MICHAEL ANTHONY CONAGE, Appellant, vs. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appellee.
No. SC20-1441
Supreme Court of Florida
August 25, 2022
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has certified to us a question about the meaning of the word “purchase” in Florida‘s drug trafficking law. The court asks whether a completed purchase of illegal drugs necessarily entails the defendant purchaser‘s possession of those drugs, as federal law defines possession. We conclude that it does, and in doing so we reject the argument that a purchase is necessarily complete as soon as the would-be purchaser pays for the drugs.
I.
In the underlying federal case, Michael Conage was convicted of a gun possession crime and then sentenced to a mandatory prison term under the Armed Career Criminal Act. United States v. Conage, 976 F.3d 1244, 1253 (11th Cir. 2020);
The ACCA defines a “serious drug offense” as one “involving manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance.”
Conage‘s appeal to the Eleventh Circuit focuses on only one of the statute‘s six forms of drug trafficking, trafficking by purchase.
Recall that the ACCA defines a “serious drug offense” as one “involving manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance.”
The Eleventh Circuit has determined that it cannot resolve Conage‘s appeal without additional guidance about how Florida law defines a completed purchase in this context. The court‘s uncertainty is understandable.
To help us answer the certified question, we have received briefing and oral argument from Conage and from the United States. After we heard oral argument, the State of Florida submitted a brief supporting Conage. Conage and the United States then filed responses to the State‘s brief.
II.
The certified question is:
How does Florida law define the term “purchase” for purposes of Florida Statutes § 893.135(1) ? More specifically, does a completed purchase for purposes of conviction under§ 893.135(1) require some form of possession—either actual or constructive—of the drug being purchased?
Id. at 1263. The Eleventh Circuit explains that its focus “is on the conduct that the ‘purchasing’ element of [Florida‘s drug trafficking law] prohibits.” Id. at 1252. The court needs to know “what the State must prove in order to convict a defendant of purchasing a trafficking quantity of” illegal drugs. Id. at 1247.
Before explaining our answer to the certified question, we address a threshold issue about Florida‘s law of statutory interpretation. The United States encourages us to use an approach that is often linked to a passage from our Court‘s decision in Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1984) (quoting A.R. Douglass, Inc. v. McRainey, 137 So. 157, 159 (Fla. 1931)). There we said that “[w]hen the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion for resorting to the rules of statutory interpretation and construction.” In practice, following this maxim often leads the interpreter to focus on a disputed word or phrase in isolation; the maxim also leaves the interpreter in the dark about how to determine whether a particular word or phrase has a clear meaning.
We believe that the Holly principle is misleading and outdated. More recently our Court has said that judges must “exhaust ‘all the textual and structural clues’ ” that bear on the meaning of a disputed text. Alachua County v. Watson, 333 So. 3d 162, 169 (Fla. 2022) (quoting Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 141 S. Ct. 1474, 1480 (2021)). That is because “[t]he plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is determined by reference to the language itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.” Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997).
Viewed properly as rules of thumb or guides to interpretation, rather than as inflexible rules, the traditional canons of statutory interpretation can aid the interpretive process from beginning to end (recognizing that some canons, like the rule of lenity, by their own terms come into play only after other interpretive tools have been exhausted). It would be a mistake to think that our law of statutory interpretation requires interpreters to make a threshold determination of whether a term has a “plain” or “clear” meaning in isolation, without considering the statutory context and without the aid of whatever canons might shed light on the interpretive issues in dispute.3
With that, we turn to our analysis of the certified question.
A.
We emphasize at the outset that there are two aspects to the Eleventh Circuit‘s question. The first is wholly a matter of
defines possession.4 We think the clearest way to present our analysis is to start by explaining possession as a matter of federal law.
The Eleventh Circuit informs us that, under federal law, ” ‘possession’ includes both actual and constructive possession.” Conage, 976 F.3d at 1255. The former occurs when a person has “direct physical control” over the item in question. Id. By contrast, “constructive possession exists when the defendant exercises ownership, dominion, or control over the item or has the power and intent to exercise dominion or control.” Id. (quoting United States v. Beckles, 565 F.3d 832, 841 (11th Cir. 2009)). Another Eleventh Circuit precedent says that “[a] defendant has constructive possession of a substance when he has some form of control other than direct physical control.” United States v. Edwards, 166 F.3d 1362, 1364 (11th Cir. 1999). For example, “a defendant has constructive possession of a substance if it is being held by an agent of the defendant.” Id.
Understanding how federal law defines possession helps to frame the parties’ disagreement over the proper interpretation of
First, consider the ordinary meaning of the word “purchase.” When a contested term is undefined in statute or by our cases, we presume that the term bears its ordinary meaning at the time of enactment, taking into consideration the context in which the word appears.5 And we typically look to dictionaries for the best evidence of that ordinary meaning.
Our research shows that dictionaries are essentially uniform in how they define the word “purchase.” The American Heritage Dictionary definition is typical: “purchase” means “[t]o obtain in exchange for money or its equivalent; buy.” Purchase, The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (3rd ed. 1992). In turn, that same dictionary defines “obtain” to mean “[t]o succeed in gaining possession of, as the result of planning or endeavor; acquire.” Obtain, The American Heritage Dictionary, supra; see also Purchase, Webster‘s Third New International Dictionary Unabridged (1966 ed.) (“to get into one‘s possession; to obtain . . . by paying money or its equivalent“); Obtain, Webster‘s, supra (“to gain or attain possession or disposal of . . .“).
As a matter of ordinary meaning, then, a purchase entails both giving consideration for and obtaining the good being purchased. We do not think it would be reasonable to apply this definition so literally
Second, consider the word “purchase” in light of how this Court has defined a “sale” in the context of chapter 893. In Milazzo v. State, 377 So. 2d 1161, 1163 (Fla. 1979), we said that, along with consideration, “delivery is one of the essential elements of a sale.” This precedent was on the books when the Legislature criminalized trafficking by purchase in 1987. Given that precedent, we think that an informed reader of the Legislature‘s work product, and the Legislature itself, would have understood a purchase to require both the giving of consideration and the buyer‘s obtaining some form of control over the illegal drugs. Otherwise, there would be disharmony between the words “purchase” and “sell” in the same statute.
Third, consider the word “purchase” together with the company it keeps in
We thus conclude that, for purposes of
B.
We have carefully considered the counterarguments offered by Conage and the State, but we find them unconvincing.
Conage acknowledges that “the plain and ordinary meaning of ‘purchase’ is to obtain or acquire something through an exchange.” But he says that it is common in everyday speech to use the word “purchase” to refer to paying for and obtaining an item for someone else. That is true but irrelevant. Even if the purchaser in that scenario never assumes actual possession of the purchased item, he still will have exercised control (federal law constructive possession) over the item for purposes of directing its transfer or delivery to the recipient.
Relatedly, Conage invokes the example of a “middleman” whose role is merely to give cash for drugs on behalf of another. Depending on the facts of a particular case, the middleman would either be a copurchaser (if he gets joint control over the drugs) or an aider and abettor of the actual purchaser. Either way he would be liable as a principal under our definition of the word “purchase” in
Conage also invokes everyday references to a consumer who “purchases” an item online and then awaits its delivery.
Like Conage, the State acknowledges that, as a matter of ordinary meaning, “to purchase, one must acquire or obtain something through an exchange.” But the State argues that “one can ‘acquire’ or ‘obtain’ the right to control a good before assuming such control, like when one orders a good from an online retailer and awaits its arrival.” This argument, too, suffers from an inconsistency with this Court‘s definition of a sale in this context—we did not say in Milazzo that a sale of illegal drugs is complete when the seller takes on an obligation to deliver an item. More fundamentally, legitimate commercial transactions take place against a backdrop of laws that give rise to enforceable rights and duties, making it possible to speak of a predelivery “right” to obtain an item. The same cannot be said of the world of illegal drug trafficking. Cf. United States v. Manzella, 791 F.2d 1263, 1266 (7th Cir. 1986) (Control for purposes of constructive possession exists where a defendant has “the right (not the legal right, but the recognized authority in his criminal milieu) to possess” the drugs.) (Posner, J.).
Finally, Conage and the State point to the statutory history of
The problem with this argument is that Conage and the State assume an overly narrow definition of possession, one based on
their understanding of Florida rather than federal law. Conage says that, as a matter of Florida law, constructive possession of contraband occurs when a defendant “knows of its presence on or about his premises and can exercise dominion and control over it.” Similarly, the State cites the 2016 version of Florida‘s standard jury instructions for the proposition that constructive possession requires proof that the defendant is aware of the presence of the substance and has the ability to control it, and that the substance is in a place over which the defendant has control.7
the Legislature would have criminalized conduct (consideration plus obtaining control, without regard to the defendant‘s relationship to the place where the drugs are found) that would not have been captured by the statute‘s reference to possession (as Conage and the State understand Florida law possession).8
In any event, the Legislature appears to have been willing to tolerate some redundancy in its design of
specialized definition saying that a purchase is complete upon payment, if the Legislature wishes to do so.
C.
Finally, there is the rule of lenity. Through
Conage says that the rule of lenity requires us to resolve ties in his favor, because he is the defendant in the underlying federal case. We disagree. The reference in
We believe that the United States has the better reading of
III.
To sum up: for purposes of
It is so ordered.
CANADY, POLSTON, LAWSON, COURIEL, and GROSSHANS, JJ., concur.
LABARGA, J., concurs in result with an opinion.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED.
LABARGA, J., concurring in result.
Although I agree with the majority‘s conclusion that the word “purchase,” as set forth in
As recently as May 26, 2022, in a unanimous opinion, this Court quoted the same principle it now finds untenable, and it did so without questioning its viability. See Shim v. Buechel, 339 So. 3d 315, 317 (Fla. 2022) (“See State v. Peraza, 259 So. 3d 728, 730 (Fla. 2018) (quoting Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1984) (‘[W]hen the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion for resorting to the rules of statutory interpretation and construction; the statute must be given its plain and obvious meaning.’ “))).
Certified Question of Law from the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit – Case No. 17-13975
A. Fitzgerald Hall, Federal Defender, James T. Skuthan, First Assistant Federal Defender, Conrad Benjamin Kahn, Interim Chief of Appeals, Katherine Howard, Research and Writing Specialist, Federal Defender‘s Office, Orlando, Florida,
for Appellant
Roger B. Handberg, United States Attorney, David P. Rhodes, Chief, Appellate Division, Holly L. Gershow, Assistant United States Attorney, Appellate Division, Middle District, Tampa, Florida,
for Appellee
Henry C. Whitaker, Solicitor General, Jeffrey Paul DeSousa, Chief Deputy Solicitor General, and David M. Costello, Assistant Solicitor General, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Amicus Curiae State of Florida
Notes
established by proof that (defendant) had direct personal power to control the substance or the present ability to direct its control by another.To prove (defendant) knowingly possessed a substance, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [he] [she] a) knew of the existence of the substance and b) intentionally exercised control over that substance.
Control can be exercised over a substance whether the substance is carried on a person, near a person, or in a completely separate location. Mere proximity to a substance does not establish that the person intentionally exercised control over the substance in the absence of additional evidence. Control can be
Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 25.7(a).