M'Millan v. M'NeillM'Millan v. M'Neill
- Reporters:
- , , ,
- Before:
- Marshall Ch.
On the 1st of July 1817, the present suit was instituted by McNeill, describing himself as a citizen of South Carolina, against McMillan, described as a citizen of Louisiana, in the district court of the United States for the district of Louisiana (having circuit court powers), to recover the sum of $700, which McNeill had paid, under the judgments on the customhouse-bonds, in South Carolina. To this suit, McMillan pleaded in bar his certificates under the Louisiana and English bankrupt laws; to which plea, the plaintiff below demurred, the defendant joined in demurrer, and the court gave judgment for the plaintiff; from which judgment, the cause was brought, by writ of error, to this court.
He contended, 1. That this case was distinguishable from the preceding case of Sturges v. Crowninshield, because the state law, under which the insolvent obtained his discharge, was passed long before the contract was made, and therefore, it could not be said to impair the obligation of a contract not then in existence.
2. That although the contract was made in Sonth Carolina, between parties who were at the time citizens of the state, yet the debtor having removed to Louisiana, and become a resident citizen of that state, and the creditor pursuing him thither, the local court had authority, under the local laws, to grant him a discharge, which might be effectual within the limits of the state, even if it had no extra-territorial operation. The discharge, being effectual in the courts of the state where it was obtained, would, of course, be equally effectual in the courts of the United States, sitting in that state, the laws of the state being made by the
3. That the certificate of discharge under the English bankrupt laws, was a good plea in bar to the action.2
MARSHALL, Ch. J., delivered the opinion of the court, that this case was not distinguishable in principle from the preceding case of Sturges v. Crowninshield.
That the circumstance of the state law, under which the debt was attempted to be discharged, having been passed before the debt was contracted, made no difference in the application of the principle. And that as to the certificate under the English bankrupt laws, it had frequently been determined, and was well settled, that a discharge under a foreign law, was no bar to an action on a contract made in this country.
Judgment affirmed.1