In re the Marriage of D.H. and B.G. D.H., Appellant, v. B.G., Respondent.
D079801 (Super. Ct. No. D474390)
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Filed 1/17/23
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
Antonyan Miranda, Anthony J. Boucek and Timothy Miranda for Appellant.
No appearance for Respondent.
After D.H. (Mother) and B.G. (Father) divorced, Father was obligated to pay $10,000 per month in child support for the parties’ youngest child, A.G., subject to
18 years old, is a full-time high school student, and is not self-supporting, until he or she finishes 12th grade or turns 19 years old, whichever happens first.
Father filed requests for orders (RFOs) seeking (1) a judicial determination that his child support obligation had terminated and (2) a refund of overpaid support—both on the basis that A.G. had turned 18 and was no longer enrolled as a full-time high school student after June 2020. Father also sought sanctions
On appeal, Mother argues that the court erred by: (1) misinterpreting the meaning of “full-time” in
We conclude that “full-time” in
necessary, so that the court may make appropriate findings and enter a new order consistent with this opinion. We reject Mother’s remaining arguments.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This marital dissolution proceeding has been pending for 20 years. The record on appeal does not include any of the pleadings or orders before 2020, but one of the family court’s orders suggests that there has been a “long history of protracted, contentious and seemingly unnecessary litigation.”
Mother had primary custody of the parties’ youngest child, A.G. In 2019, the parties agreed that Father would pay child support at a previously set amount of $10,000 per month, but only for A.G., who was the parties’ remaining minor child. A.G. turned 18 in March 2020.
Father filed RFOs in July and September 2021 seeking a determination that his child support obligations had terminated, a return of overpaid support, and sanctions under
After June 2020, A.G. took a summer class at Ingenuity Charter School (Ingenuity), but in September 2020, A.G. entered an inpatient treatment facility where she remained until January 2021.
According to Mother, A.G. received treatment for a chronic eating disorder for most of her teen years and did not follow a traditional school calendar as a result. During the first month of A.G.’s inpatient treatment in September 2020, she was not permitted to attend classes. A.G.’s transcript reflects that she took one class through Grossmont Adult School in the fall of 2020, and no classes during the winter from late 2020 to early 2021, while she was still in inpatient treatment. However, she took two classes in the spring of 2021 after her discharge and earned a high school diploma in May 2021 from Grossmont Adult School, four years after starting high school in the fall of 2017.
Father submitted a reply declaration in which he summarized A.G.’s transcript, listing the year and school in which she earned credits. A.G. took 50 credits her freshman year (2017-2018) at West Hills High School; 60 credits at the same school her sophomore year (2018-2019); five credits at Apex Learning over the summer of 2019; 40 credits her junior year (2019-2020) at River Valley and Grossmont College; five credits at Ingenuity during the summer of 2020; and a total of 20 credits her senior year (2020-2021) from Grossmont Adult School (Grossmont).
Father stated in his declaration that “[a] quick phone call to [Grossmont] confirmed that to be a full-time student . . . one must have fifteen credits per quarterly term.” He asserted that because A.G. was only taking five credits for each of the first and third terms of her senior year, zero credits her second term, and 10 credits her fourth term, she was not enrolled as a full-time high school student during any term that year.
At the first hearing on Father’s RFOs in October 2021, the parties agreed to have the court decide the matter on the papers without an evidentiary hearing and the court heard arguments from both sides. The court indicated that after “read[ing] all the pleadings” and “all the exhibits,” its tentative
Mother’s counsel went on to argue that “full-time” should mean a student who is on a trajectory to matriculate in four years, which A.G. had satisfied. Mother’s counsel concluded his argument by observing that it appeared the court had “read everything . . . . And so I don’t think there’s anything else and [Father’s counsel] indicated that he’s the one that didn’t want additional evidence. So I’m finished, as far as we’re concerned.”
In arguing for sanctions, Father’s counsel said that Father received information in September 2020 from River Valley that A.G. was no longer in school. Mother’s counsel objected on hearsay grounds, prompting the court to respond that “[t]he problem . . . is a lot of the evidence I have is hearsay. And it seems that for the most part both of you are submitting on it[.]” Mother’s counsel said that “what the [River Valley] charter school told [Father] was not for the truth. . . . So it’s not relevant. And I’d already raised the objection to the unidentified person that said 15 units.” The court overruled the hearsay objection as to information from River Valley and observed that it was “not that relevant in any case.”
The court held a second hearing to deliver its decision and subsequently issued a written order finding that A.G. left River Valley in June 2020, and then attended Grossmont for four quarters. The court further found that the “plain meaning” of
The court made no reference to A.G.’s summer coursework in its order. When asked by Mother’s counsel at the second hearing whether the court gave consideration to A.G.’s summer 2020 credits, the court said that it did
DISCUSSION
I
We begin with Mother’s threshold argument that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to terminate child support retroactively. We also address her
related contention that even if the court had jurisdiction to terminate child support, the court erred by implicitly finding a material change of circumstances.
Mother’s arguments first require that we correct her characterization of the relief Father sought. Mother presumes that Father’s RFOs requested retroactive modification of a child support order. However, Father was instead seeking a judicial determination that his child support obligation had already terminated as a matter of law. (See Look v. Penovatz (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 61, 65, fn. 6 [“Under
The relevant provisions of the Family Code expressly provide for the remedy Father was seeking.
obligation of the person ordered to pay support terminates on the happening of the contingency[]” and the payor may receive a refund for overpayments, which is
The pleadings confirm that Father was seeking a judicial determination that his child support obligation had already terminated as a matter of law, not a retroactive modification of child support. Rather than indicating on his FL-300 Request for Order forms that he was seeking a “change” in child support, Father’s RFOs specified he was seeking “other” relief: a determination that “child support terminated as a matter of law” and that “child support was reduced to zero in June[] 2020” pursuant to
Mother cites
We disagree. By their own terms,
This reading is consistent with the wording of
We therefore conclude that the trial court did not lack jurisdiction to rule on Father’s RFO seeking a determination that his child support obligation had terminated as a matter of law in June 2020, and because it made no finding regarding a material change in circumstances, there was no error in that respect.
II
We turn next to the primary issue on appeal, which is whether A.G. was a “full-time” high school student after June 2020, and therefore entitled to continued post-majority child support under
A. Meaning of “Full-Time”
Court-ordered child support ordinarily terminates when the child reaches age 18, the age of majority. (
“(1) The duty of support imposed by Section 3900 continues as to an unmarried child who has attained 18 years of age, is a full-time high school student, unless excused pursuant to paragraph (2), and who is not self-supporting, until the time the child completes the 12th grade or attains 19 years of age, whichever occurs first.
“(2) A child is excused from the requirement to be a full-time high school student for purposes of paragraph (1) if the child has a medical condition documented by a physician that prevents full-time school attendance.” (Italics added.)
Neither
construing them in light of the statute as a whole and its purpose. (United Educators, at p. 812, internal quotation marks omitted.)
Without citation to any authority supporting her proposed definition, Mother contends that “full-time” should mean “demonstrably engaged towards timely graduation[]” within a traditional four-year time period for completing high school. The trial court rejected Mother’s proposed definition and instead adopted Father’s position that the term’s meaning depends on what the child’s school considers to be a “full-time” course load, including during the summer. We disagree with both interpretations. As we explain, we conclude that the term “full-time” as used in
We begin with the usual and ordinary meaning of the term. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary defines “full-time” as “employed for or working the amount of time considered customary or standard” or “involving or operating the amount of time considered customary or standard.” (Webster’s 3d New Internat. Dict. (2002) p. 919.) The Oxford English Dictionary defines the term as “[t]he total number of hours normally allotted to daily or weekly work, etc.; all of a person’s available time.” (Oxford English Dict. Online (2022) <https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/75366> [as of January 10, 2023], archived at <https://perma.cc/F75M-ZNNB>.) In the current context, these definitions indicate that “full-time” means whatever is considered the customary, standard, or normally allotted time for high school attendance.
These dictionary definitions comport with the definition contained in
Code section 3901 was first enacted in 1985 as former Civil Code section 196.5 (Stats. 1985, ch. 379, § 1, p. 1547), the term “full-time” already had the meaning attributed to it in
We presume that the Legislature is aware of existing laws when enacting new legislation. (See Viking Pools, Inc. v. Maloney (1989) 48 Cal.3d 602, 609.) Because
We further conclude that this definition best serves the purposes of
The record indicates that Grossmont may be a continuation school. Continuation school students are also subject to compulsory education requirements, and according to
(See Cal. Law Revision Com. com., 29F West’s Ann. Fam. Code (2013 ed.) foll.
As for the language in the bill, when it was first introduced, it provided that child support obligations would continue “as to any unmarried child who has attained the age of 18, is making a good faith effort to obtain a high school education, and resides with a parent, until such time as he or she completes the 12th grade or attains the age of 19, whichever occurs first.” (Assem. Bill No. 716 (1985-1986 Reg. Sess.) as introduced Feb. 14, 1985.)5 However, before enactment, an Assembly committee report expressed concern
about “what efforts on the part of the child would constitute ‘good faith efforts’ ” and noted that “[t]he duty of a parent to support a minor child exists irrespective of the child’s academic performance.” (Assem. Com. on Judiciary, com. on Assem. Bill No. 716 (1985-1986 Reg. Sess.) Mar. 26, 1985, p. 2.) The bill was subsequently amended to replace the “good faith effort” language with the current language specifying that the child must be a “full-time high school student.” (Assem. Amend. to Assem. Bill No. 716 (1985-1986 Reg. Sess.) Apr. 22, 1985.)
Interpreting “full-time” as the length of a schoolday designated by the school district also reduces uncertainty about the term’s meaning and gives local school districts appropriate discretion. The Education Code’s definition prescribes use of an objective measure that is not dependent on a student’s academic performance, course load, or a subjective interpretation of “good faith” effort, which a committee report expressed concern about when the
Legislature was considering the post-majority support bill. The Education Code also provides for consideration of exemptions from compulsory education, valid excused absences, and alternate schedules in settings such as continuation schools. (See, e.g.,
Finally, we stress that courts should not be so rigid in applying the “full-time” standard that it defeats the Legislature’s goal of continuing child support to afford unmarried students between the ages of 18 and 19 an opportunity to complete a high school education. For example, the Education Code provides that students may have valid excuses for being absent from school, such as illness, death in the family, medical appointments, cultural ceremonies, and “other reasons that are within the discretion of school administrators and, based on the facts of the of the pupil’s circumstances, are deemed to constitute a valid excuse.” (
Accordingly, we conclude that “full-time” in the context of
the law. Without any case law to guide them, the parties litigated the matter and the trial court decided it based on incorrect definitions of the term “full-time” as used in
B. Application to Summer Months
For the trial court’s guidance on remand, we provide additional direction about how to apply this standard in deciding whether Father’s obligation to pay child support ended in June 2020, when summer started after A.G.’s junior year. The Supreme Court’s opinion in United Educators, supra, 8 Cal.5th 805, is instructive. In that case, the court considered whether school employees are eligible to collect unemployment benefits during summer months pursuant to
In analyzing whether a school district’s summer session fell within one of the statute’s ineligibility periods or whether the session was itself an “academic term” within the meaning of the statute, the court noted that an “academic year” is “conventionally understood to refer to a nine- or 10-month school calendar, typically running from August or September to May or June, followed by a period of summer recess. [Citations.]” (United Educators, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 813.) The court cited
support obligation does not terminate just because a student who has turned 18 is taking either no classes or something less than a full course load during the summer break between traditional academic years. Such a result would defeat the purposes of
III
Mother next contends that no evidence was properly before the trial court because Father did not move to admit any evidence at the hearing in October 2021. We disagree.
At the beginning of the RFO hearing in this case, Father’s counsel stated that he was not requesting an evidentiary hearing and “just want[ed] this resolved today.” Mother’s counsel did not object or voice opposition to that proposal, and the court acknowledged that if the parties “just want to
submit” on the papers, they could do so. The court stated it had “read all the pleadings” and “all the exhibits” and asked Father’s counsel whether there was “anything, other than what’s in the pleadings,” that he would like to argue. During argument about the meaning of “full-time,” Father’s attorney made reference to exhibits submitted with the parties’ declarations without any objection from Mother’s attorney, except regarding Father’s assertion that 15 credits constitutes “full-time” at Grossmont. When Mother’s counsel objected to the latter, the court noted that the parties could still request an evidentiary hearing, “but if you’re all agreeing to just submit upon [the papers], that’s fine too.” Mother’s attorney commented that Father was
Mother’s counsel proceeded to make arguments about how “full-time” should be defined, relying on statements from Mother’s declaration and documents attached to it. He concluded his argument by noting that it appeared the court had “read everything . . . . And so I don’t think there’s anything else and [Father’s counsel] indicated that he’s the one that didn’t want additional evidence. So I’m finished, as far as we’re concerned.”
During subsequent argument regarding sanctions, Mother’s counsel objected many times, including on hearsay grounds when Father’s attorney referenced receiving information that A.G. was no longer enrolled in River Valley. The court responded that “[t]he problem . . . is a lot of the evidence I have is hearsay. And it seems that for the most part both of you are submitting on it[.]” Mother’s counsel responded that “what the charter school told [Father] was not for the truth. . . . So it’s not relevant. And I’d already raised the objection to [the] unidentified person that said 15 units.” The
court overruled the objection regarding information from River Valley and observed that it was “not that relevant in any case.”7 Again, Mother’s counsel did not request an evidentiary hearing or contradict the court’s assessment that the parties were choosing to submit on hearsay declarations.
We conclude that the parties agreed to rely on the pleadings and that the trial court properly considered the declarations and their attached exhibits as to the meaning of “full-time,” with the exception perhaps of Father’s hearsay assertion that 15 credits constituted “full-time” at Grossmont.8 We reached a similar conclusion in In re Marriage of Deamon (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 476 (Deamon). In Deamon, we rejected a party’s argument that her ex-husband’s declarations were not properly before the family court because she “ ‘did not agree to stipulate to the admission of the declarations’ ” and her ex-husband’s attorney “never affirmatively offered the declarations and documents into evidence.” (Deamon, at p. 483.) We concluded this argument failed “because nothing in
While
offered by the parties, it does not foreclose the parties from submitting evidence through other means, such as declarations and pleadings. (See Binette, supra, 24 Cal.App.5th at p. 1129;
Mother relies on In re Marriage of Pasco (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 585 (Pasco), to argue that the trial court erred in relying on the parties’ declarations even though they were never admitted into evidence. However, the facts in Pasco are distinguishable because one of the parties in that case requested an evidentiary hearing and the case was set for trial. (See id. at p. 588.) On the first day of the trial, the court in Pasco refused to hear evidence even though both parties intended to present evidence. (Id. at p. 589.)
Here, neither party requested an evidentiary hearing, and neither party indicated that they intended to present additional evidence. When the court noted it had reviewed the pleadings and exhibits, Mother’s attorney only raised an evidentiary objection as to hearsay relating to Grossmont’s credit requirements. Her counsel also relied on Mother’s declaration in his argument, indicating “an implicit agreement between the parties to rely on the documents submitted, unless the court directed otherwise.” (Binette, supra, 24 Cal.App.5th at p. 1130.) Accordingly, we reject Mother’s argument that no competent evidence was before the trial court.
IV
Lastly, Mother argues that the trial court improperly shifted the burden of proof to her on Father’s RFOs. We disagree, and we conclude that in this instance an exception should apply to the general rule that the requesting party bears the burden of proof.
As noted, Mother has incorrectly presumed that Father’s RFOs sought a reduction of a child support order as opposed to a finding that it had terminated as a matter of law. Based on that erroneous presumption, Mother cites cases involving child support modifications to support her argument that Father bears the burden of showing that changed circumstances warrant termination of his obligation. (See, e.g., Cryer, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at p. 1054 [moving party in child support modification proceeding bears the burden of proof regarding changed circumstances]; In re Marriage of Tydlaska (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 572, 576.) Mother also cites In re Marriage of Hubner (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 175 (Hubner I) and In re Marriage of Hubner (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1082 (Hubner II), which involved a father seeking suspension, and subsequently termination, of child support for a post-majority child who participated in a foreign exchange program abroad. According to Mother, those cases support her contention that she should not bear any burden of proof regarding A.G.’s enrollment status.
However, those cases are readily distinguishable. In Hubner I, the mother requested an upward modification in child support in part because of her son’s desire to participate in a foreign exchange program. (Hubner I, supra, 94 Cal.App.4th at p. 180.) The mother submitted evidence to the trial court regarding the costs and nature of the program, and based on that evidence, the Court of Appeal found that the child would continue to meet
pay child support during the program. (Hubner I, at p. 189.) The father, however, refused to make payments and claimed in Hubner II that his child support obligation terminated absent some ongoing “monthly proof” that the child continued to meet
Here, Father did not seek periodic, ongoing proof that A.G. was a full-time student as a condition for paying child support. Rather, Father obtained evidence in the fall of 2020 suggesting to him that A.G. was no longer a full-time student, and because Mother did not notify Father regarding any condition terminating support pursuant to
We conclude that the cases cited by Mother involving child support modifications do not control who bore the burden once the issue was properly
raised in Father’s RFO. We therefore turn to generally applicable burden-of-proof principles to determine who bears the burden in this context.
In the absence of an express allocation of the burden of proof in the Family Code or other statutes for a motion seeking a judicial determination that child support has terminated as a matter of law, we start by considering the knowledge of the parties concerning A.G.’s enrollment status. This factor weighs in favor of Mother bearing the burden of proof because as the parent who had primary custody and still resided with A.G., Mother had the best knowledge of A.G.’s enrollment status and school attendance. Father’s declaration attached exhibits, which Mother did not object to, including text messages in which Mother made representations about A.G.’s enrollment in October 2020, as well as an email addressed to Mother from an employee at
River Valley asking about A.G.’s attendance. These documents show that Mother had superior knowledge regarding A.G.’s school attendance.
For similar reasons, the second factor addressing the availability of the evidence to the parties also weighs in favor of allocating the burden of proof to Mother. As the custodial parent with whom A.G. still lived, Mother was in a unique position to access relevant information and documents regarding A.G.’s enrollment status. Father attempted to obtain records from A.G.’s schools regarding her enrollment status, and he was only partly successful because according to Father’s reply declaration, Mother prevented him from obtaining records from two school districts by “enlist[ing] A.G. to sign objections” to Father’s subpoenas. This factor thus supports Mother bearing the burden of proof.
The third factor—public policy considerations—lends further weight to placing the burden of proof in this case on Mother as the custodial parent. Under
was strictly speaking no longer the custodial parent after A.G. turned 18, the record establishes that A.G. still lived with her.
The fourth factor—the probability of the existence or non-existence of the fact in dispute—is essentially neutral here. We have no way of knowing how common it is for full-time students in high school to be 18 years or older, unmarried, and not self-supporting. (
We conclude that because the relevant factors favor shifting the burden of proof to Mother, on remand, she should bear the burden of proof as to A.G.’s status as a full-time high school student during the time period placed at issue by Father’s RFO.
DISPOSITION
We reverse the trial court’s order and remand for further proceedings, including additional discovery, if necessary, so that the court may make appropriate findings and enter a new order consistent with the principles discussed in this opinion. The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.
BUCHANAN, J.
WE CONCUR:
McCONNELL, P. J.
DATO, J.