Leon CHEATHAM, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. William MUSE, Chairman Virginia Parole Board; Harold Clarke, Director, Virginia Department of Corrections, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 15-6309.
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
July 6, 2015.
611 F. App‘x 253
James Milburn Isaacs, Jr., Office of the Attorney General of Virginia, Richmond, Virginia, for Apрellees.
Before DUNCAN and DIAZ, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Leon Cheatham appeals from the district court‘s order granting summary judgment to Defendants in Cheatham‘s
Virginia‘s “three-strikes” statute provides that “[a]ny person convicted of three separate felony offenses . . . when such offenses were not part of a common act . . . shall not be eligible for a parole.”
Members of the Parole Board, who perform a quаsi-judicial function, are immune from suits for damages. See Franklin v. Shields, 569 F.2d 784, 798 (4th Cir. 1977). However, in Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-84, 125 S.Ct. 1242, 161 L.Ed.2d 253 (2005), the Supreme Court held that a prison inmate may bring an action against parole officials seeking declaratory and injunctive relief challenging the procedures used in denying parole. Accordingly, while Cheatham‘s claims against Muse for damages were properly dismissed as barred by Muse‘s immunity, the district court erred in dismissing Cheatham‘s claims for declaratory and injunctive relief which sought rulings requiring his eligibility for parole review.
However, we find that Cheatham‘s equal protection claim against Muse, the only claim he pursues оn appeal, is without merit. “To succeed on an equal protection claim, a [prisoner] must first demonstratе that he has been treated differently from others with whom he is similarly situated and that the unequal treatment was the result of intentional or purposeful discrimination.” Morrison v. Garraghty, 239 F.3d 648, 654 (4th Cir. 2001). Cheatham‘s claim is reviewed under a “relaxed standard of scrutiny,” as prisonеrs are not a suspect class and, moreover, Cheatham has not alleged any class that he is a member of that his co-defendant is not. See Moss v. Clark, 886 F.2d 686, 690 (4th Cir. 1989). We conclude that Cheatham has failed to allege how the Board‘s deniаl of parole consideration was the result of intentional or purposeful discrimination.
At most, Cheatham contends that Muse found him ineligible for parole based on some unexplained personal dislike or vendetta against him that Muse did not have against Cheatham‘s co-defendant.* Cheatham also points to Muse‘s changing stories on his co-defendant‘s parole details as proof that Muse is hiding something. While it appears that, in situations where the statе action complained of is discretionary in nature, “treating like individual differently is an accepted consequence,” Engquist v. Oregon Dep‘t of Agr., 553 U.S. 591, 128 S.Ct. 2146, 170 L.Ed.2d 975 (2008), in this case, Cheatham argues that
As discussed above, Cheatham must provide allegations sufficient to show that Muse intentionally or purposefully discriminated against him. This is so because “[t]o prove that a statute has been administered or enforced discriminatorily,” and sо violates equal protection rights, a plaintiff must show “more . . . than the fact that a benefit was denied to one person while conferred on another.” Sylvia Dev. Corp. v. Calvert County, 48 F.3d 810, 819 (4th Cir. 1995) (emphasis added). Instead, Cheatham must also specifically allegе that Muse intended to discriminate against him.
Here, Cheatham alleges no facts that, if proved, would demonstrate that Muse intentionally discriminated against him. He never alleges any of the factors that “have been recognized as probative of whether a decisionmaking body was motivated by a discriminatory intent,” Sylvia Dev. Corp., 48 F.3d at 819. For example, Cheatham does not allege a “consistent pattern” of arbitrary and inconsistent decisions by Muse, a “history of discrimination” by him, a “sрecific sequence of events” leading up to the Muse‘s ineligibility finding, or “contemporary statements” by Muse evidenсing intentional discrimination. Id. In sum, Cheatham sets forth no facts—indeed no allegations—supporting the contention that Muse intentionally discriminated against him. At most, his allegations and evidence show negligence, mistake, or a lack of care; however, there is absolutely no showing of intentional discrimination, much less a showing satisfactory to survive summary judgmеnt.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment to Clarke and Muse. We dispense with oral argument becаuse the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court аnd argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED.