LUMENATE TECHNOLOGIES, LP, a Texas Limited Partnership, v. INTEGRATED DATA STORAGE, LLC, a Limited Liability Company, JEFF PARCHOMENKO, MICHELANGELO SCALERA, and STEVEN SPREHE
Case No. 13 C 3767
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION
November 11, 2013
Judge Amy St. Eve
AMY J. ST. EVE, District Court Judge:
On July 16, 2013, Plaintiff Lumenate Technologies, LP (“Lumenate“) filed a five-count First Amended Complaint (the “Complaint“) against Defendants Integrated Data Storage, LLC (“IDS“), Jeff Parchomenko, Michelangelo Scalera, and Steven Sprehe based on the Court‘s diversity jurisdiction. See
BACKGROUND
Lumenate alleges the following facts, which the Court assumes as true for purposes of this motion to dismiss.
Plaintiff Lumenate is a technical consulting firm that provides integrated technology solutions for large and mid-market businesses. (R. 16, Compl. ¶ 1.) All but one of Lumenate‘s limited partners and all members of Lumenate‘s general partner, Lumenate, L.L.C. are citizens of Texas. (Id. ¶ 5.) Lumenate‘s remaining limited partner is a citizen of Massachusetts. (Id. ¶ 5(f).) Lumenate, therefore, is a citizen of Texas and Massachusetts for purposes of diversity jurisdiction. See Lear Corp. v. Johnson Elec. Holdings Ltd., 353 F.3d 580, 582 (7th Cir. 2003).
On or around April 2, 2013, Lumenate acquired the assets of Augmentity Systems, Inc. (“Augmentity“), a company that offered a variety of technical services to its clients. (Compl. ¶¶ 1, 4.) As a result of Lumenate‘s acquisition, it now owns Augmentity‘s confidential information and trade secrets and any claims Augmentity may have had against third parties as of April 2, 2013. (Id. ¶ 4.) Augmentity has since ceased operations. (Id.) Lumenate now services Augmentity‘s business and contracts in place as of April 2, 2013. (Id.)
Defendant IDS is a direct competitor of Lumenate and former competitor of Augmentity. (Id. ¶ 2.) IDS is a limited liability company created under Illinois law with its principal place of business in Cook County, Illinois. (Id. ¶ 6.) The membership of IDS is not a matter of public information, but Lumenate alleges on information and belief—and IDS does not contest—that none of IDS‘s members are citizens of Texas or Massachusetts. (Id.)
The remaining Defendants—Jeff Parchomenko, Michelangelo Scalera, and Steven Sprehe (collectively, the “Individual Defendants“)—are former employees of Augmentity. (Id. ¶¶ 7-9.) The Individual Defendants left Augmentity in October or November 2012 and began working for IDS shortly thereafter. (Id. ¶¶ 7-9, 18.) They are citizens of Illinois for purposes of diversity jurisdiction. (Id. ¶¶ 7-9.)
During their employment with Augmentity, the Individual Defendants had access to Augmentity‘s confidential proprietary business information, including Augmentity‘s client lists and other client-related information, pricing information, contracts and arrangements with original equipment manufacturers (“OEMs“), and financial data. (Id. ¶ 21.) The Individual Defendants each signed a non-disclosure agreement when Augmentity hired them.1 (Id. ¶ 25.) As part of the non-disclosure agreements, the Individual Defendants agreed not to use, disclose, or divulge Augmentity‘s confidential information. (Id.)
Augmentity took additional measures to protect its confidential information and trade secrets. (Id. ¶¶ 26-27, 60.) Its employee handbook, which the Individual Defendants received and acknowledged reading, contains a “Confidentiality” policy to protect Augmentity‘s confidential information and trade secrets. (Id.) Augmentity also password protected its confidential information, imposed user-level access restrictions on that information, and watermarked or otherwise labeled documents containing confidential information as “Confidential.” (Id. ¶ 60.) Lumenate has continued to take measures to protect this confidential information since purchasing Augmentity‘s assets. (Id. ¶ 23.)
III. The Individual Defendants Leave Augmentity for IDS
In July or August 2012, IDS hired Vincent Buscareno, a former employee of Augmentity. (Id. ¶¶ 15, 31.) Around this same time, while they still worked for Augmentity, the Individual Defendants began taking steps toward joining IDS. (Id. ¶ 32.) Cellular phone records show frequent phone calls and text messages between Buscareno, on the one hand, and Scalera or
Scalera resigned from Augmentity on Friday, October 26, 2012. (Id. ¶ 36.) Augmentity terminated Parchomenko that same day, suspecting that he planned to leave with Scalera. (Id.) Sprehe resigned from Augmentity about two weeks later. (Id.) Each took the same position at IDS that he previously held at Augmentity. (Id. ¶ 18.)
Lumenate alleges, on information and belief, that the Individual Defendants used Augmentity‘s confidential information to unfairly compete for business from several of longstanding Augmentity‘s clients, including DeVry, Inc., Morningstar, Grant Thornton, and Sears. (Id. ¶ 39.) DeVry, Morningstar, and Grant Thornton subsequently ceased doing business with Augmentity (or Lumenate), and Sears greatly reduced its business with Augmentity. (Id. ¶ 40.)
Augmentity forensically examined Parchomenko‘s and Sprehe‘s work computers after they left the company. (Id. ¶¶ 42-51.) Through this analysis, Augmentity discovered evidence showing that Parchomenko and Sprehe had saved files to external drives and databases. (Id. ¶¶ 48-50.) Lumenate alleges, on information and belief, that they downloaded Augmentity‘s confidential information onto these external drives and databases. (Id. ¶ 51.) The forensic analysis also revealed that Parchomenko‘s and Sprehe‘s computers were “unusually ‘clean,‘” suggesting that they had taken steps to “cover their digital tracks.” (Id. ¶¶ 43-43.) Parchomenko and Sprehe allegedly used a “virtual machine” program to operate their computers, and then
IV. Procedural History
On May 21, 2013, Augmentity filed this lawsuit against IDS and the Individual Defendants. (R. 1.) Lumenate filed an amended complaint on July 16, 2013, replacing Augmentity as plaintiff. (R. 16.) In the operative Complaint, Lumenate asserts the following five counts: breach of contract (Count I) and breach of fiduciary duty (Count III) against the Individual Defendants, tortious interference with the Individual Defendants’ non-disclosure agreements against IDS (Count V), and violation of the Illinois Trade Secrets Act (Count II) and tortious interference with prospective business expectancies (Count IV) against all Defendants. (R. 16, Compl.) Defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to
LEGAL STANDARD
I. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
A
II. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e)
Under
ANALYSIS
I. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
Defendants move to dismiss each of the five counts Lumenate asserts pursuant to
A. Violation of the Illinois Trade Secrets Act (Count II)
Count II alleges trade secret misappropriation in violation of the Illinois Trade Secrets Act (“ITSA“),
Defendants contend that Lumenate fails to plead two elements of its ITSA claim. First, Defendants argue that Lumenate does not sufficiently allege the existence of a trade secret because the Complaint fails to identify actions Lumenate took to maintain the secrecy of the information at issue. (See Def. Mem. at 9; Def. Reply at 8-10.) Second, Defendants argue that Lumenate fails to plead actual or threatened misappropriation of its alleged trade secrets. (See Def. Mem. at 5-8; Def. Reply at 4-8.)
1. Lumenate Sufficiently Alleges that It Maintained the Secrecy of Its Trade Secrets
To plead the existence of a trade secret, a plaintiff must allege, among other things, facts that show it took reasonable efforts to maintain the secrecy of the information at issue.
Paragraph 23 of the Complaint alleges that “Augmentity took reasonable means under the circumstances to safeguard the secrecy of the Confidential Information, and Lumenate continues to do so.” (Compl. ¶ 23 (emphasis added).) The Complaint later describes those “reasonable means” in paragraph 60. Specifically, the Complaint alleges that Augmentity required the Individual Defendants and vendors with access to confidential information to enter non-disclosure agreements, advised its employees of the importance of maintaining the confidentiality of its information through the “Confidentiality” policy in the employee handbook, watermarked or otherwise labeled documents containing confidential information as “Confidential,” required a password to access confidential information electronically, and installed user-level access restrictions on its confidential information. (Id. ¶ 60(a)-(m).) Although paragraph 60 itself does not specifically state that Lumenate continued these measures after purchasing Augmentity, the earlier allegation in paragraph 23 ties the laundry list of confidentiality measures Augmentity took to Lumenate. Therefore, the Complaint, when read as a whole and viewed in the light most favorable to Lumenate, sufficiently alleges that both Augmentity and Lumenate maintained the secrecy of the trade secret information at issue. See, e.g., Mintel Int‘l Grp., 2010 WL 145786, at *11 (finding that evidence that the plaintiff required its employees to sign non-disclosure agreements and installed security measures to limit access
2. Lumenate Sufficiently Alleges Misappropriation of Its Trade Secrets
Misappropriation of trade secrets occurs one of three ways: by improper acquisition, unauthorized disclosure, or unauthorized use.
Under the ITSA, a court may enjoin threatened misappropriation as well as actual misappropriation.
Defendants argue that these allegations fail to support Lumenate‘s allegation “on information and belief” that Defendants misappropriated its trade secret information. (Def. Mem. at 6-8.) According to Defendants, the Complaint merely cites “routine business practices,” recasts them as “suspicious and nefarious” and then leaps to an unwarranted conclusion that “‘on information and belief,’ Defendants must have misappropriated something.” (Def. Mem. at 6.) The Court disagrees. Although, as a result of the Individual Defendants’ own actions, Lumenate cannot state exactly what information they downloaded before leaving Augmentity, Lumenate alleges sufficient facts regarding the suspicious circumstances of the Individual Defendants’ downloads to raise its right to relief above the speculative level and,
Courts, moreover, have repeatedly recognized that plaintiffs in trade secret cases can rarely prove misappropriation by convincing direct evidence. See PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, No. 94 C 6838, 1996 WL 3965, at *15 (N.D. Ill. Jan 2, 1996). “In most cases, plaintiffs . . . must construct a web of perhaps ambiguous circumstantial evidence from which the trier of fact may draw inferences which convince him that it is more probable than not that what plaintiffs allege did in fact take place.” Id. (quoting Si Handling Sys., Inc. v. Heisley, 753 F.2d 1244, 1261 (3d Cir. 1985)); see also RKI, Inc., 177 F. Supp. 2d at 876 (“Because direct evidence of theft and use of trade secrets is often not available, the plaintiff can rely on circumstantial evidence to prove misappropriation by drawing inferences from perhaps ambiguous circumstantial evidence.“). Courts often consider a defendant‘s suspicious downloading of company information before his departure and attempts to “cover his tracks” in determining whether the defendant misappropriated trade secrets. See, e.g., RKI, Inc., 177 F. Supp. 2d at 866-68, 875 (determining that the defendant had misappropriated his employer‘s trade secrets based in part on evidence that the defendant downloaded 60 megabytes of the company‘s data to his home computer two days before resigning and then suspiciously deleted the information and defragmented his computer four times in a ten-day period to prevent the plaintiff from discovering his actions); Liebert Corp., 357 Ill. App. at 282, 293 Ill. Dec. 28, 827 N.E.2d 909 (“The fact that Mazur attempted to destroy any indication of his downloading activities when plaintiffs filed suit also suggests improper acquisition.“). A plaintiff‘s reliance on allegations of suspicious circumstances to plead misappropriation, therefore, does not, by itself, doom the plaintiff‘s ITSA
With respect to threatened misappropriation under the inevitable disclosure theory, Lumenate alleges that the Individual Defendants “cannot help but employ” their knowledge of Lumenate‘s trade secrets, including client-specific information and Lumenate‘s strategies in the market, to help IDS target Lumenate‘s clients and undercut Lumenate‘s pricing and strategies. (Compl. ¶¶ 65-66.) Defendants attack Lumenate‘s inevitable disclosure allegations on two grounds. First, because the Individual Defendants never worked for Lumenate (as opposed to Augmentity), Defendants argue that they do not have knowledge of Lumenate‘s strategies, client information, and other alleged trade secrets. (Def. Mem. at 8; Def. Reply at 7-8.) The Complaint, however, plainly states that Lumenate purchased Augmentity‘s trade secrets and other assets in April 2013. (Compl. ¶¶ 4, 61.) Although Defendants contend that it is unreasonable for Lumenate to use the same pricing, strategies, and other allegedly protected information as Augmentity (see Def. Mem. at 8)—a failed company—this argument raises factual issues that the Court cannot decide at the pleadings stage.
Second, Defendants argue that Lumenate fails to plead sufficient facts to demonstrate a “high probability” that Defendants inevitably will use Lumenate‘s alleged trade secrets. (Def. Mem. at 8; Def. Reply at 8.) Courts consider three factors in determining whether disclosure of trade secrets is inevitable: “(1) the level of competition between the former employer and the new employer; (2) whether the employee‘s position with the new employer is comparable to the position he held with the former employer; and (3) the actions the new employer has taken to prevent the former employee from using or disclosing trade secrets of the former employer.” Saban v. Caremark Rx, L.L.C., 780 F. Supp. 2d 700, 734 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (citing RKI, Inc., 177 F.
In this case, Augmentity and now Lumenate are direct competitors with IDS. (Compl. ¶¶ 2, 18.) In addition, the Individual Defendants hold the same positions at IDS that they previously held at Augmentity. (Id. ¶ 18.) Finally, the allegations in the Complaint suggest that IDS has taken few, if any, precautions to prevent the Individual Defendants from using Augmentity‘s trade secrets. Lumenate alleges that the Individual Defendants began planning to leave Augmentity to join IDS a couple months before their actual departure; they downloaded confidential information before leaving Augmentity and then attempted to conceal their activities from the company; and after joining IDS, they began poaching Augmentity‘s clients with whom they had previously worked. (Id. ¶¶ 32-51.) These allegations sufficiently support a claim based on inevitable disclosure. See AutoMed Techs., 160 F. Supp. 2d at 921 (“Based on defendants’ prior positions with plaintiff, the information to which they had access and the nature of their work for their new employer“—which included working on the same project the defendants had worked on for their former employer—“we can arguably infer use of AutoMed‘s information.“); see also PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1269 (affirming order granting a preliminary injunction where the
B. Breach of Contract (Count I) and Tortious Interference with the Non-Disclosure Agreements (Count V)
In Count I, Lumenate alleges that the Individual Defendants breached their non-disclosure agreements with Augmentity by actually or inevitably disclosing or using Augmentity‘s trade secret information to benefit IDS. (Compl. ¶ 54.) In Count V, Lumenate alleges that IDS knowingly and improperly interfered with the Individual Defendants’ non-disclosure agreements by using Augmentity‘s trade secret information to gain an unfair competitive advantage or, alternatively, by knowing that the Individual Defendants would inevitably disclose the trade secret information to benefit IDS. (Id. ¶ 81.)
Defendants argue that Counts I and V fail for the same reasons as Count II, namely that Lumenate does not allege sufficient facts to show that the Individual Defendants used, disclosed, or inevitably will disclose Augmentity‘s confidential information. (See Def. Mem. at 9; Def. Reply at 10-11.) Because the Court rejected Defendants’ argument with respect to Count II (see Part I.A. supra), their argument with respect to Counts I and V also fails.
Defendants also argue that the ITSA preempts Count V. (Def. Mem. at 11; Def. Reply at 11-13.) Section 8 of the ITSA preempts “conflicting tort, restitutionary, unfair competition, and other [Illinois] laws . . . providing civil remedies for misappropriation of a trade secret.”
In Hecny Transportation, Inc. v. Chu, 430 F.3d 402 (7th Cir. 2005), for example, the Seventh Circuit considered whether the ITSA preempted a breach of fiduciary duty claim based on the defendant‘s taking of the company‘s customer list, which the company claimed as trade secret information. Id. at 403-05. The Seventh Circuit determined that the Illinois Supreme Court would follow the dominant view on preemption under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act of 1985, which is “that claims are foreclosed only when they rest on the conduct that is said to misappropriate trade secrets.” Id. at 404-05 (collecting cases). Under this view, preemption “does not apply to duties imposed by law that are not dependent upon the existence of competitively significant secret information . . . .” Id. at 405. Based on these principles, the Seventh Circuit held that the plaintiff‘s “assertion of trade secret in [its] customer list [did] not wipe out claims of theft, fraud, and breach of the duty of loyalty that would be sound even if the customer list were a public record.” Id.
The question before the Court, then, is whether Lumenate‘s tortious interference claim against IDS would stand even if the information that the Individual Defendants allegedly misappropriated from Augmentity does not constitute trade secrets. See id. Put differently, would the Individual Defendants have breached their non-disclosure agreements if the information they allegedly took from Augmentity was not trade secret information? The answer is no. The non-disclosure agreements between the Individual Defendants and Augmentity prohibit the Individual Defendants from using, disclosing, or divulging Augmentity‘s
In an attempt to save Count V, Lumenate argues that it is premature to determine whether ITSA preemption applies. (Pl. Resp. at 14.) According to Lumenate, only after the fact-finder determines whether the confidential information at issue does, in fact, constitute trade secret information can the Court determine whether the ITSA preempts its claim for tortious interference. (Id.) The Court disagrees. If the fact-finder ultimately determines that the confidential information that the Individual Defendants allegedly misappropriated is not trade secret information, the plain terms of the non-disclosure agreements dictate that Lumenate‘s tortious interference claim would fail alongside its ITSA claim.
Accordingly, the Court denies Defendants’ motion to dismiss with respect to Count I but Defendants motion to dismiss with respect to Count V without prejudice.
To state a claim for breach of fiduciary duty, a plaintiff must allege the existence of a fiduciary duty, a breach of that duty, and damages proximately caused by the breach. Neade v. Portes, 193 Ill. 2d 433, 250 Ill. Dec. 733, 749 N.E.2d 496 (Ill. 2000). Under Illinois law, employees owe a duty of loyalty to their employer. Lawlor v. North Am. Corp. of Ill., 2012 IL 112530, ¶ 69, 368 Dec. 1, 983 N.E.2d 414 (Ill. 2012); Beltran v. Brentwood N. Healthcare Ctr., LLC, 426 F. Supp. 2d 827, 831 (N.D. Ill. 2006). While employees “may plan, form, and outfit a competing corporation” before leaving a company, they cannot begin competing with their employer or soliciting their employer‘s clients until after they leave the company. Cooper Linse Hallman Capital Mgmt., Inc. v. Hallman, 368 Ill. App. 3d 353, 357, 395 Ill. Dec. 780, 856 N.E.2d 585 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006); Lawlor, 2012 IL 112530, ¶ 69, 368 Dec. 1, 983 N.E.2d 414 (“[A] fiduciary cannot act inconsistently with his agency or trust and cannot solicit his employer‘s customers for himself.“).
Defendants argue that Lumenate fails to allege sufficient facts to plead a breach of the Individual Defendants’ fiduciary duties. (Def. Mem. at 11-12.) The Court disagrees. Lumenate alleges that the Individual Defendants plotted their departure from Augmentity a couple of months before actually terminating their employment with Augmentity. (Compl. ¶ 69.) While this allegation alone is insufficient to state a claim for breach of fiduciary duty, Lumenate also alleges: (1) Defendant Parchomenko spoke disparagingly about Augmentity to its clients and contractual partners and “engaged in a work slowdown,” reducing his monthly sales revenue by nearly 90% (id. ¶¶ 35, 37); (2) Defendants Scalera and Parchomenko failed to process a quote for a client, and then brought that client over to IDS with them (id. ¶ 38); (3) Defendants Parchomenko and Sprehe downloaded Augmentity‘s files onto external drives and databases
Defendants’ reliance on Ellis & Marshall Assocs., Inc. v. Marshall, 16 Ill. App. 3d 398, 306 N.E.2d 712 (Ill. App. Ct. 1973) (see Def. Mem. at 11), is misplaced. To begin, the Complaint does not rely solely on the Individual Defendants’ telephone calls with IDS to show their disloyalty during their employment with Augmentity, as the plaintiff in Ellis & Marshall Assocs. had. See id. at 402. In that case, moreover, the court determined that the defendant‘s discussions with the plaintiff‘s employees and clients were merely “statements as to the defendant‘s future plans,” not, as the Ellis & Marshall Assocs. plaintiffs suggested, “solicitations of business for himself.” Id. Here, Lumenate alleges sufficient facts to infer that the Individual Defendants began competing with Augmentity to the benefit of IDS before terminating their employment. Although Defendants offer other benign inferences that the Court may also draw from Lumenate‘s allegations, the Court must draw all plausible inferences in Lumenate‘s favor.
D. Tortious Interference with a Prospective Business Expectancy (Count IV)
Under Illinois law, the elements of a claim of tortious interference with a prospective business expectancy are “(1) [the plaintiff‘s] reasonable expectation of entering into a valid business relationship; (2) the defendant‘s knowledge of the plaintiff‘s expectancy; (3) purposeful interference by the defendant that prevents the plaintiff‘s legitimate expectancy from ripening into a valid business relationship; and (4) damages to the plaintiff resulting from such interference.” Botvinick v. Rush Univ. Med. Ctr., 574 F.3d 414, 417 (7th Cir. 2009) (alteration in original) (quoting Fellhauer v. City of Geneva, 142 Ill. 2d 495, 154 Ill. Dec. 649, 568 N.E.2d 870 (Ill. 1991)). Defendants argue that Count IV fails because Lumenate does not plead a
In support of Count IV, Lumenate alleges that Augmentity had conducted business with various clients, including DeVry, Inc., Morningstar, Grant Thornton, and Sears, every year for a number of years. (Compl. ¶ 40.) Lumenate also alleged that “[a]t all relevant times, Augmentity and Lumenate had a valid and reasonable expectation they would continue to be the recipient of this business from clients.” (Id. ¶ 74.) Indeed, Lumenate, which began servicing Augmentity‘s clients in April 2013 (see id. ¶ 4), has successfully retained the business of those clients who had not worked with the Individual Defendants. (Id. ¶ 41.) DeVry, Morningstar, and Grant Thornton, on the other hand, terminated their business with Augmentity or Lumenate and now do business with IDS. (Id.) Sears, moreover, significantly reduced the amount of business it directed to Augmentity and Lumenate. (Id.) In addition, Lumenate alleges that Defendants Scalera and Parchomenko specifically interfered with Augmentity‘s contract with Grant Thornton by failing to process a maintenance quote as the company had directed them to do shortly before their departure. (See id. ¶ 38.) These allegations satisfy the federal notice-pleading standards. See, e.g., MapQuest, Inc. v. CIVIX-DDI, LLC, No. 08 C 1732, 2009 WL 383476, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 11, 2009) (denying motion to dismiss counterclaim where two of the plaintiff‘s clients had begun to do business with the defendants and, thus, it was not merely speculative that other clients of the plaintiff would also enter agreements with the defendant); Quantum Foods, LLC v. Progressive Foods, Inc., No. 12 C 1329, 2012 WL 5530211, at *2-3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 14, 2012) (denying motion to dismiss where the plaintiff alleged that it had a “track record” with its clients and certain clients were interested in continuing their business with the plaintiff); see also Cook v. Winfrey, 141 F.3d 322, 328 (7th Cir. 1998) (determining that
E. Request for Injunctive Relief
Defendants argue that even if the Court does not dismiss Counts I and II, the Court should strike Lumenate‘s requests for injunctive relief in those claims. (See Def. Mem. at 15; Def. Reply at 15.) With respect to Count II, Defendants argue that Lumenate cannot show that it will suffer irreparable injury based on Defendants’ alleged misappropriation of Augmentity‘s trade secret information six months before Lumenate purchased Augmentity. (See Def. Mem. at 15.) Defendants contend that “Lumenate was necessarily aware of Augmentity‘s potential claims against Defendants when it purchased Augmentity‘s assets . . . . [and] [a]s a matter of law, Lumenate cannot knowingly purchase impaired assets, and then claim to be irreparably harmed by the impaired nature of those assets.” (Id.) Defendants cite no legal support for their argument that Lumenate, as the current owner of Augmentity‘s trade secrets and assignee of its claims against third-parties, cannot establish that it will suffer irreparable harm from Defendants’ alleged misconduct. The Court, therefore, rejects Defendants’ argument with respect to Count II. See Hess v. Kanoski & Assoc., 668 F.3d 446, 455 (7th Cir. 2012) (“[P]erfunctory and undeveloped arguments, and arguments that are unsupported by pertinent authority, are waived.” (citation omitted)).
The Court also rejects Defendants’ argument with respect to Count I. Although Defendants correctly note that Lumenate does not plead that it will suffer irreparable harm in Count I, Lumenate does plead that it “will suffer irreparable injury should the Defendants continue to use the Confidential Information” at issue in Count II. (Compl. ¶ 61.) Because
II. Defendants’ Motion for a More Definite Statement
Defendants argue that, at a minimum, the Court should require Lumenate to provide a more definite statement under
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court denies in part and grants in part Defendants’ motion to dismiss and denies Defendants’ motion for a more definite statement. The Court
DATED: November 11, 2013 ENTERED
AMY J. ST. EVE
U.S. District Court Judge