MARCELINO ALVAREZ VICTORIANO v. CITY OF WATERLOO, IOWA, C.J. NICHOLS, in his/her Individual and Official Capacity, and WATERLOO POLICE DEPARTMENT
No. 22-0293
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
Submitted November 17, 2022—Filed January 6, 2023
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Joel A. Dalrymple, Judge.
The plaintiff appeals from an order dismissing with prejudice his petition asserting claims arising under the Iowa Municipal Tort Claims Act. REVERSED.
McDonald, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which all justices joined.
Molly M. Hamilton (argued) of Hamilton Law Firm, P.C., Clive, for appellant.
Bradley M. Strouse (argued) and Bruce L. Gettman, Jr., of Redfern, Mason, Larsen
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, Samuel P. Langholz, Assistant Solicitor General, and Tessa M. Register (argued), Assistant Attorney General, for amicus curiae State of Iowa.
McDONALD, Justice.
Marcelino Alvarez Victoriano filed suit against the City of Waterloo and Waterloo Police Department Officer C.J. Nichols, alleging Nichols shot him without justification. The defendants moved to dismiss the petition pursuant to
A plaintiff‘s right to dismiss a petition without prejudice to a future action has been the law since the founding of this state. The
The current rule of civil procedure,
We have interpreted the voluntary dismissal rule broadly. Generally, the rule “allows plaintiffs to dismiss their petitions without prejudice and start over—once” as a matter of right. ACC Holdings, LLC v. Rooney, 973 N.W.2d 851, 852 (Iowa 2022). We have stated the rule provides “the absolute right to dismiss” a petition “without court approval” at any time prior to ten days before trial is scheduled to
The district court here recognized “in nearly all circumstances the plaintiff is allowed to dismiss its own petition at any time up to 10 days before trial is scheduled to begin and such dismissal shall be without prejudice.” The district court concluded, however, that section 670.4A conflicted with and superseded rule 1.943 and our precedents interpreting the same. In the district court‘s view, a party‘s voluntary dismissal of a petition, when made in response to a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 670.4A, must be construed as a dismissal with prejudice.
Section 670.4A was enacted into law on June 17, 2021. See 2021 Iowa Acts ch. 183, § 14 (codified at
1. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an employee or officer subject to a claim brought under this chapter shall not be liable for monetary damages if any of the following apply:
a. The right, privilege, or immunity secured by law was not clearly established at the time of the alleged deprivation, or at the time of the alleged deprivation the state of the law was not sufficiently clear that every reasonable employee would have understood that the conduct alleged constituted a violation of law.
Second, the law changes pleading requirements for a claim brought under the IMTCA.
A plaintiff who brings a claim under this chapter alleging a violation of the law must state with particularity the circumstances constituting the violation and that the law was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. Failure to plead a plausible violation or failure to plead that the law was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation shall result in dismissal with prejudice.
The heightened pleading requirement in section 670.4A(3) has three components. First, a plaintiff “alleging a violation of the law must state with particularity the circumstances constituting the violation.”
The text of section 670.4A expresses no intent to abrogate rule 1.943 or our longstanding precedents, nor does the text make such a conclusion inescapable. On the contrary, the statute incorporates existing law regarding pleading practice and procedure. The statute requires dismissal with prejudice only upon “[f]ailure to plead” a plausible violation of law or the law was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.
The defendants nonetheless contend different language in the statute requires dismissal with prejudice. The statute provides that the failure to meet heightened pleading requirements “shall result in dismissal with prejudice.”
We reached a similar conclusion in Venard v. Winter, 524 N.W.2d 163. In that case, we held the plaintiff had an absolute right to dismiss his petition without prejudice even when done to avoid an adverse ruling on the defendant‘s motion for summary judgment. Id. at 168. We reached that conclusion even though the rule governing summary judgment provides that “[t]he judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings . . . show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”
Ordinarily, unless two sources of law directly conflict, “we attempt to harmonize them in an effort to carry out the meaning and purpose of both.” In re Est. of Kirk, 591 N.W.2d 630, 633 (Iowa 1999). Here, there is no direct textual conflict between the statute and the rule, and our interpretation and construction of the statute carries out the purposes of both the statute and the rule. “Qualified immunity balances two important competing interests—‘the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.‘” Minor v. State, 819 N.W.2d 383, 400 (Iowa 2012) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)). Depriving a plaintiff of an opportunity to establish a viable claim against government officials pursuant to long-established pleading rules undermines the ability to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly. Conversely, honoring a plaintiff‘s right to dismiss a petition once as a matter of right pursuant to the rules of civil procedure does not deprive government officials of the shield of immunity when they perform their duties reasonably. Government officials will still be able to test the sufficiency of the plaintiff‘s pleading once the plaintiff has put the pleading into its final and best form, and government officials will still be able to do so at the motion to dismiss stage prior to any litigation-related disruption of government services. To the extent these officials are concerned about stale claims or gamesmanship, the statute of limitations still applies. In addition, other pleading rules prevent the plaintiff from engaging in bad faith or other dilatory conduct facilitating undue delay in perfecting a petition.
Although not dispositive of the issue, we note the State, as amicus, supports the plaintiff‘s interpretation of the statute. The State agrees with the plaintiff that “the [qualified immunity] statute‘s text doesn‘t limit a plaintiff‘s intermediate ability to amend or voluntarily dismiss and refile to attempt to cure pleading defects before a court rules on the petition‘s compliance with section 670.4A(3).” The State also agrees that government officials suffer no cognizable prejudice by allowing plaintiffs to amend or refile in accord with the rules because “[s]eeking dismissal under 670.4A(3) is just as available to the City upon receipt of an amended or refiled petition as it is upon receipt of an initial petition.” As discussed above, we agree with the plaintiff and amicus regarding the interpretation and construction of the statute.
In sum,
REVERSED.