Lindsey v. StateLindsey v. State
inhеrently prejudicial such as to deny Sherman a fair trial because (1) the comments did not necessarily brand Sherman as a criminal who had committed the specific crimes at issue in this case; and (2) the comments did not link Sherman to any other criminal violations. See Sharpe v. State, 272 Ga. 684, 688 (5) (531 SE2d 84) (2000) (Where prospective juror‘s comments “neither necessarily implied Appellants’ guilt of the offense under consideration, nor linked them to other criminal violations,” the remarks were not inherently prejudicial and did not deprive the Appellants of their right to begin their trial with a jury “free from even a suspicion of prejudgment or fixed opinion.“) (citation and punctuation omitted). Cf. Moore v. State, 156 Ga. App. 92 (1) (274 SE2d 107) (1980) (juror‘s comment during voir dire that the defendant was a “firebug” was inherently prejudicial where the defendant was on trial for arson). Instead, the comments were in response to whеther Juror #12 could be fair and impartial after hearing the charges against Sherman, and Juror #12 was struck for cause. Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying Sherman‘s amended motion for a new trial.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
DECIDED JUNE 16, 2014.
Maryann F. Blend, for appellant.
Daniel J. Porter, District Attorney, John A. Warr, Assistant District Attorney, Samuel S. Olens, Attorney General,
HINES, Presiding Justice.
Lorenzo Dexter Lindsey appeals the denial of his motion for new trial, as amended, following his convictions for malice murder and criminal solicitation to commit murder in connection with the fatal shooting of Marcus Taylor. He challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, statements by the trial court, and the admission into evidence of prior consistent statements by a witness for the prosеcution.
The evidence construed in favor of the verdicts showed the following. On August 11, 2002, Marcus Taylor was fatally shot in a Citgo store parking lot in Richmond County. Taylor had testified for the State against Lindsey at Lindsey‘s two trials for the drive-by shooting and resulting death of 83-year-old Rosa Barnes.2 While incarcerated and awaiting his second trial for Barnes‘s murdеr, Lindsey began plotting with fellow inmates Lawton and Hankerson to kill Taylor, who was then also incarcerated. After the men were released from prison, the plot to kill Taylor continued. Lindsey attempted to recruit another individual, Antonio Tyler, to murder Taylor. Ultimately, Lawton agreed to kill Taylor, and Lindsey gave Hankerson the murder weapon and instructed him to give it to Lawton, which he did. Hankerson was present when Lawton approached Taylor at the Citgo store and shot him multiple times, fatally wounding Taylor in the torso and head. The murder weapon was returned to Lindsey. Lindsey gave Lawton money and drugs in payment for killing Taylor.
1. Lindsey contends that his conviction for criminal solicitation to commit murder must be reversed because the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Richmond County was the venue of the crime. However, that is not the case.
Venue is a matter of jurisdiction, which the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. State, 292 Ga. 685, 688 (740 SE2d 609) (2013). To meet that burden and establish venue, the State may use both direct and circumstantial evidence. Brinson v. State, 289 Ga. 150, 153 (2) (709 SE2d 789) (2011), citing Jones v. State, 272 Ga. 900, 902-903 (2) (537 SE2d 80) (2000). And, the State did so to establish that Lindsey criminally solicited the murder of Taylor, in part, in and around the Old Savannah Road neighborhood in Richmond County.
By the time of the present triаl, Hankerson had died, so his testimony from Lindsey‘s prior trial for the murder of Taylor was read into the record. That testimony established that Hankerson, Lawton, and Lindsey were all from the Augusta area, and that consequently, they were in the same clique in prison; that it was “a home boy thing,” in that “[t]he Augusta boys hang together“; the plan to kill Taylor began while the men were imprisoned and continued after their release and return home; Hankerson and Taylor, who was Hankerson‘s friend, were seen together at the Citgo station in Richmond County where Taylor was later fatally shot; after Lindsey learned of the encounter, he
A State‘s witness, who at the time of the Barnes murder was an investigator with the Richmond County Sheriff‘s Office, testified that the address where that fatal shooting occurred was in Richmond County in an area called “Old Savannah Road.” Later at trial, another investigator with the Richmond County Sheriff‘s Office testified that during the course of his investigation he met with Lawton at Lawton‘s home, which was two to three miles from the Old Savannah Road neighborhood and was “still in Richmond County,” plainly indicating that the Old Savannah Road neighborhood was also in Richmond County.
The evidence was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that criminal solicitation to commit murder occurred in Richmond County.
2. Lindsey contends that his convictions must be reversed because the trial court wrongfully commented on the evidence when it announced to a panel of the venire that the indicted offense of malice murder occurred in Richmond County, thereby violating
Certainly it is error for the court in a criminal case to indicate any opinion as to the evidence or the guilt of the accused, but that is not what happened in this instance. The comments at issue4 were made during the trial court‘s preliminary instructions to the venire, in which the court made plain that it was explaining what was alleged in the indictment against Lindsey, not what had been proven in regard to Lindsey‘s culpability for the crimes on trial. There was no violation of
Former
As made plain in Crawford, corroboration of only the chronology and details of the crimes, in and of itself, is not sufficient to satisfy the requirement of additional evidence. Id. However, there may be circumstances in which the timing and the specifics of criminal acts can servе as corroborating circumstances if they are directly linked to the identity of the defendant as the perpetrator of the crime on trial. And, even though evidence of motive without more is insufficient to corroborate the testimony of an accomplice, Reaves v. State, 242 Ga. 542, 543 (1) (250 SE2d 376) (1978), overruled on other grounds, Felker v. State, 252 Ga. 351, 366 (2) (a) (314 SE2d 621) (1984), it can be considered in the determination of whether an accomplice‘s version of events inculpating a defendant is corroborated. See Terrell v. State, 271 Ga. 783, 786 (3) (523 SE2d 294) (1999). And, this is certainly true in the present case.
The timing and circumstances of Taylor‘s murder support the identity of Lindsey as the mastermind behind the crimes. Lindsey had ample motive to kill Taylor, that is, initially to prevent Taylor from again testifying at Lindsey‘s retrial for the murder of Rosa Barnes, and then as retribution for Taylor having twice testified against him. Indeed, an investigator in the Barnes murder case testified about Lindsey‘s visible animus toward Taylor during the initial trial of that case. And, perhaps even more significantly, in the present trial the State presented evidence of a separate and independent attempt to cause fear and potential harm to an anticipated witness for the prosecution.
The State‘s witness, who was a close friend of the victim Taylor and who had previously offered evidence in the case against Lindsey, testified that she had received threatening phone calls in an attempt to dissuade her from testifying; she had notified law enforcement because she feared for her life and the welfare of her children. Although the witness was not permitted to give further details about the substance of the phone calls, inasmuch as Lindsey was the one on trial, a reasonable and plain inference to be drawn is that Lindsey made the calls or that they were made at his instigation. Evidence of a defendant‘s attempt to influence or intimidate a witness is circumstantial evidence of guilt, even in the situation in which the defendant does not personally make the attempt, that is, action by a third party to influence a witness not to testify or to testify falsely is relevant and admissible into evidence in a criminal prosecution on the issue
As noted, the independent corroborating evidence need only “justify an inference that [the defendant] is guilty.” Crawford, supra at 901. And, the jury was authorized to make the inference that Lindsey was responsible for the menacing calls, which evidenced Lindsey‘s intent to exact retribution against one who would aid the State in obtaining his conviction. Thus, there was evidence, albeit slight, to corroborate Hankerson‘s version of events identifying Lindsey as the prime mover in the plot to murder Taylor.7
In sum, the evidence was sufficient to enable the jury to find Lindsey guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes of which he was convicted. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).
4. Finally, Lindsey cоntends that the trial court committed harmful error by permitting into evidence prior consistent statements made by Hankerson to law enforcement, thereby improperly bolstering Hankerson‘s credibility.8 However, this complaint too is unavailing.
The record discloses that early in the trial, Lindsey acknowledged that the State wanted to admit the evidence as prior consistent statements by Hankerson, yet acquiesced to the jury hearing the content оf the taped statement, and merely requested that it do so by a reading of a transcript of the statement rather than by playing the tape.9 Later
Judgments affirmed. All the Justices concur.
DECIDED JUNE 16, 2014.
Brian Steel, for appellant.
Ashley Wright, District Attorney, Madonna M. Little, Joshua B. Smith, Assistant District Attorneys, Samuel S. Olens, Attorney General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Benjamin H. Pierman, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.