LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF OHIO ET AL. v. OHIO REDISTRICTING COMMISSION ET AL.
Nos. 2021-1193, 2021-1198, and 2021-1210
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
May 25, 2022
Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-1727
[Until this оpinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Ohio Redistricting Comm., Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-1727.]
NOTICE
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published.
SLIP OPINION NO. 2022-OHIO-1727
LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF OHIO ET AL. v. OHIO REDISTRICTING COMMISSION ET AL.
BENNETT ET AL. v. OHIO REDISTRICTING COMMISSION ET AL.
OHIO ORGANIZING COLLABORATIVE ET AL. v. OHIO REDISTRICTING COMMISSION ET AL.
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Ohio Redistricting Comm., Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-1727.]
Redistricting—Original actions under
(Nos. 2021-1193, 2021-1198, and 2021-1210—Submitted May 17, 2022—Decided May 25, 2022.)
ORIGINAL ACTIONS filed pursuant to
{¶ 1} Respondent Ohio Redistricting Commission1 adopted four General Assembly-district plans between September 2021 and March 2022. We invalidated each
{¶ 2} On April 20, a federal district court found that a group of Ohio voters had shown, at least at the preliminary-injunction phase, that Ohio‘s failure to implement new General Assembly districts in time for the May 3, 2022 primary election likely infringes on their right to votе. Gonidakis v. LaRose, S.D.Ohio No. 2:22-cv-0773, 2022 WL 1175617, *14-17 (Apr. 20, 2022). The federal court stated that if Ohio did not pass a new General Assembly-district plan that satisfies federal law by May 28, it would order the primary election for General Assembly races to be moved to August 2 and order Ohio to use, for the 2022 election cycle, the General Assembly-district plan the commission adopted on February 24, 2022—i.e., the plan we held to be unconstitutional in League III. Gonidakis at *2-3, 30; see also League III at ¶ 1-2. The federal court called that plan, and we now call it, “Map 3.”
{¶ 3} On May 5, the commission readopted Map 3, purportedly only for use in the 2022 election. Petitioners2 filed objections to the readoption of Map 3 the next day.
{¶ 4} The respondents who voted in favor of readopting Map 3 defend the commission‘s action, arguing that Map 3 is the only viable option for use in the 2022 election cycle. The fact remains that Map 3 still violates
{¶ 5} Therefore, in accord with our opinion in League III, petitioners’ objections are sustained. The plan adopted by the commission on May 5 is invalid in its entirety, including for the reason that the commissiоn purported to limit its effectiveness for only the 2022 election even though the
{¶ 6} We further order the commission to file the district plan with the secretary of state no later than 9:00 a.m. on June 3, 2022, and in this court by 12:00 p.m. on the same date. This court retains jurisdiction for the purpose of reviewing the new plan.
{¶ 7} Petitioners shall file objections, if any, to the new plan, by 12:00 p.m. on June 7, 2022. Respondents shall file responses, if any, by 12:00 p.m. on June 9, 2022. Petitioners shall not file a reply or any motion for leave to file a reply. The clerk of the court shall refuse to accept any filings under this paragraph that are untimely or prohibited.
{¶ 8} No requests or stipulations for extension of time for the objections or responses shall be filed, and the clerk shall refuse to file any requests or stipulations for extension of time. For good cause shown, the commission may file a motion for extension of time to file the district plan with the secretary of state.
{¶ 9} Petitioners’ requests for additional relief are denied.
Objections sustained and alternative or additional relief denied.
STEWART and BRUNNER, JJ., concur.
O‘CONNOR, C.J., concurs, with an opinion joined by DONNELLY, J.
KENNEDY, J., dissents, with an opinion joined by DEWINE, J.
FISCHER, J., dissents, with an opinion.
O‘CONNOR, C.J., concurring.
{¶ 10} This court has been placed in a remarkable position. With the reassurance provided by a federal district court in Gonidakis v. LaRose, S.D.Ohio No. 2:22-cv-0773, 2022 WL 1175617 (Apr. 20, 2022), that continuing delays and inaction would be rewarded with the implementation of a previously rejected map, respondent Ohio Redistricting Commission has, contrary to this court‘s clear order, resubmitted an unconstitutional General Assembly-district plan and, in doing so, has engaged in a stunning rebuke of the rule of law.
{¶ 11} In Gonidakis, the federal court thoughtfully recognized that if it were to act, it must do so only as a last resort. Id. at *4, *8, *10. Indeed, it stated: “We must provide the State as much time as possible to fix its own problems * * *. But at some point, the court must step in to provide a map if the State‘s officials fail to discharge their duties.” Id. at *21. The federal court determined that to avoid jeоpardizing Ohioans’ right to vote, it would wait until May 28 before acting. Id. at *2. But the federal court did not “stay [its] hand until May 28,” id., as it stated it would, and leave the state to fix the crisis created by the commission‘s own actions, id. at *8. Instead, the federal court provided
{¶ 12} Consider for a moment how the federal court described its decision: “So the fact that Map 3 does not comply with the Ohio Supreme Court‘s interpretation of state law does not prevent this court from imposing it—for one election cycle only—when faced with federal law violations, other state law concerns, and concerns about election administration on a short timeline.” Id. at *27. Yet, each of the federal court‘s concerns was created by the commission‘s lack of action—which is in direct defiance of its constitutional duties and this court‘s four prior judgments—and all those concerns were then, and are now, fully capable of resolution by the commission or the General Assembly.
{¶ 13} Lamentably, the federal court‘s optimism that the commission members “are public servants who still view partisan advantage as subordinate to the rule of the law,” Gonidakis, 2022 WL 1175617, at *25, fn. 19, proved to be unfounded. And its hope “that the Commission and the Ohio Supreme Court cаn set aside their differences and work together to find a solution,” id. at *3, failed to recognize the commission‘s utter refusal to comply with this court‘s orders as rulings of law and the Republican commission members’ insistence that they can act in derogation of the law and against their oaths to uphold it. The Republican dominance of the General Assembly gave rise to a telling boast by President of the Senate Matt Huffman: “We can kind of do what we want.” Staver, Who‘s Matt Huffman? The Lima man running the show at the Ohio Statehouse, Columbus Dispatch (May 20, 2022), https://www.dispatch.com/story/news/2022/05/19/meet-matt-huffman-the-lima-republican-who-runs-ohio/7269099001/ (accessed May 20, 2022).3 Do what we want apparently translates into the Republican-majority members of the redistricting commission ignoring rulings of this state‘s highest court and the mandаtes of Ohio‘s Constitution. Americans’ belief that no one is above the law—no individual, no organization, no political party—is a bedrock of our nation‘s legal system, and one which makes it the envy of many other countries.
And it is because of that unassailable, foundational principle that it is entirely beside the point whether the majority party is Republican or Democrat. This concurrence would read the same if the Democratic party held the majority in the General Assembly and the majority on the commission, and their actions were the same as those of the Republican majority in this case.
{¶ 14} The federal court‘s statement that this court and the commission might “work together to find a solution,” Gonidakis at *3, also erroneously suggests that this court actually has a seat at the commission‘s table. Indeed, if
(1) No court shall order, in any circumstance, the implementation or enforcement of any general assembly district plan that has not been approved by the commission in the manner prescribed by this article.
(2) No court shall order the commission to adopt a particular general assembly district plan or to draw a particular district.
{¶ 15} This court‘s recognition of its limits, however, does not lessen what it can do and what it has done within its constitutional authority: conclude that Map 3 does not comply with
{¶ 16} As Chief Judge Marbley recognized in Gonidakis, “[t]hesе rulings of the Ohio Supreme Court, pertaining to matters of state constitutional law, are controlling.” Id. at *33 (Marbley, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting from the remedy). The commission‘s refusal—on four occasions—to abide by this court‘s rulings has created a crisis that it has the ability to resolve. Yet, despite the federal-court majority‘s feigned interest in “buy[ing] Ohio more time to both make a new map and find ways to shorten the implementation of that map,” id. at *25, it effectively instructed the Republican members of the commission that all they had to do to get their way was to wait out the clock until May 28—despite the valid order of this court ordering the commission to adopt an entirely new General Assembly-district plan that complies with the Ohio Constitution by May 6, League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Ohio Redistricting Comm., ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2022-Ohio-1235, ___ N.E.3d ___, ¶ 78-79 (“League IV“).
{¶ 17} In light of this court‘s limited role in the rеdistricting process, setting aside differences and working together is the responsibility of the commission members in upholding their oaths of office as elected officials—oaths that are taken not to ensure that one political party has a supermajority but to obey Ohio‘s
Ohio‘s voters envisioned that the commission members would do in exercising their responsibilities as part of the commission.
{¶ 18} What was stated in a concurring opinion in League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Ohio Redistricting Comm., ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2022-Ohio-65, ___ N.E.3d ___ (“League I”), has, for me, only been reaffirmed:
Despite proponents’ and voters’ best intentions for systemic government change in approving the ballot measure to amend the state Constitution in 2015, the evidence shows that the leaders of the majority party in Ohio‘s veto-proof gerrymandered legislature managed to create a plan through the new bipartisan (as opposed to independent) redistricting commission that would have the effect of extending their party‘s dominance in even more impactful ways than in 2011—giving their party a supermajority of the legislature for another four years—just by adopting the plan by a simple majority of the commission vote without bipartisan support. * * *
The real takeaway from this four-year plan is that the Ohio Redistricting Commission should not be composed of people for whom the temptation may be too great to place political self-preservation above selfless service, regardless of party affiliation. What is needed in Ohio is an independent redistricting commission.
(ECF No. 113 at 8). In his post-hearing brief, the Secretary made a similar acknowledgement with respect to the fourth plan. Despite noting its practical benefits “from the point of view of ease of elections administration,” the Secretary wrote: “If the Supreme Court were to rule [as now it has] that the Fourth Plan violates Art. XI, then the Secretary, as a statewide official who swore an Oath to obey Ohio‘s Constitution, should no longer advocate for the adoption of the Fourth Plan.” (ECF No. 164 at 7 & n.2).
(First three brackets added.) Gonidakis, 2022 WL 1175617, at *33 (Marbley, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting from the remedy).
Then, no matter who holds the pen, the district lines drawn will more likely be fair and reflect population changes of the state over ten-year swaths of time based on changes identified by the decennial United States Census.
Id. at ¶ 179-180 (Brunner, J., concurring).
{¶ 19} The latest actions by the commission make clear that without the federal court‘s April 20 opinion, there might have been a chance at getting Ohioans a fair map. The federal-court majority brushed off Chief Judge Marbley‘s supposition that the Republican members of the commission would “wait out the clock rather than work with the legislature and the Ohio Supreme Court to figure out a new map and, if necessary, a revised election timeline.” Gonidakis, 2022 WL 1175617, at *25, fn. 19. But as Chief Judge Marbley predicted, they did just that. On April 14, this court ordered the commission to draft and adopt an entirely new General Assembly-district plan and file it with the secretary of state no later than 9:00 a.m. on May 6. League IV, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2022-Ohio-1235, ___ N.E.3d ___, at ¶ 78-79. On April 16, the two Democratic members of the commission—respondents Senator Vernon Sykes and House Minority Leader Allison
{¶ 20} The Ohio Supreme Court and the Ohio Constitution should not be held hostage by a redistricting commission acting according to partisan directives and a legislature that has created a crisis due to its own inaction. Any threat to Ohioans’ right to vote in this scenario stems entirely from the commission‘s repeated failures to comply with this court‘s rulings and the General Assembly‘s refusal to set a workable primary date. The remedy, then, should not be the approval of an unconstitutional map that rewards those who created the crisis to begin with. The remedy, instead, must be to craft a resolution of the manufactured crisis by those with the authority to do so—the commission and the legislature.
{¶ 21} Despite the deliberate intransigence of the supermajority party that has permeated these proceedings, I remind Ohioans that “the power rests at all times with the people,” Adams v. DeWine, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2022-Ohio-89, ___ N.E.3d ___, ¶ 1. Those elected to office may be granted transitory authority to discharge their responsibilities under the Constitution and the laws of this state, but the citizens of Ohio retain the true power of self-governance. Id.
{¶ 22} Having witnessed the ways in which constitutional reforms may be frustrated by hyper-partisanship and the power of inertia, Ohioans have the power to change those dynamics. That opportunity must not be squandered.
DONNELLY, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion.
KENNEDY, J., dissenting.
{¶ 23} We stand now in late May, looking back at a General Assembly-primary election that never was. From that result, it would be easy to say that the Generаl Assembly-redistricting process instituted by
{¶ 24} The majority here blames the commission. But
{¶ 25} But there is no solution in
{¶ 26}
{¶ 27}
{¶ 28}
{¶ 29} A General Assembly-district plan remains in place for ten years if it is adopted by a bipartisan vote that includes at least two members from each of the two largest political parties, unless it is invalidated by this court or a federal court.
{¶ 30} A district plan may be challenged in this court, but our authority to review the plan is limited.
{¶ 32} As in League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Ohio Redistricting Comm., ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2022-Ohio-789, ___ N.E.3d ___ (“League III”), no party here argues that the district plan the commission adopted on February 24, 2022—i.e., the plan that the majority held to be unconstitutional in League III (hereinafter, “Map 3“)—violates any of the objective map-drawing rules contained in
{¶ 33} The majority‘s role in this electoral chaos is based on its interpretation of the factors listed in
- “Each house of representatives district shall be entitled to a single representative in each general assembly. Each senate district shall be entitled to a single senator in each general assembly.” (Emphasis added.)
Section 2 . - “Every general assembly district shall be composed of contiguous territory, and the boundary of each district shall be a single nonintersecting continuous line.” (Emphasis added.)
Section 3(B)(3) .
- “Counties having less than one senate ratio of representation, but at least one house of representatives ratio of representation, shall be part of only one senate district.” (Emphasis added.)
Section 4(B)(2) . - “If more than one senator whose term will not so expire would represent the same district by following the provisions of this section, the plan shall designate which senator shall represent the district and shall designate which district the other senator or senators shall represent for the balance of their term or terms.” (Emphasis added.)
Section 5 . - “Notwithstanding the fact that boundaries of counties, municipal corporations, and townships within a district may be changed, district boundaries shall be created by using the boundaries of counties, municipal corporations, and townships as they exist at the time of the federal decennial census on which the redistricting is based, or, if unavailable, on such other basis as the general assembly has directed.” (Emphasis added.)
Section 7 .
{¶ 34} The second way that
{¶ 35} Does the majority ever wonder how we got to this place of impasse? Does the majority wonder what part of the districting process passed by the people of Ohio in 2015 did not work the way it was designed? Did the people account for partisanship? Yes, they required bipartisanship in order to pass a ten-year plan. See
{¶ 36} And did the people give this court the power to overturn district plans for a standalone violation of
{¶ 37} Does the majority ever wonder whether its claim of that power is why the map-drawing process has broken down, i.e., whether its exercise of power that is not explicitly given to it but that it has claimed has led us to the place where we are? This court‘s power is limited to what is enumerated in the
{¶ 38} The people of Ohio need look no further than this court fоr the sole cause of the debacle of the missing primary. We had a limited role to review the objective map-drawing requirements set forth in
{¶ 39} The concurrence points fingers. It blames individual members of the commission and takes specific aim at respondent President of the Senate Matt Huffman, who was not even a member of the commission when Map 3 was readopted. He removed himself from the latest proceedings and appointed another senator in his place. Perhaps he appointed the other senator because he knew of the majority‘s contempt for him, as set forth in League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Ohio Redistricting Comm., ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2022-Ohio-1235, ___ N.E.3d ___, ¶ 12-27.
{¶ 40} The concurrence accuses the commission‘s majority of “a stunning rebuke of the rule of law.” Concurring opinion, ¶ 10. But the majority in these cases is the body that rebuked the rule of law. The concurrence forgets that because of this extended rеdistricting process, for which it
{¶ 41} The concurrence reveals the actual motivation behind the majority‘s continuous invalidation of the commission‘s General Assembly-district plans, stating, “The Republican dominance of the General Assembly gave rise to a telling boast by President of the Senate Matt Huffman: ‘We kind of do what we want.‘” Id. at ¶ 13, quoting Staver, Who‘s Matt Huffman? The Lima man running the show at the Ohio Statehouse, The Columbus Dispatch, https://www.dispatch.com/story/news/2022/05/19/meet-matt-huffman-the-lima-republican-who-runs-ohio/7269099001/ (accessed May 23, 2022). So the concurrence must demonize Senate President Huffman, and the majority must demolish the Republican dominance of the General Assembly, so that the elected representatives of the people cannot control the legislation that is passed in this state. In my view, the concurrence urges Ohio‘s citizens to stop voting for Republicans and to go out and gather petition signatures calling for an independent redistricting commission.
{¶ 42} The majority concludes by setting another artificial, arbitrary deadline for a new district plan that it has no power to set while again retaining jurisdiction that it has no power to retain. By the time the majority opinion is released, the commission will have about eight days in which to create a new district plan. To what end? By that time, the primary election will be set and the districts divided according to Map 3. Any new plan passed by June 3 would not be used for a General Assembly election until 2024. A new plan passed during the pendency of a primary election could only sow confusion. Why limit the commission to an eight-day negotiation process? Can the majority not bear to be out of the limelight for much longer than that?
{¶ 43} Because no party claims that the district plan at issue violates the requirements of
DEWINE, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion.
FISCHER, J., dissenting.
{¶ 44} I respectfully dissent.
{¶ 45} As I have explained previously, these cases are governed by the impasse procedures set forth in
{¶ 46} From the start of these cases, all allegedly brought under
{¶ 47} Today‘s majority opinion acknowledges the escalating problems facing this state, all resulting from the majority opinion‘s flawed constitutional interpretation. See majority opinion, ¶ 2. As the majority opinion notes, the latest wrinkle in these cases is that respondent Ohio Redistricting Commission has purported to limit the effectiveness of the newest plan to only the 2022 election, which, as the majority opinion correctly recognizes, the commission has no authority to do. Id. at ¶ 5; see also
{¶ 48} But this is only one problem among many. Most significantly, a federal court has now stepped into this court‘s self-created redistricting mess, and Ohioans will in all likelihood be voting for state representatives in a special election imposed on this state by a panel of federal judges. As I have stated before, I wish this were not the case. League IV at ¶ 114 (Fischer, J., dissenting). By not following the text of {¶ 49} Today‘s majority opinion continues the pattern of first reviewing a General Assembly-district plan without the constitutional authority to do so and then, also without the constitutional authority to do so, ordering the commission to act in a certain way and on a specific schedule. Today‘s majority opinion does not cite any authority to support its various orders to the commission. Starting with League I, this court has retained jurisdiction over these cases through its majority opinions, which have ordered the commission to act in certain ways and within certain specified time frames, without relying on any Ohio constitutional authority under which this court may issue such orders. See League I, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2022-Ohio-65, ___ N.E.3d ___, at ¶ 139; League II, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2022-Ohio-342, ___ N.E.3d ___, at ¶ 68; League III, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2022-Ohio-789, ___ N.E.3d ___, at ¶ 44-45; League IV, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2022-Ohio-1235, ___ N.E.3d ___, at ¶ 78-79. This is because there is no such authority to do so under {¶ 50} Under {¶ 51} Moreover, the commission‘s task is a legislative one, as acknowledged by the majority opinion in League I. Id. at ¶ 76. It is fundamental that, in order to preserve the integrity of the legislative function, this court must refuse to interfere in the legislature‘s—or any similar legislative body‘s—exercise of the legislative prerogative. See Cent. Ohio Transit Auth. v. Transport Workers Union of Am., Local 208, 37 Ohio St.3d 56, 62, 524 N.E.2d 151 (1988). Thus, not only does this court lack authority under {¶ 52} As one judge summarized in the federal decision related to this case, “As Plaintiffs have maintained from the start, the perpetual turmoil and uncertainty during this redistricting cycle has harmed candidates, election officials, and the Ohio polity.” Gonidakis v. LaRose, ___ F.Supp.3d ___, 2022 WL 1175617, *40 (S.D.Ohio 2022) (Marbley, J., concurring in part and dissenting from the remedy). By violating the plain terms of {¶ 53} For these reasons, I continue to have deeply significant concerns about the approach followed in the majority opinions in these cases. I respectfully dissent and would overrule the objections. ACLU of Ohio Foundation, Inc., Freda J. Levenson, and David J. Carey; American Civil Liberties Union, Alora Thomas, and Julie A. Ebenstein; and Covington & Burling, L.L.P., Robert D. Fram, Donald Brown, Joshua González, David Denuyl, Alexander Thomson, Anupam Sharma, and Yale Fu, for petitioners in case No. 2021-1193. McTigue, Colombo & Clinger, L.L.C., Donald J. McTigue, and Derek S. Clinger; and Elias Law Group, L.L.P., Abha Khanna, Ben Stafford, Jyoti Jasrasaria, Spencer W. Klein, Harleen K. Gambhir, and Raisa M. Cramer, for petitioners in case No. 2021-1198. Reed Smith, L.L.P., Peter M. Ellis, M. Patrick Yingling, Briаn A. Sutherland, Ben R. Fliegel, Brad A. Funari, and Danielle L. Stewart; and Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law, Alicia L. Bannon, Yurij Rudensky, and Harry Black, for petitioners in case No. 2021-1210. Dave Yost, Attorney General, and Organ Law, L.L.P., Erik J. Clark, and Ashley T. Merino, special counsel to Attorney General Dave Yost, for respondent Ohio Redistricting Commission. Dave Yost, Attorney General, and Zeiger, Tigges & Little, L.L.P., John W. Zeiger, Marion H. Little Jr., and Christopher J. Hogan, special counsel to Attorney General Dave Yost, for respondent Ohio Governor Mike DeWine. Dave Yost, Attorney General, Jonathan Blanton, Deputy Attorney General, Michael J. Hendershot, Deputy Solicitor, and Julie M. Pfeiffer and Michael A. Walton, Assistant Attorneys General, for respondent Ohio Secretary of State Frank LaRose. Taft, Stettinius & Hollister, L.L.P., W. Stuart Dornеtte, Beth A. Bryan, and Philip D. Williamson; and Nelson, Mullins, Riley & Scarborough, L.L.P., Phillip J. Strach, Thomas A. Farr, John E. Branch III, and Alyssa M. Riggins, for respondents Senator Robert McColley and Representative Jeffrey LaRe. Cooper & Elliott, L.L.C., C. Benjamin Cooper, Charles H. Cooper Jr., and Chelsea C. Weaver, for respondents Senator Vernon Sykes and House Minority Leader Allison Russo. Mark G. Kafantaris; and Center for Competitive Democracy and Oliver Hall, in support of petitioners’ objections for amici curiae Center for Competitive Democracy, Professor Ruth Colker, and Professor Mark Brown. Belinda Spinosi, pro se, in support of petitioners’ objections as amicus curiae, in case No. 2021-1193.
Notes
In [League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Ohio Redistricting Comm., ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2022-Ohio-65, ___ N.E.3d ___ (“League I”)], with election-related deadlines already looming, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that “the election cycle should not proceed with a General Assembly-district map that we have declared invalid.” [Id. at] ¶ 136. Following the decision in [League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Ohio Redistricting Comm., ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2022-Ohio-342, ___ N.E.3d ___ (“League II”)], and the commencement of this litigation, Attorney General Yost wrote in a letter to the General Assembly: “The federal court may not order the use of a map that was rejected by the Ohio Supreme Court, where the underlying provision of the state constitution has not been found to violate the federal constitution.” (ECF No. 91-4 at 2 (Yost Letter of Feb. 22, 2022)). In filings with this Court, Secretary [of State Frank] LaRose has written: “[A]s a statewide elected official who swore an oath to obey Ohio‘s Constitution, the Secretary cannot agree to Plaintiffs’ motion and ask this court to order the use of a Redistricting Plan [referring there to the third plan] that a majority of the Supreme Court of Ohio has ruled violates Article XI of the Ohio Constitution.”