MEADOWS DEVELOPMENT, L.L.C., APPELLANT, v. CHAMPAIGN COUNTY BOARD OF REVISION ET AL., APPELLEES.
No. 2009-0064
Supreme Court of Ohio
Submitted November 4, 2009—Decided February 3, 2010
124 Ohio St.3d 349, 2010-Ohio-249
{¶1} Meadows Development, L.L.C. (“Meadows“), appeals from a decision of the Board of Tax Appeals (“BTA“), in which the BTA dismissed Meadows‘s appeal from a decision of the Champaign County Board of Revision (“BOR“). The BTA held that Meadows had filed its notice of appeal more than 30 days after the BOR had certified its decision pursuant to
{¶2} On line 1 of its valuation complaint, Meadows identified itself as the owner of the property and gave its own address, as called for by the complaint form. Then, on line 3, Meadows identified a law firm as its agent and gave the address of the law firm in the appropriate space. The issue in this case arises because the Champaign County Board of Revision (“BOR“), when it issued its decision in this case, certified that decision first to Meadows at its own address, and second to Meadows at its attorneys’ address. The BTA held that the 30-day period for Meadows to file its appeal from the BOR decision began to run when the BOR first certified the decision. Because Meadows filed its appeal more than 30 days after that certification, the BTA held that Meadows‘s notice of appeal was untimely and ordered that it be dismissed.
Facts
{¶4} On March 30, 2007, Meadows filed a complaint that challenged the value that the Champaign County Auditor had assigned to its property. The three parcels at issue constitute a 200-pad mobile-home park that the auditor valued at $2,170,428 for tax year 2006. Meadows argued before the BOR that the property was worth only $1,718,100. The Triad Local School District Board of Education filed a countercomplaint seeking to retain the auditor‘s valuation. After a hearing, the BOR retained the auditor‘s valuation.
{¶5} On June 14, 2007, the BOR certified its decision by certified mail to the address set forth on the complaint as Meadows‘s own address. Fifteen days later, on June 29, 2007, the BOR certified the decision again, this time sending it by certified mail to the address set forth on the complaint as the address of Meadows‘s agent—namely, the law firm Siegel, Siegel, Johnson & Jennings Co., L.P.A. A lawyer from the law firm had appeared and represented Meadows at the BOR hearing in May 2007.
{¶6} On July 24, 2007, 40 days after the first certification of the BOR decision and 25 days after the second certification, Meadows filed a notice of appeal from the BOR to the BTA. The school board moved to dismiss the appeal as untimely filed. Meadows did not respond.
{¶7} In its December 9, 2008 decision, the BTA agreed with the school board, holding that the BOR had complied with
{¶8} The BTA also held that the subsequent mailing of the decision to the address of Meadows‘s attorneys “did not change the date the appeal period began.” Id. In so holding, the BTA relied upon its decision in E. Sky Ministries v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Revision (Sept. 3, 2004), BTA No. 2004-T-559, 2004 WL 1977458, which rejected the contention that
{¶9} Meadows appealed the dismissal to this court. We now reverse the BTA‘s decision and remand the cause for further proceedings.
Analysis
{¶10} The BTA is responsible for determining factual issues, but we “will not hesitate to reverse a BTA decision that is based on an incorrect legal conclusion.” Satullo v. Wilkins, 111 Ohio St.3d 399, 2006-Ohio-5856, 856 N.E.2d 954, ¶ 14, quoting Gahanna-Jefferson Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Zaino (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 231, 232, 754 N.E.2d 789.
{¶11} The present appeal involves a legal issue.
{¶12} We conclude that the BTA erred. The BOR had jurisdiction to perform a new certification of its decision to the address of Meadows‘s attorneys on June 29, 2007, and because that certification was reasonably calculated to give actual notice of the decision to the owner, it commenced the running of a 30-day appeal period. Since Meadows filed its appeal 25 days thereafter, the appeal was timely filed.
Under R.C. 5715.20, a board of revision validly certifies its decision when it sends the decision by certified mail to an address that is reasonably calculated to give notice to the owner
{¶13} The BTA concluded that the BOR‘s first certification was proper and started the running of the appeal period and that the second certification had no effect on the appeal period. Meadows contends that the BTA erred because under
{¶14} We do not agree that the Civil Rules apply to the circumstances in this case. By their own terms, the Civil Rules apply to “all courts of this state in the exercise of civil jurisdiction at law or in equity.”
{¶15} Moreover, although Meadows relies on Swander Ditch Landowners’ Assn. v. Joint Bd. of Huron & Seneca Cty. Commrs. (1990), 51 Ohio St.3d 131, 554 N.E.2d 1324, that decision does not furnish grounds for resorting to the Civil Rules here. Swander Ditch differs from the present case in two material respects. First, Swander Ditch applied
{¶16} Although we reject Meadows‘s argument regarding the applicability of the Civil Rules, that rejection does not by itself establish whether the second certification of the BOR decision affected the time for appeal. Our recent decision in Knickerbocker Properties, Inc. XLII v. Delaware Cty. Bd. of Revision, 119 Ohio St.3d 233, 2008-Ohio-3192, 893 N.E.2d 457, ¶ 17, provides guidance in this regard.
{¶17} In Knickerbocker Properties, we held that the board of revision failed to properly give notice of a hearing pursuant to
{¶19} Thus, if the second certification of the BOR decision in this case was reasonably calculated to give notice of the BOR decision to the owner, it may have been effective in restarting the running of the appeal period.1
Sending the BOR decision to the address of the owner‘s attorney is reasonable when the attorney has represented the owner at the BOR hearing
{¶20} As an initial matter, we note that the due-process standard does not necessarily fix one address as proper to the exclusion of all others. It is possible that more than one address satisfies the requirement that the mailing be reasonably calculated to give notice to the intended recipient. In this case, that means that the BOR might have been able to validly certify its decision to the owner‘s address, the law firm‘s address, or some other address.
{¶21} That said, we have little difficulty in determining that the BOR‘s certification of its decision to the law firm was reasonably calculated to give Meadows notice of the decision. This conclusion flows from two facts: first, Meadows identified the firm as its agent for purposes of the valuation complaint; second, the firm actually represented Meadows at the BOR hearing. Indeed, when an attorney is clearly engaged in active representation of the owner, sending the BOR decision to the attorney generally constitutes the best practice for the BOR to follow.
{¶22} Despite these considerations, the BTA found that the second certification did not affect the appeal period. It based that conclusion on its determination that the initial certification to the owner‘s address was valid and that the earlier certification started the appeal period running. The BTA‘s conclusion raises one final question for our review: Did the first certification preclude the second certification? We now consider that issue.
{¶23} The BTA held that the BOR had complied with
{¶24} We hold that the first certification did not preclude the second certification. The BOR originally certified its decision on June 14, 2007, and then 15 days later recertified its decision. Because the second certification fell within the 30-day period for appealing from the first certification, and because it was reasonably calculated to give notice, the second certification was valid.
{¶25} We have held that boards of revision, being administrative tribunals, have “‘inherent authority to reconsider their own decisions since the power to decide in the first instance carries with it the power to reconsider,‘” but that such authority “does not extend beyond ‘the actual institution of an appeal or expiration of the time for appeal.‘” Columbus City Schools Bd. of Edn. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, 121 Ohio St.3d 218, 2009-Ohio-760, 903 N.E.2d 299, ¶ 14, quoting Cincinnati School Dist., 87 Ohio St.3d at 368, 721 N.E.2d 40, quoting Hal Artz Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co. (1986), 28 Ohio St.3d 20, 28 OBR 83, 502 N.E.2d 590, paragraph three of the syllabus. Under this principle, the BOR still possessed authority to vacate or modify its decision as of the date of the second certification. Had the BOR issued a new and substantively different decision on that date, the proper certification of that modified decision would unquestionably have commenced the running of a new appeal period.
{¶26} We hold that the same rationale extends to the situation when a board of revision certifies a substantively identical decision to a new address within the 30-day appeal period. Because the BOR modified its certification of the decision within the 30-day window for an appeal from the initial certification, and because no appeal had actually been instituted from the first certification, the second certification was valid and restarted the running of the 30-day appeal period.
{¶27} The recertification of the BOR‘s decision on June 29, 2007, commenced the running of the 30-day appeal period within which Meadows, on July 24, 2007, timely filed its appeal to the BTA. Accordingly, the BTA erred by dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. We therefore reverse the decision and remand the cause for further proceedings.
Decision reversed and cause remanded.
PFEIFER, J., concurs in judgment only.
Siegel, Siegel, Johnson & Jennings Co., L.P.A., Nicholas M.J. Ray, and J. Kieran Jennings, for appellant.
Bricker & Eckler, L.L.P., Jonathan T. Brollier, and Mark A. Engel, for appellee Triad Local School District Board of Education.