Background

• Michael Conage, after a federal gun conviction, received an ACCA-enhanced sentence relying on three prior "serious drug offenses," one being a 2006 Florida conviction for trafficking in cocaine under § 893.135(1).
• The Eleventh Circuit certified the question whether the word "purchase" in Florida’s trafficking statute requires possession (actual or constructive) as federal law defines it for ACCA purposes.
• Section 893.135(1) lists multiple ways to commit trafficking (sell, purchase, manufacture, deliver, bring into the state, possess) but does not define "purchase." Florida precedent on "purchase" in this context is sparse.
• Conage argued a purchase is complete upon payment (no possession required); the United States argued a purchase is not complete until the buyer has obtained control of the drugs (i.e., possession, including constructive possession).
• The Florida Supreme Court held that a completed purchase under § 893.135(1) requires (1) giving consideration and (2) obtaining control of a trafficking quantity of drugs, where "control" encompasses the federal law concept of constructive possession (including control via an agent).
• The Court considered statutory context, dictionary meaning, prior Florida law treating delivery as an element of sale, legislative history (purchase added in 1987), and the rule of lenity; it rejected defining purchase as complete at payment.

Issues

Key Cases Cited

• United States v. Conage, 976 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2020) (Eleventh Circuit decision certifying question to Florida Supreme Court)
• United States v. James, 430 F.3d 1150 (11th Cir. 2005) (possession of trafficking quantity implies intent to distribute)
• United States v. Beckles, 565 F.3d 832 (11th Cir. 2009) (definition of constructive possession in federal law)
• United States v. Edwards, 166 F.3d 1362 (11th Cir. 1999) (constructive possession as control other than direct physical control)
• Milazzo v. State, 377 So. 2d 1161 (Fla. 1979) (delivery is an essential element of a sale in chapter 893 context)
• Brown v. State, 428 So. 2d 250 (Fla. 1983) (Florida formulation of constructive possession elements)
• Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 1984) (statutory-interpretation principle discussed and critiqued)
• Manzella v. United States, 791 F.2d 1263 (7th Cir. 1986) (noting criminal-milieu concept of recognized authority to possess)