*1 Iowa, Appellee, STATE of
v. Q. ADAMS, Appellant.
Jonathan
No. 08-0513.
Supreme Court of Iowa.
Jan. *2 Dunn and Andrew J.
Afredo G. Parrish Dunn Boles Gribble Parrish Kruidenier L.L.P., Fisher, Gentry Des Parrish & Moines, appellant. for General, Miller, Attorney Thomas J. Attorney Pettinger, Assistant Jean C. (until withdrawal), General, Karen Doland General, P. John Sar- Attorney Assistant P. cone, County Attorney, and James Ward, County Attorney, ap- Assistant pellee.
HECHT, Justice. and killed his vehicle collided with After was convicted of bicyclist, the defendant vehicle, intoxi- operating while homicide cated, of an accident. leaving the scene grounds, on several appealed He his convictions appeals court of concluded evidence but supported sufficient were sentencing correction. We for a remanded review to determine granted further prose- in a must whether State under Iowa Code cution (2007) tially can, thought the defendant’s intoxication it a trash and then proximate victim’s later told thought Adams he it might have and, so, if the defendant’s death whether bicycle. been a Adams did not stop to for failing trial counsel was ineffective to investigate but instead continued driving *3 the raise issue below. We conclude the home. day, The next after hearing news State must the defendant’s intoxicat- reports about a hit and run causing victim’s death ed caused the Brown’s purchased tarp he and a conviction homicide vehi- sustain for covered his car. After several days, he cle. As we conclude the record is not turned himself in. adequate to determine whether defen- In January, charged Adams was with trial in dant’s counsel was ineffective fail- by vehicle, murder operating while intoxi- issue, to raise the we affirm
ing causation cated, leaving and scene of an the accident. conviction. the trial, At he although admitted drinking night several in question, beers on the Background he
I. and Pacts Proceed- being denied intoxicated. Several ings. wit- nesses who with had been Adams at the A reasonable fact could finder find the party specifically testified about whether following testimony at facts from the trial. Adams appeared to be under the influence 8, 2006, the evening On of December Jona- of alcohol. Five of these witnesses testi- party at than Adams attended a a friend’s fied that Adams not appear did to be By house Des Moines. his own admis- alcohol, under the of influence but the sion, he consumed three and between five sixth, who smoking marijuana had been period beers over a and five-hour throughout evening, testified to the have drunk twice that much. At about contrary. investigating The officers con- p.m., acquaintance, 10:45 he and an Sean ceded on cross-examination that the evi- Erickson, party left the in Adams’ car with gathered dence from accident scene driving. right headlight Adams on did not tend to establish Adams was driv- functioning. car was not they Adams’ As ing recklessly or at an excessive rate of Avenue, traveled westbound Park on speed at the time of the accident. Brown, car Adams’ struck Tina Marie who lane, bicycling right hand also Adams on was convicted all three heading propelled west. Brown was onto appealed, counts. He and the court of car, hood of her and head struck appeals concluded his -convictions were windshield, shattering the passenger supported by sufficient evidence but re- body eighty-six side. Her to rest came manded for resentencing.1 case impact. feet from the of initial site Brown review, sought Adams further which we from injuries. died her granted whether, for the determination only Adams and were the in a prosecution Erickson wit- for a violation of section 707.6A, nesses to the accident. Adams testified he the State must the defen- looking down at his radio dant’s a proximate when the intoxication was occurred, impact therefore he did not victim’s death whether Adams’ know what he had hit. Erickson also trial for failing counsel was ineffective sufficiency not tell they challenge could what had hit. He ini- of the evidence appeal, parties agreed On cordingly, appeals the trial court the court of vacated the by entering judgment judgment on erred both the homi- OWI for and remanded resentenc- charges. ing. cide vehicle and OWI Ac- drag the death of another while connection between causes establishing a causal in violation of 321.278. racing, section Brown’s death.2 intoxication and “D” fel- 4.A commits a class ony person unintentionally when the Scope II. of Review. injury, a serious as defined causes the interpretation Our review 321J.1, by any the means de- at correction errors of statutes scribed in subsection or 2. 575, 579 Sluyter, v. law. State Iowa 707.6A. Code 2009). review constitutional We in sec- “by” contends the word Adams State, claims, however, novo. Collins v. de *4 intent expresses legislative tion a 1998). N.W.2d 401 588 that a under the conviction be had only upon proof statute the defen- III. Discussion. proximate dant’s intoxication the to A. The State’s Burden Prove Cau- posits another’s death. Adams of 707.6A(1). Iowa sation Under Section the of sub- comparison language that a of provides: section 707.6A Code (1) (3) demon- section with subsection A a class “B” felo- person 1. commits while operating strates an intent to treat person unintentionally ny when the differently. drag racing intoxicated and by operating (1) the of another causes death unintentional Subsection addresses the intoxicated, pro- while as a motor vehicle “by death another a motor operating of ... by intoxicated,” hibited section 321J.2.3 vehicle while but subsection
(3) unintentionally causing the addresses drag racing.” death another “while of person 2. A commits a class felo- “C” added). difference, This accord- (emphasis ny person unintentionally when the Adams, to ing legislature demonstrates the by any causes the of another of death distinguish language knew to how between following the means: (“by”) indicating and language of causation Driving a. a motor vehicle in a reck- (“while”). temporal relationship a or less manner with willful wanton disre- however, State, plain the asserts safety persons for the of or gard proper- (1) language of subsection demonstrates ty, violation of section 321.277. require the did not intend to attempting b. to elude a Eluding or causal connection between the defendant’s vehicle, law in vio- pursuing enforcement Rath- intoxication and victim’s death. 321.279, lation of if the section death er, language contends State the causal person directly indirectly the other or “by” to motor only applies “operating a results from the violation. Thus the death must be caused vehicle.” by operation A motor person 3. commits class “D” fel- the defendant’s of a ony unintentionally vehicle, operat- when the and the defendant must be only eratfing] vehicle under [w]hile 2. Because causation issue relates motor vehicle, by Adams’ conviction for murder beverage or oth the influence of an alcoholic appeals’ court resolution Adams’ claim having drug,” er an alcohol concen “[w]hile support of insufficient evidence his convic- more,” any or “[w]hile tration of .08 tion while intoxicated will stand as present a controlled amount of substance judgment a final in this case. person’s blood or urine.” Iowa Code 321J.2U). Iowa Code 321J.2 the of defines "operating "op- fense of while intoxicated” as intoxicated, ing a motor vehicle he is while Prior to the enactment of section 707.6A but the need not prove explicitly addressing vehicle, State the victim’s by homicide death was caused vehicular defendant’s intox- homicide prosecuted cases were ication to sustain a under a manslaughter conviction under the statute according to common interpretation principles. law favored the State. The See State v. Rul lestad, 209, 212, State further 259 Iowa comparison contends (1966); Kellison, language in the State v. different subsections does 233 Iowa 1274, 1277, (1943). support interpretation because (1) Kellison and Rullestad both operative word in both subsection addressed the (3) required evidence to establish a man and subsection is “while.”
slaughter conviction when the defendant
was accused of unintentionally
Because we think there
killing
is more
an
other person by
plausible
than one
while
interpretation of the
intoxicated.
Kellison,
In
statute,
charged
we must
defendant was
beyond
plain
look
with and tried for manslaughter “by oper
language
the statute to resolve
am
ating an
Wiederien,
automobile while
biguity.
intoxicated”
See State v.
*5
when
(Iowa 2006).
he struck
538,
pedestrian
and killed a
N.W.2d
541
goal
Our
with his car while
“badly
he was
intoxicat
to “ascertain and
legis
effectuate the true
1275,
ed.”
guage
produce
statute to
an absurd or
Although Kellison did not explicitly con-
impractical result.
Id.
presume
“We
tend the district court’s directed verdict
legislature intends a reasonable result
upheld
should be
because the State had
when it enacts a statute.” Id. Additional
proven
not
driving”
his “drunken
was the
“ly,
strictly
‘we
construe criminal statutes’
cause of the victim’s
we considered
and resolve doubts in favor of the ac whether the evidence was sufficient to es-
McCullah,
cused.” State v.
787 N.W.2d tablish such a causal connection.
Id. at
(Iowa
90,
2010) (citation omitted).
94
at
374. We determined
4. Kellison was tried
involuntary manslaughter
under Iowa Code section
which included
(1939)
provided: "Any person
which
killing
being
"the unintentional
of a human
guilty
manslaughter
of the crime of
shall be
by
doing
another in the
of an unlawful act not
imprisoned
penitentiary
exceeding
in the
not
amounting
felony
doing
to a
or in the
of a
eight years,
exceeding
and fined not
one thou-
Kellison,
lawful act in an unlawful manner.”
sand dollars.” The court concluded the stat-
we were driving no direct there was drunken that results from matter of law death between defendant’s operation causal connection of a and reckless from wanton death.” [the victim’s] drunken at at 11 N.W.2d 233 Iowa vehicle.” (1) that a provided 373. Subsection unin- felony “D” when he a class commits later, in Rulles years Twenty of another tentionally causes the death tad, argument did make the defendant intoxicated or Kellison, driving while we either raised explicitly However, included must “show a direct the statute recklessly. the State concluded between defendant’s connection in- causal expression legislature’s no clear the death.” 259 Iowa driving and drunken prove a the State must as to whether tent at Such was 143 N.W.2d at the de- between direct causal connection section 707.6A was the law when state of and the vic- fendant’s intoxicated In in 1987. and codified enacted In support a conviction. tim’s death to statutes, legisla we assume construing rely ambiguity, upon we instances of such existing state ture is familiar with presumes rule of construction legislation. when it enacts new the law long- not intend to overturn legislature did R.R., 330 N.W.2d Hines v. Ill. Cent. Gulf in the absence legal principles established 1983). Further, statute “[a] to do so. expression of an intent of a clear long- presumed not be to overturn will Hines, at 289. that in legal principles, unless established implica or the clearly expressed tention is has amended section theAs *6 inescapable.” tion to that effect the years, the it has increased 707.6A over (citation marks quotation and internal by a death intoxicated causing penalty omitted). to the driving, language the relevant but was first codified section 707.6A When alt has not been question of causation part: in relevant provided, in 1987it no indication in the subse We find ered.5 “D” fel- person 1. A commits a class legisla a the statute of quent revisions of unintentionally ony when the common law to eliminate the tive intent by of another either of causes the death must a requirement that the State following means: between the defendant’s causal connection while Operating a. a motor vehicle death. driving and the victim’s drug or a influence of alcohol under the purpose that The State contends of such substances or or a combination (both an alcohol concentration of sections having underlying while the statutes more, 321J.2) in violation of section .10 or supports a conclusion 707.6A 321J.2. to deter legislature intended that a motor vehicle in a reck- Driving
b. a severe sanc- driving by imposing drunk manner with willful or wanton disre- less causes a death while anyone tion on who or safety persons proper- gard for or influence of alcohol driving under the ty, in violation of section 321.277. by the the death is caused drugs, whether (1987). Iowa 707.6A Code not. The driving or driver’s intoxicated certainly strong interest legislature has clearly tracked statutory The framework intoxicated. driving while “[i]nvoluntary deterring in holding Kellison — 55; 1251, § ch. 1998 Iowa Acts portion was Acts ch. of the statute relevant §§ 26-28. See 1990 Iowa amended in 1990 and 1997. However, driving while intoxicated has ed driving” the victim’s death. Put —and by statute in prohibited been this state way, another the statute demands more Importantly, since 1937. it was prohibited than proof mere that the defendant’s driv- at the time Rullestad was decided which ing caused the death of person. another A that of a held causal connection be- may defendant be guilty found of homicide driving tween the defendant’s intoxicated by only vehicle if beyond finds the victim’s death required reasonable doubt that his criminal act of manslaughter prosecution. it may While driving under the influence of alcohol legislature be conceivable the determined caused the victim’s death. public the hazards to the of drunk Because the nature of the State’s burden justified such that it punishing per- causation is of importance central requir- son for homicide vehicle without analysis case, to our in this briefly we shall ing a causal connection between the intoxi- address this court’s precedents relevant cated legislature addressing subject. We have noted express did not this intent.6 that both factual and legal, proximate, urges The State also us interpret may come play into in criminal cases providing presump- statute as a rebuttable just Marti, as in civil tort cases. State v. that tion the defendant’s intoxication was a (Iowa 1980). 584-85 Sug- cause of the victim’s death because drunk gesting “proximate concepts cause” were an inherently dangerous is such much the cases, same civil and criminal activity. approach, urges, This the State we concluded defining proxi- instructions
would still allow a defendant to assert a mate cause in civil may appropri- trials be defense based on an intervening or su- ate for use in criminal trials. Id. at 584. perseding cause of the accident. While We continued the analogy between civil construct, this indeed be a reasonable and criminal cases for purposes of the it was not articulated in separate legal aspects factual and of causa- 707.6A(1), and it is not the court’s by observing tion proximate cause is reconfigure role to the statute. established in a criminal if case the defen- *7 We conclude it is the State’s dant’s conduct “is a in ‘substantial factor’ burden prove under section a bringing about the harm and ... there is causal connection between the defendant’s no relieving other rule of law the defen- intoxicated and the liability victim’s death. dant of because of the manner in Although the statute impose does not a which her conduct resulted in the harm.” Hubka, (Iowa burden on the specific State to a State v. 480 N.W.2d 1992). causal connection between the defendant’s Recently, in a case in a which intoxication and the victim’s it does party defendant asserted the act of a third require proof of a factual causal connection and him intervened relieved of criminal specific between a criminal act—“intoxicat- responsibility, we stated: Comried, In v. State this court affirmed a the defendant’s intoxicated 707.6A(l)(c) upon resulting conviction under section death was not raised in that case operated evidence the defendant a motor ve- and was therefore not decided this court. having hicle while Accordingly, an amount of a controlled Comried does not stand for the body proposition substance in his and caused a death. that a conviction under the stat- (Iowa 2005). proof 693 N.W.2d It should ute be sustained without of a caus- be noted that the issue of whether the State al connection between the defendant’s intoxi- must, Any language to sustain a conviction under section cated and a death. 707.6A(1), prove suggesting contrary a causal connection between a conclusion is dicta. case, death would have occurred the victim’s [a] a homicide the context “[I]n which, criminal in a defendant’s is a cause the absence cause’ ‘proximate un- sequence and driving. and continuous natural act—intoxicated independent and any new broken of Counsel. B. Ineffective Assistance without cause, injury, produces been contends error has not The State oc- would not have injury which of whether on the issue preserved of ordi- and from which curred by vehicle under prosecution for homicide reasonably could have nary prudence 707.6A(1)the State must establish result, or a similar that such a foreseen driving was the the defendant’s result, under the probable injurious Adams con- of the victim’s death. existed.” they facts as not raised before cedes the issue was (Iowa Dalton, v. State court, argues his trial coun- but he district 2004) (citation omitted). failing request for sel was ineffective However, discussion in our most recent properly on causation and jury instruction case, in a criminal principles of causation causation. raise the State’s “causation does sur- clarified that when we has reason If the defendant case, our law an issue in a criminal face as is ade grounds to believe the record able if the normally requires us to consider issue, to address the quate for the court of the act was a factual cause criminal may raise a claim of ineffec Tribble, the defendant v. 790 N.W.2d harm.” State 2010). appeal. of counsel on direct where multi- tive assistance Except 126-27 814.7(2) (2007). § If consequence, we deter acts contribute to cause a Iowa Code ple may re adequate, of factual causation the record is we the determination mine “ 814.7(3). § ‘the harm would If simply turns on whether claim. Id. we solve the absent the ap [defendant’s] not have occurred for the record is insufficient conclude ” (quoting at 127 Restatement review, conduct.’ Id. may preserve it for pellate we (Third) Liability Physical of Torts: Id. The ele postconviction proceedings. (2010)).7 Harm at 346 Emotional assistance of ments of a claim ineffective prevail well-established. To counsel are us to con- Our review of this case leads claim, by pre Adams must on his just a “normal” case clude that this is such “(1) his ponderance of the evidence requires us to con- in which “our law perform an essential trial counsel failed to criminal act was a factual cause sider if the (2) preju duty, this failure resulted harm.” at 126-27. As our Straw, 128, 133 v. clear, dice.” State the cau- in this ease makes decision *8 (Iowa 2006); Strickland v. Wash see also under question prosecution sation in a 668, 687-88, 104 S.Ct. ington, whether 466 U.S. Iowa Code section asks 829, 2009) (Iowa (adopting argument, 774 N.W.2d 839 7. we understand his Adams As (Third) ineffective in contends his trial counsel was of Torts formulation the Restatement failing challenge proof a to the State's of substituting civil of causation for cases (factual) connection between his crimi- causal “scope liability” inquiry the former of failing and in nal act and the victim’s "legal "proximate concepts of cause” and challenge instruc- to the district court's Hubka, cause”); v. 480 N.W.2d see also State proof addressing the burden of tion State’s 867, (Iowa 1992) (concluding the contrib- 869 ad- factual causation. We therefore do not will not utory negligence of a homicide victim aspect today "legal dress whether the cause” allowing legal a defendant constitute a cause proximate doctrine has of the former escape responsibility for homi- to criminal any continuing viability af- in criminal cases cide). Kaczinski, Thompson v. ter our decision in
373 707.6A(l)(a). (1984). 2065, 674, 2052, To See State v. 490 Wieskamp, 80 L.Ed.2d 693 “ (Iowa (“[A] perform- prong, the first ‘counsel’s Ct.App.1992) meet N.W.2d of a against the standard ance is measured driving sober driver with care reasonable reasonably with the competent practitioner would struck the have victim.... There attorney performed that the presumption Wieskamp’s fore driving intoxicated was ” his competent in a manner.’ Dal- duties not a factor in causing substantial the vic omitted). (citation ton, at 119 tim’s death. We dismiss the vehicular satisfy Adams prejudice prong, To ”). charge.... However, homicide Adams’ “ proba- show ‘there is a reasonable must challenge trial counsel failed to the State’s that, but for counsel’s bility unprofessional proof of a causal connection between errors, the would proceeding results of the act of driving Adams’ criminal intoxicated ” (citation omit- different.’ have been death.8 and Brown’s ted). conclude We the record is inade previously court has that to
This held however, quate, permit to us to resolve “manslaughter by a conviction for sustain Adams’ ineffective assistance of counsel to show a driving” necessary it is drunken First, claim appeal. on direct we note causal defen- direct connection between interposed by defense Adams’ counsel dant’s drunken and a decedent’s the district court was solely based on Rullestad, death. Iowa at proposition that the State failed to 280; Wullner, at see also State v. N.W.2d operating Adams a un vehicle while Ct.App.1986) der (“In the influence alcohol at the time of involuntary to sustain an man- order A the crash. defense challenging public conviction slaughter upon based proof State’s of a causal be connection driving, necessary of drunk to offense it is alleged tween Adams’ show a direct causal connection between death.”). death at presented and Brown’s was not More drunk trial.9 counsel has permit the court of conclud- Trial not been recently, appeals has opportunity explain ted an ed such causal connection whether considered, if it required for a conviction under section causation defense was marshalling prosecutions required in- sec- 8. Instruction number death is under 707.6A(1). Accordingly, charge urge tion we district struction for the homicide vehicle Adams, the uniform cases courts to use instruction in against the bur- allocated to the State type. of this prove: den to day On or about the December 1. 18th Although we conclude we on are unable operated the Defendant motor appeal to decide law direct as matter of of al- vehicle while under the influence duty whether trial counsel breached a cohol. issue, failing raise the we note causation unintentionally 2. The Defendant’s actions the record does tend to Brown the death Brown. caused of Tina Marie clothing wearing bicycling while on a dark language utilized court in district city night in highly street late at traveled this instruction for the second element right the time of December at the crash. The charge did not conform to the Iowa State Bar *9 functioning. headlight Adams’ car was not Jury circumstances, Criminal num- Association’s Instruction we Under these think ration- require expressly which ber 710.1 would al- al fact finder could have found Adams' set out that defendant’s act or acts leged was not the factual intoxicated (the in element 1 criminal act of intoxicated death who cause of Brown’s because a driver driving) opinion ingested in caused a death. As our alcohol before the crash had not clear, proof struck the victim cir- this case makes of a causal con- would have under the between nection the criminal act cumstances. cation) sepa- I write type. cases of this considered, plau- were whether there rately my to elaborate on reasons. it. pursuing for not strategic reasons sible Adams’ conviction affirm We therefore require does not The text of the statute and leave his claim by vehicle for murder finding Adams’ intoxication separate pos- of counsel assistance of ineffective interpret to the death. Our task is caused proceedings. postconviction sible the statute as written: felony “B” A commits a class person IV. Conclusion. unintentionally causes person when conviction for homi- affirm Adams’ We by operating a the death of another affirm the court of by vehicle and cide intoxicated, pro- as motor vehicle while in- of Adams’ claim of resolution appeals’ hibited section 321J.2. support to his convic- evidence sufficient 707.6A(1). fighting § is- Iowa Code intoxicated. We also tion for while by a decision of the Indiana sue is framed resolution of appeals the court of affirm Supreme construing equivalent stat- Court sentencing challenge and vacate prov- causation is utory language10 to hold and remand to the judgment, the OWI ran into the by showing “the driver en resentencing. district court for State, N.E.2d victim.” Micinski v. AP- OF DECISION OF COURT (Ind.1986). reasoned, The court AFFIRMED; DISTRICT PEALS nothing in the statute to indicate “We find AFFIRMED IN COURT JUDGMENT Assembly require the General intended to IN PART AND PART AND VACATED a causal link between that the State REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING. intoxication and the fact the the driver’s driving.” from his Id. The injury resulted except justices All concur rejected argument Micinski court WATERMAN, J., specially concurs who “ asked, it driv- jury should be ‘Is MANSFIELD, J., part. who takes no him to hit the er’s intoxication that caused ” that this victim?’ Id. The court concluded WATERMAN, (concurring spe- Justice legislature intended. was not what cially). Rather, focus be “on the driv- should join majority I concur. I specially speculation and not on about er’s acts affirming Adams’ conviction for vehicular if stopped he could have he had whether rejecting and in Adams’ claim the homicide If the driver’s conduct caused been sober. separately prove must the driver’s State injury, he commits the crime.” As (as opposed intoxication while below, application I of our own explain intoxicated) caused the death for a convic- statutory interpretation leads to rules of tion under Iowa Code section the same conclusion here. (2007). majority’s agree I also with the criminal instruction on that the Iowa State Bar Associ- The ISBA conclusion (intoxication) (ISBA) correctly vehicular homicide Jury ation Criminal Instruction statutory of the of- correctly applies law and should elements 710.1 states the (intoxi- majority faults the district homicide fense.11 The given be vehicular 9-4-l-54(b)(2) (1982) ("A bodily per- felony if the offense results in serious Ind.Code 10. (as 35-41-1-2), injury defined IC other operates who a vehicle son while person.”). another However, than A misdemeanor. commits Class felony if the offense is a Class C it results Jury 710.1 Criminal Instruction No. ISBA the death of another and is a Class D provides: *10 Erickson, drinking bring-your- the second element to Sean at a rephrasing court for act or acts set out in replace “defendant’s in party own beer Des Moines. Adams ac- simply, Element 1” with “defendant’s drove because Erickson’s license was sus- I given in the instruction at trial. tions” pended prior drunk-driving from a convic- in context that the actions think it is clear They bought gas tion. beer at a local given instruction were referenced station; picked up twelve-pack Adams a in- operation of his vehicle while Budweiser cans and Erickson a purchased immaterial, was toxicated. The revision twenty-pack They of Budweiser bottles. given and the instruction was not errone- party p.m. arrived at the between 5:30 and ous. p.m. began 5:45 and drinking their beer. impose greater chose to later, they departed When about five hours who penalties people criminal on they left, had four cans and two bottles drunk, fatal accidents while based twenty-six fewer twelve-ounce beers than knowledge that alcohol on the common they brought. partygoer Another drank a skills, impairs judgment, perception, motor thirty-pack Light during par- of Busch times. It is safe to assume and reaction witness, ty. A Matthew Montgomery, tes- factor in contributing that alcohol is most appeared tified Adams and Erickson intox- drivers, involving accidents drunk which is at the party. Montgomery icated himself makes why legislature’s policy choice marijuana throughout party. smoked But, legislature stopped short sense. sipped Adams testified he three to four jury requiring separately find the opened a cans of beer and bottle of Bud- itself caused the accident. intoxication weiser, but admitted he have con- Adams’ trial counsel therefore lacked a many. sumed‘twice that Adams denied he objection valid to the instruction. the influence when was under he left the provide explain why To context to party and asserted others drank some of instructed, jury properly was it is worth got “pretty his beer. Erickson testified he reviewing supporting the facts party drunk” at the told his cousin verdict. he and Adams were intoxi- later both Adams partygoers cated. Other testified Jury Supporting
A. Facts Ver- “aggressive” “arrogant” at the Tragedy dict. results when a drunk driv- party. Montgomery described Adams as bicyclist er and meet on the road. The unsteady “a on his feet” and that [h]is little shortly p.m., before 11 accident occurred speech seemed to be little bit slurred.” Friday, December after an eve- friend, ning spent guest that Adams with his Another testified Adams was “loud ent, (Intoxi- By blood 710.1 Homicide Vehicle as measured the defendant's cation) The State must or urine. —Elements. following of the elements of Homicide both 2. The defendant’s act or acts set out By Vehicle: unintentionally caused the death Element 1 of_, the_day 1. On or about (victim). 20_, the defendant: proved has both of the ele- If the State operated vehicle while a. a motor under ments, guilty defendant is of Homicide drug the influence of alcohol or or a Vehicle. If the State has failed to substances; of such or combination elements, the defendant is either operated while hav- b. a motor vehicle (and you guilty Vehicle will of Homicide ing an concentration of [.08] alcohol of_ charge as then consider the more, or No-). explained in Instruction operated any vehicle while c. a motor pres- amount of controlled substance *11 obnoxious,” by his that knew he hit simply and “the entire time ed denial he [she] and driving. or a bottle of the victim and continued saw him he had can of beer Montgomery in hand.” also testi- beer his supported by The verdict was also ex- forth, rocked back and wob- fied Adams testimony. pert County medical Polk appeared and too intoxi- party, bled at the Examiner, Schmunk, Gregory Medical tes- cated to drive home. acuity intoxication tified reduces visual and impairs perception: together left in Adams and Erickson things you You don’t see as well as p.m. Adams’ Monte Carlo about 10:45 normally you would when were sober. in They stashed the backseat the six beers you physically seeing Either are not thirty-two remaining from the full beers you’re fairly high them if at a level of they party. The brought right to the front intoxication, you’re just paying or not headlight functioning. was was Adams your attention to what visual cues on Park driving west Avenue when Brown may looking directly are.... be at [Y]ou bicycling in the same direction on that someone, you’re paying but no attention in right road lane near the curb. your your ... them because mind change Adams he testified looked down to thinking functions are affected. the satellite radio station when his car hit something that into slammed the wind- collapsed
shield and the windshield into something ... You but not see Er- kept driving. front seat. Adams perceive paying it. You’re not attention. said, “Dude, ickson just something.” we hit reports When Adams heard news , Sean, replied, Adams “No what f--s — fatal bought Brown’s hit-and-run he it f— A what was that?” tarp cover his Monte Carlo. He later, Erickson, questioned by block when later, days turned himself two too late exclaimed, f— up Adams “Shut the and let any for chemical test to determine his me think They for a minute.” drove home alcohol at blood level the time of the acci- and reported pas- never the accident. A in fleeing dent. Adams’ conduct the scene serby body found 11 p.m., Brown’s around impaired judgment showed and conscious- pronounced and Brown was at the dead guilt. appeals ness of The court of con- scene. She had fractured skull. The supported cluded sufficient evidence court of appeals affirmed Adams’ convic- Adams’ convictions vehicular homicide tion for vehicular homicide and noted: (intoxication), operating a motor vehicle (OWI), leaving while intoxicated judicial It is difficult to describe scene of an accident. opinion impression conveyed by the post-accident photographs Adams’ ve- majority correctly The allows the deci- windshield, hicle. The where Brown’s appeals sion of the court of to stand as the car, body head and hit the was smashed judgment final that the evidence was suffi- in, shattered, collapsed into the cient to convict Adams of vehicular homi- passenger front seat. Yet Adams cide while intoxicated. claimed not to have realized that he had Interpretation B. of Iowa Code Sec- hit someone. 707.6A(1). majority correctly tion The re- powerful jects This is argument evidence intoxication. Adams’ belated Any person possession requires proof of his faculties statute his intoxication would Application have realized he had hit someone. caused Brown’s death. of our principles statutory could infer Adams was intoxicat- well-settled inter-
377 operating of a motor vehicle in violation proof required the is sim- of shows pretation Comried, driving act of the defendant’s Iowa Code section 321J.2. In we ply that the death. intoxicated caused “the purpose chapter while noted of 321J is ‘to highways[,] reduce the holocaust on our statutory interpretation polestar “The part of which is due to the driver who legislature.” v. intent of the State is the ” freely imbibes too of intoxicating liquor.’ (Iowa 540, Carpenter, 616 N.W.2d 542 (quoting Kelly, State v. 430 N.W.2d 2000). Comried, we reiterated In State v. (Iowa 427, 1988)); 429 see also State v. interpretation perti- most principles (Iowa Garcia, 2008) 216, 756 N.W.2d 220 707.6A(1): construing to section nent (observing purpose underlying Iowa statute, interpret a we at- we “When “ help Code section 321J is ‘to reduce the give general effect to the as- tempt to appalling highway number of deaths re- law. sembly’s enacting intent sulting part at least from intoxicated gleaned intent from Generally, this is ” Wallin, (quoting drivers.’ v. State 195 of the statute. To ascer- language (Iowa 1972))). 95, N.W.2d 96 statutory lan- meaning of the tain the we consider the context of guage, majority correctly rejects The interpret to provision at issue and strive proof requirement effort to add a not with the stat- it in a manner consistent found the statute —that his intoxication Similarly, integrated ute as an whole. proximately op- caused Brown’s as consistently a statute with interpret we posed simply driving to his act of while concerning the same or a other statutes intoxicated. Supreme As the Wisconsin subject. Finally, statutes are related observed, aptly impossible it is Court in a manner to avoid absurd interpreted unnecessary separate to the intoxication rendering any part and to avoid results driving: from the act of superfluous.” enactment has determined that Also, construing a statute de- “[i]n combining operation of a motor vehi- nouncing driving the offense of while being in an intoxicated state is cle with intoxicants, under the influence prohibitum conduct which is malum may of the statute purpose manifest The com- pervasively antisocial.... Although such a statute is a ignored. be require does not mission of the offense strictly and must con- penal statute be driving. Be- any negligent erratic or strued, statute, it is such a since de- of an driving under the influence public, to should be signed protect it is prohibitum intoxicant is malum reasonably in or- liberally or construed impossible separate to the intoxication purpose protect, der to effect its as from the from the or the be, every lawfully on may far as intoxication.... highway, and to reduce the hazard of not include as an The statute does a motor vehicle prohibited operation of causal of the crime a direct element a minimum.” fact of defen- connection between the (Iowa 2005) (quoting 775 intoxication, as an conceptualized dant’s Pickett, State v. act, death. Un- isolated and the victim’s 2003) (first quotation); 61A C.J.S. Motor inherently this statute there is an der (2002) (second quo- at 274 Vehicles it activity in which is reason- dangerous tation)). intox- ably foreseeable that while in the death of an un- icated result A conviction for vehicular homicide legislature has deter- individual. The predicate der rests on a offense activity inherently danger- (quoting Phillips, this so Id. at 776 State v.
mined require (Ariz.Ct.App. ous that of it need not Ariz. 873 P.2d 1994)). recognized causal connection between the defen- We J.2(l)(c) prohibits “people *13 operat dant’s intoxication and the death. 321 from ing motor vehicles with controlled sub Caibaiosai, 122 State v. Wis.2d 363 bodies, stances in their or whether not (1985); People 577-78 see also N.W.2d they are under the influence.” Id. We Martin, Ill.App.3d v. 266 203 Ill.Dec. affirmed Comried’s conviction under sec (1994) (“[I]n the 640 N.E.2d tion because he was a fatal of a convicted of [driv case defendant DUI accident while he had a detectable amount influence], under the law holds him ing the methamphetamine of in his at blood. Id. precisely accountable for those harms ac (“ [A]ny any amount’ means amount tually by namely, that risked his conduct— zero.”). greater Obviously, than jury, the seriously injure on might pedestrians he or convict, separately to did find that the roadway, might next to the or that he trace amount of methamphetamine caused crash his vehicle into other vehicles on the Comried’s fatal accident. A amount trace seriously roadway, injuring their occu unlikely to cause an accident. If a trace pants.”). conviction, drug support amount of a can correctly The State observes section it require proof is nonsensical to the alco 707.6A(1)imposes presumption the driv- hol an intoxicated driver consumed caused proximately er’s intoxication caused the the accident. Comried was decided unani accident. This conclusion is reinforced mously years ago. a mere seven Stare liability the of imposition statute’s for even yet compelling decisis is another reason to trace amounts of controlled substances. reject interpretation. Comried, 775-76, See 693 N.W.2d at Because the effects alcohol are better 321J.2(l)(c) (construing sections known, legislature requires proof 707.6A(1)). only A driver with a trace defendant was “while intoxicated.” methamphetamine amount of in his blood 707.6A(1). § Iowa Code Intoxication is fact, may, in unimpaired, yet gets be if he presumed at a blood alcohol level of .08. accident, guilty a fatal he can be found 321J.2(1)(6). But, § intoxi proof of of vehicular homicide. Id. at 778. The supports cation sep a conviction without a Comried court observed: finding arate the intoxicant caused the ac legislature reasonably The could have legislature intentionally cident. The imposed such a ban because the effects stopped requiring proof short of that the drugs, as contrasted to the effects of intoxication, consumption alcohol or the alcohol, vary can greatly among those any drugs, actually amount of illicit caused who use them. One court has observed the fatal accident. It did so to avoid the that, proof separating difficulties of intoxication since the Supreme manufacture and distribution from that the Wisconsin Caibaiosai, drugs of illicit are unregulated and Court noted in at varies, drugs’ potency because the 577-78. This is not unusual in criminal Therefore, unpredictable. effects are example, robbery law. For armed re ... there is no quires robbery level of use above that occurred while the people presumed § which can be im- defendant was armed. Iowa Code 711.2. paired or they weapon below which can be The State need not presumed unimpaired. necessary accomplish robbery. to However, § legislature 123.92. how to draft ve Code knows legislature Our expressly provided following affirma- that re penal statutes hicular homicide injury “If tive defense: was caused predi specifically find quire person, permittee an or licen- caused proximately violation cate may establish as an affirmative de- see eluding provision, section The the death. fense that the intoxication did not contrib- 707.6A(2)(6), example, criminalizes injurious person.” ute to the action of the by ... of another “caus[ing] the death pro- Iowa Code 123.92. pursuing elude a [e]luding attempting no such affirmative defense to a vided the death vehicle law enforcement if charge of vehicular homicide while intoxi- indirectly re person directly or the other *14 707.6A(1). § It cated. See id. is not our add (Emphasis violation.” sults from defense, a much role to create such less ed.) in language was not That italicized of the offense the impose another element 707.6A(1) (3) which in section cluded beyond a reasonable State must when happen fatal accidents that govern doubt. intoxicat is “while” the defendant drag drag racing.12 This is because
ed or
In the rare case which the evidence
are
driving while intoxicated
racing and
alcohol is not a factor
clearly establishes
inherently dangerous. “[Legislative
both
a
driver would have struck
because
sober
by
omission as well
expressed
is
circumstances,
intent
the victim
the same
under
statutory
inclusion of
terms.”
as
recognizes
[the]
law
a defense based on
Iowa
Supply, Inc. v. Prime
Oyens Feed &
superseding
See
proximate
sole
cause or
cause.
(Iowa 2011)
bank,
Hubka,
N.W.2d
193
808
See State v.
869
(citation
(Iowa 1992) (“[T]he
marks
quotation
and internal
may
defendant
be re-
Beach,
omitted);
N.W.2d
State v.
630
if a court
responsibility
lieved of criminal
(Iowa 2001).
legislature
If
had
intervening
600
are such
finds that the
events
the defendant’s
require proof
intended to
causal connection
as to break the chain of
death,
the victim’s
it
intoxication caused
between the defendant’s conduct
language
Micinski,
to
death.”);
have added conditional
would
487
victim’s
see also
707.6A(1),
(“This
such as it included
say
section
to
that a
N.E.2d at 154
is not
707.6A(2)(6).
us to
Adams asks
section
a
who has run
drunk driver who hits
child
to add such
effectively rewrite the statute
parked cars is not
out from between two
chose to
requirement
legislature
a
jury
guilty
to find him not
entitled to ask a
omit.
doubt whether
because there is reasonable
collision.”);
Rivas,
State v.
he caused the
an
Shop
provides
The Dram
Act
exam-
(1995)
443, 896 P.2d
126 Wash.2d
clearly condi-
where the
ple
(“[A]n
defendant
still
liability
finding
on a
the driver’s
tioned
re-
for a death which
responsibility
avoid
vic-
proximately caused the
intoxication
if
her
the death
sults from his or
harm.
Iowa Code section 123.92
tim’s
intervening
superseding,
caused
statutory
victims of drunk drivers
gives
event.”).
the licensed vendor who sold
right to sue
Hubka,
affirmed the defen-
In
our court
beverages
person
to a
the seller
alcoholic
for vehicular homicide
dant’s conviction
have known was intoxicat-
knew or should
707.6A(1), rejecting the ar-
Iowa under section
or would become intoxicated.
ed
707.6A(3) (em-
Iowa Code
felony when
tion 321.278.”
person
"A
commits a class 'D'
12.
unintentionally
added).
causes the death
phasis
racing,
drag
in violation of sec-
another while
proximate
conviction
gument that the sole
under Rullestad is the same as
children’s death was the failure
for
conviction under
the victim
use
child seat restraints.
must find the defen-
proper
—the
In
Wieskamp,
operating
at
State v.
our
dant’s act of
a motor vehicle
appeals
court of
reversed
conviction
while intoxicated caused the
because “as a matter of
the intoxication itself
vehicular homicide
cause.
person driving
with rea-
law
a sober
construing equivalent
Other courts
stat
sonable care would have struck and killed utory language
expressly rejected
have
566, 567
the victim.” 490 N.W.2d
arguments
the State must
intox
Wieskamp,
In
an intoxicat-
Ct.App.1992).
ication
a proximate
cause of the vic
over
victim who was
ed driver ran
See,
Benoit,
e.g.,
tim’s death.
State v.
“lying
solely
in the street covered
in dark
(R.I.1994) (“We
do,
A.2d
how
clothing
unlighted
high-
in an
area of the
ever, agree with the state’s contention
way.”
Wieskamp
empha-
Id. The
court
that the statute
not require
does
the in
sized there was “no evidence in the record
proxi
toxication of the defendant to be a
dispute Sgt.
opinion testimony
Sellars’
Therefore,
mate cause of the death....
all
*15
that a
person
sober
would not have seen the state
need
is that
the defen
they
right
top
the victim ‘until
were
on
of
operation
dant’s
of his or her motor vehi
”
contrast,
By
them.’
the
record here
proximate
cle was a
of
the death
expert testimony
includes
that Adams’ in- question occurring while the defendant
impaired
toxication
night
would have
his
intoxicated.”);13
legally
see also Peo
perception.
jury
vision and
It was for the
Garner,
(Colo.1989)
ple v.
781 P.2d
to decide whether
act
of
(“The
require
statute does not
evidence
while intoxicated caused the accident.
that the intoxication affected the driver’s
interpretation
Our
of
operation
the statute is con
in a
that
manner
results in a
Rullestad,
sistent with State v.
259 Iowa
collision. The clear intent of
legisla
the
(1966).
209,
tion and opera the defendant’s between
connection victim’s motor vehicle and the
tion of a Caibaiosai,
death”);16
78.17 interpre contrary proffered to Adams’
ty 707.6A(1).
tation of section any operat- beverages, chemi- vehicular homicide if the driver was alcoholic influence of 877.111, any (a) in s. or ing cal substance set forth vehicle: While under the a motor chapter controlled under substance intoxicating any drug, liquor influence of extent that his normal when affected to the 46.61.502....”). by as defined RCW impaired”). are faculties (1984) 940.09(l)(a) (stating Stat. 17. Wis. (1991) § 46.61.520 16. Wash. Rev.Code "(1) felony commits a Class D who ("When any person death of ensues within another, (2) by opera- the death of causes injury proximate years as a result of three vehicle, (3) tion of a while under the influence any vehi- proximately caused intoxicant”). anof guilty any person, cle the driver