After Charles Hammer failed to win two promotions, he filed this suit alleging race and age discrimination and retaliation. The District Court 1 granted summary judgment to the defendants. With respect to the race-discrimination claim, the District Court concluded that Hammer was unable to show that the government’s legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for not promoting him wаs pretext. As for the age-discrimination claim, the District Court determined that Hammer could not establish a prima facie case and, in any event, could not show pretext. Finally, regarding the retaliation claim, the District Court ruled that Hammer could not establish a prima facie case because he had suffered no adverse emplоyment action. Hammer has appealed only his claims of race and age discrimination. We affirm.
Hammer, who is white, was a corrections officer with the United States Bureau of Prisons at the United States Medical Center for Federal Prisoners in Springfield, Missouri. By all accounts, Hammer was a very good employee. In late May 1993, Jerry Scоtt, an official at the facility, sent a memorandum to Sherman Waltner, the assistant warden for mental health, noting that a counselor position would soon be opening and suggesting that “[i]t might also be advisable to consider a minority counselor for 10 North. Many of our patients are Black and some Hispanic and a minority counselor could bе an asset. Springfield has only one minority counsel- or .... ” Scott Mem. (May 25, 1993). For his part, Waltner conceded that he agreed with Scott’s assessment. Sherman Walt-ner EEO Aff. at 6 (Sept. 29,1994). A copy of Scott’s confidential memorandum found its way, into Hammer’s work mailbox. In October 1993, Hammer applied for the 10 North counselor position. For promotions such аs this, the Bureau used a two-tiered procedure. A selection board, which included Waltner, first rated the applications and produced a Best Qualified list that was submitted to the selecting, official, Warden Richard Rison. 2 Hammer’s name was not among the three names included on the Best Qualified list for the 1993 counselor position, and Warden Rison еventually selected Lee Walton, an African-American male. These events gave rise to Hammer’s reverse race-discrimination claim.
In April 1994, Hammer applied for another counselor position. This time the selection board, of which Waltner was again a member, included Hammer’s name among the five names listed on the Best Qualified list. For this counselor position, Warden Rison selected Mark Miller, a thirty-seven-year-old white male; Hammer was forty-three. These events gave rise to Hammer’s Age Discrimination in Employment Act claim. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2000).
After unsuccessfully making use of the EEO process, Hammer filed suit in federal court. The government successfully moved for summary 'judgment and Hammer now appeals the adverse judgment on his claims of race and age discrimination. We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo.
Gen. Trading
*724
Int’l, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
We turn first to'Hammer’s reverse race-discrimination claim. A plaintiff who lacks direct evidence of discrimination may utilize the framework set forth in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
In this case, the parties agree that Hammer has established a prima facie case of reverse race discrimination because he is white; he applied for and was qualified for an open position; he was rejected for that open position; and the employer hired someone ‘ of a minority ‘ race.
See Duffy v. Wolle,
The parties also agree that the government has articulated a legitimate nondis-eriminatory reason for not including Hammer on the 1993 Best Qualified list: the individuals included on the list and the individual eventually promoted (Walton) scored significantly better than Hammer. Thus, Hammer’s claim must fail unless he can “demonstrate that the proffered reason was not the true reason for the employment decision,” which he may do “direсtly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.”
Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine,
Hammer urges that he has presented sufficient evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could find pretext because he is in fact more qualified than Walton and because an internal memorandum suggested that the government should consider hiring a minority for the position. Concerning the applicants’ relative qualifications, we have recognized that “[ejvidence that an employer hired a less qualified candidate for a position can support a finding that the employer’s nondiscriminatory reason for the hiring was pretextual.”
Duffy,
Hammer also points to the memorandum sent to Assistant Warden Waltner, a member of the selection board, suggesting that “[i]t might also be advisable to consider a minority counselor for 10 North. Many of our patients are Black and some Hispanic and a minority counselor could be an asset. Springfield has only one minority counselor as far as I know .... ” Scott Mem. For his part, Assistant Warden Waltner stated that “I concede that I agreed with Mr. Scott, that we were under-represented in Black staff. That was an issue that I saw as important tоday.” Waltner Aff. at 6. We agree with the District Court’s conclusion that this case is quite similar to
Duffy v. Wolle,
where we held that “[a]n employer’s affirmative efforts to recruit minority and female applicants does not constitute discrimination.”
Duffy,
An inclusive recruitment effort enables employers to generate the largest pool of qualified applicаnts and helps to ensure that minorities and women are not discriminatorily excluded from employment. This not only allows employers to obtain the best possible employees, but it “is an excellent way to avoid lawsuits.” The only harm to white males is that they must compete against a larger pool of qualified applicants. This, of course, “is nоt an appropriate objection,” and does not state a cognizable harm.
Id. at 1039 (citations omitted). We conclude that Duffy controls the case at hand, and we believe the only meaningful distinction between-the present case and Duffy cuts against Hammer. In Duffy, the plaintiff sued a panel of district court judges who picked a female candidate for a position as chief United States рrobation officer instead of the plaintiff, a white male. As proof of pretext, Duffy pointed to a statement by the chief judge that there was “an interest in the appointment of a female” and that, consequently, the panel sought “an open, nationwide, diverse pool of qualified applicants.” Id. at 1030 (quoting witness affidavits). Although Hammеr points to the Scott memorandum as evidence of racial bias, by all accounts Waltner was the only person on the selection board who ever saw the memorandum, and Warden Rison, who made the final decision, denied that he ever saw the memorandum. Richard Rison EEO Aff. at 2 (Oct. 7, 1994) (“I know of no letter that was made known to me prior to my selection.”). In these circumstances, the District Court correctly determined that a reasonable trier of fact could not conclude the memorandum was evidence of pretext, and Hammer did not proffer any other evidence to show discrimination against him on account of race. Accordingly, the District Court did not err when it grantеd summary judgment on Hammer’s race-discrimination claim.
We next turn to Hammer’s age-discrimination claim. As with his race-discrimination claim, Hammer may utilize the
McDonnell Douglas
framework to present his case.
Mayer v. Nextel
W.
*726
Corp.,
To establish a prima facie case of age discrimination, Hammer had to presеnt evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that he belonged to the protected class, he was qualified for the position for which he applied, he was rejected, and his employer filled the position with an individual “sufficiently younger to permit the inference of age discrimination.” Sch
itz v. Burlington N. R.R.,
The
McDonnell Douglas
framework was “never intended to be rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic.”
Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 4
Hammer, in addition to the prima facie case (which we have assumed exists for the sake of argument), can only point to evidence that Miller and Hammer were considered equally qualified by the mеmbers of the selection board,
supra
at n. 4; that sometime after Warden Rison took charge of the facility he made a remark about “old timer dinosaurs around here that won’t change,” Wanda Young EEO Aff. at 2 (Nov. 28, 1994); that Warden Rison’s remark was taken seriously and protested by the older employees at the facility who felt they were disfavored; and thаt, although Warden Rison was adamant that the remark was misinterpreted, he acknowledged that the remark took on a life of its own, especially with “some of the old timers,” Rison Aff. at 3. This evidence regarding the Warden’s “old-timer dinosaurs” comment and the older employees’ reaction to the comment does not assist Hammer at this juncture. The “dinosaurs” comment only suggests that the Warden could have harbored discriminatory feelings toward older employees in general; it does not directly deal with the ultimate question: whether Hammer was discriminated against on account of age when he applied for the counselor position in 1994.
Cf. Burdine,
Fоr the reasons stated, the judgment of the District Court is affirmed.
Notes
. The Honorable Richard E. Dorr, United States District Judge for the Western District of Missouri.
. There is evidence in the record to support the conclusion that the selection board also made a non-binding recommendation as to which Best Qualified candidate should be chosen by the warden. Noel Bascom EEO Aff. at 5 (Sept. 29, 1994).
. Though we do not decide the question, we do not mean to suggest that we think the District Court was wrong.
See Grosjean v. First Energy Corp.,
. With regard to its legitimate nondiscriminatory reason, the government has only argued that:
The most highly qualified applicants were scored by four individuals on the selection board. The board then submitted its best qualified list to the Warden for the selection of his choice. The Warden ■ chose Mark Miller, who was only six years younger than the Plaintiff. There has been no evidence presented that the Warden chose Miller because he was younger than Mr. Hammer. In this case, Mr. Hammer did ma[ke] the BQ list. Mr. Hammer has no direct evidence that his nonselection was in any way based upon his age, or the age of Mark Miller. Mr. Hammer also has no evidence that he was morе qualified for the counsel- or position than Mark Miller was. Thus, DOJ has given a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for promoting Mark Miller, and the burden [in the McDonnell Douglas formula] shifts back to Mr. Hammer to demonstrate that this given reason is pretextual.
Appellee’s Br. at 25-26 (citations omitted); see also Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 15 (April 9, 2003). Moreover, the evidence in the record tends to suggest that Hammer and Miller were equally qualified. See Bascom Aff. at 7 ("Charlie [Hammer] is an outstanding officer.... It's just *727 luck of the draw. He was up against top flight candidates. He's a top flight candidate in that group. It's just, Warden could have just flipped a coin and made his choice. It just happens that he chose Mark Miller.”); Waltner Aff. at 3 ("Any of the five candidates that were in that final list were satisfactory from my perspective, and basically from the perspective of the other members of the committee .... ”).