METROPOLITAN COUNCIL NO 23, AFSCME v OAKLAND COUNTY PROSECUTOR
Docket No. 63127
Supreme Court of Michigan
July 16, 1980
Argued January 10, 1980 (Calendar No. 15).
409 MICH 299
Docket No. 63127. Argued January 10, 1980 (Calendar No. 15).--- Decided July 16, 1980.
Seventeen investigating officers employed by the Oakland County Prosecutor‘s office, who were represented by Metropolitan Council No. 23, American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO, reached an impasse in negotiations to establish a collective bargaining agreement with their employer. The union petitioned the Employment Relations Commission for compulsory arbitration of the contract under the statute concerning contract-formation disputes in police and fire departments. The Employment Relations Commission granted the petition, finding that the prosecutor‘s investigators were “subject to the hazards” of police officers within the meaning of the compulsory arbitration statute, and that it therefore applied. The Court of Appeals, Danhof, C.J., and Bronson and Beasley, JJ., affirmed (Docket No. 78-1196). Defendant appeals. In opinions by Justices Williams, Ryan, and Moody, Justice Levin dissenting, the Supreme Court held that the dispute in this case is not subject to the compulsory arbitration statute.
Justice Williams, joined by Chief Justice Coleman and Justice Fitzgerald wrote:
1. Each part of a statute must be considered with every other part. The meaning of any part of the statute should be construed, if possible, to produce a harmonious and consistent enactment as a whole. The particular effect of any part generally must be found from the context of the act, the nature of its subject, and the legislative purpose. The purpose of interpreting
REFERENCES FOR POINTS IN HEADNOTES
[1-3, 9, 11-13] 73 Am Jur 2d, Statutes §§ 145, 158.
[2, 11-13] 73 Am Jur 2d, Statutes § 154.
[3, 11-13] 73 Am Jur 2d, Statutes §§ 207, 208.
[4-13] 48 Am Jur 2d, Labor and Labor Relations (Rev) §§ 1772, 1773.
Validity and construction of statutes or ordinances providing for arbitration of labor disputes involving public employees. 68 ALR3d 885.
2. The legislative purpose of the statute in this case was to provide a binding procedure for resolving contract-formation disputes and to avert strikes in police and fire departments which would be likely to cause an imminent, serious threat to the public order, safety, and welfare and undermine the high morale and efficient operation of the departments. The argument that the Legislature intended the dispute of the prosecutor‘s investigators to be resolved under the statute is not persuasive. Although they are found to be subject to the hazards of police work and are engaged in that capacity by a county department, submission of their dispute to binding arbitration would not effectuate the general legislative intent to avert stoppages of critical public services. To permit the investigators’ dispute to be submitted under the statute, by applying one provision of it literally, would be neither consonant with the express legislative intent nor sound reason. The dispute in this case does not constitute an impasse in collective bargaining where the public welfare cannot endure a stoppage of work until negotiation resolves the dispute.
3. The parties, the Employment Relations Commission and the Court of Appeals have considered only the situation of the complaining employees, regardless of the principal function of the public employer. The factual finding that these investigators are subject to the hazards of police work is supported by competent, material and substantial evidence on the whole record. However, to terminate the inquiry there is to ignore the act as a whole. These investigators, as public employees, are prohibited from striking by the public employment relations act and may resort to its provisions for resolving labor disputes. Even if they were to engage in an illegal strike, that would not invade the public order, safety, and welfare and endanger the community in the manner contemplated by the compulsory arbitration statute. The practical duties of the prosecutor‘s office, unlike those of emergency medical services which are now included within the statute, are not as valuable to the public as that provided by police or fire departments, and a disruptive labor dispute among these employees would not be detrimental to the public welfare as would a strike by police
Justice Ryan, joined by Chief Justice Coleman, concurred in the result because the prosecutor‘s investigators are not “employees engaged as policemen” whose strike would be likely to cause an imminent and serious threat to public safety and were not intended by the Legislature to be included within the provisions of the statute.
Justice Moody concurred in the result. While the investigators in this case may function in some ways as “policemen“, the Legislature did not intend that they should be included under the mantle of the compulsory arbitration statute. He offered no opinion whether a person who functions as a “policeman” but is not a member of a “police department” may be or was intended to be included among those protected by the statute. There may be persons clearly intended to be protected who would not be afforded protection if the statute were given too strict or literal an interpretation.
Reversed.
Justice Levin, joined by Justice Kavanagh, dissenting, would not introduce a requirement that the employees and the employer both have “critical-service status“. While the statute aims to provide a means of averting critical-service work stoppages by police officers and fire fighters, the act by its terms covers persons “subject to the hazards” of police work and fire fighting without inquiry whether a work stoppage by those persons would threaten community safety.
1. It is unnecessary to the disposition of this case to consider what might be the proper resolution of a case in which it was claimed that because some of a county or city department‘s employees were subject to the hazards of police work, all employees were subject to compulsory arbitration irrespective of whether their positions exposed them to those hazards. The question in this case is not whether employees who are neither policemen nor subject to the hazards of police work come within the act, but whether employees who are subject to the hazards of police work, although neither titled “policemen” nor employed by an agency called a police department, are subject to its provisions.
2. One can agree that the primary motivation for the passage of the compulsory arbitration act was to forestall police and fire fighter work stoppages which might threaten community safety without conceding that the Legislature intended to limit the
3. There is no indication in the act that the Legislature considered some police officers more important than others or regarded some departments as more indispensable than others. But the proposed “critical-service” analysis suggests that among the ranks of an ordinary police or fire department, some officers (e.g., those in charge of files, fingerprints and storage of evidence) might not meet the definition for arbitration along with their fellow officers, and moreover leads either to the conclusion that the officers from municipal police departments who worked side-by-side with Oakland County Prosecutor‘s investigators on such assignments as gambling raids, narcotics surveillance and “buys“, and the special child homicide task force, are not within the intendment of the act, or to the conclusion that those officers are subject to arbitration while the investigators are not solely because of departmental affiliation, although the act draws no distinctions between “public police and fire departments” meeting the statutory definition. Before adopting such a construction, the Court should, at minimum, remand the cause to the Employment Relations Commission whose perspective for gauging the effect of such a construction upon the operation of the act is superior to the Court‘s. The impasse in bargaining in this case should be resolved by arbitration.
89 Mich App 564; 280 NW2d 600 (1979) reversed.
OPINION BY WILLIAMS, J.
1. STATUTES -- CONSTRUCTION -- LEGISLATIVE INTENT.
A statute generally must be construed as a whole, and the particular effect of any part must be found from the context of the act, the nature of its subject, and the legislative purpose;
2. STATUTES -- CONSTRUCTION -- LEGISLATIVE INTENT.
The purpose in interpreting a statute is to give effect to the legislative intent; if there is a conflict, the spirit and purpose of the statute should prevail over its strict letter.
3. STATUTES -- CONSTRUCTION -- LEGISLATIVE INTENT.
Departure from the literal construction of a statute is justified where such a construction would produce an absurd and unjust result, and would be clearly inconsistent with the purposes and policies of the act in question.
4. LABOR RELATIONS -- COMPULSORY ARBITRATION -- POLICE AND FIRE DEPARTMENTS -- MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS -- LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE.
The legislative purpose of the statute which provides for compulsory arbitration of disputes concerning contract formation in police and fire departments was to provide a binding procedure for resolving disputes to avert strikes which would be likely to cause an imminent, serious threat to the public order, safety, and welfare and undermine the high morale and efficient operation of the police and fire departments (
5. LABOR RELATIONS -- COMPULSORY ARBITRATION -- POLICE AND FIRE DEPARTMENTS -- PROSECUTING ATTORNEYS -- INVESTIGATING OFFICERS.
Submission of a dispute concerning labor contract formation for investigating officers employed by a prosecuting attorney to binding arbitration under the statute concerning such disputes in police and fire departments would be neither consonant with the express legislative intent of the statute, nor sound reason; a dispute between a prosecutor and his investigating officers does not constitute an impasse in collective bargaining such that the public welfare cannot endure a stoppage of work until negotiation resolves the dispute (
6. LABOR RELATIONS -- COMPULSORY ARBITRATION -- POLICE AND FIRE DEPARTMENTS -- PROSECUTING ATTORNEYS -- INVESTIGATING OFFICERS.
The conclusion that the statute which provides for compulsory arbitration of disputes concerning contract formation in police and fire departments applies to investigating officers employed by a prosecuting attorney after considering only the situation
7. LABOR RELATIONS -- COMPULSORY ARBITRATION -- POLICE AND FIRE DEPARTMENTS -- PROSECUTING ATTORNEYS -- WORDS AND PHRASES.
A prosecuting attorney‘s office does not constitute a “public police * * * department” within the legislative intent of the statute providing for compulsory arbitration of disputes concerning contract formation in police and fire departments (
OPINION CONCURRING IN RESULT BY RYAN, J.
8. LABOR RELATIONS -- COMPULSORY ARBITRATION -- POLICE AND FIRE DEPARTMENTS -- PROSECUTING ATTORNEYS -- INVESTIGATORS -- WORDS AND PHRASES.
Investigators employed in a prosecuting attorney‘s department are not “employees engaged as policemen” whose strike would be likely to cause an imminent and serious threat to public safety and were not intended by the Legislature to be included within the provisions of the statute which provides for compulsory arbitration of disputes concerning contract formation in police and fire departments (
OPINION CONCURRING IN RESULT BY BLAIR MOODY, JR., J.
9. LABOR RELATIONS -- COMPULSORY ARBITRATION -- STATUTES -- CONSTRUCTION -- PROSECUTING ATTORNEYS -- INVESTIGATORS.
The Legislature did not intend that investigating officers employed in a prosecuting attorney‘s department should be included under the statute which provides for compulsory arbitration of disputes concerning contract formation in police and fire departments, although the investigators may function in some ways as “policemen” (
DISSENTING OPINION BY LEVIN, J.
10. LABOR RELATIONS -- COMPULSORY ARBITRATION -- STATUTES -- CONSTRUCTION -- CRITICAL SERVICE.
The statute providing for compulsory arbitration of contract-formation labor disputes in police and fire departments by its terms covers persons “subject to the hazards” of police work
11. LABOR RELATIONS -- COMPULSORY ARBITRATION -- STATUTES -- CONSTRUCTION.
The language of the statute providing for compulsory arbitration of contract-formation labor disputes in police and fire departments is not entirely free of ambiguity, but in a case where the question is whether employees who are subject to the hazards of police work, although neither titled “policemen” nor employed by an agency called a police department, are subject to its provisions, it is unnecessary to decision to consider what might be the proper resolution of a case in which it was claimed that, because some of a county or city department‘s employees were subject to the hazards of police work, all employees were subject to arbitration irrespective of whether their work exposed them to those hazards (
12. LABOR RELATIONS -- COMPULSORY ARBITRATION -- STATUTES -- CONSTRUCTION.
The Legislature has not used the word “critical” or any similar term in identifying the departments or employees within the scope of the statute providing for compulsory arbitration of contract-formation labor disputes in police and fire departments, and while the primary motivation for the statute may have been to forestall police and fire fighter work stoppages which might threaten community safety, there is no indication that the Legislature intended to limit its reach to cases where both the complaining employee and the interested employer enjoy critical-service status (
13. LABOR RELATIONS -- COMPULSORY ARBITRATION -- PROSECUTING ATTORNEYS -- INVESTIGATORS.
It is not manifestly absurd or incredible to suppose that the Legislature intended employees in the position of prosecutor‘s investigators, who were found by the Employment Relations Commission to be “subject to the hazards” of police work within the meaning of the statute providing for compulsory arbitration of contract-formation labor disputes in police and fire departments, to come within the scope of the statute, and to permit the investigators or the county to initiate arbitration
Zwerdling & Maurer (by M. Elizabeth Bunn and George M. Maurer, Jr.) for plaintiff.
A. Russell Messina, Assistant Civil Counsel, for defendant.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, and George M. Bourgon, Jon M. De Horn, and Dennis J. Grifka, Assistants Attorney General, for Employment Relations Commission.
Amici Curiae:
Roy W. Rogensues for City of Center Line.
George G. Matish, Acting Corporation Counsel, Michael A. Hurvitz, Assistant Corporation Counsel, and William M. Saxton and Bernard J. Fieger, Special Assistants Corporation Counsel, for the City of Detroit.
Lippitt, Harrison, Perlove, Friedman & Zack (by Bernard A. Friedman and Bernard Feldman) for the Detroit Police Lieutenants and Sergeants Association.
Gregory, Van Lopik, Korney & Moore for the Detroit Police Officers Association.
Hiller, Howard, Larky & Hoekenga (by Daniel J. Hoekenga and Marc M. Susselman) for the Police Officers Association of Michigan.
OPINION BY WILLIAMS, J.
WILLIAMS, J. (for reversal). This is a case of first impression in this Court. Generally, it involves whether 17 prosecutor‘s investigators employed in the Oakland County Prosecutor‘s Department and represented by a separate collective bargaining unit therein may initiate compulsory, binding “public police and fire department” interest arbitration proceedings pursuant to 1969 PA 312.
The Legislature, seeking to avoid the peril to public safety, order and welfare caused by “public police and fire department” critical-service work stoppages, enacted Act 312. The express purposes, objects, and mechanics of the act are codified in §§ 1, 2(1) and 3 respectively:
“Sec. 1. It is the public policy of this state that in public police and fire departments, where the right of employees to strike is by law prohibited, it is requisite to the high morale of such employees and the efficient operation of such departments to afford an alternate, expeditious, effective and binding procedure for the resolution of disputes, * * *”
MCL 423.231 ;MSA 17.455(31) . (Emphasis supplied.)“Sec. 2. (1) Public police and fire departments means any department of a city, county, village, or township having employees engaged as policemen, or in fire fighting or subject to the hazards thereof, emergency medical service personnel employed by a police or fire department, or an emergency telephone operator employed by a police or fire department.”
MCL 423.232(1) ;MSA 17.455(32)(1) . (Emphasis supplied.)“Sec. 3. Whenever in the course of mediation of a public police or fire department employee‘s dispute * * * [an impasse is reached], the employees or employer may initiate binding arbitration proceedings
* * *.”
MCL 423.233 ;MSA 17.455(33) . (Emphasis supplied.)
In essence, pursuant to § 3 either “the employees or employer” of a § 2(1) public police or fire “department * * * having employees engaged as policemen, * * * or subject to the hazards thereof“, may initiate binding interest arbitration proceedings to resolve a “public police or fire department employee‘s dispute” where, as stated in § 1, it is requisite to the high morale of such employees and the efficient operation of such departments” for averting critical-service work stoppages.
While the act as a whole was obviously engineered to avert critical-service work stoppages arising from the nonresolution of a “public police * * * department employee‘s dispute“, the act is inherently ambiguous regarding eligibility to invoke its intended coverage. Although §§ 1, 2(1) and 3 each refer to a “public police or fire department” as the object of the act‘s dispute resolution coverage, this object admits of three differing interpretations. These interpretations depend on whether one concentrates on (1) the literal status of the interested municipal department/employer, (2) the critical-service status of the complaining employee, or (3) the critical-service status of both guided by the legislative intent underlying the act as a whole.
The first interpretation concentrates sole attention on the status of the interested department/employer and emerges from a literal reading of § 2(1) alone. As such, regardless of the critical-service employment status of the particular complainant employee, if the interested department/employer is a literal § 2(1) county department having somewhere within its ranks more than one employee engaged subject to the hazards of police
We are persuaded that the third mode of dual analysis is the appropriate one for ascertaining whether the instant prosecutor‘s investigators may initiate Act 312 proceedings to resolve their dispute as critical-service “public police * * * department” employees. Applying that dual, third mode of interpretive analysis to the facts of this case, it emerges that although these investigators are subject to the hazards of police work and although the Oakland County Prosecutor‘s Department is literally a county department engaging such employees, we are unpersuaded that the Oakland County Prosecutor‘s Department constitutes an intended “public police department” so that allowing either itself or its investigators to resolve their dispute pursuant to Act 312 will effectuate the whole act‘s intent as either (1) “requisite to the high morale of [the Oakland County Prosecutor‘s Department] employees” or (2) requisite to “the efficient operation of [the Oakland County Prosecutor‘s Department]” or (3) necessary for averting critical-service
For these reasons, we hold that the instant dispute is not subject to Act 312 coverage. As this Court early stated in Common Council of Detroit v Rush, 82 Mich 532, 542; 46 NW 951 (1890):
“[A] thing which is within the spirit of a statute is within the statute, although not within the letter; and a thing within the letter is not within the statute, unless within the intention.”
Accordingly, we reverse both the MERC and the Court of Appeals.
I. FACTS
Appellee Metropolitan Council 23, American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO, is the labor representative for a separate bargaining unit of 17 prosecutor‘s investigators employed by the Oakland County Prosecutor‘s Department as authorized by
On October 6, 1977, MERC conducted a hearing to determine whether the prosecutor‘s investigators could properly invoke the Act 312 arbitral mechanism. Two witnesses--prosecutor‘s investigators6--testified on behalf of appellee; appellant presented no witnesses.
At the hearing it was developed that the 17 prosecutor‘s investigators were assigned to four divisions of the Oakland County Prosecutor‘s Department as follows: Organized Crime Strike Force, 7; Criminal Investigation, 5; Welfare Fraud, 4; and Consumer Fraud, 1. As their title implies, the principal function of these individuals involved
Of the 17 investigators, 15 had prior police experience and, at the time of the hearing, were deputized by the Oakland County Sheriff; their deputization was subsequently withdrawn effective July, 1978. The two remaining nondeputized investigators who did not share prior police experience were described as engaged in duties substantially similar to those of their deputized colleagues.
Testimony was elicited that the investigators were required to carry a weapon by oral directive of their division supervisor; this was not required by departmental regulation of the Oakland County Prosecutor. On occasion, the investigators had found it necessary to employ their weapons. Certain investigators had suffered non-weapon-related injury in the execution of their investigatory functions.
It was related that although the specific investigative tasks of the prosecutor‘s investigators varied from division to division, as a result of their investigations they made arrests, booked and “mugged” prisoners and prepared arrest reports. Indeed, one witness testified that in the first nine months of 1977, the investigators had effected approximately 190 arrests during their investigations of various completed criminal offenses. Although they were wholly under the aegis of the Oakland County Prosecutor‘s Department, it was reported not to be uncommon for the prosecutor‘s
Although appellant presented no witnesses, it countered in its opening argument that since the investigators were primarily engaged in the performance of investigative duties collateral to prosecution rather than enforcement, were not subject to the daily encounters of front-line police officers, and did not function in a manner “critical” to the maintenance of public order and safety, they could not properly be characterized as “policemen * * * or subject to the hazards thereof“.
On the basis of the record, as well as the parties’ briefs, on March 8, 1978 the MERC issued its decision and order favorable to the investigators as being within the § 2(1) scope of Act 312, stating:
“On the basis of this record, we find that the duties of the Oakland County Prosecutor‘s Investigators go beyond the information-gathering process and directly involve them in law enforcement. See Oakland County Sheriff‘s Dep‘t, [1977] MERC Lab Op 843. Although they do not carry the title of ‘police officer,’ we find that the record supports the conclusion that they are clearly subject to the hazards of police work and thus within the scope of Act 312.” Oakland County (Prosecutor‘s Investigators), 1978 MERC Lab Op 328, 331-332. (Emphasis supplied.)
On April 16, 1979, the Court of Appeals affirmed the MERC ruling as supported by competent, material and substantial evidence on the whole record. In the Matter of the Petition of Metropolitan Council 23, AFSCME, 89 Mich App 564, 569-573; 280 NW2d 600 (1979). The Court of Appeals opined that MERC had “applied the correct statutory standard in its decision below [i.e., “the sole statutory precondition for invoking Act 312, other than employment by a municipal or county department,
We granted leave to appeal on July 19, 1979.7 406 Mich 1011 (1979). Oral argument was heard on January 10, 1980.
II. PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION: THE WHOLE ACT
From the litigant‘s viewpoint in statutory litigation of this type, the practical inquiry is usually framed in the basic determination of a particular provision‘s, clause‘s or word‘s meaning. Unremarkably, to satisfactorily fulfill that inquiry one must proceed in the same manner one would in considering any other composition--construe the object of inquiry with reference to the leading idea or purpose of the whole instrument. Indeed, much like any other literary composition, a statute is enacted as a whole rather than in parts or sections and is animated by one general purpose and intent. Consequently, each part or section must be considered in connection with every other part or section and the meaning ascribed to any one sec-
While it is axiomatic that this Court must enforce clear and unambiguous statutory provisions as written, Nordman v Calhoun, 332 Mich 460, 465; 51 NW2d 906 (1952); Ypsilanti Police Officers Ass‘n v Eastern Michigan University, 62 Mich App 87, 92; 233 NW2d 497 (1975), it is equally true that “[w]hat is ‘plain and unambiguous’ often depends on one‘s frame of reference“. Shiffer v Board of Education of Gibraltar School Dist, 393 Mich 190, 194; 224 NW2d 255 (1974). The whole act provides this proper “frame of reference” in cases of statutory construction: “A statutory provision that is in dispute must be read in light of the general purpose of the act and in conjunction with the pertinent provisions thereof.” Romeo Homes, Inc v Comm‘r of Revenue, 361 Mich 128, 135; 105 NW2d 186 (1960).
It is equally axiomatic, therefore, that “the intention of the Legislature, when discovered, must prevail, any existing rule of construction to the
contrary“. Michigan Central R Co v Michigan, 148 Mich 151, 156; 111 NW 735 (1907). Neither clinical construction nor the letter of the statute nor its rhetorical framework should be permitted to defeat the act‘s purpose and intent as gathered from consideration of the whole act. As eloquently stated by Justice GRANT in Common Council of Detroit v Rush, 82 Mich 532, 542; 46 NW 951 (1890): “[A] thing which is within the spirit of a statute is within the statute, although not within the letter; and a thing within the letter is not within the statute, unless within the intention.” This principle was more recently stated in Aikens v Dep‘t of Conservation, 387 Mich 495, 499; 198 NW2d 304 (1972): “It is well settled that the proper construction of any statute is for the court. The purpose of the court in interpreting a statute is to give effect to the legislative intent. If there is a conflict, the spirit and purpose of the statute should prevail over its strict letter.” (Citations omitted.)In such instances of conflict, courts “are authorized to collect the intention of the Legislature from the occasion and necessity of the law—from the mischief felt, and the objects and remedy in view; and the intention is to be taken, or presumed, according to what is consonant to reason and good discretion“. Sibley v Smith, 2 Mich 486, 492 (1853). “Where the language of a statute, in its ordinary meaning and grammatical construction, leads to a manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose of the enactment, or to some inconvenience or absurdity, hardship or injustice, presumably not intended, a construction may be put upon it” so that those unintended ends are avoided. Elba Twp v Gratiot County, 287 Mich 372, 394; 283 NW 615 (1939). This fundamental rule of
III. THE LEGISLATIVE INTENT OF ACT 312
Since
In response to a February, 1967 Report of the Governor‘s Advisory Committee on Public Employee Relations,
As a consequence of the fact that illegal strikes in the public sector nonetheless resulted from
Although as originally enacted
“The obvious intent of the Legislature was to forestall any serious disruption of [“municipal police and fire departments“], not only of a particular group of employees within the department. * * * The service [emergency medical service personnel] provide is as valuable to the public as that provided by other fire or police department employees, and a disruptive labor dispute among these employees would be just as detrimental to the public welfare as a strike by policemen or firemen. These employees need and deserve the protection of the act.”
Comparing the practical impact of the PERA and
“PERA procedurally requires the parties to meet at the bargaining table and confer in good faith with an open mind and a sincere desire to reach an agreement. It does not mandate agreement. If the parties fail to agree on one or more mandatory subjects, an ‘impasse’ situation is reached and the employer may take unilateral action on an issue consistent with its final offer to the employees’ representative. The duty to bargain is then suspended until there is a change in the surrounding conditions or circumstances.
“In the private sector ‘impasse’ often results in a strike. The employees refuse to accept the unilateral conditions imposed by the employer and withhold their
services as a bargaining weapon. In the public sector strikes are prohibited but nevertheless occur. If the public employees do strike, the public employer may resort to the courts in order to return the labor situation to the status quo. By the time that court relief is obtained, however, the public may well have been left for a long period without the services and protection of the striking employees. “When policemen engage in a strike, the community becomes immediately endangered by the withdrawal of their services. Likewise, our case law has often focused on the fact that fire fighters have a distinct and crucial employment relationship with a public employer.
“The Legislature, with knowledge of the vital character of police and fire services and with reference to the specific recommendations of the Governor‘s Advisory Committee on Public Employee Relations (February, 1967) moved to foreclose strikes to police officers and fire fighters by enacting
1969 PA 312 .” Dearborn, supra, 278-279 (footnotes omitted).
In Dearborn, supra, four members of this Court had occasion to assess the constitutional propriety of
As quoted above, Justice COLEMAN discerned that the Legislature promulgated
Implicitly distinguishing
“The challenged act represents a legislative attempt to prevent the dire consequences of strikes or work stoppages by certain public employees—policemen and firemen.” Id., 247.
As characterized by Justice WILLIAMS: “Compulsory [interest] arbitration is a practical response to the impasse experienced from time to time in collective bargaining where the public welfare cannot endure the impact of a work stoppage while awaiting the resolution of problems through normal negotiations“. Id., 292-293. The principal advantage of the
These various formulations of the legislative intent underlying
Thus, although variously described, it is evident that
IV. DISCUSSION
Guided by the manifest intent of
A. Status of the Interested Department/Employer
By the literal terms of
Although the literal terms of
We are likewise unpersuaded that the Legislature intended these prosecutor‘s investigators’ dispute to be resolved in accordance with the
“[D]eparture from the literal construction of a statute is justified when such construction would produce an absurd and unjust result and would be clearly inconsistent with the purposes and policies of the act in question.” Salas, supra, 109. We do not perceive that the Legislature intended compulsory interest arbitration in favor of the Oakland County Prosecutor‘s Department to constitute “a practical response to the impasse experienced from time to time in collective bargaining where the public welfare cannot endure the impact of a work stoppage while awaiting the resolution of problems through normal negotiations“. Dearborn, supra, 292-293 (opinion of WILLIAMS, J.).
B. Critical-Service Status of the Complaining Employee
Also reading
Under this interpretation, the two individuals employed by the hypothetical county library in a capacity subject to the hazards of police work could invoke the act‘s significant benefits as being “requisite to the high morale of such [county library] employees and the efficient operation of such [county library] departments” for averting critical-service work stoppages. Sole emphasis is placed on the complaining employees’ situation regardless of the interested department‘s/employer‘s principal function or character.
It is evident that the parties, the MERC and the Court of Appeals have each adopted this interpretation to determine whether these prosecutor‘s investigators may invoke the benefits of
The occasion of such narrow analytic focus is certainly not surprising since it has likewise been employed by others—including other Court of Appeals panels, the MERC and the Attorney General—in seeking to answer whether similarly situated complainants may invoke
As succinctly stated in Detroit v General Foods Corp, 39 Mich App 180, 190; 197 NW2d 315 (1972):
“When a court reviews an administrative tribunal decision, it reviews the original record to determine if the decision is supported by competent, material and substantial evidence, and will overturn a decision only when such decision is contrary to law, or is not supported by the necessary competent, material and substantial evidence.” (Emphasis in original.) See
Const 1963, art 6, § 28 ;MCL 24.306 , subds (d) and (f); MSA 3.560(206), subds (d) and (f). See alsoMCL 423.23(2)(e) ; MSA 17.454(25)(2)(e),MCL 423.242 ; MSA 17.455(42).
In reviewing the MERC finding in this matter that the prosecutor‘s investigators “are clearly subject to the hazards of police work and thus within the scope of
We agree in part and disagree in part with the rulings of both the MERC and the Court of Appeals.
Cognizant of our limited standard of review of administrative factual findings summarized in General Foods Corp, supra, as to the limited factual finding that these investigators are “subject to the hazards [of police work]“, we agree that this ruling is supported by competent, material and substantial evidence on the whole record. Guided by this facet of our restrictive standard of review, we afford due deference to administrative expertise and decline to “invade the province of exclusive administrative fact-finding by displacing an agency‘s choice between two reasonably differing views“. Michigan Employment Relations Comm v Detroit Symphony Orchestra, Inc, 393 Mich 116, 124; 223 NW2d 283 (1974).
Beyond this factual ruling, however, we hold that both the MERC and the Court of Appeals
Rather than engaging the totality of inquiry, we regard these literal terms of
We cannot perceive that invoking
C. Critical-Service Status of Both the Interested Department Employer and the Complaining Employee
As we have just discussed, it is only when both the complaining employee and the interested department/employer enjoy critical-service status that invocation of
Under this dual, whole-act interpretation, two premises must be satisfied. First, the particular complainant employee must be subject to the hazards of police work; it is not enough that the interested department/employer merely employ at least two persons engaged in that capacity who are not complainants. Second, the interested department/employer must be a critical-service county department engaging such complainant employees and having as its principal function the promotion of the public safety, order and welfare so that a work stoppage in that department would threaten community safety; again, it is not enough that the interested department/employer merely employ at least two persons who fulfill the first premise whether or not complainants. Only when both premises are fulfilled may the benefits of
We are persuaded that the third mode of dual analysis is the appropriate one for ascertaining whether the instant prosecutor‘s investigators may initiate
V. CONCLUSION
Guided by the standard of review for assessing
COLEMAN, C.J., and FITZGERALD, J., concurred with WILLIAMS, J.
RYAN, J. (concurring in the result). I concur in the result reached by my Brother WILLIAMS because I am persuaded that the Oakland County Prosecuting Attorney‘s investigators are not “employees engaged as policemen” whose strike would be likely to cause an imminent and serious threat
COLEMAN, C.J., concurred with RYAN, J.
BLAIR MOODY, JR., J. (concurring in the result). I concur in the result reached by Justice WILLIAMS. While the Oakland County Prosecuting Attorney‘s investigators may function in some ways as “policemen“, I do not think that the Legislature intended that these investigators should be included under the mantle of
LEVIN, J. (to affirm).
The Michigan Employment Relations Commission found that the investigators met the statutory definition because they were “subject to the hazards” of police work, and that factual finding is not challenged on appeal.
Our colleague would confine the operation of the act by reading into it a requirement that the employees and the employer both have “critical-service status” and would find that the investigators do not satisfy the proposed requirement.
We would not introduce such a requirement. While
I
Our colleague would hold that the compulsory, binding arbitration proceedings provided by
It is asserted that the act should be so construed, in accordance with its “spirit” rather than its “letter“, because an inherent ambiguity “regarding eligibility to invoke its intended coverage” “admits of three differing interpretations“, two of which must be rejected as inconsistent with the act‘s “manifest intent” “to avert critical-service work stoppages“.
We perceive no reason to add a gloss to the act which would limit its application to law-enforcement or fire-fighting personnel who provide “critical” services in “critical-service departments“.
It is unnecessary to the disposition of this case to consider what might be the proper resolution of a case in which it was claimed that, simply because some of a county or city department‘s employees were “subject to the hazards of police work“, all employees of that department were subject to arbitration of collective bargaining impasses under
The appearance of ambiguity is magnified by the evocation of a hypothetical county library, all of whose employees are held subject to the act be-
The question in the instant case is not whether employees who are neither policemen nor subject to the hazards of police work come within the act, but whether employees who are subject to the hazards of police work, although neither titled “policemen” nor employed by an agency called a police department, are subject to its provisions.
II
Our reading of the act discloses no reason to suppose that the Legislature did not intend its coverage to extend to all persons “subject to the hazards” of police work without regard to whether employed in “critical-service” capacities.
According to its title,
“[P]ublic police and fire departments” are defined by
One can agree that the primary motivation for the passage of
To permit the prosecutor‘s investigators or the county to initiate arbitration proceedings to resolve their collective bargaining impasse would not “defeat the act‘s purpose and intent” or be inconsistent with its “spirit“.8 To hold
III
It appears from our colleague‘s opinion that the gloss to be applied would cover all clauses of definitional
We discern no indication in the act that the Legislature considered some police officers more important than others or regarded some departments as more indispensable than others. But the proposed analysis suggests that among the ranks of an ordinary police or fire department, some officers (e.g., those in charge of files, fingerprints and storage of evidence) might not meet the definition for arbitration along with their fellow officers. Moreover, the analysis leads either to the conclusion that the officers from municipal police departments who worked side-by-side with Oakland County Prosecutor‘s investigators on such assignments as gambling raids, narcotics surveillance and “buys“, and the special child homicide task force, are not within the intendment of the act, or to the conclusion that those officers are subject to arbitration while the investigators are not solely because of departmental affiliation, although the act draws no distinctions between “public police and fire departments” meeting the
IV
It does not appear that the proposed limiting
In sum, we find no need to apply a broad gloss to the act to deal with hypothetical situations not presently before us. We would approve the determination of the MERC, well-grounded in the language of the act, that these investigators, whose positions involve them in law enforcement and subject them to the hazards faced by police officers, fall within the scope of
KAVANAGH, J., concurred with LEVIN, J.
Notes
“Although it can be argued that a strike by noncritical police department employees could burden police officers with nonemergency duties, thereby adversely affecting the operation of the entire department and possibl[y] causing indirect harm to the public due to weaker patrols or overworked officers, we do not think that the act was meant to be so all-encompassing. Work stoppages by almost any group of public employees could theoretically cause an extra burden on the police department. For example, a strike by street and highway personnel could cause defective traffic lights to become unreported and force some police officers to shift to traffic directing duties thereby weakening other sections of the police force.” Id., 365.
A similar argument was posited and rejected in dicta by another panel in Ypsilanti Police Officers Ass‘n v Eastern Michigan University, 62 Mich App 87; 233 NW2d 497 (1975), with respect to the relationship of Ypsilanti Police Department officers and campus police of the University.The MERC has likewise centered its attention on § 2(1) in determining Act 312 eligibility. In Oakland County Sheriff‘s Dep‘t, 1977 MERC Lab Op 843, 848-849, the MERC held clerk III, department clerk, account clerk, typist I and II, police communication agent, first cook, second cook, police para-professional and maintenance laborer “non-police classifications” engaged by the Oakland County Sheriff‘s Department outside the scope of § 2(1) “policemen * * * or subject to the hazards thereof“. Similarly, in an unpublished opinion of the Attorney General (No 5154, April 21, 1977), fire fighting personnel employed by the Wayne County Road Commission at the Wayne County Metropolitan Airport were opined to be “fire fighters” as defined by § 2(1).
Compare Ypsilanti Police Officers Ass‘n v Eastern Michigan University, 62 Mich App 87; 233 NW2d 497 (1975), where the Court of Appeals ruled in a similar vein that Eastern Michigan University, which employed commissioned police officers with a close nexus to Washtenaw County Sheriff‘s Department, was not a § 2(1) department of a “city, county, village or township” and therefore its employees could not invoke Act 312. Focus again remained on § 2(1). In the Matter of the Petition of Metropolitan Council 23, AFSCME, 89 Mich App 564; 280 NW2d 600 (1979).“Sec. 1. In each county of the state of Michigan, the board of supervisors of such counties, at their regular annual meeting, may, by resolution authorize the appointment by the prosecuting attorney of said county of as many assistant prosecuting attorneys as said board of supervisors shall deem necessary, and shall in addition authorize the appointment by said prosecuting attorney, of such investigating officers, clerks, stenographers and other clerical employes as said board of supervisors shall deem necessary.”
