Columbus City Schools Board of Education v. Franklin County Board of RevisionColumbus City Schools Board of Education v. Franklin County Board of Revision
Lead Opinion
{¶ 1} As it comes before us, this case presents a purely procedural issue. When a board of revision has decided, through a majority vote, to vacate a determination of value that it had previously certified pursuant to
{¶ 2} We hold that the decision to vacate the previous determination of value becomes effective when the board votes and the results of that vote are entered on the record of the board’s proceedings. Because the Board of Tax Appeals (“BTA”) held the contrary, and because the record shows that the BOR did act to vacate, we reverse the order of the BTA and remand for further proceedings.
Facts
{¶ 3} On March 24, 2006, the Columbus City Schools Board of Education (“school board”) initiated these proceedings by filing a valuation complaint. That complaint asked the BOR to adopt a May 2005 sale price as the value of the property at issue for tax year 2005.
{¶ 4} On September 29, 2006, the BOR held a hearing at which the school board presented a conveyance-fee statement and deed to document its claim. On October 18, 2006, the Franklin County Board of Revision (“BOR”) issued a decision that adopted a May 2005 sale pricé of $2,900,000 as the value of the property at issue for tax year 2005, and the BOR certified that decision to the parties pursuant to
{¶ 5} On June 6, 2007, the BOR held a second hearing, at which the owner, Leonard L. Green Brice Road, L.L.C. (“Green LLC”), presented evidence in support of its contentions. First, Green LLC presented testimony that the May 2005 sale was one between related parties and therefore not at arm’s length. Second, Green LLC offered evidence that a later sale in December 2005 for $2,665,123 was an arm’s-length sale. Third, Green LLC submitted that a
{¶ 6} On the basis of these submissions, the BOR determined that the value for tax year 2005 should remain $660,000, while for 2006, the value of the property was $2,665,100, based on the December 2005 sale price.
{¶ 7} On January 18, 2008, the BTA issued a show-cause order. The order stated that “the record suggests that the BOR certified its November 20, 2006 entry more than thirty days after its October 18, 2006 certification. If so, the BOR issued its vacating order after it had lost jurisdiction over the complaint.” The BTA ordered the parties to show cause why the matter should not be remanded to the BOR so that the October 18, 2006 order could be reinstated.
{¶ 8} The school board did not respond to the show-cause order, but Green LLC did. Green LLC asserted that the BOR had “set the matter down for hearing to be conducted on November 7, 2006, at which time it voided its October 18 decision.” Attached to Green LLC’s memorandum was a copy of a faxed document purporting to be a record of the “2005 Board of Revision November 7, 2006 (PM Hearings).” The case at issue, BOR number 900799, is handwritten with a notation “Reopen and Reset.” At the top of the page, a handwritten notation says “sent 11/20/06.” Green LLC attached no affidavit or other document explaining the exhibit.
{¶ 9} On March 18, 2008, the BTA issued its decision. The BTA acknowledged that “the BOR retains jurisdiction to reconsider, modify, or alter its decision until such time as thirty days have elapsed or a notice of appeal is filed * * Columbus City Schools Bd. of Edn. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision (Mar. 18, 2008), No. 2007-T-616, at 3, citing Cincinnati School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Revision (2000),
{¶ 10} Accordingly, the BTA vacated the later valuation decisions of the BOR and remanded the case to the BOR “with orders to reinstate its October 18, 2006 determination of value.”
{¶ 12} Green LLC has appealed to this court, and we now reverse.
Analysis
{¶ 13} Under our cases, “[t]he BTA is responsible for determining factual issues and, if the record contains reliable and probative support,” the court will affirm. Satullo v. Wilkins,
{¶ 14} As administrative tribunals, boards of revision have “ ‘inherent authority to reconsider their own decisions since the power to decide in the first instance carries with it the power to reconsider,’ ” but such authority does not extend beyond “the actual institution of an appeal or expiration of the time for appeal.” Cincinnati School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Revision (2000),
{¶ 15} In this case, the BTA correctly stated that during the 30-day period following the certification of the October 18, 2006 determination of value, the BOR would have had jurisdiction to vacate that decision. That means that the BOR could have acted at any time through November 17, 2006 (a Friday), to vacate or modify its determination of value. The BTA held that the BOR had not acted within the period because a vacating order, in the BTA’s view, does not constitute a completed act of the BOR until it is certified as a “decision letter” to the parties.
{¶ 17} Under
{¶ 18} We construe these statutes to establish that the boards of revision complete official action when they vote on matters that are properly before them and the vote is noted on the record of the board’s proceedings. Indeed, by requiring the certification of certain decisions,
{¶ 19} As noted, when the official act of a board of revision consists of “rendering] a decision on a complaint,”
{¶ 20} Moreover, the statutes prescribe the act of certification — the issuance of what the BTA referred to as decision letters' — -only with respect to a “decision on a complaint.” Other actions taken by the boards of revision involve not decision letters but other methods of giving notice. See
{¶ 21} Nor do we discern any need to infer such a requirement in order to effectuate the intent of the statutes. The auditor as the secretary of the board will know that the board has vacated a determination and will not put a vacated determination into effect — indeed, the statutes provide that the' auditor acts upon a determination of the board of revision when that body has separately certified its action to him.
{¶ 22} At worst, a party who is dissatisfied with the original determination and who is unaware that the determination has been vacated might try to appeal a vacated determination to the BTA. That appeal would likely face a motion to dismiss by the county auditor, the board of revision itself, or another party. In any event, requiring the board of revision to certify a vacating order would not cure this potential problem, because both the appeal and the certification could occur as late as the last day of the appeal period.
{¶ 23} In holding that the board of revision speaks “exclusively through its journal, i.e., its decision letters,” the BTA appears to confuse the board of revision’s enabling statutes with the BTA’s own.
{¶ 24} Thus, the BTA statutes plainly call for the BTA to journalize entries in order to effectuate its decisions and make them appealable. By stark contrast, the statutes relating to the boards of revision do not speak of journalization; it suffices that the board of revision votes and that the auditor as secretary makes note of the event on the board of revision’s record. In the case of a “decision on a complaint,”
(¶ 25} Moreover, the BTA’s own statutes demonstrate the difference between journalization and certification — two acts that the BTA’s decision in this case appears to conflate. As discussed, the BTA makes its decisions effective by journalizing them; separate provisions then require that those decisions be certified to specified persons.
{¶ 26} Finally, the BTA relies on decisions from this court that address orders rendered by courts of record in this state. See Bittmann v. Bittmann (1934),
{¶ 27} We hold that a board of revision succeeds in vacating a previously certified decision on a complaint when it votes to do so and the auditor notes the fact on the record of its proceedings. In this case, two pieces of evidence pertain to the issue: the document attached to Green LLC’s brief at the BTA and the CD that records the actual vote by the BOR. On the current record, we hold that the BOR vacated the October 18, 2006 order by the action it took on November 7, 2006. Because that act occurred within 30 days of the October 18 certification, the BOR possessed jurisdiction to effectuate its order, to hold the June 6, 2007 hearing, and to render its subsequent determinations of value.
Conclusion
{¶ 28} For all the foregoing reasons, we reverse the decision of the BTA and remand for further proceedings.
Decision reversed, and cause remanded.
Notes
. Although the original complaint pertained to tax year 2005,
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
{¶ 29} I would affirm the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals. The real issue is whether vacation of a previous decision — determination of value in a property valuation case filed under
{¶ 30}
{¶ 31} The board’s vacation of a previous determination of value appears to me to be a “decision on a complaint.” Although the majority takes great pains to distinguish a decision to vacate a determination of value from other decisions, I am unconvinced that there is a distinction.
{¶ 32} Furthermore, the majority opinion states at ¶ 21: “Nor do we discern any need to infer [the requirement of certification to the parties] to effectuate the intent of the statutes. The auditor as the secretary of the board will know that the board has vacated a determination and will not put a vacated determination into effect — indeed, the statutes provide that the auditor acts upon a determination of the board of revision when that body has separately certified its action to him.
{¶ 33} In fact,
{¶ 34} In holding that “a board of revision succeeds in vacating a previously certified decision on a complaint when it votes to do so and the auditor notes the fact on the record of its proceedings,” ¶ 27, the majority opinion fails to follow a clear statute. Because
{¶ 35} I respectfully dissent.