Lightfoot v. WalkerLightfoot v. Walker
Ralph LIGHTFOOT, LaCarttle Jones, Fred Jenkins, and Nelson
Weaver, on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v.
Daniel WALKER, Governor of the State of Illinois, et al.
Defendants-Appellants.
Nos. 86-2004, 86-2184.
United States Court of Appeals,
Seventh Circuit.
Argued Jan. 15, 1987.
Decided July 24, 1987.
As Amended Aug. 3, 1987.
James Prendergast, Richard J. Prendergast, Ltd., Chicago, Ill., for defendants-appellants.
Harvey Grossman, Roger Baldwin Foundation of ACLU, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiffs-appellees.
Before WOOD, FLAUM, Circuit Judges, and GRANT, Senior District judge.*
HARLINGTON WOOD, Jr., Circuit Judge.
Nearly fourteen years ago, several inmates at the Menard Correctional Center (Menard) filed an individual suit against the State of Illinois,1 under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, seeking to improve conditions in segregation. Their case eventually mushroomed into a massive legal battle on behalf of all inmates at Menard, challenging conditions prison-wide as unconstitutional. After thirty-one days of trial, the district court found the substandard conditions violated the eighth and fourteenth amendments and, in February 1980, ordered extensive relief. Lightfoot v. Walker,
I. BACKGROUND
The state claims that the underlying litigation was merely a "routine legal matter" that the plaintiffs' attorneys prolonged unnecessarily and unreasonably. See Argument of Patricia Chapin, Report of Proceedings at 54 (July 26, 1985). The district court, on the other hand, characterized this litigation as extremely complex and observed that no ground had been surrendered without a struggle. We therefore provide the following summary of that litigation in order to demonstrate the artificiality of the state's claim. See also Lightfoot I.
On October 2, 1973, public interest attorneys from the Land of Lincoln Legal Assistance Foundation filed an individual action on behalf of 38 black inmates confined to segregation at Menard, challenging the constitutionality of their conditions of confinement. These inmates were living in overcrowded cells and were surrounded by open sewers, standing water, flies, roaches, dried food, dirt and decaying garbage. They had no hot water for their once-a-week showers and some were deprived of exercise for months at a time. As the attorneys began to discover the extent of these disturbing conditions, they moved for the appointment of an independent medical panel to inspect the prison. In addition, they sought to amend the complaint to include as plaintiffs all inmates in segregation. The state resisted the plaintiffs' efforts in both regards, but in March 1976, the court granted the two motions.
Over the next six months, the medical panel inspected the prison, reviewed voluminous medical records and interviewed numerous staff members and inmates. On November 18, 1976, the panel issued its first report, revealing that unsafe and unsanitary conditions existed prisonwide. Problems ranged from improperly sterilized instruments in the medical unit to health-threatening plumbing in the food service area to improper treatment by untrained medical technicians resulting in unnecessary deaths. The panel report concluded that all prisoners were being denied even minimally adequate health care at Menard. As a result, the plaintiffs moved for, and were granted, certification of the entire prison population of over 2,600 as a class in December 1976.
Along with its findings, the panel also made specific recommendations for remedying the deficiencies. Although the state was not quick to implement the panel's sound recommendations, the report apparently prompted the state to initiate settlement talks. The talks, however, were fruitless. The state never offered a comprehensive plan for remedying the deficiencies, instead making only "piecemeal" proposals. See, e.g., Discussion between Court and Patricia Chapin, Report of Proceedings at 39-40 (July 26, 1985). The state did not rely upon the advice of any doctors in formulating its proposals, see Testimony of Fred Montgomery, Report of Proceedings at 138-40 (Dec. 13, 1984), and the proposals therefore reflected a lack of understanding regarding the extent of the prison's massive deficiencies. Moreover, the state refused to admit to its constitutional violations despite the growing reality to the outside world of the frightening conditions that existed within the prison's walls. As a result of these inadequacies, settlement was never reached.
The state's failure to offer an acceptable settlement required the continual updating of discovery since it became clear that at trial the plaintiffs would be required to prove ongoing constitutional violations with timely facts. Thirty-one days of trial began in August 1977. Although the state had consistently tried to thwart their discovery attempts and had refused to even commit to the findings of the panel, the plaintiffs were able to prove at trial that, for instance, there was no hot water until 1977; extremely poor sanitation still existed in segregation; housekeeping in the medical unit remained unacceptable (e.g., clean and soiled linen stored together, improperly sterilized instruments, no ventilation in isolation rooms); the food services area was still a health hazard (e.g., insects and rodent droppings in the bakery area, no fire extinguishing equipment near the deep fat fryers or elsewhere, obnoxious odors emanating from the workers' toilet, inadequate handwashing and shower facilities for workers); the number of physicians and scheduled medical hours remained insufficient; and, preventable deaths occurred even during the trial. And the list goes on.
Despite the plaintiffs' evidence, the state was not ready to give up its fight. It attempted to show, through the testimony of six expert witnesses, that the plaintiffs' claims were largely moot. To further support its mootness argument, the state requested a second panel investigation which was conducted midway through the trial. Unfortunately, the second panel report merely bolstered the plaintiffs' case. The panel concluded that, not only had its original recommendations been largely ignored, but an increased prison population (despite its recommendation against it) had cancelled any progress that might have been made.
Trial ended in November 1977 and, in March 1980, the court entered an order finding that the conditions in the prison were so substandard as to lead to unnecessary suffering in violation of the eighth and fourteenth amendments and that these conditions existed even at the time of trial. Lightfoot I,
Far from cooperative even after trial, the state initially filed a mandamus action in an unsuccessful attempt to bar the newly-appointed master from entering Menard. Four and one-half years later, however, the court found that the state had substantially complied with its February 1980 order. In the meantime, the plaintiffs' attorneys who tried the case, Grossman and Flynn, had petitioned for costs, expenses and attorney's fees, under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1988, in October 1981.
Although the plaintiffs' attorneys maintained that a hearing on the fee petition was unnecessary, the state requested one. The court set a hearing for June 6, 1984, and a month before the hearing, the state moved for a continuance. Following seven days of trial on the fee petition in November 1984, the court awarded Grossman and Flynn $605,243.00 in attorney's fees for their work in the underlying litigation. Lightfoot II.
In calculating the fee award, the court initially considered the state's argument, based upon Marek v. Chesny,
The state challenges the fee awards as unreasonable. Although it does not challenge any of the 899 hours the plaintiffs' attorneys claim for work prior to the first panel report,2 it argues that their unreasonable refusal to settle should preclude them from recovering all of their fees for work after that point. Instead, the state argues, they should be paid for only 1,220 hours of work in this case since that is the number of hours attorneys in Palmigiano v. Garrahy,
II. ATTORNEY'S FEES
A. Standard of Review
The prevailing party in a federal civil rights case is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney's fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1988. Here the district court found, and the state does not seriously contest, that the plaintiffs prevailed.4 We need only review then whether the fee award is reasonable.
Our review of the fee award is very limited. Given "the district court's superior understanding of the litigation and the desirability of avoiding appellate review of what are essentially factual matters," Hensley v. Eckerhart,
As the Supreme Court has stated, "[w]here a plaintiff has obtained excellent results, his attorney should recover a fully compensatory fee." Hensley,
B. Reasonableness of Hours
Grossman and Flynn requested compensation for 6,036.8 hours for their work in the underlying litigation. The district court opinion provides a lengthy and detailed explanation for its finding reasonable all of the hours requested. Several important factors motivated the court. The court recognized that this case was one of the first of its kind in this country, thereby raising novel and complex legal and factual issues. Although the Supreme Court decided Estelle v. Gamble,
The state argues that the district court's adoption of the exact number of hours claimed clearly shows that the court performed no independent analysis. Although the state does not dispute that the plaintiffs' attorneys actually worked over 6,000 hours, it asserts that the number of hours actually worked rarely equals the number of hours reasonably expended, citing Ohio-Sealy Mattress Manufacturing Co. v. Sealy, Inc.,
Initially, we reject the state's assertion that the attorneys here should be paid for only 1,220 hours of their work simply because attorneys in Palmigiano, an unrelated prisoners' rights case, worked only 1,220 hours. To the contrary, the Supreme Court instructs that, "[t]he amount of the fee awarded turns on the facts of each case." Hensley,
In Marek v. Chesney, the Supreme Court held that a prevailing plaintiff for purposes of Sec. 1988 is not entitled to any attorney's fees incurred after a valid Fed.R.Civ.P. 68 settlement offer has been made.5 The district court construed the state's argument regarding the plaintiffs' refusal to settle as one under Marek, and found that, since no adequate Rule 68 offer had been made, Marek did not apply. The state asserts in this court that it never made a Rule 68 argument; that the district court misconstrued its argument below. Appellant's Reply Brief at 5. But see Argument of Patricia Chapin, Report of Proceedings at 39 (July 26, 1985) (Marek "is significant not only for the Rule 68 provisions upon which this defendant relies.... It specifically says if there is a settlement offer on the table as there was in this particular case, a Rule 68 offer, that affects the assessment of the results achieved."). Regardless, what the state's argument boils down to is that counsel should not be paid for the majority of the hours expended after the plaintiffs' allegedly unreasonable refusal to settle. The state asserts that the Supreme Court's decision in Estelle, combined with the first medical panel report, should have ended this litigation. We agree. That the litigation continued was not the fault of plaintiffs, however, for bringing the litigation to an end required the state to offer an adequate and comprehensive plan for remedying unconstitutional prison conditions overall. This was never done by the state. Instead, the district court, with the assistance of extensive post-trial briefs, tackled the job. Hence the district court properly rejected the state's argument that the plaintiffs' refusal to settle was unreasonable. To the contrary, the court found, and we agree, that the relief ultimately obtained was "far more favorable than any offer of settlement."6 Lightfoot II,
Even if the plaintiffs' reasonably refused to settle, the state asserts, it was not reasonable for them to spend over 6,000 hours litigating this case. The state relies on Ohio-Sealy Mattress Manufacturing Co. v. Sealy, Inc., to support its argument that the number of hours actually worked does not generally equal the number reasonably expended. In Ohio-Sealy, we stated that "the court must disallow hours devoted to unrelated, unsuccessful claims[,] hours which the attorneys would not bill to their clients.... [and] hours for which the plaintiff provides inadequate documentation."
The district court carefully reviewed the attorneys' time sheets and considered their testimony regarding the division of tasks. Grossman petitioned for 3,070.5 hours for the underlying litigation, while Flynn petitioned for 2,966.3. The court found these time expenditures well-documented and, where necessary, conservatively reconstructed.7 At the fee hearing, Grossman testified that he had handled discovery for issues relating to psychiatric care, medical care, physician coverage, and intake screening, while Flynn's discovery work covered environmental health care and ancillary health personnel. He further testified that both attorneys did not attend every deposition and that they hired law students to do much of the non-lawyer work (for which they did not seek fees). In addition, Alvin Bronstein, a national expert in prison and civil rights litigation, testified on behalf of the plaintiffs that 6,036.8 hours was reasonable considering the difficulty in representing prisoners and the complexity of the issues in this type of case. Although the state tried to compare Lightfoot I with Palmigiano, Bronstein opined that the vast differences between the two cases made such a comparison impossible. Finally, when the state's own expert, John Bauman, testified as to the dollar value of Lightfoot I, he based his estimate upon the same number of hours claimed by counsel, albeit at lower than the requested hourly rates. After considering all of this evidence, as well as relying on its own observations of the litigation, the court found the number of hours claimed reasonable. Under the circumstances, we will not second-guess the court's judgment.
Nonetheless, the state asserts that no client would pay for the 829.50 hours counsel claim they spent in preparing the massive post-trial brief. It is true that at first glance the hours billed towards the post-trial brief appear lengthy. It is the district court which benefited from the preparation of this document, however, and we therefore defer to that court's judgment as to whether the time was well-spent. It was one thing to prove to the court that the prison's medical system was grossly deficient; it was quite another to guide the court in devising a plan for "totally revamp[ing that system] to such an extent that it now serves as a model for prison health care." Lightfoot II,
Finally, the state argues that counsels' vague description of time spent on the post-trial brief is insufficient to insure against double-billing. The district court found no duplication of effort, however, and we will not now penalize the attorneys simply because their later time-keeping may have lacked the extreme detail of their earlier records. As the Supreme Court has noted, an attorney "is not required to record in great detail how each minute of his time is expended[, as long as] ... counsel identif[ies] the general subject matter of his time expenditures." Hensley,
C. Use of Current Rates
The state also challenges the court's use of current rates. In Sec. 1988 cases, payment of attorney's fees is contingent upon success and is delayed until after the litigation has ended. In re Burlington Northern, Inc.,
The state argues, however, that a windfall results where as here the prevailing party is responsible for the delay in payment. While this may generally be true, we have already determined that the plaintiffs in this case were not responsible for protracting the litigation by refusing to settle. Moreover, even if the parties had settled, there is no guarantee that the settlement would have been expeditious. When "broad equitable relief is sought to remedy a constitutional violation," it is not unusual for the parties to "struggle, often for years, over the scope and details of injunctive relief." Gautreaux,
Nor were the plaintiffs' attorneys dilatory in pursuing their fee petition as the state asserts. Shortly after the underlying litigation ended, but before the state had substantially complied with the court's remedial order, Grossman and Flynn began pursuing their Sec. 1988 claim. Unfortunately, as the district court noted, the fee issue erupted into a second major litigation. Our review of the record suggests that the state was at least equally responsible for the fact that five and one-half years elapsed between the issuance of the district court's underlying order and its fee orders.8 The state wants to accept no responsibility for the delay, however, arguing that plaintiffs' counsel intentionally failed to press their claim until 1984, when the Supreme Court decided in Blum v. Stenson,
D. Reasonableness of Hourly Rates
Finally, the state challenges the hourly rates awarded to Flynn and Grossman.9 In determining an hourly rate, the court's objective is "to find the rates 'prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation.' " Blum,
Flynn's affidavits show that the top rate he had been paid in private practice was $70 per hour, yet Bronstein opined that Flynn could command a rate of $95 to $100 per hour for work in prisoners' civil rights litigation. The state argues that Flynn's top rate should serve as a rate ceiling and urges that Bronstein's testimony be disregarded since he is unfamiliar with rates paid attorneys practicing in the Southern District of Illinois. The plaintiffs' attorneys assert, on the other hand, that Flynn's $70 rate was for work in an area of law other than civil rights and performed in a locality other than the Southern District of Illinois and thus is not conclusive with respect to the rate Flynn should be paid for his work in this case. We agree that Flynn's $70 rate should not be used as a ceiling in these circumstances. As counsel argues, the $70 rate is not necessarily the prevailing rate since it was paid to Flynn for work outside of the market and outside of his specialty. The rate might serve as a starting point, however, enabling the district court to assess such variables as Flynn's experience and reputation. See, e.g., Chrapliwy,
We similarly approve the court's award of $115 per hour for work done by Grossman. The court, which is in a better position than we to assess an attorney's skill and experience, recognized Grossman as superior in this type of complex litigation. Moreover, the rate awarded falls somewhere between the rates testified to by the parties' experts and is comparable to the rates Grossman has received under Sec. 1988 in other civil rights cases. The state asserts, however, that this rate is too high for the 198.3 hours Grossman claimed for his work in the fee litigation. The state argues that Grossman had no particular expertise in this area and that, since its own attorneys were paid only $85 per hour, that $85 per hour is the prevailing rate. We disagree. Grossman was, as the district court put it, "uniquely qualified to litigate the fee petition." Although Grossman had to merely review the massive underlying litigation, another attorney would have been required to completely familiarize himself with it in order to carry counsels' burden of showing that the number of hours claimed was reasonable. Grossman's intimate knowledge of this litigation no doubt saved numerous hours otherwise chargeable to the state. Moreover, Grossman has had experience in litigating fee petitions in other civil rights cases. We therefore find that the court's award of $115 per hour for all of the hours claimed by Grossman was not an abuse of discretion.
E. Reasonableness of Fee Award
Having obtained a lodestar figure of $605,243.00 (3,070.5 hours X $115 per hour plus 2,966.3 hours X $85 per hour) for the underlying litigation, plus $60,120.50 (198.3 hours X $115 per hour plus 396.9 hours X $90 per hour plus 15.95 hours X $100 per hour) for the fee litigation, the district court declined counsels' request to add a positive multiplier of 25%. As explanation the court noted that the lodestar figure adequately compensated the attorneys for their work. The plaintiffs' attorneys have not appealed the district court's denial.
The results in this case were exceptional and counsel should therefore receive a fully compensatory fee. See Hensley,
III. BOND PENDING APPEAL
There is one more matter which we must address. The state requests that we reconsider our decision in Lightfoot III,
The state then filed an emergency motion in this court, asking for an unsecured stay under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. The state argued that a bond was unnecessary given the state's solvency. Yet the state neglected to address the district court's concern regarding the uncertainty of payment or to provide any assurances that counsel would be able to expeditiously collect their judgment following the appeal. We therefore held that the district court had not abused its discretion in denying an unsecured stay and similarly denied the state's emergency application. Although the state requested that we make an independent judgment under Rule 8, as opposed to reviewing the court's order for an abuse of discretion, we declined to do so absent a change in circumstances occurring after the district court's denial.
The state subsequently petitioned for a rehearing of Lightfoot III, with the suggestion that it be en banc. In its petition, the state argues that the earlier panel misunderstood the certainty with which the state pays its judgments. The state asserts that if permitted to stand, our decision in Lightfoot III will have a profound impact on the state's financial resources. It is too late, however, for the state to argue for the first time in this case that its judgment creditors do not in fact face a cumbersome, time-consuming and uncertain method of collection. Since the state does not argue that there has been a change in the collection method subsequent to Lightfoot III, we will not make an independent determination under Rule 8. Lightfoot III is the law of this case, and we thus leave to the state the opportunity to argue in another case that the method it provides for collection of judgments is efficient and expeditious. The petition for rehearing is denied.
Notes
The Honorable Robert A. Grant, Senior District Judge for the Northern District of Indiana, is sitting by designation
The public officials who are the named defendants were sued in their official rather than personal capacities, so that the suit is in effect one against the state
In addition, the state does not challenge any part of the award relating to expenses
The state's attempt to supply an easy formula is confusing; it has neglected to indicate which of the 1,220 hours should be attributed to Grossman at $60 per hour and which to Flynn at $50 per hour
In finding that the plaintiffs prevailed, the district court noted that, "it would be difficult ... to think of a case where the plaintiffs have more completely prevailed." Lightfoot II,
Rule 68 provides:
At any time more than 10 days before the trial begins, a party defending against a claim may serve upon an adverse party an offer to allow judgment to be taken against him for the money or property or to the effect specified in his offer, with costs then accrued.... If the judgment finally obtained by the offeree is not more favorable than the offer, the offeree must pay the costs incurred after making the offer.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 68.
The state also argues, without further elaboration, that the failure to reach a settlement in this case was unreasonable since in an "identical case involving the Stateville penitentiary, the State entered into a consent decree and paid $77,210 in attorneys' fees to settle the entire Cook v. Rowe case." Appellant's Brief at 33. The Cook v. Rowe, No. 76 C 2224 (N.D.Ill.1977), consent decree was entered into after Lightfoot I was tried, however, and so arguably the state settled Cook in an attempt to avoid a repeat of Lightfoot I. Although the state is a defendant in both cases, it fails to shed any more light on the circumstances of settlement in Cook than to provide us with copies of the orders in that case. What is clear, however, is that the consent decree in Cook did not encompass the constitutional violations at Menard. Compare Spanish Action Committee of Chicago v. City of Chicago,
When Lightfoot I was originally filed, Sec. 1988 had yet to be enacted. Public interest attorneys such as Grossman and Flynn therefore had previously had no reason to document their hours. Although contemporaneous time records are generally required, reconstruction of their hours was appropriate under the circumstances. See, e.g., Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority,
Interestingly, the state's attorneys billed over 1,220 hours during the fee litigation alone, the total number of hours the state now argues that counsel should recover for both the underlying litigation and the fee litigation combined. While we do not suggest that the hours billed by the losing party's attorneys should be compared to those of the prevailing attorneys in calculating a fee award, we do find the state's hours enlightening given its assertion that the plaintiffs alone were responsible for the long delay in payment
The state has not challenged the hourly rates awarded to the two additional attorneys, Richard Chase and Herbert Eastman, who litigated the fee issue on behalf of the plaintiffs