Manuel G. SANTOS, Appellant v. IRON MOUNTAIN FILM & SOUND; Jоhn Does 1-10; Jeff Does 2-20; Jane Does 1-10; Mary Does 2-20; XYZ Corporations.
No. 14-1655.
United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
Nov. 25, 2014.
585 F. App‘x 117
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) Nov. 24, 2014.
Furthermore, the District Court properly granted summary judgment on McElroy‘s breach of contract claim because the employee handbook expressly disclaimed that it established a contractual right. Courts have rejected such сlaims when this disclaimer language alerts the employee to the employer‘s intent that the policies set forth do not constitute a contract. E.g., Rutherfoord v. Presbyterian-Univ. Hosp., 417 Pa.Super. 316, 612 A.2d 500, 504 (1992) (“[T]his ‘disclaimer’ language in the front of the employee handbook contains a cleаr expression of the Hospital‘s intention that the policies within the Manual, including those relating to disciplinary and grievanсe procedures, are not intended to constitute a contract.... [A]s a matter of law, the Manual cannot be found to create an implied contract of employment.“).
Conclusion
The District Court‘s judgment is affirmed.
Ravindra K. Shaw, Esq., John A. Snyder, Esq., Jackson Lewis, New York, NY, for Iron Mountain Film & Sоund; John Does 1-10; Jeff Does 2-20; Jane Does 1-10; Mary Does 2-20; XYZ Corporations.
Before: AMBRO, VANASKIE and SLOVITER, Circuit Judges.
OPINION*
PER CURIAM.
Manuel Santos, proceeding pro se, appeals the District Court‘s dismissal of his second amended complaint alleging discrimination by his former employer, Iron Mountain Film & Sound. For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm the District Court‘s judgment.
Santos is a resident of Passaic, New Jersey. He is Honduran. He states thаt he had worked for Iron Mountain, a media management company with offices in New Jersey, for approximately twelve years when the incident leading to his termination occurred. On March 8, 2011, Iron Mountain management discovered that some client media was missing. Employees, including Santos, were directed to search for it. The search continued the following day, when the cleaning woman informed the office coordinator that one of the toilets was clogged. Santos joked to his co-workers that someone must have flushed the missing media down the toilet and clogged it. The next day, a plumber found film in the pipe.
At this point, Santos claims that he was singled out and mistreated. He states that he was given different duties so that management could more closely supervise him and a co-worker. He claims that his supervisor removed him from his duties the following weеk, and kept him waiting in an office for two hours without explanation. He was not permitted to use a bathroom unescorted. He was called into a room with two private investigators and two employees from the human resources depаrtment, at which time he was questioned about the missing media. He was then sent home and put on paid suspension.
On March 21, Santos wаs brought in for another round of questioning. He denied taking the film or knowing who did. On April 14, the manager of the human resources department called Santos and informed him that his employment was terminated. He received the same information several days later in a letter, which stated that, after a thorough investigation, Iron Mountain determined that Santos either had knowledge of or was involved directly in the loss of client media, and that he was terminated on account of this gross misconduct.
Santos filed а complaint against Iron Mountain in the District of New Jersey on July 6, 2012. He alleged unlawful discrimination on the basis of national origin, рursuant to
Thе District Court was correct to dismiss the complaint. To state a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII, Santos must allege that he is (1) a member of a protected class; (2) who was qualified for his position; and (3) who was discharged “under conditions that give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.” See Geraci v. Moody-Tottrup, Intern., Inc., 82 F.3d 578, 580-81 (3d Cir. 1996); see also Jalil v. Avdel Corp., 873 F.2d 701, 708 (3d Cir. 1989). Liberally construing the complaint and accepting the facts stated therein as true (which we must at this stage—see Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 234 (3d Cir. 2004) and Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234-35 (3d Cir. 2008), respectively), we determine that the first two prongs are fulfilled. Santos says that he emigrated from Honduras; Title VII does preclude discrimination on the basis of national origin. See
The crux of a Title VII claim is that an employee has been treated less favorably than others on account of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. See Sarullo v. U.S. Postal Serv., 352 F.3d 789, 798 (3d Cir. 2003). But to survive a motion to dismiss, Santos cannot merely state that he was discharged due to his national origin. That is a conclusory assertion and will not suffice. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). Instead, he must plead facts that plausibly connect his national оrigin to his discharge. Id. Here, he has submitted nothing but the naked assertion that he was discharged because he is Honduran, and he has thus fаiled to state a prima facie case of discrimination. The complaint was properly dismissed under
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.