LOBNA ELBERRI v. CROSSPOINTE CONDO ASSOCIATION, JOSEPH GENCHIK, DHELMA SALAZAR, TANIA SALAZAR, and KUAN HSIUNG CHOU, and JACOBSON GOLDFARB SCOTT INSURANCE and ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY
DOCKET NO. A-3008-23
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION
Decided October 2, 2025
Before Judges Gooden Brown and DeAlmeida.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION. Submitted September 10, 2025. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Middlesex County, Docket No. L-7205-20.
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not “constitute precedent or be binding upon any court.” Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited.
Hill Wallack, LLP, attorneys for respondent Crosspointe Condominium Association (Michael S. Karpoff, on the brief).
Hoagland, Longo, Moran, Dunst & Doukas, LLP, attorneys for respondent Joseph Genchik (Juliann M. Alicino, of counsel and on the brief; Kristin M. Gummoe, on the brief).
O‘Toole, Couch & Della Rovere, LLC, attorneys for respondents Dhelma Salazar and Tania Salazar (Michael Della Rovere, on the brief).
Venema, Proko & Keahey, attorneys for respondent Kuan Hsiung Chou (George B. Keahey, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
This dispute arises from flooding incidents that occurred at the Crosspointe Condominium located in East Brunswick. Plaintiff Lobna Elberri‘s ground-floor unit was damaged as a result of the flooding and was deemed uninhabitable. Plaintiff sued Crosspointe Condominium Association (Association) as well as three insurance entities1 and four individual unit owners whose units allegedly caused the flooding. The individual defendants are Dhelma Salazar, Tania Salazar, Kuan Hsiung Chou, and Joseph Genchik. After
Despite listing several orders in her amended notice of appeal, other than challenging the February 3, 2023 order granting the Association‘s motion for summary judgment on its counterclaim, plaintiff, who is self-represented, makes no argument to support any other claim. Accordingly, we deem those claims waived and only address the February 3 order granting summary judgment to the Association, which we affirm. See Pressler and Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 5 on R. 2:6-2 (2026) (“[A]n issue not briefed is deemed waived.“); see also N.J. Dep‘t of Env‘t Prot. v. Alloway Twp., 438 N.J. Super. 501, 505 n.2 (App. Div. 2015) (“An issue that is not briefed is deemed waived upon appeal.“); Telebright Corp. v. Dir., N.J. Div. of Tax‘n, 424 N.J. Super. 384, 393 (App. Div. 2012) (deeming contention waived when party failed to include arguments supporting contention in its brief other than “one sentence in the conclusion section“).
The following facts are germane to the issues properly before us on appeal. Plaintiff purchased a ground-floor unit at Crosspointe Condominium in December 2018. Plaintiff‘s unit is located in a condominium building consisting of three floors. As a unit owner, plaintiff was subject to the governing master deed (Master Deed) and bylaws of the Association (Bylaws). The Master Deed defined both the unit elements and the common elements comprising a condominium building. The Master Deed also specified the responsibility for and method of addressing casualty losses to the property.
Specifically, Section 11.02 of the Master Deed provided that if any building, improvement, or common element or part thereof was damaged by casualty, the repair, restoration, or disposition of insurance proceeds must be done in accordance with its terms. Section 11.05 stated that if damage was only to those parts of the unit for which the responsibility for repair was that of the unit owner, then the net insurance proceeds would be paid to the unit owner. Section 11.04 specified that if insurance proceeds derived from property loss exceeded $25,000, the Board of Trustees (Board) of the Association shall enter into a contract with a licensed contractor for the repair or rebuilding of all the damaged portions of the affected property in accordance with all applicable
On October 11, 2020, plaintiff filed a complaint against the Association alleging that on January 11, 2020, her unit had been “flooded with water from the above unit.” In the complaint, plaintiff claimed that her primary insurance was the Association and because it was “refusing to give [her] the money to fix [her] condo” and she had “exhaust[ed] ... [her] temporary living expenses” from her own insurance policy with Allstate Insurance Company (Allstate), she was “forced to move back” into her “uninhabitable” unit, which “[did not] have a shower, kitchen, [or] ceiling.”
The complaint further alleged that plaintiff and her family had “suffered emotional and physical distress” from being displaced from the unit “for [nine] months during a global pandemic.” In addition, plaintiff asserted that her “human rights ha[d] been violated” because the Association had enabled two “white male” tenants who were “involved in the incident . . . to fix their condos without any issues” but had “discriminat[ed]” against her as “a single woman of color.” In the complaint, plaintiff requested relief in the form of damages, attorneys’ fees, and “any other relief” the court deemed proper.
According to the counterclaim, “Decker Associates adjusted plaintiff‘s claim on behalf of . . . [PIIC] and produced a list of items for repair and replacement in and adjacent to plaintiff‘s unit,” including “removal of the unit‘s sheetrock to inspect the walls for potential mold and other underlying damage.” Thereafter, “[PIIC] paid the Association the net sum of $36,147.71,” after withholding the policy‘s deductible and an amount for depreciation. The counterclaim further alleged that plaintiff received insurance proceeds in the amount of $23,521.21 from Allstate “to be used for repairs of her unit, plus $3,333.33 representing Allstate‘s estimate of her share of the Association‘s policy deductible.”
In response, plaintiff filed a document objecting to the Association‘s affirmative defenses and counterclaim.2 In it, plaintiff asserted that any delay in completing the repairs was due to the Association‘s piecemeal requests of
Thereafter, plaintiff filed a first amended complaint (FAC) dated December 30, 2021, naming the Association, Allstate, Jacobson Goldfarb Scott Insurance (JGS), and NJM Insurance Group as defendants. She sought the same relief but added claims for breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty and included damages for destruction of personal property and health issues due to “mold,” “dust,” “lack of nutrition,” and “lack of necessary daily hyg[i]ene.” Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint (SAC) dated February 23, 2022, naming the same parties and requesting the same relief. In the SAC, plaintiff asserted that her unit suffered water damage three times after the initial flood—
Plaintiff then filed a third amended complaint (TAC) dated May 19, 2022. In the TAC, plaintiff added the individual defendants, identifying them as “the owners of the units that flooded [her] unit.”3 The complaint alleged plaintiff‘s “entire condo and personal belongings were damaged and made unliv[able]” by the four flooding incidents and that the individual defendants and “their respective insurance companies ha[d] not paid ... plaintiff any compensation to repair her condo.” Plaintiff again alleged physical and emotional distress, and sought damages, attorneys’ fees, costs of suit, and “other relief.” The Association filed an answer to the TAC, asserting the same twenty-four affirmative defenses and cross-claims.
On January 6, 2023, the Association moved for partial summary judgment on its counterclaim, seeking to compel plaintiff “to permit the Association to make repairs to the common elements in and around [p]laintiff‘s unit and to
The Association filed two additional motions for summary judgment, one to dismiss plaintiff‘s claims for emotional and physical damages, and one to dismiss the complaint for failure to prove causation. In support, the Association submitted excerpts from plaintiff‘s October 4, 2022 deposition, in which she denied seeking treatment from any mental health professional and claimed that the flooding incidents, for which she allegedly sustained significant damage to her personal possessions and fixtures, were caused by “broken pipes” in adjoining units. The Association also submitted a supporting certification by its counsel, in which counsel averred that “[p]laintiff ha[d] not served an expert
The individual defendants also filed motions for summary judgment. Although plaintiff did not oppose any of the summary judgment motions, she moved for summary judgment of her own, seeking damages in the amount of $2.1 million, constituting $100,000 for “the present[-]day inflated estimate amount to fix her condo,” and $2 million “for forcing [her] to live in ... uninhabitable, inhumane living conditions.”
In three separate orders entered on February 3, 2023, the judge granted the Association‘s unopposed motions pursuant to
Subsequently, on February 21, 2023, plaintiff filed a motion “to redact the partial summary [judgment] that was granted on February 3, 2023 because . . . [the Association] has yet to show documented proof that the common elements . . . were damaged.” In support of her motion, plaintiff provided a certification responding to the statement of material facts submitted with the Association‘s motion for summary judgment on its counterclaim. In the certification, plaintiff asserted that based on the estimate of the Association‘s Insurance Adjuster, David Shupe of Decker Associates, as well as her contractor‘s report, “no common elements” sustained water damage. Plaintiff also included Shupe‘s estimate; her contractor‘s proposal; an unsigned construction permit dated June 4, 2020; and communications between plaintiff, her contractor, the Association, its lawyer, and Decker Associates.
The Association opposed plaintiff‘s motion, supporting its opposition with certifications from counsel and a counterstatement of material facts, including Sections 3.01 and 3.02 of the Master Deed which described the boundaries of and the items included in each unit. In the counterstatement of material facts, the Association asserted:
Stated simply, [plaintiff‘s] unit only includes the face (gy[]psum board) of the sheet rock only, not the entire sheet rock. The balance of the sheet rock, which [plaintiff] acknowledges was damaged in this matter is common area as are the firestops associated with same. Typical sheet rock consists of three parts: two paperboards that sandwich gypsum, a powdery white or gray material. Face; interior; Face. [Plaintiff‘s] unit includes only the paper faceboard adjacent to the interior of the unit. The gy[]psum and the backside of the paperboard are not part of her unit, but are common elements as are the life safety firestops that are part of installation of the sheetrock.
Although plaintiff‘s motion only addressed the Association‘s counterclaim, the judge treated it as one for reconsideration of all orders issued on February 3, 2023, and heard oral argument on June 2, 2023. Following oral argument, the judge summarily denied reconsideration of the orders granting summary judgment to the individual defendants and denied reconsideration on the Association‘s counterclaim. The judge credited the Association‘s argument that plaintiff had “not demonstrated any . . . basis for reconsideration” and issued an order on June 13, 2023, memorializing that decision. The June 13, 2023 order allowed the Association to enter plaintiff‘s unit “without notice” to inspect it and restore common elements, and to do what was “reasonably necessary to access the [u]nit for such purpose, including changing the lock.”
In a May 14, 2024 order,4 the judge granted the Association‘s motion, stating:
Although plaintiff filed opposition, her papers are [non-]responsive and mainly re-hash arguments that she previously made throughout the pendency of this matter which have been rejected by this court. Also, the court notes that plaintiff includes certain bizarre and irrational fears in her papers; to wit, she is concerned that the . . . Association will poison her with “killing chemicals” and that the . . . Association will install
hidden cameras and spy on her .... The reason that the court granted the Association the authority to complete repairs in . . . [p]laintiff‘s apartment regardless of her cooperation is due to potential public health issues which could endanger ... [p]laintiff‘s neighbors who reside in attached units. This was a water damage/potential mold case.
Plaintiff subsequently filed an amended notice of appeal identifying the February 3, 2023, June 2, 2023, and May 14, 2024 orders as the subjects of her appeal.5 As previously stated, only consideration of the February 3, 2023 order pertaining to the Association‘s counterclaim was properly preserved for appeal and we deem all other issues abandoned, including challenging the denial of reconsideration of the February 3, 2023 order. See Telebright Corp., 424 N.J. Super. at 393.
II.
We review a trial court‘s summary judgment ruling “de novo under the same standard as the trial court.” Templo Fuente De Vida Corp. v. Nat‘l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 224 N.J. 189, 199 (2016). That standard is well-settled.
[I]f the evidence of record—the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and affidavits—“together with all legitimate inferences therefrom favoring the
non-moving party, would require submission of the issue to the trier of fact,” then the trial court must deny the motion. R. 4:46-2(c) ; see Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995). On the other hand, when no genuine issue of material fact is at issue and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law, summary judgment must be granted.R. 4:46-2(c) ; see Brill, 142 N.J. at 540.[Steinberg v. Sahara Sam‘s Oasis, LLC, 226 N.J. 344, 366 (2016) (citation reformatted).]
Whether a genuine issue of material fact exists depends on “whether the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party in consideration of the applicable evidentiary standard, are sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party.” Brill, 142 N.J. at 523. However, ”
Where there is no material fact in dispute, we “must then ‘decide whether the trial court correctly interpreted the law.‘” DepoLink Ct. Reporting & Litig. Support Servs. v. Rochman, 430 N.J. Super. 325, 333 (App. Div. 2013) (quoting Massachi v. AHL Servs., Inc., 396 N.J. Super. 486, 494 (App. Div. 2007),
Plaintiff essentially argues the judge erred in granting the Association summary judgment on its counterclaim because no common elements were damaged by the flooding and she was thus entitled to the insurance proceeds from PIIC to repair her unit. In support, she asserts that no “common elements” as defined by the Master Deed and Bylaws were “stated on any estimates . . . [as] damaged by the flood(s).” Therefore, she contends that the Association did not have the right to repair her unit and had a “fiduciary duty to give the [PIIC] insurance proceeds to [her].”
“The physical extent of [a unit] depends upon what has been included in the common elements.” Siller v. Hartz Mountain Assocs., 93 N.J. 370, 382 (1983). Whether an item is a common element “may be ascertained by examination of the statutory definition and the master deed.” Ibid.
as to any improvement, the foundations, structural and bearing parts, supports, main walls, roofs, basements,
halls, corridors, lobbies, . . . and other means of access, excluding any specifically reserved or limited to a particular unit or group of units; . . . all other elements of any improvement necessary or convenient to the existence, management, operation, maintenance and safety of the condominium property or normally in common use; and
. . . such other elements and facilities as are designated in the master deed as common elements.
[Ibid. (emphasis added).]
“[A]s a general matter the thrust of [
One easy way to visualize a condominium unit is as a cube of air, the tangible boundaries of which are usually the finished side of the interior sheetrock, ceilings[,] and floors. While many condominiums vary this definition slightly (driven, in part, by allocating maintenance responsibilities), the condominium unit is generally seen by owners as the “inside” of their structure while the shell and “outside” of the building is a common element.
[Ibid. (quoting Soc‘y Hill, 347 N.J. Super. at 172).]
Except as provided by the declaration:
(1) If walls, floors, or ceilings are designated as boundaries of a unit, all lath, furring, wallboard, plasterboard, plaster, paneling, tiles, wallpaper, paint, finished flooring, and any other materials constituting any part of the finished surfaces thereof are a part of the unit, and all other portions of the walls, floors, or ceilings are a part of the common elements.
[Soc‘y Hill, 347 N.J. Super. at 172 n.1 (quoting
Unif. Common Int. Ownership Act § 2–102 , 7 U.L.A. 65 (1994)).]
Section 3.01 of Article III of the Master Deed describes the boundaries of each Crosspointe Condominium unit as follows:
Each [u]nit is intended to contain all space within the area bounded by the interior surface of the perimeter walls of each [u]nit and the lowermost floor and the uppermost ceiling of each [u]nit as follows:
BOTTOM: The bottom is an imaginary horizontal plane through the lowest point of the interior surface of each portion of subfloor, if any, within the [u]nit, and extending in every direction to the point where it closes with a side of such [u]nit.
TOP: The top is an imaginary horizontal plane along and coincident with the unfinished and unexposed upper surface of the gypsum board or other material which forms the uppermost ceiling of the [u]nit,
extending in every direction to the point where it closes with every side of such [u]nit.
SIDES: The sides of each [u]nit are imaginary vertical planes along and coincident with the innermost surface of the studding of the perimeter walls. . . . The sides of each such [u]nit are bounded by the bottom and top of the [u]nit.
Section 4.01 defines the common elements as “[a]ll appurtenances and facilities and other items which are not part of the [u]nits described in Article III,” including “exterior or interior bearing or main walls and floors between [u]nits.”6
Section 7.01, which sets forth each unit owner‘s responsibilities, reads:
Each [u]nit [o]wner is responsible to perform all of the maintenance, repairs[,] and replacements that may be required within the boundaries of his own [u]nit, at his own expense, and in accordance with the requirements of this Master Deed and the [Bylaws] . . . .
In addition, each [u]nit [o]wner shall be responsible to perform all of the maintenance, repairs[,] and replacements that may be required for parts of his [u]nit which are not located within the boundaries of his [u]nit as set forth in Section 3.01 when the following conditions are met:
(i) the part of the [u]nit is accessible without a breaking or intrusion into the [c]ommon [e]lements or any other [u]nit; and
(ii) the part of the [u]nit is not functionally connected with a [c]ommon [e]lement or a component of an integrated system which services more than one [u]nit.
In turn, Sections 7.02 and 7.03 describe the Association‘s responsibilities and rights. Section 7.02 provides that “[t]he Association shall . . . furnish the maintenance, repairs[,] and replacements that are required for any part of a [u]nit not located within the boundaries of the [u]nit as set forth in Section 3.01 herein (except as otherwise provided in Section 7.01 herein) ....” Section 7.03 provides:
The Association may effect emergency repairs to any [u]nit which the [o]wner of that [u]nit has failed to perform . . . . The Association may also effect non-emergency repairs within the boundaries of a [u]nit which the [u]nit [o]wner has failed to perform . . . if (i) any such failure to maintain by the [u]nit [o]wner will have a material and adverse impact upon any other portion of the [c]ondominium and (ii) the [u]nit [o]wner(s) responsible for such . . . repair . . . have failed to remedy the situation within sixty ... days after written notice is given by the Association to do so.
Relatedly, Section 8.03 reserves both a “perpetual exclusive easement” for the Association to maintain “any [c]ommon [e]lements, including those which presently or may hereafter encroach upon a [u]nit,” and a “perpetual and non-
Taken together, these provisions of the Master Deed establish that some parts of each unit‘s perimeter walls lie outside the unit‘s boundaries, making it solely the Association‘s responsibility to repair those portions. Only the interior-facing surface of the sheetrock belongs to the unit itself; the remainder of the sheetrock, including the material covering the outermost portions of the wall, is considered a common element. It is also the Association‘s duty to make “non-emergency repairs within the boundaries of a [u]nit,” which the unit owner has failed to perform after written notice, if the failure to repair will adversely impact any other portion of the Condominium. This conclusion is dictated by the Master Deed and accords with precedent addressing the topic. See Soc‘y Hill, 347 N.J. Super. at 172.
The Association submitted competent evidence to support its summary judgment motion. In addition to relevant provisions of the Master Deed and
Affirmed.
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
M.C. Hardly
Clerk of the Appellate Division