accommodation at that time. Id.
Following that meeting, Miller submitted a request to be relieved of her monitoring and testing functions as a medical accommodation for her ADHD. Id., ¶ 21. Soon thereafter, Elbony Cole, an Accommodation and Leave Analyst for Regions, informed Miller that it would not be possible to remove all monitoring and testing activities, as these were essential functions of her role. Id., ¶ 22. Cole offered to provide the following alternative accommodation on behalf of Regions: Weekly 1:1s with her manager (to level set expectations, ask questions, etc.), date range communication for deadlines, referral to Degreed resources (e.g., Prioritization and Time Management courses), and/or referral to the FMLA process. Id. Cole asked Miller to identify which of the offered accommodations she wished to have implemented by July 1, 2022, id., but Miller did not do so. On July 12, 2022, Miller requested Cole’s assistance in applying for FMLA leave. Id., ¶ 24. Regions approved Miller’s request for FMLA leave, which was to begin on July 20,
After commencing in July, Miller’s leave continued through October 14, 2022. Id., ¶ 25. On July 18 (before her leave began), she informed Cole that she preferred to discuss the accommodations after her return from FMLA leave. Id., ¶ 26. Cole informed Miller that she would be closing the accommodation request but would reopen it if she wished to discuss accommodations upon her return. Id.
While Miller was on leave, Regions discovered the extent to which she had not been fulfilling her job duties, which included incomplete tasks that left Regions at risk for operational losses and compliance violations. Id., ¶ 31. Prior to Miller’s return from leave, Melissa Crump assumed the role of Business Unit Compliance Manager, replacing Amanda McMinn, and became Miller’s new manager. Id., ¶ 28.
Upon her return from leave, Miller requested and was permitted to continue working from home, as she had been doing since December 2021, and was invited to re-engage with the ADA process for any other accommodations she needed. Id., ¶¶ 27, 29. She told Crump that she did not want to perform tasks related to monitoring and testing, but Crump explained to her that it was an important part of her role as a member of the surveillance team. Id., ¶ 30. Crump allowed Miller to
In November 2022, individuals from Regions’ Associate Relations group met with Miller to discuss tasks that Miller had left unfinished while she was on leave that created unnecessary risks and inefficiencies. Id., ¶ 32. They allowed her to present any documents she wished to, and they met with her a second time later that month. Id. Following the Associate Relations review, Miller received a final written warning on December 8, 2022. Id., ¶ 33. The final written warning noted that [p]rior to [the FMLA leave], several areas for which [Miller was] responsible had missing or incomplete tasks which left the Wealth Management group at risk . . . . [F]ailure to achieve and sustain improvement in this area or to maintain all standards of performance for [her] position [would] result in further disciplinary action, up to and including termination of employment . . . . Id., ¶ 34.
On February 8, 2023, during a call with approximately 250 to 300 of Regions’ Wealth Associates, Miller provided inaccurate information while discussing the consequences for customers who opted out of email communications from Regions, which was a part of her assigned CAN-SPAM project. Id., ¶ 35. Her mistake raised significant concerns across Regions. Id., ¶ 36. After receiving numerous questions and communications related to the inaccurate information, Regions management was forced to issue a mass communication addressing and correcting Miller’s
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is proper if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
In her Complaint, Miller asserts three causes of action: (1) ADA discrimination, by failing to accommodate her ADHD (Count I); (2) ADA retaliation, by asking her to perform menial tasks and removing job duties in retaliation for requesting an accommodation (Count II); and (3) FMLA Retaliation, by terminating her employment and taking other adverse actions in retaliation for taking protected leave (Count III). (Doc. 1-1 at 16–18). There is no genuine issue of material fact as to any of these claims, and Regions is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
I. Count I: ADA Failure to Accommodate
In Count I, Miller alleges that Regions discriminated against her in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) by failing to provide her requested disability accommodation. (Doc. 1-1 at 16). To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff must show that she (1) is disabled, (2) is a qualified individual, and (3) was discriminated against because of her disability. Beasley v. O’Reilly Auto Parts, 69 F.4th 744, 754 (11th Cir. 2023). Miller cannot establish a prima facie case of discrimination because she has not proven that she is disabled under the ADA or, alternatively, because she cannot establish that she was discriminated against.
In her Complaint, Miller claims that she is disabled due to her ADHD and that she requested accommodations on that basis. (Doc. 1-1, ¶¶ 109, 120). Under the ADA, a disability is defined as a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of an individual.
While ADHD can—if sufficient evidence is presented—constitute a disability under the ADA, an ADHD diagnosis does not automatically mean that an individual is substantially limited in a major life activity. Simpson, 311 F. App’x at 267 (affirming a grant of summary judgment because the plaintiff’s ADHD diagnosis did not automatically render him disabled); Williamson v. Clarke Cnty. Dep’t of Hum. Res., 834 F. Supp. 2d 1310, 1319 (S.D. Ala. 2011) ([A] mere diagnosis of ADHD, without more, may not suffice to establish disabled status under the ADA.). The plaintiff must produce evidence in the form of a record of impairment that her ADHD substantially limits a major life activity. Simpson, 311 F. App’x at 268 (In
Miller claims that her ADHD impacted her concentration at work and that she has offered medical evidence and testimony supporting such limitations, (doc. 23 at 22), but she cites no such evidence. While ADHD can qualify as a disability under the ADA, Miller’s ADHD only qualifies as such if it substantially limits her major life activities, but she has failed to create a genuine factual dispute on this point sufficient to defeat summary judgment.3 Because Miller has cited no evidence demonstrating that her ADHD substantially limited a major life activity, she cannot be considered disabled under the ADA. Accordingly, her ADA failure to accommodate claim fails as a matter of law.
B. Miller Cannot Establish that She was Discriminated Against
Even assuming Miller’s ADHD rendered her disabled within the meaning of the ADA, Miller’s claim still fails because she cannot satisfy the third element of her
Under the ADA unlawful discrimination includes not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability unless doing so would impose an undue hardship on the employer. Id. (quoting
Miller bases her ADA discrimination claim entirely on Regions’ failure to eliminate the monitoring and testing functions as she requested. (Doc. 1-1, ¶¶ 110–13); id. at 72, 85. She cannot satisfy her showing that her requested accommodation was reasonable because it was a request to eliminate essential functions of her position. See Beasley, 69 F.4th at 758–59. A request to accommodate a plaintiff’s disability by eliminating essential functions of her position is unreasonable as a matter of law and, under Eleventh Circuit precedent, the ADA does not require such an accommodation. Id. (holding that the ADA did not require the employer to restructure [a job] in a way that would eliminate its essential functions because doing so would have changed the nature of the job, and that is not something the
Here, monitoring and testing duties were essential functions of Miller’s Business Unit Compliance Administrator position. This is indicated by the job description, which states that Miller [a]dministers a monitoring and testing program to ensure effective compliance with all applicable laws and regulations. (Doc. 20-1 at 119–20). Miller told her manager in a recorded conversation that she had fourteen monitoring and testing functions that were a part of her daily activities. Id. at 71. Indeed, she admits her monitoring and testing responsibilities occupied forty percent or more of her time since 2019. Id. at 30.4
Miller’s subjective belief that monitoring and testing were not essential to her position is not relevant to the analysis, as deference is given to the employer’s determination of what constitutes the essential functions of the job, see Beasley, 69 F.4th at 760 (citing
Regions is therefore entitled to summary judgment on Count I because Miller has provided no evidence that she is disabled within the meaning of the ADA and her claim is premised entirely on Regions’ denial of her request to remove essential functions of her position.
In Count II, Miller alleges that Regions retaliated against her in violation of the ADA when it took certain actions against her after she requested disability accommodations. (Doc. 1-1 at 17). To establish a prima facie case of ADA or FMLA retaliation, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that she engaged in statutorily protected conduct, (2) that she suffered an adverse employment action, and (3) that a causal connection exists between the two. Batson v. Salvation Army, 897 F.3d 1320, 1329 (11th Cir. 2018). Only the second and third prongs are at issue here.5
As to the second prong—whether she suffered an adverse employment action—Miller claims that, following her accommodations request, she was subject to retaliatory disparate treatment by being given menial tasks to perform, being required to keep an activity log, and having duties and tasks previously assigned
An adverse employment action must be material, meaning it must be one that could well dissuade a reasonable worker from engaging in protected activity. Wood v. Gilman Bldg. Prod. Inc., 769 F. App’x 796, 802 (11th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (quoting Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 57 (2006)).7 Trivial harms, petty slights, or minor annoyances are insufficiently dissuasive to qualify as adverse employment actions. See Fortner v. DeJoy, No. 2:19-cv-01409, 2022 WL 4591647, at *20 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 29, 2022), aff‘d sub nom. Fortner v. Brennan, No. 22-13688, 2023 WL 8813574 (11th Cir. Dec. 20, 2023) (holding that undesirable work assignments, performance and attendance reviews,
Miller identified a single menial task: her manager asking her to go into a system called One View and look up some information [her manager] received. (Doc. 20-1 at 86–87). This task took pretty much the [rest of the] day to complete. Id. at 86. A manager’s one-time request that an employee-plaintiff look up information in order to assist the manager with a task does not rise to the level of an adverse employment action, regardless of whether the plaintiff viewed that task as menial. Instead, it falls squarely within the category of minor annoyances . . . common to the everyday workplace. See Byrd v. Gwinnett Cnty. Sch. Dist., 728 F. Supp. 3d 1257, 1267 (N.D. Ga. 2024). Miller’s single identified menial task falls far short of qualifying as an adverse employment action.
Likewise, McMinn’s directive that Miller maintain an assignment log does not qualify as an adverse employment action for purposes of her ADA retaliation claim. This was a shared log showing Miller’s current projects and assignments to which her manager had access. (Doc. 20-1 at 87). Miller had previously kept such a log after suggesting that it would help her prioritize tasks. Id. at 61. The implementation of a shared log to identify and prioritize projects—which the employee previously indicated would be helpful—is not an adverse employment action as required to support an ADA retaliation claim.
There is no evidence that any of these challenged acts—considered separately or together—harmed Miller at all, much less caused the degree of harm or injury that would dissuade a reasonable employee from making or supporting a charge of discrimination. Accordingly, there are no genuine issues of material fact on this issue
III. Count III: FMLA Retaliation
Finally, in Count III, Miller claims Regions violated the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) by retaliating against her for taking medical leave by: (1) having tasks taken away and given to other employees; (2) being made to maintain daily logs and journals that documented her work; (3) being issued write-ups and verbal warnings and (4) ultimately being terminated. (Doc. 1-1, ¶¶ 124–26).
To establish a prima facie case of FMLA retaliation in the Eleventh Circuit, an employee must prove: (1) she engaged in an FMLA-protected activity; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) a causal connection between the two. Batson, 897 F.3d at 1329. If the employee can make out a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to demonstrate that the adverse employment action was not retaliatory. Id. Regions does not challenge that Miller engaged in FMLA-protected activity when she took FMLA leave. (See Doc. 21 at 35–42). Accordingly, only the second and third prongs are at issue.
As explained above, requiring Miller to keep an activity log and removing certain of her duties does not qualify as an adverse employment action. See Section II, supra. In Count III, Miller also claims that she was issued write-ups and verbal warnings in retaliation for her FMLA leave. (Doc. 1-1, ¶ 126). Minor workplace issues—including warnings that do not have a tangible impact on the plaintiff’s employment—generally do not constitute adverse employment actions absent evidence of materially adverse consequences. See Fortner v. DeJoy, 2022 WL 4591647, at *20, aff‘d sub nom. Fortner v. Brennan, 2023 WL 8813574 ([N]othing in the record showed that these [warnings] were materially adverse in that they would have affected any future pay raise or [the plaintiff’s] future job status in any way. On the contrary, the evidence established that these acts had no effect on [her] job status whatsoever.) (quoting Barnett, 550 F. App’x at 715); Bush v. Regis Corp., 257 F. App’x 219, 222 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (affirming district court holding that warning letters and a shift change were insufficient to establish an adverse employment action).
Here, the only warning or write-up following Miller’s FMLA leave was the final written warning.9 (Doc. 21-1, ¶ 33). The warning states:
This final written warning is being issued to emphasize that immediate and continued improvement in your performance is expected. Any other policy or procedure violations, or failure to achieve and sustain improvement in this area or to maintain all standards of performance for your position will result in further disciplinary action, up to and including termination of employment. This final written warning is effective for one year.
(Doc. 20-3 at 110). Essentially, then, because Miller had been issued this final written warning, she was one step away from termination. Because this written warning impacted Miller’s future job status, it constituted an adverse employment action. See Fortner v. Brennan, 2023 WL 8813574, at *2; see also Tolliver v. City of Birmingham, No. 2:25-cv-812, 2026 WL 823304, at *2 (N.D. Ala. Mar. 25, 2026) (holding that, in the discrimination context, movement along a progressive discipline track can constitute an adverse employment action).
Furthermore, Miller’s termination plainly qualifies as an adverse employment action for purposes of her FMLA retaliation claim. See Munoz v. Selig Enters., Inc., 981 F.3d 1265, 1276 (11th Cir. 2020) (First, [the plaintiff] suffered an adverse employment action because [the defendant] terminated her.) (citing Krutzig v. Pulte Home Corp., 602 F.3d 1231, 1234–35 (11th Cir. 2010)). Thus, Miller has satisfied the second prong by demonstrating that she was subject to an adverse employment action.
Although Miller engaged in protected activity and subsequently suffered an adverse employment action, her FMLA claim fails as a matter of law because she has not put forth sufficient evidence of the requisite causal connection between the two. Batson, 897 F.3d at 1329.
Insofar as Miller relies on her write-ups and verbal warnings, she was placed on a performance improvement plan on April 6, 2022, and given a verbal warning on June 3, 2022, but she did not request FMLA leave until July 12, 2022, after the events occurred. (Doc. 1-1, ¶¶ 56, 57). Likewise, the tasks that Miller states were taken away from her were transferred to another team in June 2022, before her leave. (Doc. 20-1 at 86). As a result, these events could not have been motivated by her later FMLA leave. See Drago v. Jenne, 453 F.3d 1301, 1308 (11th Cir. 2006).
To the extent these challenged acts occurred after Miller requested FMLA leave—including the written warning Regions issued to her on July 13, 2022, and the final written warning they issued to her on December 8, 2022—they were the next steps in performance counseling that began months before her FMLA leave. There is no evidence suggesting that these acts were triggered by her leave. See id. ([I]n a retaliation case, when an employer contemplates an adverse employment action before an employee engages in protected activity, temporal proximity between the protected activity and the subsequent adverse employment action does
As to her termination, Miller appears to rely solely on the temporal proximity between it and her FMLA leave to prove causation.10 (See Doc. 23 at 33–36). Even measuring from the end of Miller’s FMLA leave in October 2022—the date most favorable to her for purposes of temporal proximity—nearly five months elapsed before her March 2023 termination. This gap in time is too great to establish a causal connection between the events on the basis of temporal proximity alone. Drago, 453 F.3d at 1308 (We have previously held that, in the absence of any other evidence of causation, a three and one-half month proximity between a protected activity and an adverse employment action is insufficient to create a jury issue on causation. [Likewise, w]e are not persuaded that three months . . . is sufficiently proximate to show causation.); Higdon v. Jackson, 393 F.3d 1211 (11th Cir. 2004) (By itself, the three month period between the September 29 letter and the December 31 incident does not allow a reasonable inference of a causal relation between the protected expression and the adverse action.); Wascura v. City of S. Mia., 257 F.3d 1238, 1248 (11th Cir. 2001) (In light of the other evidence in the record, the three
Further, to prevail on her FMLA claim, Miller must not only demonstrate a causal connection but must ultimately show that but for her taking FMLA leave, she would not have been subject to the challenged adverse actions. See Lapham v. Walgreen Co., 88 F.4th 879, 893 (11th Cir. 2023). [B]ut-for causation is established whenever a particular outcome would not have happened but for the purported cause. Id. at 894 (quoting Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., Ga., 590 U.S. 644, 656 (2020)). Thus, the but-for test directs us to change one thing at a time and see if the outcome changes. Bostock, 590 U.S. at 656. If it does not, the isolated factor is not a but-for cause, and the defendants’ proffered explanations for taking the adverse employment action are sufficient to defeat the plaintiff’s claim. See Lapham, 88 F.4th at 895.
Miller cannot demonstrate that Regions even considered her FMLA leave in deciding on her termination or the allegedly-retaliatory acts leading up to it, and she certainly cannot show that but for her FMLA leave, she would not have been discharged. The undisputed facts demonstrate that she had already been on a performance improvement plan and had numerous counseling sessions and warnings about her performance deficiencies, all before she took her protected leave. According to Miller, she believed management was trying to push her out of her job
Furthermore, it is deemed admitted11 that while [Miller] was on leave, Regions discovered the extent to which she had not been fulfilling her job duties, which included incomplete tasks that left Regions at risk for operational losses and compliance violations. Id., ¶ 31. It is deemed admitted that [o]n November 8, 2022, Associate Relations met with [Miller] to discuss unfinished tasks that created unnecessary risks and inefficiencies while she was on leave. Id., ¶ 32. It is deemed admitted that [o]n February 8, 2023, during a call with approximately 250 to 300 of Regions’ Wealth Associates, [Miller] provided inaccurate information related to consequences when customers opt[ed] out of email communications from Regions, which was a part of her assigned CAN-SPAM project. Id., ¶ 35. It is deemed
Even disregarding the deemed-admitted fact that she was terminated not for taking FMLA leave but rather for her unsatisfactory performance, the substantial undisputed evidence of performance issues—as well as the total dearth of evidence suggesting that she was treated negatively in any way for taking FMLA leave—means that no reasonable jury could find that Miller was retaliated against for taking FMLA leave. Accordingly, Regions is entitled to summary judgment on Count III.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, the court GRANTS Defendant Regions Bank’s motion for summary judgment, (doc. 19), and DISMISSES the case. A separate judgment will be issued along with this opinion.
HAROLD D. MOOTY III
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE