League of Women Voters of South Carolina, Petitioner, v. Thomas Alexander, in his official capacity as President of the South Carolina Senate; Murrell Smith, in his official capacity as Speaker of the South Carolina House of Representatives; and Howard Knapp, in his official capacity as Director of the South Carolina Election Commission, Respondents, and Henry Dargan McMaster, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of South Carolina, Respondent-Intervenor.
Appellate Case No. 2024-001227
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA In The Supreme Court
Heard June 24, 2025 – Filed September 17, 2025
Opinion No. 28301
IN THE COURT‘S ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
David Allen Chaney Jr., of the ACLU of South Carolina, of Columbia; Patrick Coleman Wooten and Charles Wilson Daniel, both of Duffy & Young, LLC, of Charleston; Theresa J.
Robert E. Tyson Jr., Vordman Carlisle Traywick III, La‘Jessica M. Stringfellow, and Sarah Cameron Frierson, all of Robinson Gray Stepp & Laffitte, LLC, of Columbia, and John M. Gore and Benjamin P. Daus, both of Washington, DC, for Respondent Senate President Thomas C. Alexander; Mark Carroll Moore and Michael Antonio Parente, of Columbia, and Andrew A. Mathias, of Greenville, all of Maynard Nexsen PC, for Respondent G. Murrell Smith Jr.; in his official capacity as Speaker of the South Carolina House of Representatives; and Mary Elizabeth Crum, Tracey Colton Green, Michael Reid Burchstead, and Benjamin Roper Jenkins IV, all of Burr & Forman LLP, of Columbia, and Thomas Wells Nicholson, of the State Election Commission, of Columbia, for Respondent Howard Knapp, in his official Capacity as Director of the South Carolina Election Commission.
Chief Legal Counsel Thomas Ashley Limehouse Jr., Senior Litigation Counsel & Chief Deputy Legal Counsel William Grayson Lambert, Deputy Legal Counsel Erica Wells Shedd, and Deputy Legal Counsel Tyra S. McBride, all of the Office of the Governor, of Columbia, for Respondent-Intervenor Henry D. McMaster as Governor of the State of South Carolina.
Joshua Snow Kendrick, of Kendrick & Leonard, P.C., of Greenville, for the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law and Professor Robert F. Williams Amici Curiae.
Armand G. Derfner, of Derfner & Altman, LLC, of Charleston; Annabelle E. Harless, of Chicago, IL; and Benjamin Phillips, of Washington, DC, for the Campaign Legal Center Amicus Curiae.
JUSTICE JAMES: “Partisan gerrymandering is the practice of dividing a geographical or jurisdictional area into political units or election districts to give a particular political party or group ‘a special advantage.‘“” Harper v. Hall, 384 N.C. 292, 299, 886 S.E.2d 393, 400 (2023). As the Supreme Court of the United States has noted, this practice in the United States dates back
Petitioner League of Women Voters of South Carolina asks this Court to strike down the South Carolina General Assembly‘s 2022 congressional redistricting plan (the “Plan“), 2022 Act No. 118 (S.865), codified as
I.
Congressional districts within a state must have, as nearly as practicable, populations equal to one another.2 South Carolina has seven congressional districts. Districts 1 and 6 are adjacent to each other. The 2020 census revealed District 1 to be overpopulated by 87,689 residents and District 6 to be underpopulated by 84,741 residents. Alexander v. S.C. State Conf. of the NAACP, 602 U.S. 1, 12 (2024). To regain the required population balance, South Carolina had to modify its districting map. The disputed portion of the Plan mainly involves changes to District 1 and District 6. Senator Chip Campsen spearheaded the mapmaking process, id. at 14, and his map became Senate Amendment 1 and then Senate Bill 865 (S.865). Governor McMaster signed S.865 into law in January 2022. S.865 is now codified at
In 2024, the Supreme Court of the United States analyzed the Plan in the context of racial gerrymandering and held a three-judge panel of the United States District Court for the
The Supreme Court summarized how the Plan differed from the 2011 map in three important respects, all of which reflected the legislature‘s priorities:
First, the Enacted Plan unified Beaufort and Berkeley Counties within District 1. This move enhanced the Republican advantage in District 1 because the moved-in portions of those counties leaned Republican. Second, to further increase the Republican lead in District 1, Roberts also put more of Dorchester County in District 1. These changes exacerbated the population imbalance between District 1 and District 6. Third, to cure this problem, Roberts moved a series of precincts in Charleston from District 1 to District 6. In keeping with the legislature‘s partisan objectives, the precincts moved out of District 1 had a 58.8% Democratic vote share.
Id. at 14. The Plan divided Charleston between Districts 1 and 6, which the Supreme Court noted “was seen
The Supreme Court noted partisan objectives explained why the legislature chose to split Charleston and other counties. Id. at 21. The Court explained the “State claims it sought to ensure that District 1 had a reliable Republican majority, and simply removing 88,000 voters without regard to their party preferences would not have satisfied that objective. Similarly, the high priority that the legislature gave to its partisan goal provides an entirely reasonable explanation for the subordination of other objectives such as the avoidance of county splits.” Id. The Court held there was no direct evidence supporting the District Court‘s finding that race predominated in the design of District 1 and “[t]he circumstantial evidence falls far short of showing that race, not partisan preferences, drove the districting process . . . .” Id. at 33 (emphasis added); see also id. at 25 (“The fact of the matter is that politics pervaded the highly visible mapmaking process from start to finish.“). The Court concluded the evidence showed the legislature‘s primary goal in drawing the Plan was to increase the advantage of the Republican Party in elections, not to engage in gerrymandering along racial lines.
Five years before Alexander, the Supreme Court held in Rucho v. Common Cause that federal law does not furnish judicially discernible and manageable standards for reviewing claims of partisan gerrymandering (as opposed to racial gerrymandering), thus rendering such claims nonjusticiable under the United States Constitution. 588 U.S. at 718. Relying upon Rucho, the Alexander Court held the
The Supreme Court remanded the case to the District Court for further proceedings on the plaintiffs’ remaining vote dilution claim. Id. at 38-39. However, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed that claim. Shortly thereafter, the League filed with this Court a Petition for Original Jurisdiction and Complaint naming as respondents Thomas Alexander, President of the South Carolina Senate; Murrell Smith, Speaker of the South Carolina House of Representatives; and Howard Knapp, Executive Director of the South Carolina Election Commission.3 Governor Henry
D. McMaster moved to intervene. We granted the Petition for Original Jurisdiction and the Governor‘s motion to intervene.
II.
“[T]he General Assembly‘s authority to legislate is plenary: the South Carolina Constitution grants power to the legislature to ‘enact any act it desires to pass, if such legislation is not expressly prohibited by the Constitution of this state, or the Constitution of the United States.” Planned Parenthood S. Atl. v. State, 440 S.C. 465, 475, 892 S.E.2d 121, 127 (2023) (quoting Heslep v. State Highway Dep‘t, 171 S.C. 186, 193, 171 S.E. 913, 915 (1933)). “[S]tatutes are presumed constitutional[, and t]hat presumption is a weighty one and can be overcome only by a showing of unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 476, 892 S.E.2d at 127. A facial challenge is “the most difficult to mount successfully” because a petition must show the law “is unconstitutional in all its
III.
Rucho v. Common Cause is a logical starting point for our analysis of the League‘s claims. In Rucho, plaintiffs in North Carolina and Maryland challenged their states’ congressional redistricting maps as unconstitutional partisan gerrymanders. 588 U.S. at 689-90. The North Carolina plaintiffs complained the State‘s districting plan discriminated against Democrats; the Maryland plaintiffs complained their State‘s plan discriminated against Republicans. Id. at 690. The Supreme Court observed both plans were “highly partisan, by any measure.” Id. at 691. The plaintiffs alleged the gerrymandering violated the
The Rucho Court explained it has identified political question cases in the past as those that lack “judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving [them],” and that, therefore, the question before the Court was whether there was an “‘appropriate role for the Federal Judiciary’ in remedying the problem of partisan gerrymandering—whether such claims are claims of legal right, resolvable according to legal principles, or political questions that must find their resolution elsewhere.” Id. at 696. The Court noted “[p]artisan gerrymandering is nothing new” and the practice goes back to the colonies prior to independence. Id. Noting partisan gerrymandering claims have been difficult for the Supreme Court to adjudicate because a jurisdiction is permitted to engage in constitutional political gerrymandering, the Court observed the “‘central problem’ is not determining whether a jurisdiction has engaged in partisan gerrymandering” but instead “determining when political gerrymandering has gone too far.” Id. at 700-01 (quoting Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 296 (2004)). The Court further noted partisan gerrymandering claims “ask the courts to make their own political judgment about how much representation particular political parties deserve—based on the votes of their supporters—and to rearrange
The Rucho Court held the text of the federal Constitution and its amendments do not supply workable standards for federal courts to police the role partisanship plays in redistricting. See id. at 718 (“We conclude that partisan gerrymandering claims present political questions beyond the reach of the federal courts. Federal judges have no license to reallocate political power between the two major political parties, with no plausible grant of authority in the Constitution, and no legal standards to limit and direct their decisions.“). The Supreme Court explained partisan gerrymandering claims present questions about how to “apportion political power as a matter of fairness,” despite the fact that “[t]here are no legal standards discernible in the Constitution for making such judgments, let alone limited and precise standards that are clear, manageable, and politically neutral.” Id. at 705, 707. The Court further noted “the one-person, one-vote rule is relatively easy to administer as a matter of math[,]” but “[t]he same cannot be said of partisan gerrymandering claims, because the Constitution supplies no objective measure for assessing whether a districting map treats a political party fairly.” Id. at 708. Because courts “have no commission to allocate political power and influence in the absence of a constitutional directive or legal standards to guide us in the exercise of such authority,” the Rucho Court held partisan gerrymandering claims are nonjusticiable. Id. at 721.
The Rucho Court also underscored it has “never struck down a partisan gerrymander as unconstitutional—despite various requests over the past 45 years” and that “[t]he expansion of judicial authority would not be into just any area of controversy, but into one of the most intensely partisan aspects of American political life.” Id. at 718-19. However, the Court noted this “conclusion [does not] condemn complaints about districting to echo into a void” but rather, “[p]rovisions in state statutes and state constitutions
The League latches onto the “state statutes and state constitutions” language in Rucho and asks this Court to hold certain provisions of the South Carolina Constitution supply judicially discoverable and manageable standards for adjudicating partisan gerrymandering claims.
IV.
Before we venture into the League‘s four claims, we emphasize the constraints placed on a properly functioning judicial branch when faced with a nonjusticiable political question.
In the government of this State, the legislative, executive, and judicial powers of the government shall be forever separate and distinct from each other, and no person or persons exercising the functions of one of said departments shall assume or discharge the duties of any other.
“In the instance of nonjusticiability, consideration of the cause is not wholly and immediately foreclosed; rather, the Court‘s inquiry necessarily proceeds to the point of deciding whether the duty asserted can be judicially identified and its breach judicially determined, and whether protection for the right asserted can be judicially molded.” Id. (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198 (1962)). In determining whether a question is political and
Of course, if a legislative enactment is alleged to be unconstitutional, we cannot dodge the question of constitutionality by hiding behind a “political question” excuse—we must determine whether the enactment passes constitutional muster. “[T]his Court is duty bound to review the actions of the Legislature when it is alleged in a properly filed suit that such actions are unconstitutional.” Segars-Andrews, 387 S.C. at 123, 691 S.E.2d at 460-61. “While ‘[a]ll considerations involving the wisdom, policy, or expediency of an act are addressed exclusively to the General Assembly[,] . . . when the unconstitutionality of an act is clear to this court, beyond a reasonable doubt, then it is its plain duty to say so.” Id. at 123, 691 S.E.2d at 461 (quoting Elliott v. Sligh, 233 S.C. 161, 103 S.E.2d 923 (1958)); see also Japan Whaling Ass‘n v. Am. Cetacean Soc., 478 U.S. 221 (1986) (stating the political question doctrine, which derives from the separation of powers doctrine, excludes from judicial review those controversies that revolve around policy choices and value determinations constitutionally committed for resolution to the halls of state legislatures or to the confines of the executive branch). “A court must conduct a limited examination of the matter when it is argued a non-justiciable political question is presented.” Alexander v. Houston, 403 S.C. 615, 619, 744 S.E.2d 517, 520 (2013).
Therefore, we will analyze the provisions of the South Carolina Constitution raised by the League and determine whether (1) any provision pertains to partisan gerrymandering and (2) if so, whether the Plan violates such provision. To that end, we will determine whether any of these constitutional provisions provide “satisfactory criteria” or “judicially discoverable
V.
The South Carolina Constitution vests in the Legislature the sole authority to draw congressional districts.
The Rucho Court noted “[t]he States . . . are actively addressing the issue” of partisan gerrymandering “on a number of fronts,” and acknowledged that “[p]rovisions in state statutes and state constitutions can provide standards and guidance for state courts to apply.” 588 U.S. at 719. The Rucho Court also noted “numerous . . . States are restricting partisan considerations in districting through legislation,” some “by placing power to draw electoral districts in the hands of independent commissions,” others by “outright prohibit[ing] partisan favoritism in redistricting.” Id. at 719-20. Indeed, a minority of states have prohibited, or simply addressed, partisan favoritism in redistricting in their constitutions or statutes. See, e.g.,
Unlike the foregoing minority of states, New Hampshire, North Carolina, and Kansas have no constitutional provisions or statutes addressing partisan redistricting, and the highest courts in those states have followed the Rucho Court‘s reasoning—partisan gerrymandering claims are not justiciable when there are no judicially discoverable and manageable standards for adjudicating such claims. In Brown v. Sec‘y of State, 176 N.H. 319, 329, 313 A.3d 760, 768 (2023), the Supreme Court of New Hampshire held “the New Hampshire Constitution contains a textually demonstrable commitment to redistrict to the legislature” and “the plain text of the specific provisions invoked by the plaintiffs . . . contains no judicially discernible and manageable standards for adjudicating claims of extreme partisan gerrymandering.”
It is not within the authority of this Court to amend the constitution to create such limitations on a responsibility that is textually assigned to another branch. Furthermore, were this Court to create such a limitation, there is no judicially discoverable or manageable standard for adjudicating such claims [and] creating partisan redistricting standards is rife with policy decisions. Policy decisions belong to the legislative branch, not the judiciary. . . . [W]e hold that partisan gerrymandering claims present a political question that is nonjusticiable under the North Carolina Constitution.
Harper v. Hall, 384 N.C. 292, 300, 886 S.E.2d 393, 400-01 (2023).
Similarly, the Kansas Supreme Court recently held:
[W]e conclude that until such a time as the Legislature or the people of Kansas choose to follow other states down the road of limiting partisanship in the legislative process of drawing district lines, neither the Kansas Constitution, state statutes, nor our existing body of caselaw supply judicially discoverable and manageable standards[.] . . . We hold that the question presented is nonjusticiable as a political question, at least until such a time as the Legislature or the people of Kansas choose to codify such a standard into law.
Rivera v. Schwab, 315 Kan. 877, 906, 512 P.3d 168, 187 (2022).
The League claims the Plan is unconstitutional under four separate provisions of the South Carolina Constitution—(1) the Free and Open Elections Clause,
As we will now discuss, like New Hampshire, North Carolina, and Kansas, South Carolina has no statutes or constitutional provisions that pertain to, prohibit, or limit partisan gerrymandering. The absence of such provisions is fatal to the League‘s claim.
S.C. Const. art. I, § 5
First, the League argues the Free and Open Elections Clause,
All elections shall be free and open, and every inhabitant of this State possessing the qualifications provided for in this Constitution shall have an equal right to elect officers and be elected to fill public office.
The Court has not often been asked to interpret this Clause, and never in the context of gerrymandering. However, the League contends Cothran v. W. Dunklin Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 1-C, 189 S.C. 85, 200 S.E. 95 (1938), State v. Huntley, 167 S.C. 476, 166 S.E. 637 (1932), and Gardner v. Blackwell, 167 S.C. 313, 166 S.E. 338 (1932), stand for the proposition that the South Carolina Constitution “prohibits legal manipulations that would curb voters’ right to an equal say in their government based on partisan grounds.” Respondents contend these 1930s cases are readily distinguishable from the issue of partisan gerrymandering because each case involved a law that actually deprived a voter of the right to cast a ballot. We agree with Respondents.
In Gardner, Republican candidates for federal offices challenged the “custom and practice” of providing voters with two general election ballots—one with Republican candidates and the other with Democratic candidates, which the petitioners argued destroyed the secrecy of the ballot. 167 S.C. at 316-17, 166 S.E. at 339. We held restricting ballot access to Republican and Democratic candidates violated “the free exercise of the right to suffrage” because it denied voters “who are not members of the Democratic or Republican parties, such as [third-party] and independent voters, the free exercise of the right of suffrage in this State.” Id. at 325-26, 166 S.E. at 342. Gardner, while dealing with an election issue, did not implicate or include a discussion of the Free and Open Elections Clause. Furthermore, Gardner is distinguished from the present case because the Plan does not deny voters of any political party the right to vote.
In Cothran, the petitioners challenged a state statute allowing the issuance of school bonds upon a majority vote of “only such electors as return real or personal property for taxation and who exhibit their tax receipts and registration certificate.” 189 S.C. at 86, 200 S.E. at 95. We held the statute was unconstitutional, noting “[t]he Constitution does not . . . anywhere provide” that a voter “must be the owner of property, real or personal.” Id. at 87, 200 S.E. at 96. We further stated:
Under [the Free and Open Elections Clause,] the right to vote, as the words expressly state, must be maintained absolutely free, and the vote of every elector must be granted equal influence with that of every other elector. To be free means that the voter shall be left in the untrammeled exercise, whether by civil or military authority, of his right or privilege; that is to say, no impediment or restraint of any character shall be imposed upon him either directly or indirectly whereby he shall be hindered or prevented from participation at the polls. As otherwise expressed, an election is free and equal within the meaning of the Constitution when it is public and open to all qualified electors alike; when every voter has the same right as any other
voter; when each voter under the law has the right to cast his ballot and have it honestly counted; when the regulation of the right to exercise the franchise does not deny the franchise itself, or make it so difficult as to amount to a denial; and when no constitutional right of the qualified elector is subverted or denied him.
Id. at 90, 200 S.E. at 97 (quoting 9 R.C.L., § 8, p. 984). We held that because the statute “adds to the law” regarding eligibility of voting, it “deprives voters . . . of their constitutional rights of suffrage.” Id. at 90, 200 S.E. at 96-97.
The League bends Cothran to support the proposition that all voters have a right to equal political influence on the outcome of elections. We disagree. We interpret the Free and Open Elections Clause, in conjunction with Cothran, to mean the Clause is satisfied when every voter has an unhindered opportunity to cast a ballot free from intimidation, every voter gets one vote, and each voter has an “equal influence with that of every other elector.” See Cothran, 189 S.C. at 90, 200 S.E. at 97. The Plan does not prevent any voter from casting a ballot, and each vote is counted and weighed the same.
The South Carolina Free and Open Elections Clause protects an individual‘s right to vote, but it does not create a right for political parties or their dedicated voters to have their chosen candidates win. Respondent Alexander contends that “[i]f the Clause did convey a right to voters’ preferred electoral outcomes, South Carolina courts would be called upon to review every redistricting plan—and every election—across the State to ensure that every voter‘s equal right to his or her preferred ‘partisan outcome’ has been upheld.” See also Harper, 384 N.C. at 344-45, 886 S.E.2d at 427 (warning against adopting a process that would “involve endless litigation that would task our judges with ensuring that the political makeup of every city council, county commission, or local board of education adequately reflected the distribution of Republicans and Democrats in the corresponding locality“). We agree and hold South Carolina‘s Free and Open Elections Clause does not prohibit or limit partisan gerrymandering. Our adoption of the League‘s interpretation of the Free and Open Elections Clause would necessarily lead to an abjectly unworkable court-sponsored standard.
S.C. Const. art. I, § 3
Second, the League contends South Carolina‘s Equal Protection Clause,
The privileges and immunities of citizens of this State and of the United States under this Constitution shall not be abridged, nor shall any person be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
The South Carolina Equal Protection Clause provision requires “that all persons be treated alike under like circumstances and conditions, both in privileges conferred and liabilities imposed.” Planned Parenthood S. Atl. v. State, 438 S.C. 188, 240, 882 S.E.2d 770, 798 (2023) (“Planned Parenthood I“) (Beatty, C.J., concurring) (quoting Doe v. State, 421 S.C. 490, 504, 808 S.E.2d 807, 814 (2017)). “To succeed, an equal protection claim must have a showing that similarly situated persons receive disparate treatment.” Id. Statutes purportedly infringing upon fundamental rights, such as the right to vote, are subject to “heightened” scrutiny. See Sojourner v. Town of St. George, 383 S.C. 171, 176, 679 S.E.2d 182, 185 (2009). To the extent this “heightened” scrutiny is the same as strict scrutiny, the government must show the law “meet[s] a compelling state interest and [is] narrowly tailored to effectuate that interest.” Planned Parenthood I, 438 S.C. at 237, 882 S.E.2d at 796 (Beatty, C.J., concurring) (quoting In re Treatment and Care of Luckabaugh, 351 S.C. 122, 140-41, 568 S.E.2d 338, 347 (2002)). The League acknowledges the Court may disagree that allegations of partisan gerrymandering trigger strict scrutiny, and if so, the League suggests the Court should adopt and apply the less-stringent three-part test used by the New Mexico Supreme Court in Grisham, as Justice Kagan proposed in her dissent in Rucho. See Grisham v. Van Soelen, 539 P.3d 272, 289 (N.M. 2023) (quoting Rucho, 588 U.S. at 735 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“As many legal standards do, that test has three parts: (1) intent; (2) effects; and (3) causation.“)).
C. Free Speech Clause, S.C. Const. art. I, § 2
Third, the League contends partisan gerrymandering is prohibited by South Carolina‘s Free Speech Clause:
The General Assembly shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or abridging the freedom of speech or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition the government or any department thereof for a redress of grievances.
We hold South Carolina‘s Free Speech Clause does not pertain to, limit, or prohibit partisan gerrymandering. Congressional redistricting is not a speech restriction, and here, the speech of neither the League nor its members—or any voters, for that matter—has been restricted by the Plan. In South Carolina, the Free Speech Clause has never been interpreted to apply to a gerrymandering claim. The Rucho Court rejected such a claim, and several other state courts have rejected partisan gerrymandering claims under their states’ free speech clauses. See Rucho, 588 U.S. at 713-14 (holding there were no restrictions on speech, association, or any other
D. S.C. Const. art. VII, §§ 9 & 13
Fourth and finally, the League contends the congressional redistricting plan violates
Each County shall constitute one election district, and shall be a body politic and corporate.
The General Assembly may at any time arrange the various Counties into Judicial Circuits, and into Congressional Districts, including the County of Saluda, as it may deem wise
and proper, and may establish or alter the location of voting precincts in any County.
The League contends these provisions reflect a constitutional commitment to preserving county boundaries. The League acknowledges there are times when this preference must yield to other principles, such as ensuring congressional districts are approximately equal in population; however, it argues counties should not be split unless there is a good reason, and it claims partisan gain is not a valid reason for splitting ten counties.
Nothing in
VI.
In addition to our review of the League‘s constitutional claims, we are mindful of the following statement of the Rucho Court when it noted the drawing of maps cannot account for how human nature impacts a voter‘s decision to vote for a particular candidate in a given election:
Even the most sophisticated districting maps cannot reliably account for some of the reasons voters prefer one candidate over another, or why their preferences may change. Voters elect individual candidates in individual districts, and their selections depend on the issues that matter to them, the quality of the candidates, the tone of the candidates’ campaigns, the performance of an incumbent, national events or local issues that drive voter turnout, and other considerations. Many voters split their tickets. Others never register with a political party, and vote for candidates from both major parties at different points during their lifetimes. For
all of those reasons, asking judges to predict how a particular districting map will perform in future elections risks basing constitutional holdings on unstable ground outside judicial expertise.
588 U.S. at 712-13. This statement, borne of common sense and practical reality, resonates with us.
There are no constitutional provisions or statutes that pertain to, prohibit, or limit partisan gerrymandering in the congressional redistricting process in South Carolina. There are no judicially discernible or manageable standards or satisfactory criteria to adjudicate partisan gerrymandering claims. Therefore, we hold partisan gerrymandering claims present a nonjusticiable political question in South Carolina, and we deny the League‘s claim for relief.
RELIEF DENIED.
FEW and VERDIN, JJ., concur. KITTREDGE, C.J., concurring in a separate opinion, in which HILL, J., concurs.
CHIEF JUSTICE KITTREDGE: From the earliest days of our nation‘s founding, it has been understood both that gerrymandering is driven by partisan politics, and that some level of gerrymandering is permissible under our Constitution. As a result, state legislatures have not always rigorously drawn their respective congressional district lines in accordance with their own precise political makeup. To the contrary, over last two centuries, it has become increasingly customary for a state legislature to draw its congressional district lines to disproportionately favor the political party in power at the time. Nonetheless, until recently, state legislatures typically drew their respective congressional district lines in a manner so as to give some sense of proportional representation to the minority party, collectively recognizing there was some limit on their power to redraw district boundaries. For most, the prospect of a federal constitutional challenge provided a safeguard to the minority political party, preserving some semblance of fair representation in Congress and cautioning state legislatures against employing a winner-take-all approach in drawing congressional district lines.
Following Rucho‘s elimination of any possibility of a federal constitutional violation, state legislatures became emboldened, as any possible check on a state‘s exercise of legislative authority was limited to that particular state‘s constitution and laws. See id. at 719 (“Provisions in state statutes and state constitutions can provide standards and guidance for state courts to apply.“). Necessarily then, in any subsequent gerrymandering challenge, a state supreme court will be limited to reviewing the law from its own state alone.5 Such a narrow perspective inevitably precludes a state‘s
supreme court from considering the full consequences of gerrymandering decisions in other states. As a result, we are seeing and will continue to see state legislatures race to further minimize and perhaps erase the representation of the state‘s minority political party in Congress. These results may, indeed, be in line with each respective state‘s constitution and laws, but they collectively have the effect of diminishing our constitutional republic as a whole. This is a troubling prospect for those who adhere to our nation‘s founding principle that
With these observations in mind, and applying the South Carolina Constitution to this legal challenge, I have no hesitation in concurring with the majority opinion, and I commend Justice James for his well-reasoned opinion. I agree that Petitioner‘s specific claims here are not justiciable under constitutional and legal standards in South Carolina and the record before us. I do not, however, read the Court‘s decision as creating a categorical rule that all future claims of excessive partisan gerrymandering are beyond judicial review. I construe today‘s decision as cautious judicial deference, not indifference. It remains conceivable that a future challenge may present more fully developed constitutional violations with a discernable nexus to manageable judicial standards, thereby warranting judicial intervention. See, e.g., id. at 313 (noting advancements in technology “may produce new methods of analysis that make more evident the precise nature of the burdens gerrymanders impose on the representational rights of voters and parties,” which in turn “would facilitate court efforts to identify and remedy the burdens, with judicial intervention limited by the derived standards“).
Today‘s decision will invariably attract praise and criticism from all corners of the political spectrum. To those on either side of the debate, I point to the constitutional bedrock of this nation: the sovereign power of the People to shape legislative outcomes through advocacy and the ballot box, a principle more fully explained by James Madison in The Federalist No. 10. Our judicial constraint today in no way muffles the People‘s voice in shaping the laws that govern us.
HILL, J., concurs.