Defendant City of Center Line appeals from two permanent injunctions issued by the Macomb County Circuit Court. We affirm.
Involved here is the question of enforcement of
*283
MCLA 423.243; MSA 17.455(43). That section of
"Sec. 13. During the pendency of proceedings before the arbitration panel, existing wages, hours and other conditions of employment shall not be changed by action of either party without the consent of the other but a party may so consent without prejudice to his rights or position under this act.”
On May 26, 1976, plaintiff union invoked compulsory arbitration under
The union obtained a show cause order from the court and, after a hearing on July 6, 1976, the court referred the matter of the layoffs to the statutory arbitration panel. An order temporarily enjoining the layoffs was not entered, however, until August 5, 1976.
After the July 6 hearing, the city informed the union that it would not pay a uniform allowance and shift differential. Under the expired contract, these payments were due on July 1. The arbitration panel considered the city’s refusal to make these payments, although the court’s opinion did not specifically refer to this matter, and on August 12, 1976, the panel issued an opinion holding that the layoffs of the patrolmen and the refusal to pay *284 the shift differential and uniform allowance were in violation of MCLA 423.243; MSA 17.455(43).
On September 7, 1976, the court entered a final judgment prohibiting the layoff of any members of the police department. Another final judgment, entered on September 15, 1976, and amended on September 27, 1976, ordered the payment of the shift differential and uniform allowance.
The city argues that the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over this action. The first basis for this argument, the union’s failure to exhaust contract grievance procedures, is clearly without merit. The contract had expired and the statutory prohibition against changes in wages, hours and working conditions, during pendency of arbitration was the basis of the union’s action. Nor is there merit in the argument that the public employment relations act (PERA), MCLA 423.201
et seq.;
MSA 17.455(1)
et seq.,
rests exclusive jurisdiction over the dispute between the union and the city in the Michigan Employment Relations Commission. While the city’s actions may have constituted unfair labor practices under MCLA 423.210; MSA 17.455(10), the union did not invoke the provisions of PERA.
*285 . The city next argues that the trial court erred by remanding the dispute to the arbitration panel. This argument is based on the distinction between grievance and interest arbitration. The city contends that only interest arbitration is compulsory and that the issues involved in this case are issues for grievance arbitration, which is not compulsory. Therefore, the court cannot compel arbitration of these issues.
But MCLA 423.243; MSA 17.455(43) does not use the terms "interest” or "grievance” arbitration. That section of the statute speaks only of maintaining existing wages, hours, and other conditions of employment during the pendency of proceedings before the panel. The city cannot inject into the statute terms which the Legislature did not put there. The city’s attempt to insert the concepts of interest and grievance arbitration can effectively divest the statute of any meaning. The city claims that the conditions of employment under consideration are matters for grievance arbitration and, therefore, subject to contractual remedies. At the same time, the city argues that no contract exists and that there are no continuing conditions of employment. According to Center Line’s interpretation, there can be no resort to contractual remedies nor to the statute. This cannot be what the Legislature intended.
Under MCLA 423.243; MSA 17.455(43), the status quo must be maintained, regardless of whether the issues involved are interest, grievance, neither or both. We see nothing improper in the court’s use of the statutory panel for assistance in determining whether the city violated one section of
Even if it was improper for the court to remand the matter to the arbitration panel, the judgments must be upheld. Even the authority to which the city refers us indicates that a change in layoff procedures is a change in working conditions.
NLRB v Frontier Homes Corp,
371 F2d 974 (CA 8, 1967). Since the expired contract between the union and the city did not provide for economic layoffs, but specifically stated that a decrease of work was a condition for layoffs, the layoff of three patrolmen for economic reasons was a change in working conditions.
Cf. Alpena v Alpena Fire Fighters Association,
Affirmed.