MELISSA VARELA v. FCA US LLC, ET AL.
No. CV-20-0157-PR
Supreme Court of Arizona
March 1, 2022
252 Ariz. 347 | 502 P.3d 969
Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County, The Honorable Connie Contes, Judge, No. CV2015-008635. REVERSED AND REMANDED. Opinion of the Court of Appeals, Division One, 249 Ariz. 89 (2020). AFFIRMED; VACATED IN PART.
G. Lynn Shumway, Shumway Law PLLC, Phoenix; Brent Ghelfi (argued), Ghelfi Law Group, PLLC, Phoenix; and Christopher J. Zachar, Zachar Law Firm, P.C., Phoenix, Attorneys for Melissa Varela
Paul G. Cereghini, Travis M. Wheeler, Bowman and Brooke LLP, Phoenix; and Thomas H. Dupree, Jr. (argued), Gibson Dunn, Washington, DC, Attorneys for FCA US LLC, LVN Motors LLC, and PV Holding Corporation
David L. Abney, Ahwatukee Legal Office, P.C., Phoenix, Attorney for Amici Curiae Arizona Association for Justice and Arizona Trial Lawyers Association
Patrick X. Fowler, Ashley Wiberg, Snell & Wilmer LLP, Phoenix; and Nicole A. Saharsky, Eric A. White, Mayer Brown LLP, Washington, DC, Attorneys for Amici Curiae PLAC and Alliance for Automotive Innovation
Thomas M. Klein, Briana L. Campbell, Klein Thomas & Lee, Phoenix, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Nissan North America, Inc.
JUSTICE MONTGOMERY authored the opinion of the Court, in which CHIEF JUSTICE BRUTINEL, VICE CHIEF JUSTICE TIMMER, and JUSTICES BOLICK, LOPEZ, and BEENE joined.
JUSTICE MONTGOMERY, opinion of the Court:
¶1 Under the Supremacy Clause of the Federal Constitution, when a state law conflicts with a properly enacted federal law, the state law is preempted. State law includes duties imposed by state tort law. Federal law includes regulations promulgated by executive agencies under authority delegated by Congress. Preemption may also occur in the absence of a regulation under the doctrine of implied obstacle preemption when state tort law conflicts with a clear federal policy objective established by an executive agency acting within properly delegated authority.
¶2 At issue in this case is whether, in the absence of a promulgated safety regulation, the National Highway Transportation Safety Administration (the “Agency“) has established a clear policy objective concerning automatic emergency breaking (“AEB“) technology that preempts state tort law claims based on an auto manufacturer‘s alleged failure to install AEB. We hold that, based on the facts and allegations in this case and the administrative record before us, the Agency has not established a policy objective that actually conflicts with the claims at issue. Thus, the claims are not preempted.
¶3 In 2015, a 2014 Jeep Grand Cherokee traveling at high speed rear-ended Melissa Varela‘s stopped car, despite the Jeep driver‘s last-moment attempt to brake and steer clear. The collision injured Varela and killed her four-year-old daughter, Vivian. The Jeep that struck Varela‘s car was a Jeep Grand Cherokee “Limited” that was not equipped with forward collision warning plus (“FCW+“), which is also referred to as AEB.1 FCW+ was available as an option on the Limited and Overland trim level versions of the Grand Cherokee and was a standard feature on the Summit and SRT trim levels.
¶4 Varela sued FCA US LLC, LVN Motors, LLC, and PV Holding Corp. (collectively “Chrysler“), alleging negligence, defective product design, defective product warning, and wrongful death. Varela asserted that the collision would not have occurred, or at least would have caused less damage, if the Jeep had been equipped with FCW+. Chrysler moved to dismiss the lawsuit, asserting it was preempted pursuant to implied obstacle preemption given the Agency‘s objectives regarding the development and deployment of AEB technology, which do not mandate AEB installation on vehicles such as the Jeep. Relying on policy guidance published by the Agency in 2016 and 2017, as well as the Agency‘s denial of a petition to regulate AEB in 2017, the trial court granted Chrysler‘s motion. The court reasoned that the referenced documents “reflect[ed] the federal government‘s intention to preempt this field ‘to incentivize the installation of these technologies in a way that allows for continued innovation and technological advancement.‘”
¶6 We accepted review because this case involves an issue of statewide importance concerning the federal preemption of state tort law, and because different panels of the court of appeals have issued conflicting opinions. We have jurisdiction pursuant to
II. DISCUSSION
A. Preemption in General
¶7 The Supremacy Clause of the Federal Constitution provides that “the Laws of the United States . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; . . . any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”
¶8 Preemption generally occurs in one of two ways. Id. at 884. Express preemption occurs when federal lawmakers explicitly state that related state law is preempted. Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383 (1992). Preemption can also be implied, Geier, 529 U.S. at 884, which can manifest in one of three forms. Field preemption occurs “when the scope of a [federal] statute indicates that Congress intended federal law
¶9 Federal regulations, in addition to laws passed by Congress, may also preempt state laws. Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 65 (2002) (stating that if a state common-law claim directly conflicted with a federal regulation promulgated under the Federal Boat Safety Act, or if it were impossible to comply with any such regulation without incurring liability under state common law, preemption would occur). Obstacle preemption may also occur when a federal agency, acting pursuant to authority delegated by Congress, decides not to regulate a particular matter, so long as its corresponding explanation for the decision conveys an “authoritative” message of preemptive federal objectives. Id. at 66-67 (acknowledging that “a federal decision to forgo regulation in a given area may imply an authoritative federal determination that the area is best left unregulated, and in that event would have as much pre-emptive force as a decision to regulate” (quoting Ark. Elec. Coop. Corp. v. Ark. Pub. Serv. Comm‘n, 461 U.S. 375, 384, (1983))); see also Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass‘n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 155 (1982) (finding that a state‘s limitation on the use of optional “due-on-sale clauses” in federal savings and loans contracts presented an actual obstacle to regulatory policy “authorizing [but not requiring] federal savings and loan associations to enforce due-on-sale clauses ‘subject only to express limitations imposed by the [Federal Home Loan Bank] Board‘“). Thus, in the specific instance of obstacle preemption, although a court must identify an “actual conflict,” an express statement of preemptive intent is not necessary. Geier, 529 U.S. at 884.
¶10 Chrysler has the burden of establishing preemption. Conklin v. Medtronic, Inc., 245 Ariz. 501, 504 ¶ 8 (2018).
B. Administrative Record
¶11 Chrysler contends that the administrative record reflects purposeful action on the part of the Agency to establish a policy to refrain
¶12 While it is not necessary to have “a specific, formal agency statement identifying [a] conflict” to conclude that one exists, Geier, 529 U.S. at 884, evidence of a preemptive intent or purpose must be clear, id. at 885, and “convey an ‘authoritative’ message of a [preemptive] federal policy,” Sprietsma, 537 U.S. at 67. The conflict cannot simply be a consequence of a secondary regulatory consideration or something simply permitted under the regulatory status quo that was not purposefully sought in pursuit of significant regulatory goals. See Williamson v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc., 562 U.S. 323, 338 (2011) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (explaining that the “mere fact” a regulation permits an option to manufacturers does not mean that this option is a preemptive “regulatory objective“).
¶13 We presume that federal lawmakers do not “cavalierly pre-empt” state law because “the States are independent sovereigns in our federal system,” see Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996), and have historically “had great latitude” to protect “the lives, limbs, health, comfort, and quiet” of their citizens, id. at 475 (quoting Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 756 (1985)). This presumption against preemption is “particularly” strong in “field[s] which the States have traditionally occupied,” Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009) (quoting Lohr, 518 U.S. at 485), such as adjudicating “common-law tort actions,” Geier, 529 U.S. at 887 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (describing this function as part of the “traditional jurisdiction” of “state courts“).
¶15 We underscore the need for interpretive caution with a few additional points. As mentioned, the Supremacy Clause, according to its plain language, comes into effect when federal “Laws . . . made in Pursuance” of the Constitution and a state law are contrary.
¶16 Implied preemption stands in tension with these procedural requirements because under that doctrine, state law is preempted not by what is expressed in federal law, but rather by what may be implied by federal law. Though such implications can certainly arise from the text of federal law, they necessarily exist outside of it. By venturing beyond the text of federal law, courts risk preempting state law based on something
¶17 Altogether, liberally applying implied preemption destabilizes the twin pillars of our constitutional order: federalism and the separation of powers. Accordingly, courts must be vigilant and avoid speculative conflicts far removed from the text of laws and authorized regulations and carefully adhere to what is in, or necessarily follows from, the text of federal law. See Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 659
¶18 Mindful of the need for caution, we now turn to reviewing the administrative record. Our task is to determine whether the Agency has conveyed an authoritative message establishing a federal policy of maintaining manufacturer choice for the development and deployment of AEB technology, has determined that AEB is best left unregulated, and that any AEB regulation is an exclusive federal responsibility. The record consists of information from the New Car Assessment Program (the “Program“), guidance published by the Department of Transportation (“DOT“) and the Agency from 2016 to 2020,4 and the Agency‘s denial of a 2017 petition for rulemaking that would have required installation of AEB technology on all light vehicles, including vehicles like the Jeep Grand Cherokee. We also have two notices of proposed rulemaking issued by the Agency in March and December of 2020.
1. The Program
¶19 Varela points to the Program as evidence of the Agency‘s goal to encourage accelerated deployment of the relevant technology. Chrysler rejects any use of the Program as a source for setting an AEB standard.
¶21 Beginning in model year 2010, the Agency identified FCW as one of several technologies for inclusion in a program for rating crash avoidance.
2. Policy Guidance
¶22 From 2016 to 2020, the Agency published a series of documents providing guidance with respect to automated vehicles and
¶23 As for Chrysler‘s assertion that the published guidance establishes a view by the Agency that regulation of automated vehicles and automated driving systems is exclusively federal, we disagree. Nowhere in any of the four documents does the Agency make such a claim of exclusive regulatory authority. Instead, the published guidance acknowledges a continuing and collaborative role for states and explicitly encourages states to review tort liability in the automated vehicle and automated driving system contexts.
¶24 Although Chrysler is correct that published guidance “strongly encourage[d] States to allow [the Agency] alone to regulate the safety design and performance aspects of [automated driving system] technology,” the Agency acknowledged in A Vision for Safety that states “are beginning to draft legislation to safely deploy emerging [automated driving
¶25 To support states’ efforts, the Agency included in A Vision for Safety a “Best Practices” section “to clarify and delineate the Federal and State roles in the regulation of [automated driving systems] and lay out a framework that the States can use as they write their laws and regulations surrounding [automated driving systems] to ensure a consistent, unified national framework.” A Vision for Safety at 19. Nonetheless, the Agency noted that “[t]he goal of State policies in this realm need not be uniformity or identical laws and regulations across all States. Rather, the aim should be sufficient consistency of laws and policies to promote innovation and the swift, widespread, safe integration of [automated driving systems].”
¶26 In delineating the respective roles of the federal government and the states, the Agency also explicitly recognized the states’ responsibility to regulate insurance and liability.
¶27 The Agency‘s only direct comment concerning preemption in the field of automated vehicles and automated driving systems concerned issues that would inevitably arise as it developed safety standards. On that point, the Agency simply stated:
The Department will carefully consider . . . jurisdictional questions as [the Agency] develops its regulatory approach to [automated driving systems] and other automated vehicle technologies so as to strike the appropriate balance between the Federal Government‘s use of its authorities to regulate the safe design and operational performance of an [automated driving system]-equipped vehicle and the State and local authorities’ use of their traditional powers.
¶28 On the whole, the published guidance fails to demonstrate any intent by the Agency to exercise an exclusive regulatory role in the area of automated vehicle and automated driving system testing, development, or deployment. Likewise, the guidance, lacking the force of law and with no requirement for compliance or mechanism of enforcement, does not foreclose the traditional role of states in regulating tort liability. As for any authoritative statement concerning preemption, the closest any document comes to discussing the issue is the acknowledgment that as standards are
3. 2017 Denial of Petition for Rulemaking
¶29 In 2017, the Agency denied a petition to initiate rulemaking that would have mandated the installation of AEB in all lightweight vehicles like the Jeep Grand Cherokee. 82 Fed. Reg. at 8391. Chrysler insists that the Agency “acted purposefully” in an authoritative and preemptive manner when it denied the petition because its stated policy goals of spurring technological advancement, encouraging consumer acceptance, and promoting safety “were best served not by an inflexible mandate that manufacturers must equip their vehicles with AEB technologies but rather by encouraging innovation and voluntary deployment through methods other than mandatory requirements.” Chrysler further concludes that the Agency declined to impose an AEB mandate “at this early stage of technological evolution” because of the “risk of inadvertently stymieing innovation and stalling the development and introduction of successively better versions of these technologies.”
¶30 However, the preceding quotes come from the section discussing the context in which the petition was considered. None of these points were offered as rationale for declining to grant the petition in the actual analysis and we should consider the entirety of the petition‘s denial to discern whether the Agency conveyed an authoritative policy objective with a preemptive intent. See Sprietsma, 537 U.S. at 66 (setting forth Coast Guard‘s entire explanation for deciding not to engage in regulatory action as part of assessing any preemptive intent).
¶31 Our review of the Agency‘s denial establishes that it did not deny the petition due to a belief that mandating installation of AEB technology would hinder development and safety objectives. Instead, the denial was based on the Agency‘s judgment that other efforts to encourage the deployment of AEB were proving to be as successful as the requested rulemaking would provide and, if needed, rulemaking was always available. 82 Fed. Reg. at 8394. In particular, the Agency noted the success of the Program in “influencing light vehicle manufacturers to increase their installation of AEB technologies and to improve their performance,” along with the specific incorporation of AEB technologies in safety ratings.
¶32 The Agency also expressed concern over the time it would take to engage in rulemaking, explaining:
Based on the Agency‘s rulemaking proceedings on complex issues in recent years, if the Agency were to grant the petition, conduct research, tentatively select required levels of performance, conduct a notice-and-comment rulemaking and provide sufficient lead time to enable manufacturers to phase-in compliance, the delay in making AEB standard equipment on light vehicles would be as many as three years, and possibly longer.
¶33 Furthermore, the Agency simply did not prioritize AEB rulemaking. Acknowledging the success at increasing AEB installation through non-rulemaking activities, the Agency determined that its limited resources could be better spent on tasks of “higher priority,” and, “if it proves necessary,” rulemaking could be commenced later on.
¶34 We cannot disregard what the Agency has highlighted as its predominant rationale for foregoing rulemaking. See Williamson, 562 U.S. at 333-35 (identifying the “more important reason” for permitting manufacturers’ an option with seat belt installation as a concern with cost rather than relying on a possible separate regulatory concern for which the record provided only “some indication” of importance). Unlike the preemptive safety standard in Geier that intentionally preserved a range of
¶35 The Agency‘s decision to forego formal rulemaking because, in its judgment, nonregulatory efforts have been or are proving successful does not establish a significant regulatory objective concerning the actual regulation of AEB, nor does it reflect a determination that AEB is best left unregulated. We will not read an agency‘s preference to avoid formal rulemaking under these circumstances to constitute a statement that “as a matter of policy” there should be no rules governing AEB. Sprietsma, 537 U.S. at 67. Similarly, the Agency‘s decision to forego rulemaking based on its judgment that rulemaking is arduous and that its resources were better invested in other priorities “cannot by itself show that [it] sought to forbid common-law tort suits in which a judge or jury might reach a different conclusion.” Williamson 562 U.S. at 335. While the Agency‘s denial of the rulemaking petition certainly reflects an intentional and careful decision to forego formal rulemaking, it does not provide an authoritative policy statement that AEB should not be regulated by state tort law. See Sprietsma, 537 U.S. at 67. Overall, the basis for the Agency‘s denial does not evince a clear authoritative preemptive intent.
4. Subsequent Rulemaking Activity8
¶36 The Agency published a proposal for rulemaking involving automated driving systems in March of 2020. Occupant Protection for
To this end, the agency has examined the nature (e.g., the language and structure of the regulatory text) and objectives of this proposal and finds that this proposal, like many [Agency] rules, would prescribe only a minimum safety standard. As such, [the Agency] does not intend that this proposal preempt state tort law that would effectively impose a higher standard on motor vehicle manufacturers than that to be established by this proposal. Establishment of a higher standard by means of State tort law would not conflict with the minimum standard announced here. Without any conflict, there could not be any implied preemption of a State common law tort cause of action.
¶37 More recently in December 2020, the Agency published an advance notice of proposed rulemaking that envisioned “a framework
¶38 Consistent with the referenced documents, the advance notice makes no statement of “exclusive” regulatory authority nor, unlike the March notice, does it reference preemption. It also notes activity within some states, including Arizona, to permit the operation of automated driving system vehicles on state roadways.
C. Actual Conflict
¶39 Chrysler argues that allowing Varela‘s claims to proceed “would frustrate [the Agency‘s] federal regulatory objectives by thrusting a jury-imposed AEB standard on [manufacturers] inside Arizona‘s borders.” Dashi, 247 Ariz. at 64 ¶ 42. We disagree. To the extent there is a manifest Agency policy objective concerning AEB installation, it is to see AEB deployed as quickly and as broadly as possible. Varela‘s suit may spur the very type of activity the Agency seeks. A jury finding in Varela‘s favor could encourage manufacturers who have decided to offer AEB technology on vehicles for sale to make AEB standard on all trim levels and not just some. Varela‘s suit may provide a complementary shove to the “pull” resulting from efforts by the Agency to encourage voluntary compliance for increased AEB deployment and the “push” from the effects of the Program and independent rating agencies to highlight the use of AEB by manufacturers. 82 Fed. Reg. at 8391.
¶40 Varela‘s claims would thus not conflict with the “execution of the full purposes and objectives” of the Agency if the message conveying a
¶41 Finally, because the applicability of implied obstacle preemption is a threshold issue, we have no occasion to consider the merits of Varela‘s claims.
D. Applicable Precedent
¶42 While our assessment of the administrative record and conclusion regarding any actual conflict with Varela‘s claims are dispositive of the issue before us, we nevertheless consider the parties’ arguments concerning an apparent conflict regarding conclusions about preemption between Dashi and the court of appeals’ opinion in this case.
¶43 The court of appeals observed that there are essentially two sets of cases that bear on the matter before us: Geier and Dashi, and Sprietsma and Williamson. Varela, 249 Ariz. at 95 ¶ 17. Chrysler argues that Geier and Dashi apply to this matter because each addresses a similar Agency policy objective concerning manufacturer choice, and each involves tort claims like Varela‘s. Chrysler further asserts that because Dashi properly relied on Geier for its analysis, Dashi should likewise guide our analysis of Agency objectives and review of the administrative record. Varela argues that the court of appeals properly recognized that Dashi did not apply, and that Sprietsma is the controlling U.S. Supreme Court precedent. We consider each case in turn.
1. Geier v. American Honda Motor Co.
¶44 Geier considered whether the plaintiff‘s state law tort suit conflicted with the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Act (the “Act“) and Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (“FMVSS“) 208 promulgated pursuant to the Act. 529 U.S at 864-65. The plaintiff‘s suit alleged negligence and design defect on the part of a car manufacturer for failing to install a driver‘s side airbag in a car, which otherwise complied with applicable safety standards. Id. at 865.
¶46 The Court ultimately concluded that if the plaintiff prevailed in the lawsuit, “manufacturers of all similar cars [would have been required] to install airbags rather than other passive restraint systems, such as automatic belts or passive interiors.” Id. at 881. Consequently, implied obstacle preemption applied “[b]ecause the rule of law for which petitioners contend would have stood as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the important means-related federal objectives” as discussed. Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
¶47 Chrysler characterizes Geier‘s holding as providing “that when [the Agency] declines to require a particular safety feature because preserving manufacturers’ choice furthers important federal policy goals, plaintiffs cannot attempt to impose that requirement through state tort liability.” Chrysler‘s generalization of the holding of Geier and the argument that it is outcome determinative in this case calls forth an observation we share with the Texas Supreme Court: “when Geier‘s reasoning is oversimplified to find preemption based on a choice between two safety options and then exported to other safety standards where the unique text and history of [the passive restraint regulation in question] are not relevant, we must respectfully disagree.” Hinton, 329 S.W.3d at 497.
¶48 We also note the importance of an actual promulgated safety regulation to Geier‘s conclusion as underscored in Williamson. 562 U.S. at 336 (reviewing whether the Act and an amended version of FMVSS 208 preempted a lawsuit over a manufacture‘s failure to install a particular style of seatbelt). Therein, the Court explicitly stated that it determined the significant policy in question in Geier “on the basis of our examination of
¶49 In the case before us, there is no promulgated safety standard for us to examine. While not fatal to Chrysler‘s conflict preemption claim, see supra ¶ 9, this does render Geier‘s analysis inapplicable. Unlike the passive restraint systems regulated in Geier, the Agency has neither authorized nor required any particular AEB system or specific combination of AEB component features from which Chrysler or any other manufacturer may reference to assert regulatory compliance. Likewise, we lack any DOT statement on preemption as to whether a suit like Varela‘s would create an obstacle to AEB policy objectives remotely like the explicit position the DOT provided in Geier. Therefore, given the distinctly different facts and the lack of a promulgated regulation with express agency views, we conclude that Geier does not control our determination of preemption nor does it offer an analogous framework for analysis.
2. Dashi v. Nissan North America, Inc.
¶50 Dashi involved a suit where the plaintiff claimed the 2008 Nissan Rogue that hit her vehicle was “unreasonably dangerous and defective” because it lacked then-available AEB technology. Dashi, 247 Ariz. at 58 ¶ 3. Dashi analyzed the administrative record before the court under the framework set forth in Geier, id. at 60-64 ¶¶ 14-39, and concluded that the plaintiff‘s claims were preempted by the doctrine of implied obstacle preemption, id. at 67 ¶ 59. Chrysler contends we should agree with Dashi‘s preemption finding and overrule the court of appeals in this case because Dashi “correctly focused on DOT and [the Agency‘s] statements regarding their ‘broad enforcement authority to address existing and new automotive technologies and equipment,’ and [Dashi‘s] emphasis on preemption in this context, including citation to Geier.” (Quoting id. at 64 ¶ 39).
¶51 There are two reasons we decline to follow Dashi‘s finding on preemption. The first has to do with the reliance on Geier. As with the record before us, the Dashi court did not have a regulation to review, which featured so heavily in Geier‘s analysis. Therefore, as discussed above, Geier does not provide the appropriate analytical framework for determining AEB preemption. Second, the record for our review has two notices of
3. Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine
¶52 In Sprietsma, a passenger fell overboard from a boat and struck the propeller blade resulting in fatal injuries. 537 U.S. at 54. Notably and like the Agency‘s action in our case, the Coast Guard had declined to promulgate a regulation concerning the equipment in question, specifically one that would have required propeller guards on outboard motors. id. at 61-62. After concluding that the authorizing congressional enactment in question did not preempt the plaintiff‘s claims, the Court then considered whether the decision by the Coast Guard to forgo regulating propeller guards was entitled to preemptive effect. Id. at 62-64.
¶53 Although the state supreme court below had concluded “that the Coast Guard‘s failure to promulgate a propeller guard requirement here equates to a ruling that no such regulation is appropriate pursuant to the policy of the [Federal Boat Safety Act],” the Court noted its conclusion did not account for the Coast Guard‘s entire explanation for declining to regulate propeller guards:
The regulatory process is very structured and stringent regarding justification. Available propeller guard accident data do not support imposition of a regulation requiring propeller guards on motorboats. Regulatory action is also limited by the many questions about whether a universally acceptable propeller guard is available or technically feasible in all modes of boat operation. Additionally, the question of retrofitting millions of boats would certainly be a major economic consideration.
Id. at 66 (citation omitted). According to the Court, “[t]his statement
¶54 The Court thus concluded that “although the Coast Guard‘s decision not to require propeller guards was undoubtedly intentional and carefully considered, it [did] not convey an ‘authoritative’ message of a federal policy against propeller guards.” Id. As for any conflict with a state tort suit, the Court observed that “nothing in [the Coast Guard‘s] official explanation would be inconsistent with a tort verdict premised on a jury‘s finding that some type of propeller guard should have been installed on this particular kind of boat equipped with respondent‘s particular type of motor.” Id.
¶55 The fact that the matter before us similarly lacks a promulgated safety standard addressing the equipment in question and involves a similar agency action – the denial of a petition for rulemaking – renders Sprietsma more relevant to our case than Geier. Sprietsma is also instructive with respect to weighing an agency‘s judgment in our determination of whether the Agency has conveyed an authoritative message concerning the regulation of AEB for our preemption analysis.
4. Williamson v. Mazda Motor of America, Inc.
¶56 The court of appeals also identified Williamson as a case bearing on the analysis of Varela‘s claims. We agree. Williamson dealt with the same authorizing Act and FMVSS as Geier did, albeit an older version of the FMVSS. Williamson, 562 U.S. at 326-27. The plaintiff‘s design defect claim was based on the manufacturer‘s alleged failure to install the proper seatbelt in a rear inner passenger seat. Id. at 327. The FMVSS gave manufacturers a choice to use either a lap belt or a lap-and-shoulder-belt on rear inner seats, such as the middle seat of a minivan. Id. at 326.
¶57 The issue was whether the regulation affording manufacturers a seat belt option preempted a tort suit that would have required a specific seat belt. Id. Although the safety standard provided manufacturers with options, the choice provision alone was not dispositive.
¶58 Williamson is thus useful in our case for considering what weight, if any, to give to the Agency‘s judgment in determining the preemptive effect of the denial to engage in AEB rulemaking in 2017. The caution against inferring an intent to preempt state law solely based on an agency‘s judgment to permit choice among available safety devices is equally informative.
III. Conclusion
¶59 We conclude that the Agency has neither conveyed an authoritative statement establishing manufacturer choice as a significant federal policy objective nor made explicit a view that AEB should not be regulated. The record also does not reflect an intent to restrict regulation of automated vehicles and automated driving systems beyond traditional federal regulatory authority nor is there a definitive statement that states may not regulate. To the contrary, the Agency has acknowledged that states have regulated and are continuing to regulate in the field of development and deployment of automated driving systems and has encouraged states to undertake a review of how liability may be affected in an automated driving system environment. What is likewise evident throughout the entirety of the regulatory record is the Agency‘s emphatic commitment to partnering with states to facilitate the ongoing development
¶60 To the extent the administrative record reflects a federal policy about AEB technology, it is that the Agency encourages AEB innovation and desires it be deployed more broadly and sooner rather than later. Because Varela‘s claims are focused on the availability of FCW+ across all trim levels of the Jeep Grand Cherokee, they are not in conflict with any identified Agency objectives or policies. Accordingly, we find her claims are not preempted by the doctrine of implied obstacle preemption.
¶61 Geier is inapposite to the facts and record before us and therefore does not control our decision, and we overrule Dashi. Given the nature of the administrative record before us and the exercise of the Agency‘s judgment to forego formal rulemaking, Sprietsma and Williamson provide the appropriate guidance for our determination.
¶62 We affirm the court of appeals but vacate ¶¶ 11-22 of the opinion, reverse the trial court‘s order, and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings.
JUSTICE BILL MONTGOMERY
SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA