PETER MARCUS, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated; MATT KOLTNOW, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated; DIANNE BARTON-PAINE, on behalf of herself and others similarly situated; ERIC BELL; JENNIFER CARMICHAEL; SUSAN S.M. DOE; HARRY FALK; JOHN GRAM; ARLEEN HARVEY; JEFFREY A. JACOB; CANDACE S. KOSCHNER; TERRY LAVENDER; KARL P. MILLER, JR.; MCKENZIE MYERS; JOAN M. PARADEIS; KENNETH VAN CLEVE; NANCY R. WATKINS; MARILYN WELLS; LYNN YOKEL, Plaintiffs, Appellants/Cross-Appellees, v. AMERICAN CONTRACT BRIDGE LEAGUE, Defendant, Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
Nos. 22-1134, 22-1135
United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit
August 14, 2023
Before Kayatta, Howard, and Montecalvo, Circuit Judges.
Raymond Dinsmore, with whom Peter Goselin, The Law Office of Peter Goselin, and Hayber, McKenna & Dinsmore, LLC were on brief, for appellants/cross-appellees.
Paul E. Prather, with whom Melissa L. McDonagh, Francis J. Bingham, and Littler Mendelson, P.C. were on brief, for appellee/cross-appellant.
MONTECALVO, Circuit Judge. Peter Marcus originally brought this action against the American Contract Bridge League (“ACBL“), where he was formerly employed. In the amended complaint, Marcus and his co-plaintiffs sought unpaid overtime wages that they claimed were due under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA“). See
Based on facts it deemed undisputed, the district court concluded that the administrative exemption applied to five
I. Statutory Background
The FLSA requires certain employers to pay their employees at least “one and one-half times the regular rate” for any hours worked in excess of a forty-hour workweek.
When considering whether the administrative exemption applies, the first determination is what an employee‘s “primary duty” is. “Factors to consider when determining the primary duty of an employee include, but are not limited to, the relative importance of the exempt duties as compared with other types of duties; the amount of time spent performing exempt work; [and] the employee‘s relative freedom from direct supervision.”
Assuming the salary criterion of
II. Factual Background
ACBL is the largest bridge organization in the world, with over 162,000 members. ACBL‘s mission is to “promote, grow and sustain the game of bridge and serve the bridge-related interests of its members” throughout the United States, Canada,
A. Relevant Job Positions at ACBL
The job titles assigned by ACBL to their employees relevant to the instant appeal are Tournament Director, National Tournament Director, Associate National Tournament Director, Field Supervisor, Area Manager, and Mentor. Tournament Directors “act as a refеree for the games played at the tournament to ensure they are played fairly and with integrity for all the players in accordance with the Laws of Duplicate Bridge.” Tournament Directors may, inter alia, rule on disputes, enforce and maintain discipline among players, keep and verify the accuracy of scores, ensure timely play, and penalize players via the deduction of points or ejection. Tournament Directors are also responsible for setting up the tournaments and selling entries.
The number of Tournament Directors present at a given tournament varies depending on the level of tournament, but every tournament has one Tournament Director who serves as the Director-in-Charge (“DIC“). The DIC role is typically filled by a full-time ACBL employee who is responsible for determining how many Tournament Directors are required for a tournament and supervising those Tournament Directors and other tournament staff.
Tournament Directors are also assigned ranks based on their experience and skill. The rank determines what level of tournament the employee can oversee as a DIC. All full-time Tournament Directors hold the rank of (from junior to senior) tournament director, associate national tournament director, or national tournament director. Generally, the DIC must have the rank of (1) at least tournament director for a sectional tournament; (2) at least associate national tournament director for a regional tournament; and (3) at least national tournament director for Nationals.1
Field Supervisor was a position in existеnce prior to January 2018, primarily responsible for tournament organization, operations, and directing. Tournament Directors reported to Field Supervisors, and Field Supervisors were responsible for hiring and firing decisions, as well as promotion, demotion, recruiting, training, and development of Tournament Directors. Field Supervisors assigned the DIC for sectional and regional tournaments and completed performance reviews for the Tournament Directors they oversaw. At tournaments, Field Supervisors refereed game play while also supervising and providing feedback to their direct reports.
Mentor was another position created in the 2018 reorganization. This position only existed from January 2018 to June 2019 and was responsible for the recruitment, training, and promotion of Tournament Directors. Mentors directly answered Tournament Directors’ questions, checked their hours, and gave performance reviews. Mentors could also serve as a DIC at large tournaments and work directly with Area Managers to make tournament staffing decisions. Although Mentors did not have the authority to fire employees, their recommendations as to employment decisions were generally deferred to.
The final two positions that came into existence because of the 2018 reorganization are National Tournament Director and Associate National Tournament Director. These employees are responsible for managing large tournaments and associated staff; training and mentoring other directors in making rulings, game setuр, and scheduling; guiding disputes concerning game play and poor behavior, including through the appeals process; and drafting regulations.
B. Compensation
1. Tournament Directors
In 2014, the only relevant position in existence was that of Tournament Director. At that time, ACBL asked its legal counsel to evaluate whether full-time Tournament Directors were properly classified as exempt under the FLSA. ACBL was advised that it had a “solid argument” that full-time Tournament Directors were exempt pursuant to the FLSA‘s administrative exemption; ACBL thus continued to treat those employees as exempt from overtime pay requirements. ACBL was also advised that employees who typically acted as DICs “almost certainly would qualify as exempt.”
2. Department of Labor Investigation
In 2014, Marcus -- a full-time salaried Tournament Director -- filed a complaint with the United States Department of Labоr (“DOL“). Marcus alleged that he had been misclassified as an exempt employee and was entitled to overtime pay. A DOL investigator concluded that “tournament directors in the field” were not exempt because “they did not supervise employees, did not have any authority to hire, fire, or discipline or make those recommendations, and did not have management as their primary duty.” The investigator concluded that Marcus was entitled to $3,883.14 in overtime back wages.
The DOL investigator communicated their findings to ACBL‘s counsel in October 2015. Counsel told the investigator that ACBL would not agree to pay any back wages because it disagreed that overtime was due to full-time salaried Tournament Directors. Counsel also said that ACBL was planning to discontinue the Tournament Director position and assurеd
3. Post-Investigation Exemption Status
In January 2017, ACBL began to classify full-time Tournament Directors as non-exempt. Field Supervisors remained exempt and ineligible for overtime pay. When ACBL reorganized its Field Operations team in 2018, the newly created positions of National Tournament Director, Associate National Tournament Director, Area Manager, and Mentor were all full-time exempt salaried positions.
C. Marcus‘s Retaliation Claim
Marcus was first hired by ACBL in 1993 as a Tournament Director and, in 2001, he held the rank of associate national tournament director. In 2011, he began directing Sectional Tournaments at Clubs (“STaCs“), which allow players from various clubs to comрete in a tournament even though the players are in different physical locations. When directing STaCs, Marcus assisted -- by phone or email -- in directing games at the clubs, as well as compiling the results.
In June 2015, Marcus was promoted to the position of STaC Coordinator and his salary was increased. The STaC Coordinator position was salaried and ineligible for overtime. In Marcus‘s annual performance review for the period from January 1, 2015, to December 31, 2015, he received an overall rating of “Meets Expectations - 3,” meaning the reviewer -- ACBL‘s Chief Executive Officer Robert Hartman -- found that his “[p]erformance consistently meets the standards of performance for [his] position and sometimes exceeds expectations.” After the performance review, Marcus‘s salary wаs increased to approximately $893 per week.
Thereafter, in April 2016, Marcus applied for the open position of Director of Field Operations. Marcus interviewed for the position in June 2016; he was the only candidate interviewed at that time. ACBL‘s Human Resources Manager, Nancy Rosenbury, told Marcus that his interview had gone well, and sometime in mid-June Marcus met with Hartman to ask when a hiring decision would be made. Hartman apparently indicated that he expected “to make some decision in the near future.” Marcus alleges that sometime thereafter Rosenbury called to inform him that he would not be hired as the Director of Field Operations due to “attitudinal concerns.”
The following month, Marcus proposed to Hartman that he work as the Director of Field Operations оn a trial basis. On August 9, 2016, Hartman informed Marcus that “[t]he executive team met [] and [] discussed your proposal. We are still considering the position. Whatever route we take, we decided not to bring anyone in on an interim or trial basis.” Two days later, Hartman reached out to Marcus about a complaint he received about STaC scores not being timely posted. Marcus resigned, effective immediately, on August 12, 2016. Marcus testified that he felt frustrated and that there was no future for him at ACBL.
In April 2017, ACBL hired another individual as Director of Field Operations. That individual had no previous knowledge of bridge directing or bridge tournaments.
III. Procedural History
A. Institution
Marcus filed the instant action on June 23, 2017, and filed an amended complaint on November 17, 2017. Marcus‘s suit alleged that ACBL failed to pay him and
B. Motion to Substitute
Kenneth Van Cleve, an opt-in plaintiff, died on July 9, 2019. ACBL filed a notice of death on May 11, 2020. On October 13, 2020, plaintiffs filed a motion to substitute his widow, Sarah Van Cleve, as a party to the lawsuit. ACBL objected, arguing that the motion to substitute was untimely because plaintiffs failed to file it within 90 days after ACBL filed the notice of death as required by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The plaintiffs maintained that because ACBL did not serve the notice of death on Sarah Van Cleve, Kenneth‘s personal representative, the 90-day clock never started to run and, “[i]n the absence of a duly-served [n]otice of [d]eath, the [c]ourt is not constrained from considering the plaintiffs’ timely motion to substitute.”
The district court agreed with ACBL and denied the motion to substitute. The court found that pursuant to
C. Summary Judgment Proceedings
In May 2020, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. ACBL and plaintiffs both moved for summary judgment on the unpaid overtime wages claims, and ACBL moved for summary judgment on Marcus‘s retaliation claim.
It is undisputed that plaintiffs satisfy the salary criterion of
The district court ultimately concluded that Tournament Directors are not subject to the administrative exemption because “the primary duty of Tournament Directors, which is officiating bridge contests, does not relate to the management or general business operations of ACBL, and [Tournament Directors] do not exercise discretion or independent judgment with respect to matters of significance.” Thus, the district court found that those plaintiffs who worked as “salaried Tournament Directors since April 24, 2017,” were entitled to overtime pay.
As to the remaining positions (National Tournament Directors, Associate National Tournament Directors, Field Supervisors, Area Managers, and Mentors), the district court found that all these positions are subject to the administrative exemption. The district court concluded that the primary duty of these positions -- managing large tournaments and associated staff; training and mentoring other directors in making rulings and tournament scheduling; guiding disputes; and drafting and updating tournament regulations -- “go[es]
Finally, the district court granted ACBL‘s motion for summary judgment as to Marcus‘s retaliation claim. The court found that “Marcus ha[d] failed to put forth evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could infer that [ACBL] did not promote him because of his November 2014 complaint” to the DOL. This appeal followed.
IV. Standard of Review
We review the entry of summary judgment de novo. See Walsh v. Unitil Serv. Corp., 64 F.4th 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2023). “Cross-motions for summary judgment do not alter the basic . . . standard, but rather simply require us to determine whether either of the parties deserves judgment as a matter of law on facts that are not disputed.” Alasaad v. Mayorkas, 988 F.3d 8, 16 (1st Cir. 2021), cert. denied sub nom., Merchant v. Mayorkas, 141 S. Ct. 2858 (2021) (quoting Adria Int‘l Grp., Inc. v. Ferre Dev., Inc., 241 F.3d 103, 107 (1st Cir. 2001)).
Because the district court‘s ruling on the motion to substitute a party turned on a question about the interpretation of Rule 25 itself, that ruling requires de novo review. See Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 560 F.3d 22, 25 (1st Cir. 2009) (employing de novo review “about the meaning or interpretation” of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure); see also Barlow v. Ground, 39 F.3d 231, 233 (9th Cir. 1994) (“The proper interpretation of Rule 25(a) is a question of law that we review de novo.“).
We begin with the motion to substitute a party, then move to Marcus‘s retaliation claim, and end on the overtime wages claims.
V. Analysis
A. Motion to Substitute a Party
The parties dispute whether ACBL was required to serve the statement noting death upon Kenneth Van Cleve‘s successor or representative. If a claim survives the death of a party, Rule 25 “facilitates the substitution of a ‘proper party’ to take the place of the decedent.” Silas v. Sheriff of Broward Cnty., 55 F.4th 872, 876 (11th Cir. 2022) (quoting
We have not yet had occasion to аddress whether the statement of the fact of death must be served upon the decedent‘s successor or personal representative before the 90-day clock starts to run. Several of our sister circuits have considered this issue and concluded that service of the notice of death upon nonparty successors or representatives of the deceased party is required to commence the 90-day substitution period. See Silas, 55 F.4th at 876; Sampson v. ASC Indus., 780 F.3d 679, 681-82 (5th Cir. 2015); Atkins v. City of Chicago, 547 F.3d 869, 873 (7th Cir. 2008); Barlow, 39 F.3d at 234; Gilmore v. Lockard, 936 F.3d 857, 866 (9th Cir. 2019); Grandbouche v. Lovell, 913 F.2d 835, 837 (10th Cir. 1990); Bass v. Attardi, 868 F.2d 45, 50 n.12 (3d Cir. 1989); Farris v. Lynchburg Foundry, 769 F.2d 958, 962 (4th Cir. 1985). This conclusion is supported by both the language and purpose of the rule.
Moreover, when
The import of this requirement is most apparent where, as here, the “opposing party, to start the 90-day clock, filed the suggestion of death.” Atkins, 547 F.3d at 873. Service of the suggestion of death upon the decedent‘s successor or personal representative “alerts [them] to the consequences of death for a pending suit.” Fariss, 769 F.2d at 962. The function of “[t]he 90-day period [is] not intended to act as a bar to otherwise meritorious actions.” Rende v. Kay, 415 F.2d 983, 986 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (quoting Staggers v. Otto Gerdau Co., 359 F.2d 292, 296 (2d Cir. 1966)). As such, “where a party files a suggestion of death, it must do so in a manner that puts all interested parties and nonparties on notice of their claims in order to trigger the 90-day window.” Gilmore, 936 F.3d at 866-67.
It appears that, of the circuits to have considered this precise issue, only the Second Circuit has concluded that under
(2021). However, the Kotler court recognized that the facts of the case before it did not arise from the posture of a “deceased plaintiff‘s representative who, having never received service of a notice of death, attempts to revive the deceased plaintiff‘s dismissed lawsuit.” Id. at 154 (emphasis in original). And that is exactly the case we have here: Sarah Van Cleve was not served with the notice of death, and she attempted to revive Kenneth‘s claims by moving to substitute. There is no indication that Sarah Van Clеve “actually received notice . . . and sat on h[er] hands while the 90-day window lapsed.” Id.
In sum, we hold that in order for the 90-day clock to begin running under
B. Retaliation
We next turn to whether the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of ACBL on Marcus‘s retaliation claim. The
The parties do not dispute that the first part of this test is met -- i.e., that Marcus engaged in statutorily protected activity when he filed a complaint with the DOL -- and the district court assumed that ACBL‘s “decision not to promote Marcus to Director of Field Operations constitutes an adverse employment action.” Thus, the case turns on whether the record -- read in the light most favorable to Marcus -- “suffices to support an inference as to whether retaliatory animus was the ‘true reason or motive’ for” Marсus not being promoted. Kearney v. Town of Wareham, 316 F.3d 18, 23 (1st Cir. 2002) (quoting Hoeppner v. Crotched Mtn. Rehab. Ctr., 31 F.3d 9, 14 (1st Cir. 1994)).
We begin with the temporal proximity between the DOL complaint and ACBL‘s decision not to promote Marcus. Marcus maintains that “the timing” of the DOL complaint and ACBL‘s decision not to promote him to Director of Field Operations contributes to the requisite causal connection showing. “[T]emporal proximity alone can suffice to ‘meet the relatively light burden of establishing a prima facie case of retaliation.‘” DeCaire v. Mukasey, 530 F.3d 1, 19 (1st Cir. 2008) (quoting Mariani-Colon v. Dep‘t of Homeland Sec. ex rel. Chertoff, 511 F.3d 216, 224 (1st Cir. 2007)).
The parties set forth different milestones from which to measure temporal proximity. Marcus maintains that the relevant time span is October 2015 -- when he alleges ACBL learned of the DOL complaint -- to July 2016 -- when he was denied the position of Director of Field Operations. Accepting Marcus‘s shortest proposed timeline, the time between ACBL‘s knowledge of the protected activity and the adverse employment action is nine months, but “a gap of several months cannot alone ground an inference of a causal connection between a complaint and an allegedly retaliatory action.” Ahern v. Shinseki, 629 F.3d 49, 58 (1st Cir. 2010).
However, Marcus does not only rely on the timing of the employment actions as his evidence of causal connection. Indeed, “‘temporal proximity’ is merely one factor relevant to causation,” Garayalde-Rijos v. Mun. of Carolina, 747 F.3d 15, 25 (1st Cir. 2014), and, where it is lacking, an inference of causation can be “reinforced by other evidence in the record.” Trainor v. HEI Hosp., LLC, 699 F.3d 19, 28 (1st Cir. 2012). The “other evidence” Marcus fastens on to show that ACBL‘s decision to not promote him to Director of Field Operations was motivated by retaliatory animus is that he was the only apрlicant interviewed for the position and, thus he presumes, the only qualified applicant, and that ACBL ultimately filled the position with someone Marcus believes was “far less qualified than” himself. Marcus also relies on purported statements made by ACBL‘s Human Resources Manager that he was not promoted due to “attitudinal” concerns.
We begin with Marcus‘s latter argument. He maintains that Rosenbury informed him that even though his interview had gone well, he would not be hired as the Director of Field Operations due to “attitudinal concerns.” However, Marcus testified under oath that Rosenbury “did not use that word for sure because that‘s [his] word, not hers.” “It is well-settled that a judge must not engage in making credibility determinations or weighing evidence at the summary judgment stage, but it is equally clear that judges cannot allow conjecture to substitute fоr the evidence necessary to survive summary judgment.” Pina v. Children‘s Place, 740 F.3d 785, 802 (1st Cir. 2014) (internal citations omitted). As such, Marcus cannot rely on his speculative and unsupported assertion of why ACBL did not hire him for the position when he readily admits that he “d[id] not remember [Rosenbury‘s] words.” See Caban Hernandez v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 486 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2007) (noting that when reviewing the entry of summary judgment, we will not “credit bald assertions, empty conclusions, [or] rank conjecture“).
We next turn to the fact that ACBL only interviewed Marcus for the position but ultimately hired someone who had very limited experience with the game of bridge. The record reflects that after Marcus filed the DOL complaint, ACBL promoted him, raised his pay, and gave him a positive performance evaluation. Moreover, ACBL hired another individual as the Director of Field Operations eight months after Marcus voluntarily resigned, and Hartman testified that this individual “had a lot of experience in [] many kinds of casino-type of environment[s]” and “gave a fresh perspective to the organization.” Marcus has not produced any evidence that ACBL‘s stated reasons for denying him the position of Director of Field Operations were pretextual.
We end with one additional argument advanced by Marcus: that “Hartman harbored animus against Marcus for having initiated a complaint . . ., and that the fruit of that animus was the decision to deny Marcus a promotion.” In furtherance of this argument, Marcus contends that Hartman lied in claiming that he did not remember Marcus applying for the position of Director of Field Operations, and that a reasonable jury could find this omission was pretext for Hartman‘s retaliatory motive. However, to draw an inference of causation “there must be proof that the decisionmaker knew of the plaintiff‘s protected conduct when [they] decided to take the adverse employment action.” Pomales v. Celulares Telefonica, Inc., 447 F.3d 79, 85 (1st Cir. 2006). A reasonable juror could not, on this record, find that Hartman knew about Marcus‘s protected activity.
The only evidence Marcus points to is that in November 2015 a DOL investigator told ACBL‘s legal counsel that Marcus was owed overtime wages as a result of an audit. Marcus does not point to any evidence that ACBL‘s counsel told Hartman -- or anyone at ACBL for that matter -- about the overtime wages due, or that counsel even adduced that Marcus was the
In short, based on the record before us, we can find no evidence of a causal connection between Marcus‘s filing of the DOL complaint and ACBL‘s decision not to promote him to Director of Field Operations. We therefore affirm the district court‘s entry of summary judgment in favor of ACBL on Marcus‘s retaliation claim.
C. Administrative Exemption
Finally, we consider whether the district court properly classified the various positions at issue pursuant to thе
1. Tournament Directors
We begin with whether the Tournament Directors’ primary duty is “directly related” to the management or general business operations of ACBL. As we recently noted, “it is often useful to [first] identify and articulate the business purpose of the employer.” Walsh, 64 F.4th at 6. ACBL is in the business of serving its members by annually “sanction[ing] over 3.5 million tables of bridge, played in more than 3,000 bridge clubs and 1,100 sectional and regional tournaments, plus 1 million tables played online.” Providing Tournament Directors for contract bridge tournaments sanctioned by ACBL represents ACBL‘s largest source of revenue besides membership dues.
The primary duty of Tournament Directors is to “supervise a duplicate bridge contest.” This work, when considered in relation to ACBL‘s business purpose, is the very service that ACBL is in the business of providing. Therefore, because Tournament Directors “provide the service that [ACBL] is in business to provide, the second prong is not satisfied.” Walsh, 64 F.4th at 7; see Davis v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., 587 F.3d 529, 535 (2d Cir. 2009) (noting that “employees directly producing the good or service that is the primary output of a business” do not perform administrative work). The district court thus correctly concluded that Tournament Directors аre not subject to the administrative exemption under the
2. National Tournament Directors and Associate National Tournament Directors
Like Tournament Directors, the primary duty of National and Associate National Tournament Directors is to supervise bridge tournaments. They are required to work around 300 tournament sessions each year. And, although they may have additional duties such as training and mentoring other directors in tournament-related areas, guiding disputes concerning game play, and/or drafting tournament regulations, these duties all go towards producing an ACBL-sanctioned bridge tournament. National and Associate National
National Tournament Directors and Associate National Tournament Directors produce the key product of ACBL-sanctioned bridge tournaments. Given the nature of ACBL‘s business, their primary duties amount to production work. See Desmond v. PNGI Charles Town Gaming, L.L.C., 564 F.3d 688, 694-95 (4th Cir. 2009) (holding that horse racetrack officials who observed and examined horses and jockeys, filled out relevant paperwork for the horses and order of finish for the race, and dealt with subsequent claims were not administrative employees because they performed tasks to produce the very product their employer offered to the public). They did not perform “work directly related to [ACBL‘s] management or general business oрerations.”
We need not address whether their work met the additional administrative exemption requirement of “includ[ing] the exercise of discretion and independent judgment with respect to matters of significance.”
3. Field Supervisors and Area Managers
Unlike the preceding positions, Field Supervisors and Area Managers meet both outstanding requirements of the administrative exemption. Despite plaintiffs’ argument to the contrary, we do not agree that the primary duty of Field Supervisors and Area Managers is direсting tournaments. These employees may spend approximately 75 percent of their time tournament directing, but “the character of the employee‘s job as a whole” reveals that their primary duty does, in fact, relate to ACBL‘s management or general business operations.
The duty of these employees goes beyond producing ACBL-sanctioned bridge tournaments and instead requires them to do “work directly related to the management or general business operations of” ACBL.
While directing tournaments, Field Supervisors and Area Managers were also
Beyond these long-term goals, Field Supervisors and Area Managers also had significant supervisory authority over other employees, including writing annual performance reviews and making hiring/firing decisions. “The supervision of other employees is clearly a management duty,” Donovan v. Burger King Corp., 672 F.2d 221, 226 (1st Cir. 1982), and it involves the exercise of discretion and independent judgment because the employment decisions made by Field Supervisors and Area Managers “affect[] business operations to a substantial degree,” “commit [ACBL] in matters that have significant financial impact,” and “bind [ACBL] on significant matters.”
Accordingly, all prongs of the administrative exemption are satisfied with respect to Field Supervisors and Area Managers. We therefore affirm the district court‘s grant of summary judgment in favor of ACBL with respect to the
4. Mentors
This brings us to the final disputed position of Mentors. Each Mentor reported directly to an Area Manager and was “responsible for (1) workforce recruitment; (2) workforce supervision and development; and (3) tournament operations.” Mentors answered Tournament Directors’ questions, checked their hours, and gave performance reviews. In so doing, Mentors “engaged in something more than routine” tournament directing. Cash, 508 F.3d at 686 (quoting Reich, 126 F.3d at 10). Instead, Mentors helped run ACBL‘s business by recruiting, supervising, and setting standards for Tournament Directors. See Reich, 126 F.3d at 10 (holding that “representing the company” qualified as administrative work).
Mentors exercised discretion and independent judgment with respect to matters of significance because “higher-level managers generally deferred to” their recommendations “as to important employment decisions.” See
VI. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court‘s order denying plaintiffs’ motion to substitute a party; affirm the district court‘s judgment in favor of ACBL on Marcus‘s retaliation claim; reverse the district court‘s judgment with respect to the