Holm v. Sponco Mfg., Inc.

even if sion in this case would be the same as- savings and loan federally to chartered it were applicable As a law Midwest Federal.4 Minnesota sociations such as argument result, disagree during to oral compelled we are now was revealed concerning buy property with the trial court’s conclusion to for Walraff intended the clause in the note. in Holi- purposes. investment We indicated enforce day generally Acres that we would limiting law Because Minnesota involving due-on-sale clauses in situations may no the exercise of due-on-sale clauses purposes property the sale of for where, case, longer applied as in this 484; investment, conse- see 308 N.W.2d Loan subject lender is to Federal Home have also quently, in this case we would regulations, Bank Board and because the the clause permitted the enforcement of clause in the note was not limited in its under state law. pro terms to actions the borrower and upon part; part. the transfer of in reversed in vided acceleration Affirmed borrower, we anyone title to other than the J., SIMONETT, part no in the con- took right Federal has the to hold that Midwest this case. sideration or decision of upon the loan the transfer of accelerate for deed5 vendor’s interest in contract gives the transferee

—a transaction that profit- to the Company

fee title—from Gate

sharing trust.6 Court’s decision de Supreme us to reverse the compels

la Cuesta also HOLM, Appellant, 81-1287. of the trial court No. decision Arnold case, due- which involved In that in the uniform on-sale clause contained al., MFG., INC., SPONCO et borrower, Boyne, mortgage agreement, espondents. R Smith, who as property to conveyed No. 81-1133. permission. with TCF’s mortgage sumed the borrower for thereby He became the Supreme Court of Minnesota. When clause.7 purposes of the due-on-sale 31, 1982. Aug. property he attempted to transfer Walraff, the terms of the due-on-sale clause law,

gave right, TCF the under federal

accelerate the loan. We note that our deci- concerning liens or encumbrances applies only the same 4. We note that de la Cuesta mortgage lending regulated by exception, institutions the Federal which is included Home Loan Bank Board under 12 C.F.R. §§ resolution of proper for the forum clause. The (1982). Holiday regulation 541.1-56.9 and other Acres pertains the above this issue as pertinent govern law still all other Minnesota Home Loan the Federal court but is not this that lend funds for institutions home this state 1464(d)(2) § See 12 U.S.C. Bank Board. (1980); mortgages. 509.1(b) (1982). § 12 C.F.R. may possible right 5. It is nevertheless that this approved first transfer Federal 6. Midwest by regulations Federal be limited Home interest, was from the of the vendor’s Snyders 545.8-3(g) Loan Bank Board. 12 C.F.R. § Company Company. to Gate Gate (1982) provides part: Midwest Federal’s consent concedes that respect July any With made loan after of its constitute a waiver transfer did not first right * * security occupied on the a home object to the second. borrower, a Federal association: Shall clause be- not exercise a due-on-sale mortgage provides in Paragraph 13 of the (i) cause of brance subordinate to creation of a lien or other encum- agreements part: herein “The covenants the association’s se- bind, rights * * hereunder contained shall curity instrument *. to, respective successors inure shall Company Fed- Id. Gate contends that Midwest Borrower, subject to the assigns attempt- Lender and regulation eral if it would violate this paragraph provisions hereof.” ed in the note. to enforce the due-on-sale clause unnecessary We have found a determination

Larkin, Hoffman, Daly Lindgren, & Jo- seph W. Anthony Mitchell, and Andrew J. Minneapolis, for appellant. Geer,

Meagher, Markham, Anderson, Ad- amson, Brennan, Flaskamp & R. Gregory Stephens and James F. Roegge, Minneapo- lis, for respondents.

YETKA, Justice. Appellant Holm severely injured on 10, 1973, September when he came in con- high tact with a voltage power line while operating an aerial by ladder manufactured respondent, Sponco Mfg., Inc. Holm against commenced lawsuit Sponco alleg- ing negligence and strict products liability: Appellant stipulated electrocution from high contact with a volt- age wire was that he knew of the danger, and that he was familiar with warning decals on the machine which specific hazard which caused injury. Hennepin County District granted Sponco’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that rule of law in Halvorson v. American Hoist and Derrick controlling. Appellant ap- from that peals entry order and the judgment thereon.. We reverse and remand for trial. accident, time of

At the Arnold Holm 58-year-old employee Naegele was a Ad- vertising, Approximately Inc.1 80% of his purposes tion. Sponco’s following summary summary judgment of facts is condensed mo-' stipulation agreed parties acknowledged that it was his practice electrician’s Holm working as an spent time was was to lines primary where his to avoid the electrical at least 15 assistant Naegele’s billboards light install fixtures Holm was also aware of the various feet. at night. illuminated On they so could be warning labels on the aerial ladder and an elec- 10,1973, Hylback, Laval September and, particular, truck of the 10 and 15 trician, assigned Holm were appellant clearance recommendations. feet advertising to billboard for illu- prepare an a.m., 10:00 approximately Hylback At fixtures on the by mounting light mination the aerial and extended ladder such Holm advertising billboard was billboard. they could the to up climb ladder the Highway 12 between Tamarach located on top Using of the billboard. the aerial lad- Avenue and Brimhall Avenue on the west der, the two men maneuvered one 18-foot Lake, Long end of Minnesota. The bill- long up top fixture to the of the billboard approximately high; board was 25 feet to began place. bolt fixture in high within 16 feet of the billboard was a intentions were to ride the Holm’s ladder to voltage approximately electrical 31 feet line ground, controlling by using the re- ground. off the In to attach order platform, device pick mote control to fixtures, Hylback required Holm and were up second 18-foot fixture that would be purchased by to use an aerial ladder their complete job, and to required to return Sponco. from employer returning In top to the of the billboard. an automatic work- ladder had aerial ground, Holm maneuvered the aerial lad- top at the section of the platform er’s platform the automatic worker’s ladder and which per- control device der with a remote standing clockwise, in a on which he was ladder from the operation mitted so, northeasterly doing direction. While he remote control device con- platform. The powerline the electrical with his struck (4) toggle switches sisted of a series of four arm below the shoulder. right which, pressed, caused the ladder when sum- Sponco’smotion for opposition down, left, up, right. move or an affidavit of judgment, Holm filed mary ladder. the aerial with was familiar Holm witness, testifying that the aerial expert use of it on the instructions He had received unreasonably dan- ladder was defective this He had used employees. Naegele from such safety it lacked devices gerous because years, ladder aerial a similar or insulation, sensors, limiting other it more operated he had during which time warning devices which would proximity Moreover, Holm main- 2,000 than times. prox- appellant either warned enough with was familiar tained that he would have the electrical wires or imity of the ladder operate he could controls that pass- electrical current from prevented di- panel at the control looking without Sponco’s ground. ing through appellant 10,1973, September Prior to rection labels. it was not a rea- indicated that expert also the aer- difficulty positioning had Holm had to in- practice to fail engineering sonable moving the when Specifically, ial ladder. fore- where it was safety devices clude such the ladder spot, designated to a ladder be used ladder would that the aerial seeable power after the drifted “carried over” or near wires. electrical However, Holm had was discontinued. appeal this is whether The issue raised on so that the the ladder work with learned to the manufacturer of an aerial ladder problem. drifting was not unreasonably dangerous defective condition ladder the aerial Holm had worked user is to the if that liable user prior lines on near electrical on billboards defective condition is obvious. aerial ladder knew that the He occasions. and Der- Hoist v. American aware that In Halvorson Holm was not insulated. 48, 240 N.W.2d Minn. the ladder if he or rick he could be electrocuted adopted to have appeared line. this court with an electrical in contact came any manufacturer of a machine or rule which relieves latent-patent [T]he article, dangerous because of dangers other liability if

a manufacturer functions, patently which it way the user. are obvious to of his so, duty those who use it a mere- Dangers owes to Comment, of Product Obviousness make it free from latent defects and Apparent- ly to Recovery: Minnesota as a Bar * * * Doctrine, dangers. concealed the Latent-Patent ly Adopts (1977). In Halvor- L.Rev. 241 Wm. Mitchell everything does nec- If a manufacturer son, that a manufacturer the court held function to make the machine essary injured plaintiff “any owe an does not it is purpose for which properly for on its crane to to install any if the machine is without designed, of electrocution guard against the risk defect, cre- functioning and if its latent when the record demonstrated that is not known peril [the] ates no obvious; known all risk was: user, manufacturer has then the involved; (3) specifically employees law’s demands. satisfied the * * Minn, 57, at against warned 307 Citing 471-72, at 803-04. Id. 95 N.E.2d at 240 N.W.2d 308. concluded that Campo, the Halvorson court law, could not a matter of requests plaintiff, that Halvorson be di- the Appellant design under overruled, (1) product it al- for rectly contending that recover defective overruled, (2) that either a strict ready implicitly has been danger the was obvious. Halvor latent-patent the rule is inconsistent with 48, 57, 303, law, son, products liability 307 Minn. 240 N.W.2d the current trend underpin- the policy that considerations are not served ning product liability strict Halvorson, the position Since of this court Halvorson, (4) that the by adherence to question the obviousness has been uncer- the allocation latent-patent rule alters basic Ferguson tain. In v. Northern States Pow- comparative of under Minnesota’s Co., 26, er 307 Minn. the Respondent argues fault statute. that (decided Halvorson), a week before plain- logical rule in Halvorson is of law laid down teen-age boy tiff was a was severely who the user of the by requiring and fair “that injured accidentally when he contacted an should, analysis, be held in the final 8,000 electrical transmis- volt uninsulated in the use accountable for his own conduct trimming sion line while a tree in his fa- obvious and in the face of backyard. ther’s The court refused to bar court found that known risks.” The district recovery, noting although instead that the compelled grant the facts the of stipulated ordinary city dweller (including plaintiff) summary respondent’s judgment motion for that utility would know the overhead lines expressed based on Halvorson. The court backyard in the electricity, transmitted “he validity, doubt as to Halvorson’s continued expected anticipate should the [not] * * however, to invite reversal appeared presence charge of a such a lethal agree this court. We with the district 33, Thus, Id. at 239 N.W.2d at while 194. analysis court’s excellent of the law con- danger was extent of accompanying its tained in its memorandum danger was not.

order. Co., In v. Goblirsch Western Land Roller

A latent-patent succinct statement of the Scofield,2 rule Campo plaintiff right attempt- is found in v. lost his hand while (1950): ing push N.Y. N.E.2d 802 wet corn down the intact chute alleged. plaintiff, caught of latent was not 2. The whose hands became istence a defect machine, Campo onion-topping the steel of an was overruled that same court with rollers brought suit the machine’s manufactur- in a weeks after the Halvorson case matter of er, alleging that available would Micallef v. Miehle was filed. See injuries. prevented 384 N.Y.S.2d 115 reduced or N.Y.2d 348 N.E.2d Appeals upheld New York of the dis- plaintiff’s complaint missal of because the ex- machine, he had that caused the ger injury.” a task Id. corn-grinding of a was times. reference The court also indicated that there performed many Without testimony that indicating discus- credible Campo and without know of danger, particular a did not apparently obvious sion of the injury. which caused his Id. at 460. upheld was for the defendant jury verdict of the risk. assumption plaintiff’s based on Fueling Finally, in Allied Aviation Co. (Minn. 1980), Corp., 287 Dover N.W.2d 657 N.W.2d Penney v. J.C. Bigham In proposi the court cited Halvorson for 1978), (Minn. approved tion that the failure of a manufacturer analysis Halvorson Eighth of Circuit’s a was not design against foreseeable misuse Engineering Bjerk v. Universal found in proximate plaintiff’s cause of loss be 1977). 552 F.2d Corp., prior knowledge had cause after crawl Bjerk, injured plaintiff’s result of such misuse. The ing guard grease metal in order to under a potential rather knowledge rock-crushing machine was oper while it defect, than the obviousness was the specifically ating. The instruction manual denying recovery. basis for while against greasing the crusher Although the manufacturer ar motion. might of all well The result these cases gued controlling, Halvorson appear confusing to be set of decisions distinguished court Halvorson and deter from which the bar could find that the was not obvious as mined way looking to be appears court Consequently, law. the issue matter of re- Campo harsh result while avoid the failing design defendant’s three-part test of Halvorson. taining safety adequately or to install products trend The current in provide warning was a fact adequate by the accurately law has been summarized question jury. for Supreme Court: Florida validity of Halvorson The continued the nation is to The modern trend in by clouded v. Allis-Chalmers further Parks doctrine patent danger the strict abandon 1979). (Minn. Corp., and to find exception as an Parks, his arm injured was when the defect is that the obviousness of forage At the pulled was into harvester. mitigating factor to be considered as a attempting injury, plaintiff time of the a defect determining in whether defense through to unclog the harvester mechanism and whether unreasonably dangerous an open power stalk-chute door. The take degree used that of reasonable off sign was still on. A on the stalk-chute required by circumstances. care from operator “keep away door told the Jones, 366 Machine Works Co. v. Auburn sign is off.” power rolls unless A second 1167, 1169(Fla.1979). latent-pat So.2d operator “keep the harvester warned the doctrine has been abandoned ent hands, clothing away power- feet and See, e.g., Davis jurisdictions. a number parts.” driven Co., 481 Tractor 518 F.2d v. Fox River instruction, jury requested Defendant law); Beloit 1975) (applying Oklahoma Cir. “there apparently based on Harrell, (Ala.1976); 339 992 Corp. v. So.2d safety 264, to install de- Riddell, no additional Inc., 550 113 Ariz. Byrns v. (1) (2) by risk is known Hough vices if the (1976); Pike v. Frank G. 1065 P.2d usér, (3) specifically 465, 229, Cal.Rptr. Co., 467 P.2d 85 2 Cal.3d against.” requested The refusal to give v. (1970); Auburn Machine Works Co. 629 the in- instruction was v. Jones, (Fla.1979); affirmed 1167 Brown 366 So.2d “assumed, Co., 530, to- the evi- P.2d contrary struction 62 Haw. 618 Equipment Clark devices, dence, Co., 88 Ill. (1980); that some device Derrick v. Yoder 267 involved, 864, 897, had 1030 particular material to the risk 43 Ill.Dec. 410 N.E.2d App.3d installed, Mass. City Corp., been and that there had been a v. Tank 376 (1980); Uloth v. specific 874, (1978); Casey dan- 1188 Gif warning particular about the 384 N.E.2d 212 harm, ing of the likelihood of Co., 208, Mich.App. 61 232

ford Wood Sears, (1975); gravity happens, Thibault v. Roe of harm if it N.W.2d 360 Co., 802, 843 buck 118 N.H. 395 A.2d precaution & burden of the which would be Co., Lilly Eli 175 (1978); Ferrigno v. the harm.” effective to avoid 551, (1980); Mical N.J.Super. 420 A.2d 376, Co., 385- Micallef v. Miehle 39 N.Y.2d 376, Co., lef v. Miehle 39 N.Y.2d 348 N.E.2d 577-78, 86, 571, 348 N.E.2d 384 N.Y.S.2d 571, (1976); v. Olson A.W. N.Y.S.2d 115, (1976) (citations omitted). 120-21 Ob- (N.D. 1977); Chesterton viousness has not been eliminated as a fac- Inc., Massey-Ferguson, Palmer v. 3 Wash. “Rather, assessing liability, tor in however. App. 476 P.2d 713 openness and obviousness out the New York Court of pointed As should be available to the defendant on the Appeals overruling Campo: issue of whether exercised rigidity pre- its Campo suffers from degree required of reasonable care as was it is demon- cluding recovery whenever under circumstances.” Id. at patent. Its strated that the defect at 122. N.E.2d at 384 N.Y.S.2d unwavering produces view harsh results gone states have further defin Some in our mecha- in view of the difficulties ing goes adopted into the what balance way fully perceive nized of life to See, e.g., Professor list of factors. Wade’s may ultimately scope Dorsey F.Supp. v. Yoder in manu- apparent found a court to be (3d (E.D. 1971), aff'd, Pa. 474 F.2d 1339 * * * of law. goods factured as a matter Jones, 1973); Works Auburn Machine Co. Apace technology, a relax- advanced (Fla. 1979). spe So.2d Campo stringency ation of the is advisa- cific the final factors which enter into bal casting responsibility ble. A of increased ance are:. manufacturer, upon the who stands in a (1) desirability the usefulness and superior position recognize and cure availability of other and defects, improper conduct need, products safer meet same placement products of finished into the probable injury likelihood of and its public channels of commerce furthers the seriousness, (4) the obviousness of the end, interest. To this that a hold (5) knowledge common and nor- obligated manufacturer is to exercise danger public expectation mal of the design that of degree plan care (6) (particularly products), for established any so as to avoid unreasonable risk of avoidability injury by the of care in use anyone harm to likely who is to be ex- product (including of the the effect of posed product when the warnings), instructions or the product used in the manner for the which ability to eliminate the without intended, as well as an unintended seriously the of the impairing usefulness yet use. reasonably foreseeable product making unduly expensive. What constitutes “reasonable care” will, course, vary surrounding Wade, of with the Liability Tort of Manufactur Strict 5, ers, (1965).3 circumstances and will involve “a balanc- 19 L.J. 17 Sw. tion, interesting analy-

3. It is to note that this article was since both traditional support danger’ analysis also cited in Halvorson in of a balanc- sis and the ‘unreasonable ing very approved liability test depend upon similar to that in Dor- make whether the utili- sey, Micallef, ty and Auburn product question Machine Works. of the or conduct in out- circumstances, weighs, light of all of the vein, In this one commentator has observed: injury taking the risk of precautions and the burden of argued “It has been that a rule of ‘strict Comment, prevent to it.” 1 Wm. liability’ permits recovery injuries 207, Mitchell L.Rev. arising only products out of defects in when Co., Halvorson v. give American Hoist and Derrick those defects rise to unreasonable dan- 48, 56, 303, (1976). gers 307 Minn. 307 240 N.W.2d is borrowed from [cit- test, Wade, ing Although indicating approval Liability Strict Tort of Manufac- turers, apt apply 19 Sw.L.J. That is an Halvorson court declined to it. observa- 5]. Willmore, Springrose 23, v. prod- of strict approving the doctrine (1971), scope v. of that statute Hankscraft N.W.2d liability ucts in McCormack 322, (1967), was to the as- judicially expanded Minn. 154 N.W.2d 488 include not is the sumption of risk defense. The statute recognized this court position than a second redefinition in Busch v. in a better underwent manufacturer Construction, Inc., re- and to economic loss Busch N.W.2d consumer bear (Minn.1977), applied of his when it was to strict it via the cost distribute result, claims well. As a con- appreciate able to as he is also better through (other than injury tributory negligence the failure minimize risk of guard v. inspect product See also Lee or to goods. of safer production misuse, 290 defects), assumption of the risk Bottling Coca-Cola Crookston 321, (1971); recognized Restate- as specifically 188 N.W.2d 426 were valid defens- Minn. Finally, comparative negli- c (Second) Torts 402A comment es. ment § gence comparative statute fault (1965). became 604.01, subds. 1-la statute. Minn. Stat. § latent-patent pro rule of Halvorson fault, (1980). including “un- Contributory products with manufacturers who sell tects assumption of risk” and “unrea- reasonable It obvious, design dangerous, but defects. injury,” failure bars sonable to avoid to be outra “encourages manufacturers greater than the recovery only when it is design, in their to eliminate geous party recovery from whom fault devices, and to hazards Au make obvious.” sought. being Id. Jones, v. burn Machine Works Co. 366 So.2d (Fla. 1979). Moreover, rule latent-patent rule defect shifts the entire economic to the in loss complete bar recov makes obviousness a jured party, notwithstanding fact that ery. It circumvents Minn. Stat. 604.01 § was, degree, the manufacturer some up assumption and swallows fault. contrary defense. This result is risk public policy apportioning loss be This result is inconsistent with the under- blameworthy plaintiffs tween and defend lying policy supporting rationale the strict Comment, ants. See Obviousness of Prod products espoused doctrine Dangers Recovery: uct as a Bar to Minne Co., 278 Minn. McCormack v. Hankscraft Apparently Adopts sota Latent-Patent and in Lee Doctrine, 3 Wm. Mitchell L.Rev. Co., 290 Bottling Crookston Coca-Cola As the Minn. Washington correctly not- Supreme Therefore, rule, latent-patent danger obviously “The ed: manufacturer rejected set out in escape not be- ought defective balancing care” test “reasonable substituted one. obviously cause the a bad therefor in the same manner the courts law, think, ought discourage The have Ac- of New York and Florida done. in its misdesign encouraging rather than cordingly, this is reversed and remand- case Massey-Fergu- obvious form.” Palmer v. opinion. a trial with this ed for consistent son, Inc., P.2d Wash.App. SIMONETT, (concurring part There little evidence Justice support respondent’s dissenting that part). contention marketplace will moti- competition of the out in persuasively For the reasons set products vate manufacturers to make their opinion, agree I that the “latent- the court’s better safer. v. Ameri danger” rule of Halvorson patent Moreover, 48, 240 con- the Halvorson case is in can Hoist Derrick (1976), be overruled. comparative flict with current fault law N.W.2d 303 should court, however, by plaintiff Min- also holds that legislature. amended our In The adopted negligence negligence to trial on both comparative may proceed nesota a I In counts. would reverse liability statute. Minn. 604.01 and strict § Stat. Nevertheless, judgment maneuvering on volved. summary plaintiff’s first but, ladder, mistake,” count I negligence since do not see he as his counsel “made claim, appropriate liability it, “unconsciouslyexposing this as an strict I himself” put by consequence, would affirm as to the second danger. count to an obvious As a not the ladder liability. plaintiff’s (apparently strict arm itself) powerline. came in contact with the great There is a deal of confusion in that the manu- theory, really, Plaintiff’s products law over liability by created him from his protected facturer could have lapping theories of strict liabili negligence, forgetfulness by doing affixing more than ty, warranty. and breach of While fine ladder, warning to the however ade- decals made, distinctions can be these are often of be; quate might their the manu- message help little to the trial bench that has to equipped facturer the ladder should jury instruct the jury and to the that has to insulation, proximity sensors or other bring in example, a verdict. For in Randall warning which would have either Warnaco, Inc., Division, Hirsch-Weis he was too close to the 1982), court, F.2d 1226 the trial electric an electric cur- prevented wires or law, applying North Dakota dismissed rent passing through plaintiff to the plaintiff’s negligence count and submitted ground. the case to the strict jury liability. on It did so on the grounds that to submit both Clearly, negligence issues here. we have only confusing theories would manufacturer, duty who has a to de- jurors liability sign and that strict was a more reasonably and make a safe favorable theory protect plaintiff’s could that its reasonably have foreseen lad- rights. jury liability. power- found no strict der would be used around electric appeal, Appeals, by split are, On they what people, being lines and decision, reversed, holding negligence preoccupied forgetful. are at times At time, should have been too. Mag submitted same has use Inc., nuson v. Rupp Manufacturing, reasonable care for his own Minn. we held danger goes obviousness of the to his con- that it was not error for the trial court to tributory negligence assumption have refused to instruct on strict liability policy risk. The same considerations that since submission on issues are served strict are liability served did not prejudice plaintiff. Trial negligence action. Manufacturers of un- courts, safe, play will tend to submit products safe are to be held accountable. products theories, liability issues on all Magnuson, Unlike supra, where the risk of then perverse there is a risk of a jury operating a snowmobile was so proof The best verdict.1 of this is Halvor- liability inapplicable, obvious that strict was There, facts, son. here, on almost identical weighing the likelihood and severity jury liability, found but no strict (electrocution) harm the bur- and we held the verdict was “inconsistent den adding safety devices more effective and irreconcilable.” warning (insulation than decals sensors) makes a jury issue.

In this case working an aerial ladder in close proximity to Why then do we have to superimpose still powerline. electric He powerline case, knew the another on this a strict dangers there and he knew the in- theory that really copy a carbon developed, recovery 1. Since strict was first con- to the exclusion of all others. Trial tributory negligence judges has been present allowed as a de- cannot under the state of the Comparative fense. And now our requires Fault Act being law be criticized for unable to submit a jury lump negligence a product and strict liability jury satisfactory case to a in a liability together compare as “fault” and to Keeton, Liability manner.” Meaning Product two. Defect, Mary’s of 5 St. L.J. (1973). apt: The comment of Dean Keeton is “Our supreme courts should arrive at a of usage.” we full matter, mon come circle back to practical So áction? As a negligence overtones, is based on liability something where the strict claim negligence with warn, as is this or design unsafe failure ironically, by adapting more con- even case, be- essentially there is no difference expectation sumer test of what is “unrea- liability negligence.2 strict tween reincorporated sonably dangerous” we have patent danger. the old tort rule of feature of strict It is said the distinctive “unreasonably of above-quoted definition not have to liability is that does taken dangerous” that the focus is on is negligence establish not the con- perhaps explains why jury the condition of the found no not, is how- duct of the manufacturer. This liability strict for an uninsulated crane ever, does quite say true. To operated by an being expe- without sensors does not mean prove negligence not have operator in of rienced a situation obvious some sense at the manufacturer is not in danger. fault, does not have that the great a liability performs service in Strict product that it. And it is not the prove duty of emphasizing the manufacturer’s sued, or mar- person who makes is but put a safe It continues product. care to out liability it. At the of a strict kets bottom perform that service. Professor Wade’s (certainly shared the notion theory is still seven-point utility-risk test for a balancing did some- manufacturer by jurors) that the opinion) in the court’s is (quoted standard therefore, and, pay. should thing wrong not, me, it seems to a definition of strict “wrongness” This of surfaces notion courts, liability only guide to enable what it attempts law to define when the line policy, as a matter of to draw a as to something is means a defect. A defect liability liability, whether that be character- “unreasonably product which makes the negligence as or strict or both.3 ized dangerous.” something And is unreasona- However, only question before us is “if bly dangerous product dangerous whether, presented, plaintiff on facts ordinary who uses it when used user try negligence case in or strict may his knowledge community with common I com- or would hold this case is product’s as to the characteristics and both. See, e.g., 3. Professor Wade does not recommend that the Knitz v. Minster Machine 2. given jury seven-point Some n. be test. com- Ohio St.2d 5 822 466 n. N.E.2d Keeton, (1982); urge one action. See F.2d mentators tort Brizendine v. Visador Wade, 849-50; law). supra, 1970) (applying Oregon supra; ski, cf. at Twer- As observes, Comparative design Wade “As in the From Defect to Cause to Professor cases, Rethinking Liability little Some Products there is the failure to warn [in case] Fault— Marq.L.Rev. (as Concepts, Eventu- distin difference for the manufacturer may guished ally, supplier) into the various coalesce one from the in an action theories Wade, tort, liability,” liability.” “product perhaps called fault for strict one Liability concepts negli- which will the traditional of On the Nature of Strict Tort for Prod use ucts, gence which have served so well and are under- 44 Miss.L.J. jurors, at same time standable to while something goes wrong If in the manufactur- incorporating bility strict some of the notions of lia- ing process, product part missing if a has a duty manufacturer’s of which stress the materials, improper malformed or made clearly care, supplier’s vicarious “breach war- have a in the “defect” situations, ranty” liability, and, in certain say prod- sense of term. But to common uct is operating plaintiffs proof relaxation of the burden accompanied not defective because to the manufacturer’s fault. instructions, it is without Thus, case, along warning with the standard devices or because it lacks the con- this instructions, might ception fect,” design, the court add of its is to use the word “de- consider, say, jury on “in a Pick- that the er’s cumstances, is to the manufactur- as Professor Wade would sense, special meaning among all facts and cir- of care wickian with a esoteric operator Words, course, that the of its Id. the likelihood own.” sense, dangers special may exposed to from the environ- need used be sometimes to be used, done, lay impact the serious- in which the but when this is their ment dangers posed, jurors kept and mechanical in mind. Witness ness should feasibility product. “proxi- jurors of additional had with the term and economic devices trouble for the mate cause.” negligence only.

to be tried in I would

hold, facts, these where the in plaintiff-user

the use of the fully and where the claims of are limited to assertions that the

“defect”

manufacturer should have added devices to

its protect to warn and the user the obvious that strict lia-

bility nothing jurors offers confusion to

and that claim is to be jury.

submitted

KELLEY, (concurring part Justice in

dissenting part). join

I in Justice concurring Simonett’s dissenting opinion.

PETERSON, Justice (concurring part

and dissenting part). join concurring

I in the dissenting

opinion of Justice Simonett.

AMDAHL, (concurring Justice Chief

part dissenting part). join

I concurring dissenting in the

opinion of Justice Simonett. Minnesota, Respondent,

STATE of Wayne HOWARD, Appellant.

Donald

Nos. 81-735.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Aug. 4, 1982.

Rehearing Denied Oct.

Case Details

Case Name: Holm v. Sponco Mfg., Inc.

Court Name: Supreme Court of Minnesota

Date Published: Aug 31, 1982

Citation: 324 N.W.2d 207

Docket Number: 81-1133

Court Abbreviation: Minn.