Meyer v. United Parcel Serv., Inc.Meyer v. United Parcel Serv., Inc.
MEYER, APPELLEE, v. UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC., APPELLANT.
[Cite as Meyer v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 122 Ohio St.3d 104, 2009-Ohio-2463.]
Employment discrimination—Age-discrimination claim under
(No. 2008-0315 — Submitted February 3, 2009 — Decided June 2, 2009.)
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County, No. C-060772, 174 Ohio App.3d 339, 2007-Ohio-7063.
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT
- An age-discrimination claim brought pursuant to
R.C. 4112.99 is subject to the substantive provisions ofR.C. 4112.02 and4112.14 . - Pursuant to
R.C. 4112.14(C) , when the discharge of an employee has been arbitrated and the discharge has been found to be for just cause, the discharged employee is barred from pursuing an action for age discrimination.
CUPP, J.
{¶ 1} This appeal requires us to consider the relationship of the several provisions of
I. Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 2} UPS terminated Meyer‘s employment as a package-delivery driver on December 1, 2003. At the time of his discharge, Meyer was 48 years old and had worked for UPS for about 25 years. UPS had terminated Meyer‘s employment two previous times in 2003. But on both of those previous occasions, Meyer had filed a grievance, his discipline had been reduced to a suspension without pay, and he had returned to work after serving his suspension. However, Meyer‘s grievance over his December 1 discharge was denied, and his discharge was upheld by UPS‘s “Ohio Joint State Committee” in January 2004.
{¶ 3} Meyer filed a complaint in the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas on May 7, 2004, alleging that he had been wrongfully terminated in retaliation for filing several workers’ compensation claims. Meyer raised two claims in his initial complaint going to the alleged retaliatory discharge: that UPS had violated
{¶ 4} In July 2005, the trial court granted Meyer leave to file an amended complaint. In the amended complaint, he added a claim of age
{¶ 5} On May 1, 2006, UPS moved for summary judgment on all of Meyer‘s claims. This motion was premised, in part, on the contention that
{¶ 6} The case proceeded to a jury trial in August 2006.2 The jury found in Meyer‘s favor on both his
{¶ 7} Upon UPS‘s appeal, the First District Court of Appeals rejected several of UPS‘s arguments regarding the age-discrimination claim, including that the claim was barred by
{¶ 8} We accepted UPS‘s appeal under our discretionary jurisdiction for review of a single proposition of law: “In order to preserve the detailed framework for age discrimination claims that the General Assembly enacted, an age discrimination claim brought under the general language of
II. Relevant Statutes and Case Law
A. Statutes
{¶ 9}
{¶ 10} “An aggrieved individual may enforce the individual‘s rights relative to discrimination on the basis of age as provided for in this section by instituting a civil action, within one hundred eighty days after the alleged unlawful discriminatory practice occurred, in any court with jurisdiction for any legal or equitable relief that will effectuate the individual‘s rights.
{¶ 11} “A person who files a civil action under this division is barred, with respect to the practices complained of, from instituting a civil action under
section 4112.14 of the Revised Code and from filing a charge with the commission undersection 4112.05 of the Revised Code .”5
{¶ 12}
{¶ 13} “(A) No employer shall discriminate in any job opening against any applicant or discharge without just cause any employee aged forty or older who is physically able to perform the duties and otherwise meets the established requirements of the job and laws pertaining to the relationship between employer and employee.
{¶ 14} “(B) Any person aged forty or older who is discriminated against in any job opening or discharged without just cause by an employer in violation of division (A) of this section may institute a civil action against the employer in a court of competent jurisdiction. If the court finds that an employer has discriminated on the basis of age, the court shall order an appropriate remedy which shall include reimbursement to the applicant or employee for the costs,
including reasonable attorney‘s fees, of the action, or to reinstate the employee in the employee‘s former position with compensation for lost wages and any lost fringe benefits from the date of the illegal discharge and to reimburse the employee for the costs, including reasonable attorney‘s fees, of the action. The remedies available under this section are coexistent with remedies available pursuant to sections 4112.01 to4112.11 of the Revised Code ; except that any person instituting a civil action under this section is, with respect to the practices complained of, thereby barred from instituting a civil action underdivision (N) of section 4112.02 of the Revised Code or from filing a charge with the Ohio civil rights commission undersection 4112.05 of the Revised Code .{¶ 15} “(C) The cause of action described in division (B) of this section and any remedies available pursuant to
sections 4112.01 to4112.11 of the Revised Code shall not be available in the case of discharges where the employee has available to the employee the opportunity to arbitrate the discharge or where a discharge has been arbitrated and has been found to be for just cause.” (Emphasis added.)
{¶ 16}
{¶ 17} “Whoever violates this chapter is subject to a civil action for damages, injunctive relief, or any other appropriate relief.”
B. Case law
1. Elek v. Huntington Natl. Bank
{¶ 18} In Elek v. Huntington Natl. Bank (1991), 60 Ohio St.3d 135, 135-136, 573 N.E.2d 1056, Elek filed an action in common pleas court pursuant to
2. Bellian v. Bicron Corp.
{¶ 19} In Bellian v. Bicron Corp. (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 517, 519, 634 N.E.2d 608, Bellian brought an age-discrimination claim pursuant to
{¶ 20} In reaching that conclusion, this court in Bellian noted that Elek had recognized that in some instances,
{¶ 21} “[W]e have held that where there is no manifest legislative intent that the general provision prevail over the specific provision, the specific provision applies. State v. Chippendale (1990), 52 Ohio St.3d 118, 556 N.E.2d 1134. Here,
R.C. 4112.99 is the more general statute. Consequently,R.C. 4112.99 prevails overR.C. 4112.02(N) only if there is a clear manifestation oflegislative intent. Since the General Assembly has not shown such an intent, the specific provision, R.C. 4112.02(N) , must be the only provision applied. Moreover, appellant alleged in Count I of his complaint that the ’ [d]efendant and its agents have violated the provisions of Chapter 4112 of the Ohio Revised Code.’ The only provision inR.C. Chapter 4112 that recognizes discrimination on the basis of age isR.C. 4112.02 . Thus, regardless of whether appellant stated reliance onR.C. 4112.02 or4112.99 , he had to be referring to the form of age-based employment discrimination identified byR.C. 4112.02 .” 69 Ohio St.3d at 519, 634 N.E.2d 608.
{¶ 22} Because
3. Cosgrove v. Williamsburg of Cincinnati Mgt. Co., Inc.
{¶ 23} In Cosgrove v. Williamsburg of Cincinnati Mgt. Co., Inc. (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 281, 638 N.E.2d 991, Cosgrove asserted that her employment had been terminated because of her pregnancy and filed a sex-discrimination claim in common pleas court under
{¶ 24} A concurring opinion in Cosgrove specifically addressed the reasons why Bellian and Cosgrove were decided the way they were, thereby reconciling the holdings of the two cases. See 70 Ohio St.3d at 290-293, 638 N.E.2d 991 (Resnick, J., concurring). That concurring opinion in Cosgrove was joined by Chief Justice Moyer and by Justices A.W. Sweeney, Douglas, and Wright, and therefore expressed the view of five members of this court.
{¶ 25} Although both Bellian and Cosgrove involved plaintiffs who brought claims under
{¶ 26} There was “no specific
{¶ 27} The concurring opinion in Cosgrove observed that ”
A. Structure of R.C. Chapter 4112 for age-discrimination claims
{¶ 28} A consideration of the foregoing authorities yields several conclusions regarding
{¶ 29} Furthermore, contrary to Meyer‘s arguments, the fact that
{¶ 30} The fundamental reasoning in Bellian regarding age-discrimination claims filed under
{¶ 31} Related sections of the Revised Code must be construed together, and in cases involving statutory construction, ” ‘our paramount concern is the
{¶ 32} Consistently with the statutory framework for age-discrimination claims set forth within
B. Leininger v. Pioneer Natl. Latex
{¶ 33} In Leininger v. Pioneer Natl. Latex, 115 Ohio St.3d 311, 2007-Ohio-4921, 875 N.E.2d 36, at the syllabus, we recently held that “[a] common-law tort claim for wrongful discharge based on Ohio‘s public policy against age discrimination does not exist, because the remedies in
{¶ 34} In Leininger, we examined the statutory remedies available under
{¶ 35} In deciding that question, we first discussed the remedy provisions of
{¶ 36} At this point in the opinion, we remarked in a footnote: “Although
{¶ 37} Our discussion in the text of the opinion continued: “We reject this argument.
{¶ 38} The foregoing discussion in Leininger must be understood within its context. Of particular importance to that understanding is the statement within footnote 4 of Leininger explaining that this court was looking “at all the remedies available to a plaintiff at the time the claim accrued.” (Emphasis added.) Id., ¶ 31, fn. 4. Notably, “when an age discrimination claim accrues,” no statute of limitations has yet expired, and therefore an age-discrimination plaintiff at that time potentially can seek “the full spectrum of remedies available” under
{¶ 39} The court of appeals was mistaken when it read our mention of Elek in the quoted passage from Leininger as reiterating the “prior holding that had rejected the argument that the specific-remedies provisions of subsections within the chapter prevail over the more general provisions of
{¶ 40} We emphasize that all age-discrimination employment-related claims must be governed by the specific statutory directives in
C. R.C. 4112.14(C)
{¶ 41} The dispositive issue in this case is whether Meyer‘s age-discrimination claim is barred by
{¶ 42} “The cause of action described in division (B) of this section and any remedies available pursuant to
sections 4112.01 to4112.11 of the Revised Code shall not be available in the case of discharges where the employee has available to the employee the opportunity to arbitrate the discharge or where a discharge has been arbitrated and has been found to be for just cause.”
{¶ 43} In resolving this issue, the court of appeals first held that Meyer‘s termination had been upheld in a proceeding that was the equivalent of arbitration for
1. Arbitration
{¶ 44} The court of appeals summarily determined that Meyer‘s termination had been upheld in a proceeding that qualified as “arbitration” under the statute by stating: “It is undisputed that Meyer contested his discharge in the grievance procedure established for employees at UPS. This grievance procedure was the functional equivalent of arbitration.” Id., 174 Ohio App.3d 339, 2007-Ohio-7063, 882 N.E.2d 31, at ¶ 28. The court of appeals supported this statement by citing its previous decision in Hopkins v. United Parcel Serv., Inc. (Feb. 11, 2000), 1st Dist. No. C-990392, 2000 WL 279228.
{¶ 45} In Hopkins, the employee challenged his termination by UPS through established grievance procedures, and after the termination had been upheld at a local hearing, he appealed that result to “the Ohio Joint State Committee” in Columbus. The Ohio Joint State Committee grievance panel, which was made up of two UPS representatives and two union representatives,
{¶ 46} In rejecting Hopkins‘s argument that “the grievance process lacked the indicia of impartiality that the term ‘arbitration’ implies,” the First District in Hopkins found persuasive the holdings of other courts that “the UPS grievance mechanism does possess the requisite procedural safeguards to be deemed arbitration.” 2000 WL 279228 at * 2. The court cited United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Mitchell (1981), 451 U.S. 56, 101 S.Ct. 1559, 67 L.Ed.2d 732, and VanDerVeer v. United Parcel Serv., Inc. (C.A.6, 1994), 25 F.3d 403.9
{¶ 47} Those cited decisions both equated the UPS grievance-review process to an arbitration. See, e.g., VanDerVeer, 25 F.3d at 405 (terming the proceeding before the Ohio Joint State Grievance Committee in which the plaintiff‘s termination was upheld an “arbitration“). Furthermore, Meyer has not taken issue in any way with this aspect of the court of appeals’ reasoning. We therefore accept the court of appeals’ holding that this case involves the functional equivalent of arbitration for
2. Applicability of R.C. 4112.14(C)
{¶ 48} In holding that Meyer‘s age-discrimination claim under
{¶ 49} The court of appeals misinterpreted the reach of
{¶ 50} Even though Hopkins interpreted a different version of the statute, it does not follow that
{¶ 51} We hold that pursuant to
D. Other Issues
{¶ 52} UPS asserts that
{¶ 53} Although our discussion of Leininger touched upon these issues, we decline to more specifically address UPS‘s argument for two reasons. First, because we have determined that Meyer‘s age-discrimination claim is barred by
{¶ 54} Second, an important component of UPS‘s argument in this regard is that the trial court erred in allowing Meyer to amend his complaint to add his age-discrimination claim, because that claim should not relate back under
{¶ 55} Finally, for the same reasons, we decline to address the argument advanced by amicus curiae Ohio Management Lawyers Association that all age-discrimination claims filed under
IV. Conclusion
{¶ 56} We hold that an age-discrimination claim brought pursuant to
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
MOYER, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, O‘CONNOR, O‘DONNELL, and LANZINGER, JJ., concur.
PFEIFER, J., dissents.
PFEIFER, J., dissenting.
{¶ 57} Although otherwise extraordinarily precise, the majority opinion is remarkably loose in describing
{¶ 58} In concluding that
{¶ 59} Furthermore,
{¶ 61} I dissent.
Law Office of Marc Mezibov, Marc D. Mezibov, Stacy A. Hinners, and Susan M. Lawrence, for appellee.
Frost Brown Todd, L.L.C., Kasey Bond, and Eugene Droder III, for appellant.
Mark P. Herron; and Christina M. Royer, Ltd., and Christina M. Royer, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio Employment Lawyers Association.
Littler Mendelson, P.C., and Suellen Oswald, urging reversal for amicus curiae Ohio Management Lawyers Association.