617 F. App'x 252
4th Cir.2015Background
- Plaintiff Leon Cheatham, pro se, sued William Muse (Chair, Virginia Parole Board) and Harold Clarke (Dir., Virginia DOC) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging denial of parole consideration violated due process and equal protection.
- District court granted summary judgment for defendants, ruling Clarke had no personal role, Muse could not be liable for supervisory actions, and Muse was entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity for damages.
- Cheatham did not challenge the statutory interpretation of Va. Code § 53.1-151(B)(1) (Virginia’s "three-strikes" parole-ineligibility rule); he claimed he and a co-defendant had identical records but were treated differently as to parole eligibility.
- On appeal Cheatham argued Muse was personally involved and not immune, and that the court erred by not addressing the merits of his equal protection claim; he did not pursue the Clarke dismissal.
- Fourth Circuit held Muse immune from damages for quasi-judicial acts but reversed dismissal to the extent Cheatham sought declaratory/injunctive relief under Wilkinson v. Dotson; however, the court affirmed summary judgment on Cheatham’s equal protection claim for failure to show intentional discrimination.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Muse is personally liable and immune for damages | Muse acted personally to deny parole consideration and is not entitled to immunity | Parole board members perform quasi-judicial functions and are entitled to absolute immunity from damages | Muse is immune from damages; district court erred only in dismissing claims for declaratory/injunctive relief under Wilkinson |
| Whether Cheatham stated an equal protection claim | Cheatham was treated differently from a similarly situated co-defendant (identical offenses) — unequal treatment violated equal protection | No plausible allegation Muse intentionally or purposefully discriminated; differences can reflect discretion or mistake | Affirmed: Cheatham failed to allege intentional discrimination or facts probative of discriminatory intent; equal protection claim fails |
Key Cases Cited
- Franklin v. Shields, 569 F.2d 784 (4th Cir. 1977) (parole board members performing quasi-judicial functions are immune from suit for damages)
- Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74 (2005) (prisoners may seek declaratory and injunctive relief challenging parole procedures)
- Morrison v. Garraghty, 239 F.3d 648 (4th Cir. 2001) (elements required to prove equal protection violation by prisoner)
- Moss v. Clark, 886 F.2d 686 (4th Cir. 1989) (standard of scrutiny for prisoner equal protection claims)
- Engquist v. Oregon Dep't of Agr., 553 U.S. 591 (2008) (employer discretion can result in different treatment of otherwise like individuals)
- Sylvia Dev. Corp. v. Calvert County, 48 F.3d 810 (4th Cir. 1995) (discriminatory enforcement requires more than disparate results; proof of intent is necessary)
- Townes v. Jarvis, 577 F.3d 543 (4th Cir. 2009) (requirement to allege intentional discrimination in equal protection claims)