Appellant Sidney Mariani-Colón (Maria-ni) is a black, Puerto Rican male who was provisionally hired as a federal air marshal, subject to his successful completion of a training program at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) in Artesia, New Mexico. Appellant failed to graduate from the FLETC program. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA), a division of appellee Department of Homeland Security, ultimately terminated his employment.
Appellant brought suit in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico alleging two distinct violations of Title VII. First, appellant alleged he was discriminated against, in the course of his employment, based on his race, sex, color, and national origin. Second, appellant asserted he was discharged in retaliation for his administrative complaints of discrimination. The district court granted summary judgment to TSA on both claims.
Appellant raises two issuеs on appeal. First, appellant challenges the district court’s decision to deem appellee’s statement of uncontested facts admitted because, according to the district court, appellant’s response failed to comply with Local Rule 56(c). Second, appellant appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of TSA on his Title VII claims for discrimination and retaliation. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and аffirm.
I.
At the outset, appellant challenges the district court’s determination that his re
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sponse to TSA’s motion for summary judgment failed to comply with Local Rule 56(c). Specifically, he challenges the district court’s order deeming appellee’s statement of uneontested facts thereby admitted.
See
D.P.R.R. 56(c). We review the district court’s application of a local rule for an abuse of discretion.
See Crowley v. L.L. Bean, Inc.,
Local Rule 56(c) requires “a party opposing a motion for summary judgment to accept, deny, or qualify each entry in the movant’s statement of material facts paragraph by paragraph and to support any denials, qualifications, or new assertions by particularized citations to the record.”
Cabán Hernández v. Philip Monis USA, Inc.,
The purpose of this “anti-ferret rule” is to require the parties to focus the district court’s attention on what is, and what is not, genuinely controverted.
Id.; see also Cabán Hernández,
In this case, appellant attempts to “confess and avoid” by admitting that his pleading fails to admit, deny, or qualify each of appellee’s assertions of fact, while arguing that his alternative statement of facts fulfills the spirit of the local rule.
Cabán Hernández,
II.
We proceed to summarizе the sequence of events related to appellant’s claims in the light most favorable to him.
See Suarez v. Pueblo Intern., Inc.,
During the hiring process, appellant filled out a duty location preferenсe form. The form provided a list of available duty stations and appellant was able to rank his top eight choices. Out of the duty stations then available, appellant ranked New York, New York as his first choice. Consequently, TSA assigned appellant to its New York office. Later candidates were provided with a different list of possible duty stations. Appellant learned that some of these candidates had been able to list Miami on their preference forms. Subsequently, appellant requested a transfer to this location. TSA denied his request. 2
One hundred and thirty nine candidates, including appellant, started service with FAMS on May 12, 2002. 3 Based on a list of qualifying factors, TSA gave sixty-five of these candidates, including appellant, a base annual salary of $36,400. Thus, TSA provided appellant with the same base salary as approximately forty-seven percent of federal air marshal candidates entering service at this time. TSA assigned seventy four candidates, or approximately fifty-three percent of the candidates entering service on May 12, 2002, an annual base salary greater than $36,400.
While at FLETC, appellant experienced difficulties with his weapons training. Several incidents, involving the scoring of a target and an offhand comment appellant made relating to another individual shooting appellant’s target for him, led certain FLETC officials to question appellant’s integrity. Appellant did, however, achieve a passing score on at least one firearms test. Nevertheless, appellant’s problems concentrating, and his apparent violation of several safety regulations while on the shooting range, led FLETC instructors to place him on “safety watch.” This resulted in appellant being more closely monitored. Appellant, however, was unawarе that he was on safety watch. After incidents in which instructors alleged appellant improperly used deadly force and pointed his gun down range while another student was manually adjusting a target, FLETC officials suspended him from further firearms training.
As a result of this suspension, appellant failed to graduate from FLETC. TSA placed him on administrative leave and appellant returned to Puerto Rico in June 2002. Shortly thereafter, appellant contacted TSA’s humаn resources department and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), alleging he was the subject of illegal discrimination. After appellant made these allegations of discrimination, TSA offered him an administrative position in New York. No record evidence suggests appellant accepted this administrative position. 4
Instead, appellant requested to be put on sick leave. TSA granted this request. Appellant used up all of his sick leаve and vacation time. Eventually, appellant went on unpaid leave. In August 2002, TSA sent appellant a termination letter, ex *221 plaining that he was being terminated during his probationary period for failure to meet the requirements of his conditional appointment as a federal air marshal. More specifically, the letter referenced appellant’s failure to graduate from the FLETC program due to multiple safety violations, aрpellant’s failure to comprehend the proper use of deadly force, and the incident in which appellant allegedly asked another person to fire at his target in order to increase his shooting score.
III.
Appellant raises two claims under Title VII. First, appellant alleges TSA discriminated against him by treating him differently than other federal air marshal candidates. Appellant argues this disparate treatment is evidenced by TSA giving him: 1) fewer placement options, 2) less pay, and 3) harsher discipline, based on his race, sex, color, and national origin. Second, appellant claims TSA fired him in retaliation for his administrative complaints concerning this discrimination.
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment
de novo
“based on the record as it stood before the district court.”
Fontánez-Núñez v. Janssen Ortho LLC,
Summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c). Although employment discrimination cases deal with “elusive concepts such as motive or intent,” this standard compels summary judgment if the non-moving party rests his case “merely upon conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation.”
Feliciano de la Cruz v. El Conquistador Resort,
A.
We first address appellant’s Title VII discrimination claim. Disparate treatment cases “ordinarily proceed under the three-step, burden-shifting framework” outlined in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
. Generally, a plaintiff - establishes a prima facie casе of discrimination by showing: 1) he is a member of a protected class, 2) he is qualified for the job, 3) the employer took an adverse employment action against him, and 4) the position remained open, or was filled by a person with similar qualifications.
See Kosereis,
Next, we consider the government’s nondiscriminatory rationales for its treatment of appellant. In regard to placement options, the government argues that no candidate who filled out a placement form at the same time as appellant was allowed to select Miami, Florida as a possible duty station. Concerning pay, the government claims that under an established list of nеutral factors appellant’s experience did not entitle him to a higher rate of basic pay. As to discipline, the government alleges that appellant’s history of learning difficulties, serious safety violations, and untrustworthy behavior justified not only heightened monitoring of appellant but also his eventual suspension from the FLETC program. We conclude that the government has provided ample nondiscriminatory justifications for its actions.
Now we must сonsider the evidence appellant has presented to show that the government’s stated reasons for its actions are pretextual.
See Kosereis,
personal observations, or conversations he had with other trainees, which led him to believe he was the target of illegal discrimination. We, therefore, discuss generally the relevance of these personal observations and conversations to appellant’s showing of pretext.
Our review of appellant’s statements, concerning his experiences at FLETC, assures us that they do not contain “adequate specific factual information based оn personal knowledge,” to create a genuine issue of material fact.
Quinones v. Buick,
First, appellant offers no evidence whatsoever that TSA provided other trainees going through the hiring process at the same time as appellant a more comprehensive list of placement options. Second, the only hard evidence appellant presents in regard to pay demonstrates that TSA granted nearly half of the candidates who entered service with appellant the same amount of basic pay appellant received. This statistical evidence does not indicate that appellant was the target of illegal discrimination.
Third, appellant alleges that a female candidate with concentration problems, similar to his own, was disciplined less harshly. He also claims that other candidates who committed safety violations, such as failing to properly store a weapon, were not punished. In addition, appellant argues that another trainee, who had diffi *223 culties during weapons training, was allowed to remain at FLETC until he passed the firearms course.
What appellant has wholly failed to show, however, is that any of these candidates engaged in rule violations that were of the same level of seriousness as the offenses with which he was charged
(i.e.,
that they were similarly situated).
See Kosereis,
Appellant engages in much speculation. But he has failed to present reliable comparative evidence suggesting the government’s actions were based not on his perceived failings, but on discriminatory animus.
Cf. Ortiz García v. Toledo Fernandez,
To survive a defendant’s motion for summary judgment on a discrimination claim, a plaintiff must produce sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of fact as to two points: 1) the employer’s articulated reasons for its adverse actions were pretextual, and 2) the real reason for the employer’s actions was discriminatory animus based on a protected category.
See Quinones,
B.
We next consider appellant’s Title VII retaliation claim. Title VII retaliation claims also proceed under the burden-shifting framework laid down in
McDonnell Douglas. See Dixon v. Int’l Bhd. of Police Officers,
In this case, appellant undoubtedly engaged in a protected activity when he contacted TSA human resources department and the EEOC alleging he was the target of illegal discrimination. Furthermore, appellee’s termination of appel
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lant was a materially adverse action to dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.
6
In dispute is whether appellant has shown a causal connection between his allegations of discrimination and his subsequent termination. We conclude that the “temporal proximity” between appellant’s allegations of discrimination in June 2002 and his termination in August 2002 is sufficient to meet the relatively light burden of establishing a prima facie case of retaliation.
Pomoles v. Celulares Telefónica, Inc.,
In support of appellant’s termination, the government points out that appellant never accepted the administrative position offered to him in New York, nor reported for duty, despite having exhausted his leave. The government further argues that appellant failed to meet the terms of his conditional appointment as a federal air marshal. Appellant’s failure to report for duty upon exhaustion of his leave, and his failure to meet the conditions of his original appointment as a federal air marshal, represent legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons for appellant’s discharge. Consequently, we conclude the government has offered a non-retaliatory justification for appellant’s dismissal that is sufficient to overcome appellant’s prima facie case of retaliation.
A more exacting examination of the sequence of events leading to appellant’s discharge shows that Mariani was fired a few weeks after he went on unpaid leave. Given appellant’s continued failure to accept an alternative position with TSA and return to work, the temporal proximity between appellant’s complaints of discrimination and his discharge fails to raise an “inference of retaliatory motive.”
Colburn v. Parker Hannifin,
Appellant offers no additional evidence to show that the reasons the government offered for his termination are pre-textual. While appellant engages in much speculation and conjecture, a plaintiff cannot defeat summary judgment by relying on “conclusory allegations, or rank speculation.”
Fontánez-Núñez,
Affirmed.
Notes
. "This, of course, does not mean the unopposed party wins on summary judgment; that party’s uncontested facts and other evidentia-ry facts of record must still show that the party is entitled to summary judgment.”
Torres-Rosado,
. Appellant does not allege that TSA allowed other similarly situated candidates to transfer. We, therefore, decline to consider this matter further.
See United States v. Soler,
. The record does not reflect the race of these candidates. Therefore, the Court cannot construct a racial distribution of basic pay offered to candidates who began service at the same time as appellant.
.Appellаnt merely alleges he requested that TSA send him a description of the position and the salary he would receive.
. Appellant also argues that: 1) one of his supervisors, Jerry Alicea, was not aware of the complaints concerning him, and 2) he never received a written warning. Appellant fails to explain, however, how these allegations support his claim of disparate treatment. For instance, appellant does not аllege that all supervisors were generally aware of problems concerning all candidates, or that it was customary for candidates to receive written warnings. Because appellant has failed to develop these arguments, we consider them waived.
See United States v. Jiminez,
. Appellant also argues that various happenings at FLETC support his claim for retaliation. Because these events occurred before appellant engaged in activity protected by Title VII (i.e., before appellant complained of discrimination), we do not address these claims.
See Torres-Negrón v. Merck & Co.,