COLETTE LUCKIE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. AMERITECH CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 03-3442
United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit
ARGUED SEPTEMBER 28, 2004—DECIDED NOVEMBER 19, 2004
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. No. 01 C 8619—Blanche M. Manning, Judge.
BAUER, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff-Appellant Colette Luckie filed suit against Ameritech Corporation, claiming racial harassment and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,
Background
Luckie, an African-American, began her employment with Security Link, a division of Ameritech, in 1995. In 1997, she was promoted to the position of Senior Manager of Organizational Development and Planning (“OD&P“) in the Human Resources department of the Small Business
Marvin left Ameritech on April 30, 1999 and was replaced by Gwen Patterson. Patterson had been the Vice-President of Human Resources at Ameritech Information Industry Services (“AIIS“). At the end of May 1999, Ashford also left Ameritech and Luckie began reporting directly to Patterson. In preparation for her new position, Patterson met with the president of GBS, Ronald Blake, who asked her to focus on widespread client dissatisfaction with Human Resources. Blake asked Patterson to talk to the managers of
Soon after her arrival, Patterson met with Luckie to assess the performance of Luckie‘s direct reports. The parties disagree regarding the details of this meeting. Luckie claims that Patterson asked only about the minority employees and wanted Luckie to create performance issues with those employees, or else Luckie would herself be scrutinized. Luckie also contends that Patterson stated that she wanted to “change the complexion” of the department. For her part, Patterson denies asking Luckie to create performance issues with minority employees and denies making the “complexion” comment. Luckie further claims that Patterson later called an African-American employee named Richard Peterson a “dunce.” Finally, as further evidence of discrimination, Luckie also points to an e-mail sent by one of her staff, James Boring, to Blake reflecting his dissatisfaction with the current culture at Ameritech and concern with Patterson‘s management style.
Though the details of Patterson and Luckie‘s meeting are disputed, it is undisputed that Patterson almost immediately began documenting performance problems with Luckie, including inaccessibility during work hours, missed deadlines, inaccurate communications, and failure to keep her credit card account up to date. Luckie contends that any credit card arrearage was due to Patterson not approving her expenses in a timely fashion. Patterson discussed her expectations with Luckie, but Luckie‘s performance did not improve. Patterson then met with Krolopp and Blake to discuss Luckie‘s continuing performance problems. With their input, Patterson ultimately decided to put Luckie on a PIP on August 27, 1999. By its terms, Luckie had 30 days to improve her performance; failure to meet the goals and expectations set out in the PIP could result in the termination of her employment. Patterson discussed the PIP with Luckie. During the PIP, Patterson met with Luckie regularly. In addition, Debbie Lewis or Susan Brenkus, who worked for different business units and did not report to Patterson, also attended. The consensus among the three was that Luckie was defensive during these meetings and not open to suggestions.
At some point in August 1999, Luckie contacted the Ameritech internal EEO hotline to complain about Patterson‘s conduct and spoke with EEO representative Mamie Clay. Luckie only identified herself by her first name, and did not name Patterson as the manager about whom she was calling. Luckie asserts that Clay guessed that she was talking about Patterson and said she would talk to Patterson about the problem. Clay denies that she guessed that the manager was Patterson. Regardless, Patterson and Clay have both testified that they have never met or spoken to one another. Luckie contacted Clay at the EEO hotline again later in August, this time with another employee, Wanda Raymond (an Asian-American), on the line. Again, Luckie and Raymond used their first names only, and did not identify Patterson or the business unit in which they worked. At some point after this second call, Luckie visited Clay face-to-face. She still identified herself only as “Colette” and provided no new information.
Luckie then retained an attorney, who sent three letters to Ameritech beginning on September 16, 1999. The letters claimed that Luckie had been discriminated
When she failed to improve her performance under the PIP, Luckie was terminated on October 4, 1999. Both Krolopp and Blake approved Patterson‘s decision to fire her. Luckie filed this suit on November 8, 2001. On August 21, 2003, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Ameritech.
Title VII Claims
Summary judgment is appropriate where the “pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Racial Harassment
Title VII prohibits an employer from engaging in racial harassment that creates a hostile working environment. Johnson v. City of Fort Wayne, Ind., 91 F.3d 922, 938 (7th Cir. 1996). To state a claim for a hostile work environment, Luckie must demonstrate that: (1) she was subject to unwelcome harassment; (2) the harassment was based on her race; (3) the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to alter the conditions of her employment and create a hostile or abusive atmosphere; and (4) there is a basis for employer liability. Williams v. Waste Mgmt. of Ill., 361 F.3d 1021, 1029 (7th Cir. 2004).
Luckie‘s allegations of harassment do not conform to the traditional hostile work environment claim in that she does not allege that she was the target of any racial slurs, epithets, or other overtly race-related behavior. See Johnson, 91 F.3d at 938. Nonetheless, Luckie contends that three separate incidents are evidence of a campaign of racial harassment by Patterson. Specifically, she points to: (1) Patterson‘s comment that she wanted to “change the complexion” of the Human Resources group; (2) Patterson calling an African-American employee a “dunce“; and (3) an e-mail sent by James Boring which complained of the effect that Patterson‘s management style was having on several employees and the department as a whole.1 None of these incidents are sufficiently connected to race so as to satisfy the second element of the hostile environment analysis. The conduct at issue must have a racial character or purpose to support a hostile work environment claim. Hardin v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 167 F.3d 340, 345 (7th Cir. 1999). Among the complained-of incidents, the only comment that arguably has a racial character is Patterson‘s statement regarding changing the “complexion” of the department. However, this remark was made in the context of discussing the department‘s organization
Furthermore, the events at issue are not severe or pervasive, as is required to satisfy the third element of a racially hostile work environment claim. A hostile work environment must be both objectively and subjectively offensive. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787 (1998). To determine whether an environment is objectively hostile or offensive, the court must consider all the circumstances, including frequency and severity of the conduct, whether it is humiliating or physically threatening, and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee‘s work performance. McPherson v. City of Waukegan, 379 F.3d 430, 438 (7th Cir. 2004). The incidents of which Luckie complains fail to satisfy this objective test. The conduct in question consists of isolated events that were not physically threatening or humiliating and in some cases were not even directed at Luckie. The evidence is insufficient to show a workplace permeated with discriminatory ridicule, intimidation, and insult. See Cooper-Schut v. Visteon Auto. Sys., 361 F.3d 421, 426 (7th Cir. 2004). Since Luckie fails to establish all of the elements of a hostile work environment claim, the district court properly granted summary judgment to Ameritech.
Retaliation
An employer may not retaliate against an employee who has complained about discrimination or other practices that violate Title VII.
A plaintiff has two distinct ways of establishing a prima facie case for unlawful retaliation: the direct method and the indirect method. Stone v. City of Indianapolis Pub. Utils. Div., 281 F.3d 640, 644 (7th Cir. 2002). In order to survive summary judgment under the direct method, Luckie must present direct evidence that: (1) she engaged in statutorily protected activity; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) there is a causal connection between the two. Haywood v. Lucent Tech., Inc., 323 F.3d 524, 531 (7th Cir. 2003). Alternatively, under the indirect method, Luckie must establish that: (1) she engaged in statutorily protected activity; (2) she was performing her job according to Ameritech‘s legitimate expectations; (3) despite her satisfactory performance, she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) she was treated less favorably than similarly situated employees who did not engage in statutorily protected activity. Williams, 361 F.3d at 1031; Stone, 281 F.3d at 644.
Luckie contends that Patterson placed her on a PIP and later fired her in retaliation for her complaints to the EEO office and for hiring an attorney who sent letters to Ameritech which complained of harassment by Patterson. Luckie‘s claim fails under the direct method because she cannot prove a causal connection
Proceeding to the indirect method, the district court correctly found that Luckie failed to establish a prima facie case because she was not performing her job according to Ameritech‘s legitimate expectations at the time she was fired. The record unambiguously reflects that Luckie had performance problems before she was placed on a PIP, and that these performance deficiencies were noted by other managers besides Patterson. Ameritech has further shown that Luckie failed to correct these problems while on the PIP. Luckie continued to miss deadlines, the quality of her work product was unacceptable, and she was often inaccessible during work hours. Luckie‘s only response is that she had received positive performance evaluations in the past. However, the fact that Luckie may have met expectations in the past is irrelevant; she must show that she was meeting expectations at the time of her termination. Peters v. Renaissance Hotel Operating Co., 307 F.3d 535, 545 (7th Cir. 2002). By failing to establish this element of the prima facie case, Luckie‘s claim cannot withstand summary judgment under the indirect analysis.
Evidentiary Rulings
Luckie also challenges the district court‘s rulings on the admissibility of two pieces of evidence. Specifically, she claims that the district court erred by refusing
Neither of the two statements at issue is hearsay because they were not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted.
For the reasons set forth above, we AFFIRM the district court‘s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant, Ameritech.
A true Copy:
Teste:
Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
USCA-02-C-0072—11-19-04