Lavigne v. Great Salt Bay Community School BoardLavigne v. Great Salt Bay Community School Board
[Hon. Jon D. Levy, U.S. District Judge]
Before Montecalvo, Howard, and Aframe, Circuit Judges.
Adam Shelton, with whom John Thorpe and Scharf-Norton Center for Constitutional Litigation at the Goldwater Institute were on brief, for appellant.
Melissa A. Hewey, with whom Susan M. Weidner and Drummond Woodsum were on brief, for appellees.
Katherine L. Andеrson, David A. Cortman, Vincent M. Wagner, Glynis R. Gilio, and Alliance Defending Freedom on brief for Tammy Fournier, amicus curiae.
Mary E. McAlister, Vernadette R. Broyles, and Child & Parental Rights Campaign, Inc., on brief for Child & Parental Rights Campaign, Inc., amicus curiae.
Alan Wilson, Attorney General of South Carolina, Robert D. Cook, Solicitor General, J. Emory Smith, Jr., Deputy Solicitor General, Thomas T. Hydrick, Assistant Deputy Solicitor General, Joseph D. Spate, Assistant Deputy Solicitor General, and State of South Carolina Office of the Attorney General on brief for South Carolina, Alaska, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota, and West Virginia, amici curiae.
I. Background
A. Facts
We draw the relevant facts from Lavigne‘s complaint, “accept[ing] the well-pleaded facts . . . as true and draw[ing] all reasonable inferences in [Lavigne‘s] favor.” Torres-Estrada v. Cases, 88 F.4th 14, 19 (1st Cir. 2023) (citing Núñez Colón v. Toledo-Dávila, 648 F.3d 15, 19 (1st Cir. 2011)).
1. Underlying Conduct
A.B. started at Great Salt Bay Community School (“Great Salt“), a kindergarten through eighth grade school, in 2019, and, initially, Lavigne was “generally pleased” with the education A.B. received. However, in December 2022, when A.B. was thirteen, Lavigne and A.B. were cleaning A.B.‘s room when Lavigne discovered a chest binder, which the complaint defines as “a device used to flatten a female‘s chest so as to appear male.” A.B. told Lavigne that defendant Samuel Roy, a school social worker, provided the chest binder and instructed A.B. on how to use it. Lavigne also alleges that, on the same day, Roy gave A.B. a second chest binder and informed A.B. that “he was not going to tell A.B.‘[s] parents . . . and A.B. need not do so either.” Lavigne was never informed that A.B. would be or had been given a chest binder and taught how to use it.
Around the same time, Lavigne learned that, at school, A.B. was using a name and pronouns different from those given to A.B. at birth. But the school never told Lavigne that A.B. was using a different name and pronouns from those used at
2. Lavigne Brings Concerns to Great Salt‘s Attention
a. Meeting with Great Salt Principal and School Superintendent
Shortly after discovering the chest binder, Lavigne met with defendants Principal Kim Schaff and Superintendent Lynsey Johnston. Both “expressed sympathy . . . and concern that th[e] information had been withheld and concealed.” Two days later, Superintendent Johnston “explained that no policy had been violated by the giving of chest binders to A.B.[] or by school officials . . . employing a different name and pronouns.” Soon after, Lavigne withdrew A.B. from Great Salt, citing its “policy, pattern, and practice of withholding and concealing of crucially important and intimate psychosexual information about her minor child.”
b. Great Salt‘s Written Policies
According to Lavigne, the school pointed to several written policies as supporting defendants’ actions, specifically Great Sаlt‘s Transgender Students Guidelines (the “Guidelines“) and the Staff Conduct with Students Policy (“Staff Conduct Policy“).
The Guidelines provide, in relevant part, that:
- Their purpose is “[t]o foster a learning environment that is safe[] and free from discrimination, harassment and bullying.”
- They “are not intended to anticipate every possible situation that may occur, since the needs of particular students and families differ depending on the student‘s age and other factors. In addition, the programs, facilities and resources of each school also differ. Administrators and school staff are expected to consider the needs of students on a case-by-case basis, and to utilize these guidelines and other available resources as apрropriate.”
- In addressing needs raised by a transgender student, the school should, among other steps, develop a plan “in consultation with the student, parent(s)/guardian(s) and others as appropriate.”
The Guidelines do not include any provision directing school staff to withhold information from transgender students’ parents or guardians. Lavigne alleges in her complaint that the Guidelines are “silent with respect to the giving of chest binders or any other devices with or without the involvement or consent of parents” and “do not mandate the involvement of parents at any point in the process of deciding whether to use alternate names and pronouns.”
The only relevаnt provision of the Staff Conduct Policy is an explicit prohibition on staff asking students to keep secrets.
c. Board Meeting
In late December 2022, Lavigne spoke at a Board meeting about these incidents. In her statement to the Board, Lavigne “detailed the trust that had been broken by [d]efendants withholding and concealing vitally important information from her respecting her minor child‘s psychosexual development and stated that the ‘decisions
d. Great Salt Statements
The Board did not respond to Lavigne during the Board meeting but later released two separate statements. Great Salt‘s principal also released a statement.
i. The Board‘s First Statement
In the first statеment, issued shortly after the meeting, the Board explained that it was unable “to discuss confidential student and staff information” but emphasized that its “first priority is always to provide a safe, welcoming and inclusive educational environment for all students and staff” and that it “has specific policies and procedures in place that must be followed” when addressing student and parent concerns. It also emphasized that its “policies comply with Maine law, which protects the right of all students and staff, regardless of gender/gender identity, to have equal access to education, the supports and services available in [Great Salt Bay area] schools, and the student‘s right to privacy regardless of age.” The statement did not explicitly address Lavigne, A.B., or any member of Great Salt staff.
ii. The Board‘s Second Statement
In the second statement, issued in January 2023, the Board addressed recent bomb threats made to the school, explaining that a “grossly inaccurate and one-sided story” gave rise to the threats. The Board again emphasized its obligation to maintain confidentiality of students and staff but explained that “[t]hose promoting th[e] false narrative are apparently disturbed by [Great Salt‘s] ongoing and steadfast commitment to providing all students with safe and equal access to educational opportunities without discrimination.” The Board then cited several Maine laws as providing students the right to access mental health services without parental consent, see
iii. Principal‘s Statement
Great Salt Principal Schaff then issued a statement in February 2023, primarily addressing ongoing threats against Great Salt and its staff. Principal Schaff explained that, under Maine law, “a school counselor or school social worker may not be required, except as provided by [law], to divulge or release information gathered during a counseling relation with a client or with the parent, guardian[,] or a person or agency having legal custody of a minor client.” As Lavigne alleges, the statement “offered no explanation of how the giving of a chest compression device or the employment of alternate names and pronouns constitutes ‘information gathered.‘” That statement did not mention A.B., Lavigne, or any facts relevant to A.B. and did not discuss or allude to Great Salt policies.
e. Post-Lawsuit Developments
Finally, following the filing of this lawsuit, the Board unanimously apprоved a second-year contract term for Roy, the school social worker who provided the chest binders to A.B.2
In April 2023, Lavigne filed suit against the defendants, pursuant to
Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that (1) the claims against the individual defendants in their official capacities were “redundant” because these claims were captured by Lavigne‘s municipal liability claim; (2) the municipal liability claim failed because Lavigne had alleged no facts establishing the alleged unconstitutional acts were caused by an institutional policy or custom; and (3) even assuming Lavigne had alleged the existence of such a policy, the defendants’ actions did not violate Lavigne‘s constitutional rights. In response, Lavigne contended that (1) retaining named individual defendants is pеrmitted in municipal liability cases because it provides plaintiffs with “a better opportunity to prove [their] case“; (2) her allegations established that the defendants’ acts were pursuant to a policy or custom of withholding information from parents and were ratified by the Board, either of which could establish municipal liability; and (3) she had alleged resulting constitutional violations.
After a short hearing on the motion to dismiss, the district court granted the motion as it related to the named individuals, the two social workers, the Great Salt principal, and the district superintendent, supra note 1, as Lavigne was not seeking any relief from them and obtaining their testimony “should not be a problеm.” The district court took the remainder of the motion under advisement.
Later, the district court issued a written decision granting the motion to dismiss with respect to the Board, determining that Lavigne had failed to plausibly show municipal liability. To begin, the district court explained that, because all of Lavigne‘s claims “center[ed] on” her right to not have information withheld pursuant to a withholding policy, the success of her suit hinged on whether she had properly alleged the existence of such a withholding policy.3
In its decision, the district court focused on the second element of municipal liability -- whether a municipality is itself responsible for the alleged constitutional violation -- concluding that the complaint did not allege facts that could plausibly support liability. Specifically, the district court determined that Lavigne was required to show that the Board‘s “policy or custom [wa]s responsible for causing the constitutional violation,” and so it concentrated its inquiry on whether Great Salt had a policy
Accordingly, the district court dismissed Lavigne‘s complaint, and she timely appealed.
II. Standard of Review
“We review the district court‘s grant of [the] motion to dismiss de novo.” Wadsworth v. Nguyen, 129 F.4th 38, 61 (1st Cir. 2025) (cleaned up) (quoting Torres-Estrada, 88 F.4th at 23). To assess whether a complaint can withstand a
Accordingly, “we will not accept a complainant‘s unsupported conclusions or interpretations of law.” Wash. Legal Found. v. Mass. Bar Found., 993 F.2d 962, 971 (1st Cir. 1993) (citing United States v. AVX Corp., 962 F.2d 108, 115 (1st Cir. 1992)). But “[b]ecause a dismissal terminates an action at the earliest stages of litigation without a developed factual basis for decision, we must carefully balance the rule of simplified civil pleading against our need for more than conclusory allegations.” Id.
III. Discussion
Municipalities cannot be held liable for the conduct of their employees unless the municipality itself is also responsible in some way for that сonduct. See Monell v. Dep‘t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978) (“[A] municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor -- or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under
On appeal, Lavigne argues that the district court erred in dismissing her claim because (1) her allegations sufficiently establish the existence of a policy or custom of withholding; (2) the district court erred in declining to address the first element of municipal liability; and (3) her allegations established that the Board violated her right to direct the education of her child. Like the district court, we resolve this case by addressing only the second element of municipal liability, concluding that Lavigne‘s allegations fail to plausibly show that either the Board had a policy of withholding or that the Board later ratified the individual defendants’ decisions to withhold information from Lavigne.4
A. Structure of Monell Liability Analysis
We begin by addressing Lavigne‘s contention that the district court erred in beginning -- and ending -- its analysis with the second element of municipal liability. Lavigne has not directed our attention to a single case requiring a district court to begin its municipal liability analysis with the constitutional question, nor are we aware of any such cases. Indeed, our case law indicates that the opposite is true. See Freeman v. Town of Hudson, 714 F.3d 29, 38 (1st Cir. 2013) (affirming dismissal of complaint against city solely because “[t]he complaint . . . references no state or local laws establishing the policymaking authority of any individual or group of individuals” and “gives no guidance about which acts are properly attributable to the municipal authority“); Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 123 (1992) (in municipal liability case, assuming constitutional violation and addressing second element); see also Sony BMG Music Ent. v. Tenenbaum, 660 F.3d 487, 511 (1st Cir. 2011) (“It is bedrock that the ‘long-standing principle of judicial restraint requires that courts avoid reaching constitutional questions in advance of the necessity of deciding them.‘” (quoting Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass‘n, 485 U.S. 439, 445 (1988))). Accordingly, we see no error in the district court‘s decision to address only the second element, and we do the same ourselves.
B. Monell‘s Second Element: Policy or Custom of Withholding
At this stage of litigation, with rеspect to the second element of municipal liability, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that the “municipal action at issue . . . constitute[s] a ‘policy or custom’ attributable to” the municipality, that “the municipal policy or custom actually . . . caused the plaintiff‘s injury,” and “the municipality possessed the requisite level of fault.” Young, 404 F.3d at 26. Here, we begin -- and end -- our inquiry with the question of whether Lavigne has plausibly alleged the existence of any policy or custom at all.
An official municipal policy can take the form of either an “officially adopted” policy statement or regulation, Monell, 436 U.S. at 690, or an informal custom amounting to a widespread practice that, аlthough “not authorized by written law,” is “so permanent and well settled as to constitute a ‘custom or usage’ with the force of law,” Abdisamad, 960 F.3d at 60 (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 691). The Supreme Court has also held that if “authorized policymakers approve a subordinate‘s decision and the basis for it,” that ratification is chargeable to the municipality as an official policy or custom “because their decision is final.” City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988) (plurality opinion); see Connick, 563 U.S. at 61 (“Official municipal policy includes the decisions of a government‘s lawmakers, the acts of its policymaking officials, and practices so persistent and widespread as to practically have the force of law.“).
Lavigne argues that she has satisfied Monell‘s policy or custom requirement by alleging facts that cоmpel the inference that (1) an unwritten but official policy or custom of withholding existed or (2) the Board ratified the individual defendants’ choices to withhold information from her. We reject these contentions and thus conclude that Lavigne has not pleaded facts sufficient to establish the existence of a permanent and well-settled policy or custom of withholding and concealing information.
1. Unwritten Policy or Custom
In support of the first theory, Lavigne directs our attention to various statements from the Board and school officials defending the legality of defendants’ conduct, arguing that each denial of wrongdoing compels the inference that the Board did indeed maintain a policy of withholding information from parents. Specifically, Lavigne argues that because Superintendent Johnston told Lavigne that “no policy was violated” by the defendants’ actions, “the logical conclusion is that the[] actions were the policy.” Lavigne cites the Board‘s January 14, 2023 statement that “[n]either the Board nor school administration
However, none of these allegations support the inference that the Board maintained an unwritten custom or policy of withholding information from parents. As Lavigne herself emphasizes, the Board‘s written policies encourage the opposite: the Guidelines state that “[a] plan should be developed by the school, in consultation with the student, parent(s)/guardian(s) and others as appropriate, to address the [transgender] student‘s particular needs,” and the Staff Conduct Policy prohibits “[a]sking a student to keep a secret.” But Lavigne argues that defendants’ alleged misconduct “should amount to violations” of these policies. In other words, Lavigne concedes that the Board maintained written policies that apply to the conduct in question. Common sense thus dictates that it was these written policies to which the Board and school officials were referring in the statements cited by Lavigne.
Contrary to Lavigne‘s contentions on appeal, there need not have been some superseding unwritten custom of active concealment for the Board and school officials to conclude that the alleged misconduct did not run afoul of the Board‘s existing written policies. While the Guidelines state that school personnel “should” consult with parents “as appropriate” in addressing the needs of transgender students, they also expressly note that they are to be “interpreted in light of applicable federal and state laws and regulations.” This would include the Maine state law protecting the confidentiality of communications between students аnd school social workers,
“We have explained that assessing plausibility is ‘a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.‘” Frith v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 38 F.4th 263, 270 (1st Cir. 2022) (quoting Rodríguez-Reyes v. Molina-Rodríguez, 711 F.3d 49, 53 (1st Cir. 2013)). Here, there are “obvious alternative explanation[s],” id. at 567, for Superintendent Johnston‘s statement to Lavigne that “no policies had
Without this faсtual support, Lavigne‘s contention that the school acted pursuant to an unwritten “blanket policy, pattern, and practice of intentional withholding and concealment of such information from all parents” is based solely on her “information and belief.” But the phrase “information and belief” does not excuse “pure speculation, Menard, 698 F.3d at 45, and a “legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation” is not entitled to a presumption of truth, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).7
2. Board Ratification
Lavigne also contends that regardless of whether the Board maintained a policy of withholding, it is liable based on its later ratification of the individual defendants’ choices to withhold information from Lavigne. We disagree.
“[I]t is plain that municipal liability may be imposed for a single decision by municipal policymakers under appropriate circumstances.” Welch, 542 F.3d at 942 (quoting Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480 (1986)). Where “authorized
Lavigne relies primarily on the Board‘s January 14 statement that it was unaware of any policy violation requiring further action, arguing that from this statement one can “reasonabl[y] infer[] that the Board ratified the challenged conduct.” She also points to the Board‘s decision to approve a second contract for Roy, arguing that by doing so the Board ratified Roy‘s conduct.
We agree with the district court that the Board‘s “vague expression” does not “identify[] any particular decision or decisions of a subordinate” and thus does not plausibly show that the Board ratified the individual decisions to not tell certain information about A.B. to Lavigne. Nothing in the Board‘s statement expressed approval for any of the alleged conduct or any reasoning behind it. The statement only explained that no policy was violated. This is nothing like the type of actively approving statement that the Praprotnik Court considered as the basis for ratification. And, moreover, Lavigne has not pointed us to any cases, nor are we aware of any, that extended Praprotnik‘s holding to vague statements like the one made by the Board here. Nothing about the Board‘s decision to grant Roy another contract, without more, expresses active approval of Roy‘s alleged conduct with respect to A.B. and Lavigne. Accordingly, we agree with the district court that Lavigne has failed to plausibly allege that the Board‘s “‘execution of a [municipal] policy or custom . . . inflict[ed] the [alleged] injury’ and [was] the ‘moving force’ behind the constitutional violation.” Young, 404 F.3d at 25 (omission in original) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 694).
IV. Conclusion
For these reasons, we affirm the dismissal.