13 Mass. 1 | Mass. | 1816
delivered the opinion of the Court. The proceedings under the insolvent act of the State of Mew York are admitted to have been regular; so that the question referred to us is, whether the plaintiff is barred of his suit on this demand, under the circumstances disclosed in the statement of facts ; the point being to be considered in the same light, as if the certificate of discharge had been regularly set forth in a plea in bar to the action, and an issue in law joined on the sufficiency of such plea.
* The law, under which the defendant claims to be discharged, is a general law, intended to affect all the citizens of the State of Mew York at least; and it provides a system, by which an insolvent debtor may, upon his own application, or upon the petition of any of his creditors, be holden to surrender all his property, and be discharged from all his debts. It is therefore a bankrupt law, and to be distinguished from insolvent laws, technically so called. The question, then, put in a general form, is, whether a discharge under a bankrupt law of any State can be effectually pleaded in bar of an action brought in another State, of which the creditor is a citizen ; the contract, which is sued, having been made within the State which enacted the law, and the debtor being there a citizen and subject at the time of making it.
That the laws of any State cannot, by any inherent authority, be entitled to respect exterritorially, or beyond the jurisdiction of the State which enacts them, is the necessary result of the independence of distinct sovereignties. But the courtesy, comity, or mutual convenience of nations, amongst which commerce has introduced so great an intercourse, has sanctioned the admission and operation of foreign laws relative to contracts ; so that it is now a principle generally received, that contracts are to be construed and interpreted according to the laws of the Stale in which they are made, unless from their tenor it is perceived that they were entered into with a view to the laws of some other State. And nothing can be more just than this principle. For, when a merchant of France, Holland, or England, enters into a contract in his own country, he must be presumed to be conusant of the laws of the place where he is, and to expect that his contract is to be * judged of and carried into effect according to those laws ; and the merchant with whom he deals, if a foreigner, must be supposed to submit himself to the same laws, unless he has taken care to stipulate for a performance in some other country, or has, in some other way, excepted his particular contract from the laws of the country where he is.
The rule does not apply, however, to the process by which a creditor shall attempt to enforce his demand in the courts of a State other than that in which the contract was made. For the remedy must be pursuant to the laws of the State where it is sought ; otherwise great irregularity and confusion would be introduced into the form of judicial proceedings. These principles have been well discussed in several cases in this Court in former periods ; particularly in those of Pearsall & al. vs. Dwight, cited in the argument, and Powers vs. Lynch.
This general rule, however, does not reach far enough to settle the question in this case ; for it cannot easily be maintained, that a law, which authorizes the discharge of a contract upon terms different from those provided for in the contract itself, amounts to a construction or interpretation of it. Some other ground must, therefore, be resorted to ; and we think it may be assumed, as a rule affecting all personal contracts, that they are subject to all the consequences attached to contracts of a similar nature by the laws of the country where they are made, if the contracting party is a subject of, or res-.dent in, that country where it is entered into, and no provision is
But, as the laws of foreign countries are not admitted ex proprio vigore, but only ex comitate, the judicial power will exercise a discretion with respect to the laws they may be called upon to sanction ; for, if they should' be manifestly unjust, or calculated to injure their own citizens, they ought to be rejected. Thus, if any State should enact, that its citizens should be discharged from all debts due to creditors living without the State, such a provision would be so contrary to the common principles of justice, that the most liberal spir of comity would not require its adoption in any other State.
It has been said, that personal contracts have no situs or locality ; but that they follow the person of the creditor wherever he goes. The general position means nothing more, than that such contracts may be enforced in any other country, and that the debtor may be arrested, or his property sequestered, to secure the debt, accord ing to the laws of the country where the creditor shall seek his remedy. This is not inconsistent with the other principle, that the lex loci shall operate in the. construction of the contract, and even in the dissolution of it.
There are not many authorities directly in point upon this question, even in England, where it was to be expected, that cases of this kind would have frequently occurred. In every case, however, happening in that country, in which the effect of a foreign bankrupt law has been discussed, we find that the place where the contract was made * has been the circumstance of principal consideration with the Court.
In the case of Ballantine vs. Goulding,
The same doctrine, however, is recognized by Lord Ellenborough in a subsequent case,
In the case of Smith & al. vs. Buchanan,
In the case, however, of Potter & al. vs. Brown, before * referred to, the point seems distinctly decided. The plea in bar set forth the bankrupt law of the United States, a surrender and regular discharge under it; and it contained an allegation, that the demand, upon which the action was brought, originated within the State of Maryland ; and it was further alleged, that the plaintiffs, being English subjects, had a house of trade in Baltimore, within the said State, and that one of the plaintiffs resided there, having charge of the said house. It was determined, that this was a good bar, on the ground, that the contract was discharged according to the laws of the place where it was made ; and the general doctrine advanced by Lord Mansfield, in the case of Ballantine vs. Goulding, was recognized and adopted, namely, “ that a lawful discharge in the country where the contract was made is a discharge everywhere ”
Upon examination of the reports of judicial decisions of several of the State Courts, we are not able to find any direct adjudication upon this question.
In Pennsylvania, they admit the operation of laws of other States, so far as to discharge from arrest or bail debtors who have been discharged under those laws in the States where they reside; provided such States show the same comity towards them.
In the State of New York, the effect of insolvent laws *of other States has frequently been discussed, upon applications to be discharged from bail, and otherwise. The uniform decision there has been, that the discharge is not available against demands which did not originate within the Stale where the laws existed : and the opinion of the Judges is very strongly intimated, that such laws are confined in their operation to contracts which have an implied reference to those laws, being made under their jurisdiction.
The same inference may be drawn from the case of Greenough vs. Emery,
In this State, several cases have occurred which brought into view the insolvent laws of some of the other States ; and, although none of them presented the general question which is no°w before us, it has been contended, that a different principle has been adopted from that which appears to have prevailed in England, and in the other States of the Union. Upon a critical investigation, however, of the several cases referred to, it will not appear, that any definitive opinion
The first case is that of Proctor vs. Moore.
The next case is that of Baker vs. Wheaton,
The law, under which the discharge was obtained, was a special law, made after the existence of the contract against which it was pleaded ; and it might well be held, that none but citizens of the State could be liable to the effects of such a law. Indeed, it is difficult to perceive how a law, which directly impairs the obligation of contracts, can have any effect, even against the citizens of the State which enacts it ; such a law being directly repugnant to an express provision of the Constitution of the United States. Perhaps, however, the long established usage in the State of Rhode Island, of legislating upon each particular case of bankruptcy which occurs there, mtght
The next and last case, which has arisen in this State, in which the insolvent laws of another State have been under consideration, is that of Watson vs. Bourne;
The observations, which have been made upon the dictum of Chief Justice Parsons, in the case of Baker vs. Wheaton, are applicable to the observation of Chief Justice Sewall in the last cited case. Both these learned Judges spoke in reference to the particular acts of discharge by the legislature of Rhode Island, and not concerning a general bankrupt or insolvent law; none such existing in that State.
Finding, therefore, no decision of our own courts upon the subject Defore us, and being satisfied that the general cast of the authorities, zited from the decided cases in England, and some of the sister
But there is another general objection to the effect of the insolvent law, on which the defence in this case rests, which, if well maintained, will supersede all others. This is, that it is void, as repugnant to the-Constitution of' the United States.
The argument, in support of this objection, has been divided into two branches ; one founded on a clause of the eighth section of the first article of the Constitution, which vests the power of making uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcy in Congress ; and the other upon the clause which prohibits the several States from passing any laws which shall impair the obligation of contracts.
With respect to the first branch, we are not of opinion that the power of the States to legislate upon that subject is taken away, merely because a general authority upon the subject is given to Congress. The authority so given is, to pass uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcy ; and in order to give this provision full effect, there is no doubt, that, if an uniform law should be passed by Congress, the respective acts of the several States would be superseded ; * because their existence would then be not only unnecessary, but inconsistent with that uniformity which it was the wish of the people to establish.
Whether particular insolvent laws, made in peculiar exigencies, would fall within the reason of this objection, we do not undertake to decide.
At the time the Constitution was framed and adopted, some of the States had insolvent laws, and others had not ; and, probably, where they existed, there was a great diversity in their provisions and effects. The establishment, therefore, of a general and uniform system was undoubtedly desirable, and, for that reason, the power was given to Congress. But it never could have been imagined, that, if Congress did not choose to exercise the authority given them, the several existing laws were to become extinct, merely because there was a power to supersede them vested in another body.
Such an effect cannot be inferred, either from analogous expressions in the Constitution, or from the practical construction of that instrument. For it is well known, that several of the States had insolvent laws at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, which continued in practical operation afterwards ; some of them have passed laws of the kind since the actual administration under that Constitution ; and it does not appear that any exception has been taken, in the State courts or elsewhere, to the validity of those laws. Indeed, the words of the Constitution themselves seem to imply the existence and continuance of local laws of this nature, until super
It may be also observed, that there is no clause in the Constitution, prohibitory of the exercise of this power by the several States ; although such clauses are to be found in regard to other powers, which are given to the general government. For instance, power is given to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises. It cannot surely be contended, that, because of this power, the States have ceased to enjoy the right of laying and collecting taxes. If such were the true construction of the Constitution, the State governments would all have expired, the moment the general government began to live. But the Convention was aware of no such consequence. On the contrary, it supposed that there might be a concurrent power ; and therefore took care expressly to prohibit the States from establishing imposts or duties on imports and exports , leaving the States respectively to exercise the power of laying taxes of a different kind from imposts, and of establishing excises, as they had before done. Congress have power to declare war, to grant letters of marque and reprisal, to raise and support armies, to provide and maintain a navy, &c. ; and yet it was deemed necessary to prohibit the States from the exercise of these attributes of sovereignty. From which it may be clearly inferred, that the mere giving of powers over certain objects to Congress did not necessarily deprive the State legislatures of the same powers antecedently enjoyed by them ; unless the exercise of those powers should interfere with the authority of the general government ; in which case the power of the State must undoubtedly give place.
We are aware of the able and elaborate argument of Judge Washington on this subject, in the case of Goulden vs. Prince, in the Circuit Court of the United States, referred to by the plaintiff’s counsel; but, with all our respect for the reasoning of that learned Judge, we cannot * yield assent to his opinion. It seems to us, that he overlooked the important circumstance, that the State governments were in existence, with full legislative powers, at the time when the Constitution of the United States was made ; and that whatever powers were not expressly and exclusively given by the people to the national government remained
Tt would seem, in order to support the position contended for, that the State governments must be supposed to have been dissolved, when the national Constitution was submitted to the people ; or, at most, that they continued provisionally only, until the national government had commenced its operation, and then, that the State legislatures ceased to have power upon any subjects which even potentially came within the purview of national authority. But we apprehend that each State had full dominion, within the limits of its Constitution, over all subjects which remained unimpaired, except so far as the people had expressly transferred part of the power to the general government.
The learned Judge has instanced the subject of naturalization, to enforce his construction of the Constitution ; and thinks it very clear, that, if Congress had passed no uniform law on that subject, the several States would be prohibited from naturalizing foreigners ; because the power to naturalize is given to Congress. But we think it at least doubtful, whether, if Congress had provided no rule of naturalization, the States might not have still exercised the power which they were accustomed to use. • For it can hardly be thought, that a sovereign State, which was desirous of replenishing its population, by encouragement to foreign artizans, or other valuable emigrants, had deprived itself of this privilege, because it had given a power to Congress, but which was never exercised, of establishing a general system upon the same subject. If the * States should abuse the power, either of' naturalization or of making bankrupt laws, the remedy is at all times in the hands of Congress. Let them establish an uniform system, and the particular systems are at once overthrown. The power of naturalization, however, considering the effect of its exercise upon all the States of the Union, may be essentially national, and, for that reason, not proper to be exercised by any individual branch of the nation.
A strong instance of the inconvenience of the doctrine contended for exists in another provision of the Constitution. Congress has power to fix the standard of weights and measures throughout the United States ; but they have not, to this day, exercised that power. Will it be pretended, that the several State authorities have lost their power to fix such a standard within their respective jurisdictions ? If they have, then, probably, all the States have acted in open defiance to the Constitution on this subject, ever since it was adopted.
Probably, the correct exposition of the Constitution on this point is, that, in whatever cases power is given to Congress, which was before enjoyed by the State governments, the same power may be exercised
We are more satisfied with the reasoning of the learned Judge, upon the other branch of the argument, which relates to laws impairing the obligation of contracts. A law, which is in force-when a contract is made, cannot be said to have that effect; for the contract, being made under the law, is presumed to be made with reference to it, and the parties are legally conusant of it at the time. The contract in such case is not impaired by the law ; for the law is a part of the contract. A law, made after the existence of a contract, which alters the terms of it by rendering it less beneficial to the creditor, or by defeating any of the terms which the parties had agreed upon, essentially * impairs its obligation, and, for aught we see, is a direct violation of the Constitution of the United States.
It has often been observed by those who have advocated a bankrupt or insolvent law in the legislature of this Commonwealth, with a view to the relief of an unfortunate class of debtors from existing embarrassments, that the object of the framers of the Constitution, in this prohibition upon the States, was to prevent tender laws and other expedients of a like nature, which had been resorted to in some of the States, to the great prejudice of creditors ; and that this article of the Constitution ought to be construed with reference to such intention. But the words are too imperative to be evaded. “No State shall emit bills of credit, make anything but gold and silver a tender in payment of debts, pass any bill of attainder, or ex post facto law, or law impairing the force and obligation of contracts.” It would be contrary to all rules of construction, to limit this latter clause of the prohibition to a subject which is expressly prohibited in a preceding sentence. Full operation ought to be given to the words of an instrument so deliberately and cautiously made as was the Constitution of the United States.
There may be laws made,'even after , the execution of a contiaut, varying the remedies which before existed, which would not be liable to this objection. It has been contended in this case, that the debt sued for arose before the law, under which the discharge is claimed, was passed. But this point is not satisfactorily made out. There was an account current between the parties, prior to the 3d of April, 1811, when the insolvent law passed. But the account was not settled, and the balance struck, until the 22d of the same April ; and we think the debt did not exist until that time. It is true, the difference in point of time is small; but we cannot depart from the rule, to suit the equity of the case. A law providing for the dis
Plaintiff nonsuit.
[See Blake vs. Williams & Trustee, 6 Pick. 286. — Ogden vs. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213.—Ed.]
4 Mass. Rep. 77.
Ingraham vs Geyer, post, p. 146. Tappan vs. Poor, 15 Mass. Rep. 419.
1 Cook s Bank. L. 347.
Potter & al. vs. Brown, 5 East, 124.
1 East,
Smith vs. Brown, 3 Binney's Rep. 201.
3 Caines' Rep. 154.— Van Raugh vs. Van Arsdaln, 1 Dall. Rep. 229. — Millar vs Hall, 2 Johns. Rep. 198. — Smith vs. Spinola, Ib. 235. — Smith vs. Smith, 7 Johns 117.
3 Dallas, 369.
1 Mass. Rep. 199.
5 Mass. Rep. 511.
10 Mass. Rep. 337
Call vs. Hagger & al., 8 Mass. Rep. 423.