Miles LaCROSS, Plaintiff-Appellant v. CITY OF DULUTH; Officer Anton Mark; Lt. Dan Chicos; Unknown/Unnamed Police Officers of the City of Duluth, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 12-2395.
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
Submitted: March 13, 2013. Filed: May 8, 2013.
713 F.3d 1155
A prima facie age-discrimination claim under the ADEA requires that the plaintiff show (1) she “was at least 40 years old; (2) was qualified to perform [her] job; (3) was terminated; and (4) was replaced by another person ‘sufficiently younger to permit the inference of age discrimination.‘” McGinnis v. Union Pac. R.R., 496 F.3d 868, 875 (8th Cir.2007) (quoting Hammer v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 722, 726 (8th Cir.2004)). We distinguish between an ADEA claim for age discrimination and an MHRA claim for age discrimination by the fact that the former requires that the age discrimination be the “but for cause” of the “adverse employment action,” while the latter does not require it to be a “but for cause.” Clark v. Matthews Int‘l Corp., 639 F.3d 391, 398 (8th Cir.2011). In analyzing both the ADEA claim and MHRA claim for age discrimination, we will distinguish between comments which demonstrate a discriminatory animus in the decisional process or those uttered by individuals closely involved in employment decisions, from stray remarks in the workplace, statements by nondecisionmakers, or statements by decisionmakers unrelated to the decisional process. Rivers-Frison v. Southeast Mo. Community Treatment Ctr., 133 F.3d 616, 619 (8th Cir.1998) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Olsen‘s age discrimination claims fail for the same reason her disability discrimination claims failed. She is unable to make a prima facie showing that she was qualified for the position. The district court did not err in granting summary judgment.
III. Conclusion
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
Albert Turner Goins, Sr., argued, Minneapolis, MN, for appellant.
Alison Lutterman, Deputy City Attorney, argued, Duluth, MN, for appellee.
Before WOLLMAN, BYE, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.
WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.
I. Background
According to police logs, Duluth, Minnesota, police officer Anton Mark came into contact with LaCross during the early morning hours of September 17, 2006.
The parties offer substantially differing accounts of what next occurred. According to LaCross, one officer opened the driver‘s side rear door, “grabbed onto my shirt, ripped me into the seat and held me onto the back of the police car” while another officer opened the passenger‘s side rear door and “began tasering me from behind.” According to the police report and the Taser-use report, Mark applied the Taser once, in stun-drive mode, after LaCross had kicked at the car‘s windows, spat, and attempted to bite Mark.3
On September 18, 2006, LaCross sought medical care for bruising on his wrists related to the handcuffs. He testified that he “never thought about telling [the doctor] about the taser marks all over me or anything like that.” He did not seek any treatment for injuries related to the Taser application, nor has he been diagnosed with any injuries or conditions related thereto. LaCross testified that, at some point after September 17 or 18, 2006, he began having episodes of anxiety. When asked to describe his symptoms, he replied, “My heart just starts beating, gets scared.... [A] weird feeling comes over me.”
LaCross filed suit in September 2010, alleging federal civil rights claims and state common law claims against a number of defendants. He thereafter sought to amend the complaint to add a claim under
The district court granted Mark‘s motion for summary judgment, holding that he was entitled to qualified immunity. In doing so, the district court determined that Mark had used a reasonable amount of force and that, even if the Taser application constituted excessive force, it was not clearly established on September 17, 2006, that the use of force resulting in only de minimis injuries might violate the Fourth Amendment.
II. Discussion
A. Summary Judgment Based on Qualified Immunity
We review de novo the district court‘s grant of summary judgment based on qualified immunity. Chambers v. Pennycook, 641 F.3d 898, 904 (8th Cir.2011). Qualified immunity shields government officials from liability and the burdens of litigation in a
In Chambers, we considered whether a plaintiff‘s showing of “only de minimis injury necessarily forecloses a claim of excessive force under the Fourth Amendment[,]” and concluded that it did not. 641 F.3d at 906. We determined that “[t]he appropriate inquiry is ‘whether the force used to effect a particular seizure is “reasonable.“‘” Id. (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989)) (emphasis omitted). So although a de minimis use of force is insufficient to support a claim, a de minimis injury does not necessarily foreclose a claim. See id.
The distinction between de minimis force and de minimis injury, however, was not clear until Chambers was decided. In September 2006, when Mark deployed his Taser, “a reasonable officer could have believed that as long as he did not cause more than de minimis injury to an arrestee, his actions would not run afoul of the Fourth Amendment.” Chambers, 641 F.3d at 908. LaCross has not set forth sufficient evidence to show that Mark‘s application of the Taser caused more than de minimis injury. Accordingly, Mark is entitled to qualified immunity because he did not violate LaCross‘s then clearly established constitutional rights.
LaCross contends that the Taser is different from other implements of force in that it can cause excruciating pain without lasting physical effects. Because it is different in kind, the argument goes, the Taser should not be judged by the physical injury it causes. LaCross argues that our post-Chambers opinion in Shekleton v. Eichenberger, 677 F.3d 361 (8th Cir.2012), establishes that “de minimis injury is effectively irrelevant where an officer uses a taser on a nonresistant misdemeanant suspect.” Appellant‘s Reply Br. 7. In other words, he argues that Chambers does not apply to excessive force claims involving Tasers. We disagree. Shekleton did not consider the extent of the plaintiff‘s injuries, beyond noting that the plaintiff sustained minor head injuries and was treated at a hospital. 677 F.3d at 365. The decision thus did not address whether the plaintiff suffered only de minimis injury, and if so, whether that injury is viewed differently because it was caused by a Taser.4
While mention has been made of “the unique nature of this type of weapon,” McKenney v. Harrison, 635 F.3d 354, 361 (8th Cir.2011) (Murphy, J., concurring), we have not categorized the Taser as an implement of force whose use establishes, as a matter of law, more than de minimis injury. In Chambers, we said that “the nature of the force applied cannot be correlated perfectly with the type of injury inflicted.” 641 F.3d at 906. This observation may be of special relevance regarding Taser-inflicted injuries, some of which are only minor in nature, but others sometimes severe and unexpected. Com-
B. Denial of Motion to Amend Complaint
LaCross argues that the district court erred in applying the pleading standard set forth in Twombly and Iqbal to deny as futile his motion to amend the complaint to add a state-law claim. We find no error in the application of the pleading standard set forth in those cases, for “[w]e apply federal pleading standards ... to the state substantive law to determine if a complaint makes out a claim under state law.” Karnatcheva v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 704 F.3d 545, 548 (8th Cir.2013).
III. Conclusion
The judgment is affirmed.