Appellant Sammy Brinson, Jr., was convicted and sentenced for felony murder and aggravated battery in connection with the death *151 of his infant daughter, Arianna Rosier. 1 He appeals, asserting, inter alia, the State failed to prove venue in Effingham County. We find no reversible error and affirm.
LaShonda Denise Rosier, the victim’s mother, took the victim to appellant’s house at approximately 9:00 p.m. on May 20, 2006. The victim was two months old at that time. LaShonda expected appellant to return the child to her house after an hour or two. Later that night, appellant telephoned LaShonda and said he wanted the child to spend the night at his house. LaShonda “kind of gave in once [she] saw that he wouldn’t bring her home” and went to sleep for the night. Later, at approximately 2:50 a.m. on May 21, Sgt. Christopher Boatwright, a City of Rincon police officer, arrived at appellant’s house in response to appellant’s 911 call. Appellant was still speaking with the 911 dispatcher when the officer came to the door. Appellant told the officer he gave the victim a bottle of infant formula at 10:00 p.m. before putting her to sleep; that he awoke when he heard the victim gasping for air; and that the victim “had been known to choke on her formula and sometimes gasp for air.”
The officer found the victim lying on the floor at the foot of appellant’s bed. She was “lifeless” and “cold to the touch.” The officer began CPR “after observing there was no pulse.” He continued to administer CPR for approximately seven minutes at which time Effingham County EMS arrived on the scene. They continued CPR as they placed the victim in an ambulance and rushed her to Effingham County Hospital.
In the meantime, appellant called LaShonda and told her that the victim was being taken to the hospital and that he was coming to her house to pick her up. LaShonda got into appellant’s car and asked what happened. Appellant replied that the victim “was choking on her milk.”
After they arrived at Effingham County Hospital, LaShonda and appellant were joined by LaShonda’s sister. When they were told that the victim was going to be airlifted to Memorial Health University Medical Center in Savannah, LaShonda and her sister decided they would drive there together. Appellant said he needed to go home to *152 change clothes, but would meet them at the hospital in Savannah.
The victim was admitted to the pediatric intensive care unit at Memorial Health. She died later that morning from a severe traumatic brain injury with subarachnoid and intraventricular hemorrhaging. Her injuries were the result of having been shaken violently. They could not have been caused by choking on a liquid or gasping for air.
LaShonda held her baby before she died. She called appellant and told him that the victim was not going to survive. He said he was on the way to the hospital. However, appellant did not go to the hospital; he never called LaShonda back; and he did not attend the victim’s funeral.
1. The evidence was sufficient to enable any rational trier of fact to find appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes for which he was convicted.
Jackson v. Virginia,
2. The State demonstrated that the crime occurred at appellant’s address in the City of Rincon but it failed to show that Rincon lies entirely within Effingham County. See
Graham v. State,
3. Appellant contends the trial court erred in permitting the State to introduce similar transaction evidence showing that defendant used his fists to attack and injure a former girlfriend nine years earlier. We disagree.
In
Collum v. State,
Before evidence of independent acts may be admitted into evidence, the State must show that it seeks to introduce the evidence for an appropriate purpose; that there is sufficient evidence to establish that the accused committed the independent act; and that there is a sufficient connection or similarity between the independent act and the crime charged so that proof of the former tends to prove the latter. Williams v. State,261 Ga. 640 , 642 (409 SE2d 649 ) (1991). “ ‘[A] transaction does not have to mirror every detail in order to authorize its admission; rather, the proper focus is upon the similarities between the incidents and not upon the differences.’ [Cit.]” Daniels v. State,281 Ga. 226 , 228 (1) (637 SE2d 403 ) (2006). Where, as here, such evidence is admitted for the purpose of showing bent of mind, a lesser degree of similarity is required than if introduced to prove identity. Smith v. State,273 Ga. 356 (2) (541 SE2d 362 ) (2001). The evidence at issue dealt with [appellant’s] violent behavior toward family members residing in the same home, even those significantly younger.
Id. at 723. Because the trial court’s determination that the State met the requirements for admission of similar transaction evidence was not an abuse of discretion, it will not be disturbed on appeal. See
Moore v. State,
In this case, as in Collum, evidence that appellant used violence against an adult with whom he had had a close, loving relationship was admissible to show his bent of mind in using violence against a member of his family, even though the family member was a mere infant, and even though the family member suffered internal, rather than external, injuries.
4. The State introduced a certified copy of appellant’s conviction for assaulting his former girlfriend even though it showed that
*154
appellant received a felony prison sentence for that prior offense. Although it would have been better to redact the evidence pertaining to the sentence, see
Miller v. State,
5. Because evidence of appellant’s guilt is overwhelming, any error in permitting the State to show that appellant did not go to Memorial Health, did not attend the victim’s funeral, and failed to meet voluntarily with police after the victim died, is harmless. See
Pearson v. State,
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
The crimes occurred on May 21, 2006. Appellant was indicted and charged with malice murder, three counts of felony murder, cruelty to children, aggravated battery and aggravated assault. Trial commenced on January 12, 2009. Pour days later, the jury returned its verdict, finding appellant not guilty of malice murder, and guilty on all the other counts of the indictment. The trial court sentenced appellant to life for felony murder (predicated on the underlying felony of cruelty to children) and twenty years concurrent for aggravated battery. The trial court merged and vacated the remaining counts. See
Malcolm v. State,