Medina v. KaplanMedina v. Kaplan
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Kenneth M. Karas
KENNETH M. KARAS, District Judge:
Pro se Plaintiff Jessica Maria Medina (“Plaintiff”) brings this Action against Defendants Bedford Hills Correctional Facility Superintendent Sabina Kaplan (“Kaplan”), Deputy Superintendent of Security Murphy (“Murphy”), Sergeant Wyman (“Wyman”), Sergeant Swanhart (“Swanhart”), and Dr. McDermott (“McDermott”) alleging violations of her constitutional and statutory rights pursuant to
I. Background
A. Factual Background
The following facts are taken from the Complaint and are accepted as true for the purposes of this Motion. At the time of the events described herein, Plaintiff was an inmate at Bedford Hills Correctional Facility (“Bedford Hills”).1
Plaintiff alleges that, on the afternoon of June 29, 2016, she was placed under mental health observation without cause and in the process was “threaten[ed]” and subjected to excessive force. (Compl. § II(D) (Dkt. No. 2).) Specifically, Plaintiff contends that she was subjected to an “illegal anal cavity search,” was beaten and forcefully injected with medicine from the Office of Mental Health (“OMH”), and was later “denied medical & PREA [Prison Rape Elimination Act].” (Id.)2 Plaintiff also alleges that her cell was “torn apart” and that a “lawsuit on another incident disappeared” during the course of a cell search. (Id.) Plaintiff contends further that Murphy “had [her] on a cell-shield [without] an order extension.” (Id.)3
B. Procedural History
Plaintiff filed her Complaint on September 14, 2016. (See Dkt. No. 2.) On December 12, 2016, Plaintiff filed a request for a Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”) against Defendants. (Pl.’s Notion of Mot. for the Immediate/Effective T.R.O. (Dkt. No. 11).) Defendants responded to the TRO on April 7, 2017, stating the TRO should be denied as moot because Plaintiff was released from the custody of the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (“DOCCS”) on December 20, 2016. (Defs.’ Reply to Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order 1 (Dkt. No. 23).) Pursuant to a Memo Endorsement on April 16, 2017, the Court dismissed the TRO as moot. (Dkt. No. 24.)
Because Plaintiff had not updated her mailing address following her December 20, 2016 release from prison, on April 16, 2017, the Court also reminded Plaintiff of her obligation to keep the Court and Defendants aware of her mailing address and that failure to do so could result
Defendants Kaplan, Murphy, Wyman, Swanhart, and McDermott moved to dismiss the Complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies; for lack of personal involvement of Defendants Kaplan, Wyman, Swanhart, and McDermott in the alleged constitutional violations; and for failure to state a claim against Defendant Murphy. (Defs.’ Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. To Dismiss (“Defs.’ Mem.”) 3–9 (Dkt. No. 21).) Defendants also moved to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds. (Id. 9–10.)
The deadline for Plaintiff to submit an opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss was April 8, 2017, (Dkt. No. 19), but Plaintiff has not filed an opposition, (see Letter from Julinda Dawkins, Esq., to Court (May 18, 2017) (Dkt. No. 25).)
II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
The Supreme Court has held that although a complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations” to survive a motion to dismiss, “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his [or her] entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” Id. (alteration and internal
“[W]hen ruling on a defendant’s motion to dismiss, a judge must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint,” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), and “draw[] all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff,” Daniel v. T & M Prot. Res., Inc., 992 F. Supp. 2d 302, 304 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (citing Koch v. Christie’s Int’l PLC, 699 F.3d 141, 145 (2d Cir. 2012)). Additionally, “[i]n adjudicating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a district court must confine its consideration to facts stated on the face of the complaint, in documents appended to the complaint or incorporated in the complaint by reference, and to matters of which judicial notice may be taken.” Leonard F. v. Isr. Disc. Bank of N.Y., 199 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir. 1999)
Where, as here, a plaintiff proceeds pro se, the Court must “construe[] [her] [complaint] liberally and interpret[] [it] to raise the strongest arguments that [it] suggest[s].” Sykes v. Bank of Am., 723 F.3d 399, 403 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, “the liberal treatment afforded to pro se litigants does not exempt a pro se party from compliance with relevant rules of procedure and substantive law.” Bell v. Jendell, 980 F. Supp. 2d 555, 559 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Caidor v. Onondaga County, 517 F.3d 601, 605 (2d Cir. 2008) (“[P]ro se litigants generally are required to inform themselves regarding procedural rules and to comply with them.” (italics and internal quotation marks omitted)).
B. Analysis
Moving Defendants raise four arguments: (1) Plaintiff has failed to exhaust her administrative remedies; (2) Plaintiff has failed to allege the personal involvement of Kaplan, Wyman, Swanhart, and McDermott in any constitutional violations; (3) Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against Murphy; and (4) the Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. (Defs.’ Mem. 1–2.) The Court will address each in turn.
1. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Defendants first move to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint on the grounds that she failed to exhaust her administrative remedies pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). (Defs.’ Mem. 3–6.) The PLRA provides that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under [§] 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are
Prisoners in the custody of DOCCS must exhaust all levels of the Inmate Grievance Program (“IGP”) process even if they do not receive a response from the Inmate Grievance Resolution Committee (“IGRC”) or superintendent. See Dabney v. Pegano, 604 F. App’x 1, 4–5 (2d Cir. 2015) (“The IGP provides a clear timeline for appealing grievances to the [Central Office Review Committee (‘CORC’)], which applies even when the prisoner does not receive a timely decision from the IGRC or a superintendent. [The] [p]laintiff therefore had an unimpeded path to the CORC, notwithstanding his claims that the . . . grievance clerk failed to process his complaint and that the . . . superintendent ignored his appeal.” (citation omitted)); see also Jackson Little v. Mun. Corp., City of New York, No. 12-CV-5851, 2017 WL 1184326 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2017) (same). If a plaintiff does not receive a response from the IGRC, she normally
The PLRA does, however, “contain[] its own, textual exception to mandatory exhaustion.” Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850, 1858 (2016). The Supreme Court recently explained:
Under § 1997e(a), the exhaustion requirement hinges on the “availab[ility]” of administrative remedies: An inmate, that is, must exhaust available remedies, but need not exhaust unavailable ones. And that limitation on an inmate’s duty to exhaust . . . has real content. . . . [A]n inmate is required to exhaust those, but only those, grievance procedures that are “capable of use” to obtain “some relief for the action complained of.”
Id. at 1858–59 (quoting Booth, 532 U.S. at 738).
There are “three kinds of circumstances in which an administrative remedy, although officially on the books, is not capable of use to obtain relief.” Id. at 1859. First, an “administrative procedure is unavailable when . . . it operates as a simple dead end—with officers unable or consistently unwilling to provide any relief to aggrieved inmates.” Id. Second, “an administrative scheme might be so opaque that it becomes, practically speaking, incapable of use. In this situation, some mechanism exists to provide relief, but no ordinary prisoner can discern or navigate it.” Id. Third, an administrative remedy may be unavailable “when prison administrators thwart inmates from taking advantage of a grievance process through machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation.” Id. at 1860. These three circumstances “do not appear to be exhaustive,” Williams v. Priatno, 829 F.3d 118, 123 n.2 (2d Cir. 2016), but they do “guide the Court’s inquiry,” Khudan v. Lee, No. 12-CV-8147, 2016 WL 4735364, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 2016).
A plaintiff need not plead that one of these three circumstances exists or that she did in fact exhaust her administrative remedies, because the “[f]ailure to exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative defense under the PLRA, not a pleading requirement.” Williams, 829 F.3d at 122. Defendants bear the burden of proving that Plaintiff failed to exhaust her available administrative remedies. See McCoy v. Goord, 255 F. Supp. 2d 233, 248 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“[The] defendants bear the burden of proof and prisoner plaintiffs need not plead exhaustion with particularity.”); see also Williams, 829 F.3d at 122 (“[I]nmates are not required to specially plead or demonstrate exhaustion in their complaints.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Thus, a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to exhaust should be granted only if “nonexhaustion is clear from the face of the complaint.” Lovick v. Schriro, No. 12-CV-7419, 2014 WL 3778184, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 25, 2014) (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Lee v. O’Harer, No. 13-CV-1022, 2014 WL 7343997, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2014) (“Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to exhaust is appropriate if such failure is evidenced on the face of the complaint and incorporated documents.”); Sloane v. Mazzuca, No. 04-CV-8266, 2006 WL 3096031, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2006) (“[B]y characterizing non-exhaustion as an affirmative defense, the Second Circuit suggests that the issue of exhaustion is generally not amenable to resolution by way of a motion to dismiss.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
With respect to her claims regarding excessive force or interference with her mail, Plaintiff did not fully exhaust her administrative remedies. In her Complaint, Plaintiff admits that while she did file a grievance, she did not appeal the grievance to either the superintendent or CORC. (Compl. § IV(F)(3).) As such, Plaintiff did not complete the requisite three-step grievance process before filing her lawsuit. Therefore, Plaintiff’s “nonexhaustion is clear from
Moreover, the IGP does not embody a process which is “[in]capable of use to obtain relief.” Ross, 136 S. Ct. at 1859. Plaintiff has offered no facts which would indicate that the IGP operates as a “simple dead end,” or that it is “so opaque that it becomes, practically speaking, incapable of use” such that “no ordinary prisoner [could] discern or navigate it.” Id. Indeed, Plaintiff completed the first step of the process by filing the grievance, (Compl. § IV(E)), which demonstrates that Plaintiff was able to “discern” the IGP. See id.
Plaintiff’s assertion that the superintendent’s threat that “the video would disappear before [she] got to file anything” does not amount to a “thwart[ing]” of her ability to “take advantage of a grievance process.” Id. at 1860. (Compl. § IV(I).) Conclusory allegations of intimidation are insufficient to establish the unavailability of administrative remedies. See Khudan, 2016 WL 4735364, at *6 (finding on summary judgment that alleged threats without specification of the dates, locations, and names of officers were not sufficient in thwarting the availability of administrative remedies). Accusations which are “unsupported” and “stand alone” are similarly insufficient. See id. Here, Plaintiff’s Complaint gives no indication as to the contents of the video and when the supposed threat occurred. There is no allegation that the threat was even related to her grievance and ability to exhaust available administrative relief. In fact, Plaintiff was able to complete the first step of the grievance procedure in spite of the alleged threat, (Compl. § IV(E)), indicating that her ability to take advantage of the grievance process was not thwarted by the supposed threat. Moreover, there is no indication that the alleged threat impeded Plaintiff’s ability to appeal her grievance to the superintendent. See Ross, 136 S. Ct. at 1860 (recognizing grievance procedures as “unavailable” if threats or intimidation prevent
However, to the extent that Plaintiff claims she was sexually abused or harassed during the course of the alleged incident, she is “not required to file a grievance . . . to satisfy the . . . [PLRA].”
2. Personal Involvement
Defendants Kaplan, Wyman, Swanhart, and McDermott next move to dismiss the Complaint for failure to allege their personal involvement in the incident. “It is well settled that, in order to establish a defendant’s individual liability in a suit brought under § 1983, a plaintiff must show . . . the defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Grullon v. City of New Haven, 720 F.3d 133, 138 (2d Cir. 2013); see also Farrell v. Burke, 449 F.3d 470, 484 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[P]ersonal involvement of defendants in alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under § 1983.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). To establish personal involvement, a plaintiff must show that:
(1) the defendant participated directly in the alleged constitutional violation, (2) the defendant, after being informed of the violation through a report or appeal, failed to remedy the wrong, (3) the defendant created a policy or custom under which unconstitutional practices occurred, or allowed the continuance of such a policy or custom, (4) the defendant was grossly negligent in supervising subordinates who committed the wrongful acts, or (5) the defendant exhibited deliberate indifference to the rights of inmates by failing to act on information indicating that unconstitutional acts were occurring.
Grullon, 720 F.3d at 139 (alterations, italics, and internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, “[b]ecause vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the [law].” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676; see also Fortunato v. Bernstein, No. 12-CV-1630, 2015 WL 5813376, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 1, 2015) (“Supervisory status, without more, is not sufficient to subject a defendant to [§] 1983 liability.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Accordingly, “[i]n an action under
With respect to the allegations raised here, as an initial matter, “a complaint that essentially regurgitates the relevant ‘personal involvement’ standard, without offering any facts indicating that, or how, an individual defendant in a supervisory role was personally involved in a constitutional violation, cannot withstand dismissal.” Davis v. County of Nassau, 355 F. Supp. 2d 668, 677 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). “[C]onclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual conclusions will not suffice to prevent a motion to dismiss.” Smith v. Local 819 I.B.T. Pension Plan, 291 F.3d 236, 240 (2d Cir. 2002) (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). With the exception of Sergeant Murphy, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to personally name any of the Defendants or offer any facts indicating their involvement in the alleged constitutional violations. (Compl. § II(D).) Plaintiff describes being beaten and forcefully injected “with OMH medicals,” but the Complaint is silent as to which, if any, Defendant was involved in the alleged incident. (Id.) When alleging her “lawsuit on another incident disappeared,” Plaintiff makes no mention of who “tore apart” her cell. (Id.) Plaintiff does not allege the personal involvement of any Defendant with respect to her claims involving excessive force and sexual abuse. Indeed, Plaintiff only refers to Murphy as “threatening” her and “[putting] [her] on a cell-shield [without] an order extension.” (Id.) Plaintiff failed to even simply “regurgitate[] [a] relevant ‘personal involvement’ standard” by which she could have pled facts showing the
Accordingly, the Court holds that Plaintiff has not stated a claim against Kaplan, Wyman, Swanhart, or McDermott because she has not plausibly alleged their personal involvement in violations of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, and the Motion is therefore granted in that respect. The Court also holds that Plaintiff has not stated a claim against Murphy for his personal involvement with respect to Plaintiff’s claims of excessive force and sexual abuse (which are separate from the claims regarding Murphy’s threat and use of the cell shield, discussed below), and the Motion is therefore granted in that respect.
3. Failure to State Claim
Defendant Murphy, whose personal involvement is alleged regarding some claims, see Grullon, 720 F.3d at 139, (Compl. § II(D)), moves to dismiss for Plaintiff’s failure to state a claim, (Defs.’ Mem. 7). With respect to Murphy’s involvement, Plaintiff alleges only that Murphy “threaten[ed]” her and put her “on a cell-shield [without] an order extension.” (Compl. § II(D)). Murphy asserts that “the allegations against [him] are merely conclusory, insufficient, and do not state a viable claim of a constitutional violation.” (Defs.’ Mem. 7.)
It is well established that to state a cognizable claim for an Eighth Amendment violation under § 1983, “the alleged ‘punishment’ must be, ‘objectively, sufficiently serious.’” Boddie, 105 F.3d at 861 (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)). Similarly, complaints which contain conclusory allegations of constitutional violations cannot survive a motion to dismiss.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 687.
Plaintiff’s accusations of a “threat” by Murphy do not amount to a legally cognizable constitutional or statutory violation. As a general matter, constitutional violations do not arise
Although Plaintiff does contend that she was injured during the course of the alleged incident, (Compl. § III), such injuries are not claimed in conjunction with Murphy’s “threat.” (Id., § II(D).) Indeed, Plaintiff’s claims of injury from excessive force and sexual abuse fail to allege the personal involvement of any of the Defendants—including Murphy—and have been dismissed. See supra Part II(B)(2). Here, Plaintiff simply claims Murphy “threatened her” during the cell extraction. (Compl. § II(D).) Plaintiff makes no accusations that Murphy played any role in her injuries. (Id.) Even when liberally construed, Plaintiff’s contentions are vague and overly general. See Micolo, 2016 WL 6404146, at *8 (explaining that such allegations
Plaintiff’s claim similarly fails with respect to Defendant Murphy’s alleged improper assignment of a cell shield. It has been established that “state procedural requirements do not establish federal constitutional rights” in the prison context. Bolden v. Alston, 810 F.2d 353, 358 (2d Cir. 1987); see also Shepherd v. Fisher, No. 08-CV-9297, 2017 WL 666213, at *36 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2017) (explaining that “the violation by prison officials of state regulations or DOCCS directives “does not in itself give rise to a due process claim” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Here, Plaintiff’s claim of improper cell shield assignment would, at most, amount to a violation of DOCCS policy. (Compl. § II(D).) DOCCS regulations require that “[a] copy of the cell shield order and any renewal thereafter shall be forwarded to . . . the inmate within 24 hours.”
4. Qualified Immunity
Because the Court has dismissed all of Plaintiff’s claims, the Court declines to address the issue of Defendants’ qualified immunity. (Defs.’ Mem. at 9–10.)
C. Dismissal Without Prejudice
A complaint should be dismissed without prejudice if the pleading, “‘liberally read,’ suggests that the plaintiff has a claim that she has inadequately or inartfully pleaded and that she should therefore be given a chance to reframe.” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000) (alterations and citation omitted) (quoting Gomez v. USAA Fed Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir. 1999)). If a complaint, however, has substantive problems and “[a] better pleading will not cure [them]” repleading may be “futile.” Id. (citing Hunt v. All N. Am. Gov’t Income Tr., 159 F.3d 723, 728 (2d Cir. 1998)).
Here, despite failing to oppose the Moving Defendants’ Motion, Plaintiff has nevertheless not been afforded an opportunity to amend her Complaint. Moreover, there is reason to suspect that, if given an opportunity to amend, Plaintiff might be able to cure the substantive deficiencies in her Complaint. Therefore, Plaintiff’s dismissed claims herein are dismissed without prejudice.
III. Conclusion
In light of the foregoing, Moving Defendants’ Motion To Dismiss is hereby granted and Plaintiff’s claims are dismissed without prejudice. If Plaintiff wishes to file an Amended Complaint, she must do so within 30 days of the date of this Opinion & Order. Failure to do so might result in dismissal of this case. Plaintiff should include within that Amended Complaint
The Clerk of the Court is to terminate the pending motion (Dkt. No. 20) and mail a copy of this Opinion and Order to Plaintiff.
SO ORDERED.
DATED: February 7, 2018
White Plains, New York
KENNETH M. KARAS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE