DAVID A. MCDOUGALL, individually and as Trustee for the Next-of-Kin of Decedent Cynthia A. McDougall, v. CRC INDUSTRIES, INC., and John Doe Company Defendants #1–10
Civil No. 20-1499 (JRT/LIB)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Filed 11/26/24
CASE 0:20-cv-01499-JRT-LIB Doc. 339
Michael D. Reif, Ryan W. Marth, Tara D. Sutton, Philip L. Sieff, Rashanda C. Bruce, and Julie Reynolds, ROBINS KAPLAN LLP, 800 LaSalle Avenue, Suite 2800, Minneapolis, MN 55402, for Plaintiff.
Beth A. Jenson Prouty and Jeffrey M. Markowitz, ARTHUR, CHAPMAN, KETTERING, SMETAK & PIKALA, P.A., 81 South Ninth Street, Suite 500, Minneapolis, MN 55402; David J. Wallace-Jackson, Robert J. Gilbertson, and Virginia R. McCalmont, FORSGREN FISHER MCCALMONT DEMAREA TYSVER LLP, 225 South Sixth Street, Suite 1500, Minneapolis, MN 55402, for Defendant CRC Industries, Inc.
This case arose from the death of Cynthia McDougall, who was killed in Baudette, Minnesota in a motor vehicle accident with Kyle Neumiller. Ms. McDougall‘s surviving spouse and next-of-kin, David McDougall, brought this action against Defendant CRC Industries, Inc. (“CRC”), alleging that Neumiller lost control of his vehicle because he was intoxicated from huffing CRC‘s computer dust remover (the “CRC Duster”). Among other things, McDougall claimed CRC was liable for Ms. McDougall‘s death under negligence,
CRC now moves for judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, for a new trial. Even if the liability judgment stands, CRC requests that the judgment be amended to be proportionate to the percentage of fault that the jury apportioned to CRC. In addition, McDougall moves to amend the judgment to add prejudgment and post-judgment interest. Because the Court finds that sufficient evidence supports the jury‘s verdict and that a new trial is not warranted, the Court will deny CRC‘s motions for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial. Because the Court finds no manifest errors of law, the Court will deny CRC‘s request to amend the judgment. Finally, the Court will grant McDougall‘s motion to amend the judgment to include prejudgment and post-judgment interest in part as follows: the Court will order CRC to pay $2,525,523.29 in pre-verdict prejudgment interest and $135,130.169 in post-verdict prejudgment interest and to pay post-judgment interest at a rate of 5.12% starting from the date of the June 11, 2024, judgment for the jury award and from the date of this Order for the jury award plus the prejudgment interest and any costs, until the judgment is satisfied.
BACKGROUND
The Court has thoroughly addressed the facts and procedural history of this litigation in prior rulings, which are incorporated by reference and summarized below.
CRC Duster is a compressed gas dusting spray used to remove dust and debris from other products without damaging surface finishes or sensitive components. Id. at *2. CRC Duster contains a pressurized volatile, fluorinated hydrocarbon gas called 1,1-difluoroethane (“DFE”), which is a central nervous system depressant that, when inhaled, can cause psychoactive intoxicating side effects like euphoria, hallucinations, and delusions. Id.
After Ms. McDougall‘s death, her husband, David McDougall, brought this action in his individual capacity and as court-appointed wrongful death Trustee against CRC and John Doe Companies 1–10, alleging claims for products liability, negligence, breach of warranty, deceptive and unlawful trade practices, and public nuisance. Id. at *3. The claims for negligence, strict liability for design defect, and strict liability for failure to warn proceeded to a seven-day jury trial in April 2024. Id. at *4–9.
At trial, McDougall presented evidence that CRC knew well before Ms. McDougall‘s death that DFE was known to cause immediate and severe impairment upon inhalation,
Further, McDougall presented evidence that, after the crash on July 22, 2019, a can of CRC Duster was found in Neumiller‘s car and Neumiller had DFE in his blood. (Trial
McDougall‘s damages expert, Dr. Felix Friedt, testified that the present value of McDougall‘s future losses was $1,142,000 and that McDougall‘s past economic losses were $391,000. (Trial Tr. 853:17–20, 872:9–13.)
During the trial, CRC moved for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to
On April 25, 2024, the jury returned a verdict finding that CRC was liable for a design defect with CRC Duster and that the design was a direct cause of Cynthia McDougall‘s death, though the jury found no failure to warn. (1st Jury Verdict at 1–2, Apr. 30, 2024, Docket No. 272.) The jury also determined that Kyle Neumiller misused CRC Duster; that he “kn[ew] that huffing CRC Duster while driving on July 22, 2019, was substantially certain to result in the consequences/the death of another person;” that he
Because the jury found CRC liable for a design defect, they were asked to determine whether to award punitive damages. (Trial Tr. 1622:22–1623:7; 1838:20–25.) After hours of deliberation, the jury chose not to award punitive damages, but they did request that the Court read a note from the jury in court before adjourning:
As indicated by our verdict yesterday, we believe that CRC Industries is partially at fault for the crash that killed Cindi McDougall. However, we do not believe they acted with deliberate disregard.
After much deliberation we, as a jury, have agreed that we expect CRC to use this as an opportunity to be a leader in their industry, and spearhead an effort to address inhalent abuse. Testimony and evidence shows that there is much more that could be done to combat the misuse of aerosol products, ESPECIALLY Duster.
Please do not confuse our decision not to award punitive damages with a lack of regard for the loss of Cindi McDougall. Our hearts go out to her husband, son, family, and community.
(2nd Jury Verdict Ex. 1, Apr. 30, 2024, Docket No. 273.)
Because the jury found that Neumiller was an intentional tortfeasor, the Court entered judgment in favor of McDougall against CRC for the full judgment amount. (J. at 1, June 11, 2024, Docket No. 309.) Three days later, the Court amended the judgment to include the specific monetary amount ($7,750,000) entered against CRC to McDougall. (Am. J. at 1, June 14, 2024, Docket No. 310.)
DISCUSSION
I. DEFENDANT‘S RENEWED MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW
A. Standard of Review
Under
If the Court denies a motion for judgment as a matter of law made during trial pursuant to
- resolve direct factual conflicts in favor of the nonmovant,
- assume as true all facts supporting the nonmovant which the evidence tended to prove,
- give the nonmovant the benefit of all reasonable inferences, and
- deny the motion if the evidence so viewed would allow reasonable jurors to differ as to the conclusions that could be drawn.
Stults v. Am. Pop Corn Co., 815 F.3d 409, 418 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting Jones v. Edwards, 770 F.2d 739, 740 (8th Cir. 1985)). Because a
B. Analysis
CRC argues that no reasonable juror would have a legally sufficient basis to find for McDougall on the design defect claim.1 Specifically, CRC claims there was insufficient evidence to support a reasonable jury‘s finding (1) that CRC owed Ms. McDougall a duty of care and (2) that CRC Duster‘s design was both defective and the proximate cause of Ms. McDougall‘s death. The Court will analyze each argument in turn.
1. Duty of Care
CRC argues that no reasonable jury could find that CRC had a duty to protect Ms. McDougall from the harm that Neumiller caused.
In its renewed motion for JMOL, CRC challenges misfeasance and foreseeability.
a. Misfeasance
First, CRC argues that McDougall provided insufficient evidence to support a finding of misfeasance. Specifically, CRC claims that McDougall was required to submit misfeasance to the jury and that in any event he failed to prove misfeasance at trial. In CRC‘s view, McDougall‘s theory of liability is through nonfeasance, which is insufficient to establish that CRC owed Ms. McDougall a duty of care.
However, McDougall need not have submitted misfeasance as a specific element to the jury. “Whether an alleged tortfeasor‘s own conduct is misfeasance or nonfeasance is a question of law.” Fenrich, 920 N.W.2d at 204 n.4 (citation and internal quotations omitted). The Court determined that genuine factual issues precluded summary judgment regarding CRC‘s own conduct. McDougall v. CRC Indus., Inc., 2023 WL 5515827,
[c]oncluding that a manufacturer does not have a duty because the manufacturer was not involved with the product user‘s misuse of the product fails to recognize that a manufacturer has a duty to avoid any unreasonable risk of harm to anyone who is likely to be exposed to danger when
the product is used in an unintended yet reasonably foreseeable use.
Id. Without clearer instruction from the Minnesota Supreme Court, the Court finds that the appropriate inquiry for the jury—as the Court instructed at trial—was whether CRC‘s own conduct of manufacturing and selling CRC Duster created a foreseeable risk of injury to Ms. McDougall. (See Jury Verdict at 1; Final Jury Instr. at 18–20, Apr. 30, 2024, Docket No. 274.) This conclusion is supported by bedrock principles of Minnesota products liability law, which hold that a manufacturer may have a duty to protect the user of a product, as well as those who might be injured by the product‘s use or misuse, from foreseeable danger. Whiteford by Whiteford v. Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A., 582 N.W.2d 916, 919 (Minn. 1998).
Having submitted appropriate instructions regarding misfeasance to the jury, the Court finds that McDougall presented sufficient evidence to support a reasonable jury‘s finding that CRC owed a duty to Ms. McDougall because its own conduct of manufacturing and selling CRC Duster created a foreseeable risk of injury to Ms. McDougall. At trial, McDougall presented evidence that CRC knew people were using CRC Duster and other aerosol duster products to get high while driving and yet failed to engage in risk assessment for CRC Duster. Further, McDougall presented evidence that CRC was aware of ACE‘s blog with a collection of reports of inhalant abuse, including driving-while-huffing dust remover cases. The evidence that was presented supports a reasonable conclusion that CRC‘s manufacturing and selling of CRC Duster—despite the known risks and abuse—
b. Foreseeability
Second, CRC challenges foreseeability, arguing that Neumiller‘s actions were too remote to be a reasonably foreseeable result. Specifically, CRC claims that McDougall did not prove that CRC‘s conduct created a foreseeable risk of injury to a foreseeable plaintiff because Neumiller‘s grossly negligent misuse of CRC Duster was too remote from CRC‘s design, manufacturing, and sale of the product to make Neumiller‘s conduct a reasonably foreseeable result. CRC analogizes this case to the wholesale sale of alcohol to an intermediary or the manufacturing of cold medicine that was made into methamphetamine by criminal intermediary “cooks.” See Johnson v. Kotval, 369 N.W.2d 584, 585–86 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985); Ashley Cnty. v. Pfizer, Inc., 552 F.3d 659, 670 (8th Cir. 2009).
It is well settled that a manufacturer has a duty to develop its “plan or design so as to avoid any unreasonable risk of harm to anyone who is likely to be exposed to the danger when the product is used in the manner for which the product was intended, as well as an unintended yet reasonably foreseeable use.” Bilotta v. Kelley Co., Inc., 346 N.W.2d 616, 621 (Minn. 1984) (quoting Holm v. Sponco Mfg., Inc., 324 N.W.2d 207, 212 (Minn. 1982)). “In determining whether a danger is foreseeable, courts look at whether the specific danger was objectively reasonable to expect, not simply whether it was within the realm of any conceivable possibility.” Whiteford, 582 N.W.2d at 918.
2. Design Defect
CRC next argues that JMOL is warranted because no reasonable jury could have found a design defect in CRC Duster. Τo prevail on his design defect claim, McDougall needed to establish that CRC owed a duty to Ms. McDougall, that CRC Duster was in a
a. Foreseeable Misuse
First, CRC argues that McDougall did not prove that huffing while driving is a foreseeable misuse, such that CRC would owe Ms. McDougall a duty of care. However, the Court finds that McDougall presented sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that Neumiller‘s decision to huff CRC Duster while driving was a foreseeable misuse. A manufacturer is obligated to address defects related to unintended, but reasonably foreseeable, uses. Bilotta, 346 N.W.2d at 621. At trial, McDougall presented evidence that CRC was aware that people were misusing CRC Duster and other aerosol duster products to get high, including while driving. This was sufficient to support the jury‘s verdict.
CRC next argues that McDougall did not offer required standard-of-care balancing-test expert testimony to evaluate whether CRC Duster‘s design was defective.
The test for a defective-design claim is a “reasonable-care balancing test,” which involves balancing “the likelihood of harm, and the gravity of harm if it happens, against the burden of the precaution which would be effective to avoid the harm.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). “When the standard of care that a manufacturer must exercise in weighing the costs and benefits of an alleged design defect is not within the general knowledge and experience of lay people, expert testimony is necessary.” Markel v. Douglas Techs. Grp., Inc., No. 17-1790, 2019 WL 1440423, at *3 (D. Minn. Apr. 1, 2019) (citation and internal quotations omitted). However, “expert testimony is not required in every product liability case involving a complex product.” Holverson v. ThyssenKrupp Elevator Corp., No. 12-2765, 2014 WL 3573630, at *4 (D. Minn. July 18, 2014).
In this case, weighing the costs and benefits of CRC Duster‘s design is not so outside the general knowledge and experience of lay people as to require expert testimony. McDougall presented evidence that CRC knew about the DFE-abuse epidemic and presented expert testimony on the danger of DFE-based aerosol dusters, and the jury was asked to weigh the dangers of misusing DFE with its utility in a product to remove dust from electronics. (See Jury Instr. at 19–20.) Lay people are suited to weigh such simple costs and benefits, as these circumstances are unlike those where the costs and benefits of an alleged design defect were more technical and thus required expert testimony. See,
Furthermore, though CRC rightly notes that McDougall ultimately decided not to call one particular expert witness in this case, the jury was no stranger to helpful expert witnesses over the course of this seven-day trial. To the extent the jury needed technical expert testimony to understand the toxic effects of CRC Duster, McDougall provided testimony from multiple experts, including a toxicologist, an addiction-medicine doctor, and an academic who studies the epidemiology of inhalant abuse. McDougall also presented expert testimony that CRC chose to design CRC Duster with 100% DFE even when other products that could be used as inhalants were designed in a way that made inhalant abuse more difficult. (Trial Tr. 269:18–271:11.) McDougall need not have supplemented that already lengthy expert testimony with yet another witness to walk through the standard-of-care balancing test the jury was already well-equipped to conduct on its own.
c. Alternative-Design Evidence
Next, CRC argues that McDougall did not present alternative-design evidence or establish that CRC Duster is so unreasonably dangerous that it should be taken off the market, as CRC claims McDougall must have done at trial.
Moreover, Kallio did not explicitly separate defective design cases into the categories argued by CRC—those that provide proof of an alternative design and those that show the product is so unreasonably dangerous that it should be taken off the market. Only in a footnote did the Kallio court explain that “[c]onceivably, rare cases may exist where the product may be judged unreasonably dangerous because it should be removed from the market rather than be redesigned.” Id. at 97 n.8. The court in Kapps interpreted the footnote in Kallio as establishing a bicategorical approach to defective design cases. Id. at 1161. This Court, however, understands the footnote to merely represent an example of cases where no alternative design evidence
d. Proximate Causation
Finally, CRC argues that McDougall did not prove proximate causation.
In Minnesota, proximate cause exists if “the act [is] one which the party ought, in the exercise of ordinary care, to have anticipated was likely to result in injury to others” and the defendant‘s “conduct was a substantial factor in bringing about the injury.” Lubbers v. Anderson, 539 N.W.2d 398, 401 (Minn. 1995).
The Court previously determined that proximate causation turned on foreseeability. McDougall, 2023 WL 5515827, at *6–7. CRC claims that McDougall did not satisfy the foreseeability or substantial-fact elements for proximate causation. Namely, CRC argues that no reasonable jury could have found that Neumiller was not a superseding cause that broke any causal chain. However, there was sufficient evidence to support a reasonable jury‘s finding that the events leading up to Ms. McDougall‘s death were a reasonably foreseeable risk of CRC‘s manufacture and sale of CRC Duster, and that CRC‘s actions were a substantial factor in causing Ms. McDougall‘s death. Specifically, at
*
*
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In sum, the Court finds no ground warranting JMOL, as sufficient evidence supports the jury‘s verdict in favor of McDougall on the design defect claim. CRC has therefore failed to show that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and the Court will deny CRC‘s
II. DEFENDANT‘S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL
A. Standard of Review
Under
B. Analysis
CRC argues that a new trial is warranted because the jury’s verdict is so contrary to the evidence that it constitutes a miscarriage of justice and because of alleged errors by the Court. The Court will analyze each argument in turn.
1. Contrary to the Weight of the Evidence
CRC first claims that the jury verdict is so unsupported by the weight of the evidence as to imply that the jury failed to consider all the evidence or acted under some mistake. However, as discussed above, the Court finds that the jury’s verdict was not against the weight of the evidence, and the Court will not grant a new trial on this ground.
2. Alternative-Design Instruction
CRC repeatedly requested that the jury be instructed that McDougall was required to either provide proof of an alternative feasible design or “prove that the product should be entirely removed from the market instead of redesigned,” which the Court rejected. (Trial Tr. 1084:22–1085:23; 1642:7–25.) CRC argues that the Court’s alternative-design instruction thus led the jury to believe that the absence of an alternative design was irrelevant and did not inform the jury that only in the rare case could the product’s design be unreasonably dangerous.
The Court’s instruction regarding alternative design adequately informed the jury of the law. The instructions stated that McDougall was not required to provide proof of an alternative feasible design. (Jury Instr. at 20.) This instruction comports with the Court’s understanding, explained above, that Minnesota law does not require proof of alternative-design evidence in all products liability cases. See McDougall, 2023 WL 5515827, at *8. Furthermore, there was no need to instruct the jury on CRC’s proposed alternative requirement that, in the absence of alternative-design evidence, McDougall needed to prove that CRC Duster was so unreasonably dangerous that it should be taken off the market. As explained above, Kallio does not explicitly require that, in lieu of alternative-design evidence, a plaintiff must then demonstrate that a product is so unreasonably dangerous that it should be removed from the market rather than be redesigned. The Court’s instruction on this matter was therefore appropriate.
3. Misfeasance on Verdict Form and in Jury Instructions
CRC repeatedly requested that the Court submit misfeasance to the jury and instruct the jury on misfeasance, which the Court rejected. (See, e.g., Trial Tr. 1071:18–1072:13, 1107:23–1108:1, 1631:17–25, 1680:17–1681:9.) CRC now claims that a new trial is warranted because the Court failed to submit the issue of misfeasance to the jury and to instruct the jury on misfeasance versus nonfeasance.
“The district court has discretion in the style and wording of jury instructions so long as the charge as a whole fairly and adequately states the law.” Horstmyer, 151 F.3d at 771 (quoting Beckman v. Mayo Found., 804 F.2d 435, 438 (8th Cir. 1986)). The Court rejected CRC’s requests to instruct the jury on misfeasance because of concerns that misfeasance would confuse the jury. (See Trial Tr. 1681:5–9.) Furthermore, as explained above, a defendant’s own conduct of manufacturing and selling a product that created a foreseeable risk of injury to a plaintiff may constitute misfeasance. See Diehl, 2019 WL 4412976, at *3. But the jury was instructed that a manufacturer owes a duty of care when its own conduct creates a foreseeable risk of injury to a foreseeable plaintiff, and the jury was asked to determine whether CRC Duster’s design created a foreseeable risk of injury to Ms. McDougall. Thus, the lack of an explicit instruction on misfeasance was appropriate in adequately instructing the jury on the law.
The Court’s rejection of CRC’s proposed predicate question on misfeasance in the special verdict form was also appropriate. District courts have “broad discretion in deciding whether to use a special verdict form” under
4. Court’s Answer to Jury’s Fault Question
Finally, CRC argues that a new trial is warranted because the Court’s answer to Juror Question 2 impermissibly road-mapped how the jury could ensure that McDougall would receive all the damages.
“A district court has broad discretion to respond to a jury request for supplemental instructions,” so long as the court “insure[s] that any supplemental instructions given are accurate, clear, neutral and non-prejudicial.” United States v. Felici, 54 F.3d 504, 507 (8th Cir. 1995). In addition to being accurate, clear, neutral, and non-prejudicial, answers to
Juror Question 2 asked, “Will the percentages we provide in question 4 affect the damages awarded? (If we decide to award damages)[.]” (Answer of the Court to Juror Question 2 at 1, Apr. 30, 2024, Docket No. 277.) The Court held a conference with the parties to determine how to answer the jury’s question, which concerned the effect of the jury’s apportionment of fault. (Trial Tr. 1824–1831.) Over objection from CRC’s counsel, the Court determined that the following answer was appropriate: “If you answer ‘Yes’ to both questions under Count 1 and/or both questions under Count 2, and answer ‘Yes’ to Questions 3A and 3B, then any damages awarded would not be divided and Plaintiff would receive all the damages.” (Answer of the Court to Juror Question 2 at 1.)
CRC contends that the Court’s answer improperly permitted the jury to “concern themselves about whether their answers will be favorable to one party or the other or what the final result of the law suit may be.” Chicago, R.I. & P. R. Co. v. Speth, 404 F.2d 291, 295 (8th Cir. 1968). However, the Court’s answer to Juror Question 2 was appropriate. The Court’s answer was clear and within the limits of the question presented, as it succinctly provided the only scenario where the jury’s percentages of fault would affect the damages award. The Court’s answer was also accurate, as it comports with the Court’s understanding that Minnesota law does not apportion fault between
* * *
In sum, the Court finds no basis for granting a new trial on any of CRC’s raised grounds and will thus deny CRC’s Rule 59 motion for a new trial.
III. DEFENDANT’S REQUEST TO AMEND JUDGMENT
Even if the liability judgment stands, CRC requests that the judgment be amended to 22.5% of the damages to be proportionate to the 22.5% fault that the jury apportioned to CRC, pursuant to
“Rule 59(e) motions serve a limited function of correcting manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence.” Innovative Home Health Care v. P.T.-O.T. Assoc. of the Black Hills, 141 F.3d 1284, 1286 (8th Cir. 1998) (quotations omitted). The Court “has broad discretion to alter or amend a judgment under Rule 59(e).” SFH, Inc. v. Millard Refrigerated Servs., Inc., 339 F.3d 738, 746 (8th Cir. 2003).
At trial, the parties disputed whether and how the jury should be instructed to consider the fault of Neumiller with CRC. The parties’ dispute centered on whether the fault of an intentional tortfeasor can be compared with that of a negligent tortfeasor under Minnesota’s comparative fault statute. The Court ruled that if the jury found that Neumiller was an intentional tortfeasor, it would not permit CRC to limit its exposure to liability to the extent of its fault. (Mem. Op. & Order on Special Verdict Form and Post-Incident Evidence (“SVF Order“) at 1–3, Apr. 17, 2024, Docket No. 229.)
Now, CRC again argues that any fault of CRC must be compared to Neumiller’s fault, regardless of whether Neumiller engaged in an intentional tort. However, the Court
That same conclusion applies here, in a case where McDougall argued CRC was responsible for taking necessary steps to avoid the kind of harm that ultimately claimed
CRC’s remaining arguments are no more convincing. CRC argues that because the jury found Neumiller misused CRC Duster while driving, his fault should be compared to CRC’s because “misuse of a product” is “fault” as defined by
CRC also argues that no reasonable jury could have found that Neumiller was substantially certain that he would kill when he huffed CRC Duster and then drove on July 22, 2019. The Court already rejected this argument during trial. (SVF Order at 3–5.) The test for intentionally tortious conduct is whether the tortfeasor “believes that the consequences are substantially certain to result” from his act. Victor v. Sell, 222 N.W.2d 337, 339 (Minn. 1974). Intent can be inferred from the circumstances under Minnesota law, R.W. v. T.F., 528 N.W.2d 869, 872 (Minn. 1995), and the evidence presented to the jury could support either intentional or negligent misconduct. (SVF Order at 4.) The jury ultimately determined that Neumiller acted intentionally, and sufficient evidence supports that conclusion. As a result, the Court sees no reason to alter the judgment on this matter.
Finally, CRC argues that judicial estoppel, which “forbids a party from assuming inconsistent or contradictory positions during the course of a lawsuit,” bars the intent finding. State v. Profit, 591 N.W.2d 451, 462 (Minn. 1999). CRC’s argument is that because McDougall petitioned for the approval of a settlement in his separate lawsuit against Neumiller alleging that Ms. McDougall’s death was caused by Neumiller’s negligent actions, McDougall should not be allowed to argue in this action that Neumiller acted intentionally.
The Minnesota Supreme Court has not expressly adopted the doctrine of judicial estoppel, which “is intended to protect the courts from being manipulated by chameleonic litigants who seek to prevail, twice, on opposite theories.” State v. Pendleton, 706 N.W.2d 500, 507 (Minn. 2005). Because the Minnesota Supreme Court has not formally adopted this doctrine, the Court declines to apply it to this case. Cf. North Cent. Cos., Inc. v. Minerva Dairy, Inc., No. 16-3816, 2018 WL 4181605, at *5–6 (D. Minn. Aug. 31, 2018).
But even if it did apply, the doctrine would not bar McDougall’s claims because not all three conditions under the doctrine are met. The three conditions are (1) that the party presenting inconsistent theories must have prevailed in its original position; (2) that there is a clear inconsistency between the original and subsequent position; and (3) that there are not any distinct or different issues of fact in the proceedings. Pendleton, 706 N.W.2d at 507. Here, however, McDougall did not “prevail” in his original position that
For the reasons discussed above, the Court does not find that any manifest errors of law justify an amended judgment, and CRC does not present any new evidence. Accordingly, the Court will deny CRC’s request to alter or amend the judgment.
IV. PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO AMEND JUDGMENT TO INCLUDE PREJUDGMENT AND POST-JUDGMENT INTEREST
The Court next considers McDougall’s motion to amend the judgment to include prejudgment and post-judgment interest pursuant to Rule 59(e).
A. Prejudgment Interest
In a diversity action such as this, Minnesota law governs a request for prejudgment interest. Matthew v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 639 F.3d 857, 864 (8th Cir. 2011). Under Minnesota law, prejudgment interest is computed “from the time of the commencement of the action or a demand for arbitration, or the time of a written notice of claim, whichever occurs first” until judgment is entered.
There are two types of prejudgment interest: pre-verdict interest and post-verdict interest. McDougall claims he is entitled to both.
1. Pre-Verdict Interest
McDougall claims he is entitled to $2,525,523.29 in pre-verdict interest. By contrast, CRC argues that, if judgment is awarded, McDougall is only entitled to $149,330 in pre-verdict interest.
Pre-verdict interest is “an element of damages awarded to provide full compensation by converting time-of-demand . . . damages into time-of-verdict damages.” Marvin Lumber & Cedar Co. v. PPG Indus., Inc., 401 F.3d 901, 918 (8th Cir. 2005) (citing Lienhard v. State, 431 N.W.2d 861, 865 (Minn. 1988)). It is designed to “compensate the plaintiff for the loss occasioned by the defendant’s tort.” Lienhard, 431 N.W.2d at 865.
Where damages are not readily ascertainable, pre-verdict interest is computed from the time that the action was commenced until the time of the verdict.
First, the Court will determine the appropriate timeframe within which the pre-verdict interest accrued. The pre-verdict interest began to run on the date that McDougall commenced this action by filing his complaint, which was July 1, 2020. The verdict was rendered on April 25, 2024. The parties disagree on the number of days that pre-verdict interest accrued between the commencement of the action and the verdict. McDougall argues that pre-verdict interest accrued from the commencement of the action through the date that the verdict was rendered, or 1,395 days.4 By contrast, CRC claims that pre-verdict interest accrued from the commencement of the action to the date that the verdict was rendered, or 1,394 days. It is the Court’s practice to calculate pre-verdict interest through the date that the verdict was rendered. See, e.g., Steady State Imaging, LLC v. General Elec. Co., No. 17-1048, 2023 WL 4203162, at *8 n.2 (D. Minn. June 27, 2023); Selective Ins. Co. of Am. v. Heritage Constr. Cos., LLC, No. 19-3174, 2024 WL 1886124, at *3 (D. Minn. Apr. 30, 2024). Accordingly, the Court finds that pre-verdict interest accrued across the 1,395 days from the commencement of the action on July 1, 2020, through the date that the verdict was rendered on April 25, 2024.
On the one hand, McDougall argues that the remaining $6,608,000 ($7,750,000 minus $1,142,000) of the damages award is eligible for pre-verdict interest. On the other hand, CRC argues that pre-verdict interest only accrued on the damages that Dr. Friedt explicitly calculated as McDougall’s past economic losses—or $391,000. Because the jury did not specify in the verdict what types of damages they awarded, CRC claims that the Court cannot assume that the remaining $6,217,000 that the jury awarded ($7,750,000 minus the $1,142,000 in future losses and the $391,000 in past economic losses) is for anything other than future damages. See Adams v. Toyota Motor Corp., 867 F.3d 903, 921 (8th Cir. 2017) (“[W]e predict that the Minnesota Supreme Court would conclude that
However, Minnesota law does not require a jury to spell out how and why it apportioned every penny of its damages for its award to be eligible for pre-verdict interest. It merely requires the Court to exclude pre-verdict interest from awards when future damages are inextricable from other damages. Here, future damages are ascertainable. Cf. Adams, 867 F.3d 903, 919–21; Stinson, 473 N.W.2d at 335–36. Dr. Friedt testified that McDougall’s future losses were $1,142,000, and the parties do not dispute that calculation, so the Court will exclude this amount from the pre-verdict interest principal. The remainder, $6,608,000, is eligible for pre-verdict interest.5
2. Post-Verdict Interest
McDougall claims he is entitled to $127,619.09 in post-verdict interest. CRC contends McDougall is only entitled to $101,717.40 in post-verdict interest.
Minnesota law provides for the accrual of interest “from the time of the verdict . . . until judgment is finally entered.”
Because post-verdict interest is calculated by combining the jury award with the pre-verdict interest, the parties’ contrasting post-verdict calculations are due, in large part, to their contrasting pre-verdict interest calculations. Because the Court determined that the pre-verdict interest is $2,525,523.29, that amount will be combined with the jury award of $7,750,000 for a total principal of $10,275,523.29 on which to base the post-verdict interest.7
The parties’ main disagreement relates to the time period over which post-verdict interest accrued. McDougall argues that post-verdict interest accrued until the Court entered amended judgment on June 14, 2024, whereas CRC argues that post-verdict interest accrued until the Court entered original judgment on June 11, 2024.
Post-verdict interest accrued until the Court entered judgment on June 11, 2024. “Logically, the accrual of prejudgment interest ends when the accrual of postjudgment interest begins, and postjudgment interest, which is a procedural matter of federal law, begins to accrue when a ‘money judgment’ is entered.” U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Indian Harbor Ins. Co., No. 12-3175, 2015 WL 12778848, at *6 (D. Minn. Mar. 19, 2015) (quoting
Having determined that the post-verdict interest accrued across the 48 days between the jury’s verdict and the original judgment and that $10,275,523.29 is eligible
Taking pre-verdict and post-verdict interest together then, the total amount of prejudgment interest that McDougall is entitled to under § 549.09 is $2,660,653.46. Pursuant to
B. Post-Judgment Interest
The parties do not dispute applying post-judgment interest to the judgment pursuant to
The parties agree that the post-judgment interest rate on the $7,750,000 jury award is 5.12%, which was the weekly average 1-year constant maturity Treasury yield for the week before the June 11, 2024, judgment. However, the parties disagree on whether an additional interest rate should apply if prejudgment interest and costs are added to the jury award. CRC argues that any hypothetical amended judgment awarding prejudgment interest and costs should be subject to a different interest rate, which cannot yet be determined because the post-judgment interest rate depends on the entry of such amended judgment. Munson Hardisty, LLC v. Legacy Pointe Apartments, LLC, No. 3:15-547, 2023 WL 6393157, at *5 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 29, 2023) (calculating post-judgment interest based on different rates for the verdict judgment and the amended judgment including prejudgment interest).
Despite CRC’s well-taken claim, the Court will apply a single post-judgment interest rate. This conclusion aligns with the Eighth Circuit’s logic in Jenkins v. Missouri, where the court held that a litigant is entitled to post-judgment interest on its attorney’s fees from the date that the litigant becomes entitled to the award, rather than the date when the court quantifies the fees. 931 F.2d 1273, 1275–76 (8th Cir. 1991). Further, the Court’s conclusion aligns with the Supreme Court’s holding in Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Co. v. Bonjorno, where the court held that the language of § 1961 “directs that a single
* * *
In sum, the Court will grant McDougall’s motion to amend the judgment to include prejudgment and post-judgment interest in part. The Court will order CRC to pay McDougall $2,525,523.29 in pre-verdict prejudgment interest and $135,130.169 in post-verdict prejudgment interest and will thus amend the judgment to be $10,410,653.46.
CONCLUSION
Because the Court finds no ground warranting JMOL as sufficient evidence supports the jury’s verdict in favor of McDougall on the design defect claim, the Court will deny CRC’s Rule 50(b) motion. Because the Court finds no basis for granting a new trial on any of CRC’s raised grounds, the Court will deny CRC’s Rule 59 motion for a new trial. Because the Court finds no manifest errors of law and CRC does not present any new evidence, the Court will deny CRC’s request to amend the judgment to be proportionate to the percentage of fault that the jury apportioned to CRC. Finally, the Court will grant McDougall’s motion to amend the judgment to include prejudgment and post-judgment interest in part, as consistent with this opinion.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, and all the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
- Defendant’s Motions for Judgment as a Matter of Law, a New Trial, and Amended Judgment [Docket No. 312] are DENIED; and
- Plaintiff’s Motion to Alter/Amend/Correct Judgment [Docket No. 313] is GRANTED in part, as follows:
The Amended Judgment [Docket No. 310] is amended to be $10,410,653.46; - CRC is ordered to pay pre-verdict prejudgment interest in the amount of $2,525,523.29;
- CRC is ordered to pay post-verdict prejudgment interest in the amount of $135,130.169; and
- CRC is ordered to pay post-judgment interest at a rate of 5.12% starting from the June 11, 2024, judgment for the jury award and from the date of this Order for the jury award plus the prejudgment interest and costs, computing daily and compounding annually until the judgment is satisfied.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
DATED: November 26, 2024
at Minneapolis, Minnesota.
s/John R. Tunheim
JOHN R. TUNHEIM
United States District Judge