LAUREN C., by аnd through her next friend, Tracey K., Plaintiff - Appellant v. LEWISVILLE INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant - Appellee
No. 17-40796
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
September 14, 2018
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas
Before DAVIS, HAYNES, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Lauren C., a young woman with disabilities previously in the Lewisville Independent School District, appeals the district court’s decision denying her attorneys’ fees under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”),
The underlying case involves a years-long dispute over whether Lauren should have been diagnosed with autism or intellectual disability and whether that issue should have affected her education program. Unable to resolve the matter with the District, Lauren received a hearing at which an administrative officer heard expert testimony and reviewed Lauren’s educational plan. The officer found that Lauren should have been diagnosed with both autism and intellectual disability, but concluded that Lauren’s plan was nonetheless appropriate in all respects. The officer ordered the District to review Lauren’s plan in light of the autism diagnosis, which the District did. But the District made no changes to Lauren’s plan and confirmed the plan had already incorporated various autism strategies, despite lacking a prior autism diagnosis. Neither Lauren’s parents nor her counsel offered any suggestions for further altering her plan.
Lauren’s parents instead sued the District in federal court, claiming the officer’s decision made Lauren a “prevailing party” entitled to attorneys’ fees under IDEA. Reviewing the officer’s decision, the district court agreed that Lauren’s educational plan was entirely proper under IDEA. The court disagreed, however, with the officer’s focus on Lauren’s specific diagnosis. Instead, the court reasoned that IDEA focuses less on a disabled student’s diagnostic label and more on whether the student has been given an appropriate education. The court thus concluded Lauren was not a prevailing party for fee purposes.
Lauren appealed. At oral argument, what was already a complex case became more complicated still: fоr the first time, Lauren’s attorney argued that she had “aged out” of special education eligibility after the 2015-16 school year and that her IDEA case was therefore moot. Consequently, Lauren now asks us to vacate the district court’s decision and remand for further consideration of whether she is entitled to fees based on the hearing officer’s decision alone.
This we decline to do. We agree with Lauren that her underlying IDEA case became moot after the 2015-16 school year, a full year before the district court’s decision. We nonetheless have jurisdiction to resolve the separate issue of whether Lauren is a prevailing party under IDEA, and we do so. Based on our de novo review of the well-develoрed record, we conclude that the hearing officer’s decision does not make Lauren a prevailing party. One qualifies as a prevailing party under IDEA if a judicial decision materially alters the parties’ legal relationship and furthers IDEA’s purposes. The officer’s limited decision
I.
A.
Lauren C. is a young woman with disabilities whо lives with her mother, Tracey K., in Lewisville, Texas. At the time of the administrative due process hearing below, Lauren was twenty-one years old and attended school in the Lewisville Independent School District (“LISD” or “District”).
As Lauren’s resident district, LISD was responsible for providing her a Free Appropriate Public Education (or FAPE) under IDEA. IDEA is a federal law under which states, in exchange for federal funds, “pledge to ensure ‘[a] [FAPE] is available to all children with disabilities residing in the State between the ages of 3 and 21[.]’” Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Woody, 865 F.3d 303, 309 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting
Lauren first attended school in LISD in 1998, when she was in preschool. Over the next fifteen years, Lauren was evaluated many times both by District multidisciplinary teams and by private physicians. The LISD teams—conducting assessments known as a “Full and Individual Evaluation” (or FIE), see
On March 26, 2013, Lauren’s Admission, Review, and Dismissal (ARD) committee met to develop Lauren’s annual IEP. See, e.g., Cypress-Fairbanks Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Michael F., 118 F.3d 245, 247 (5th Cir. 1997) (explaining that “[i]n Texas, the persons charged with preparing an IEP are known collectively as an … [ARD Committee]”). In its evaluation, the committee declined to accept Dr. Wooten’s autism diagnosis, concluding instead that Lauren continued to meet the criteria for intellectual disability and speech impairment. According to the notes of the committee deliberations, Lauren’s mother and stepfather disagreed concerning the autism diagnosis, but they broadly supported the committee’s recommendations in all other respects. They “expressed agreement with the proposed IEP goals, accommodations, and schedule of services and had no concerns or disagreement with the program as proposed.” They also “clarified that [they] were not concerned with the [a]utism supplement and [that] their goal was not to obtain any additional services from the school system, but wanted the [a]utism supplement added in order to ensure optimal services from [the Department of Assistive and Rehabilitative Services], [Supplemental Security Income], and other agencies in the future.”
Disagreement persisted over the autism diagnosis, however. Consequently, Lauren’s parents requested an “Independent Educational Evaluation” (or IEE), which was conducted by Dr. Kim Johnson on August 17, 2013. See, e.g., Seth B. v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 810 F.3d 961, 965 (5th Cir. 2016) (explaining IDEA “afford[s] the parents of a child with a disability the right to an … [IEE] at public expense”) (citing
After review of the recent IEP in February 2013, the LISD evaluation team completed a comprehensive evaluation with very appropriate recommendations to address Lauren’s intellectual, social, behavioral, speech-related, and occupational therapy-related delays—these cannot be currently improved upon and space will not be wasted in this report merely to repeat them here. Likewise, [Lauren’s mother] made no complaint about the type and quality of services provided by the District; rather, her concern was over the diagnostic label.
The ARD committee declined to accept Dr. Johnson’s diagnosis, and in subsequent meetings held to its view that Lauren did not qualify as a student with autism. Nonetheless, on April 3, 2014, the District agreed to Lauren’s request for additional IEEs in various other areas.
At a meeting on May 21, 2014, the ARD committee developed an IEP for Lauren that included occupational therapy, adaptive physical education, speech, transportation, parent training, and assistive technology. The committee concluded that “[d]ue to Lauren’s disability she required Special Education services and support in a Special Education setting for a majority of the day”; observed that “Lauren has successfully met academic requirements for the minimum graduation plan”; and explained that “Lauren requires continued support in the areas of independent living, vocational training, employment options, and money management.” Lauren’s parents were represented at the meeting by counsel, who reiterated her parents’ disagreement with the committee’s diagnosis of Lauren’s disability. Counsel did not communicate any specific reservation about the IEP, but stated he would disagree with the committee so that he could confer with his clients.
B.
On August 21, 2014, Lauren’s parents requested a due process hearing under
The SEHO ruled on June 22, 2015. He first considered the Child Find provision, requiring a state plan to ensure that all resident disabled children needing special education are “identified, located, and evaluated and a practical method … developed … to determine” whether they are receiving required services.
On the remaining issues, however, the SEHO found for the District. For instance, he found that “the District’s FIE and IEE appropriately addressed all requirements for a sufficient evaluation of [Lauren]” and consequently denied Lauren’s request for an additional IEE. He also found that “[Lauren’s] parents were NOT denied a meaningful process in her [ARD] committee meetings,” and that they “brought forth no probative evidence to support the allegation that [they] were denied meaningful participation in the process” (capitalization in original). Finally, applying this Circuit’s four-factor test, the SEHO concluded that “[the] IEP adoрted by the District’s ARD committee provided [Lauren] with [a] FAPE” (brackets added); see, e.g., Richardson Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Michael Z., 580 F.3d 286, 293 (5th Cir. 2009) (discussing four-factor test for evaluating IEP from Michael F., 118 F.3d at 253). Specifically, he found that Lauren’s program was “individualized, administered in the least restrictive environment, [and] provided in a coordinated and collaborative manner for all stakeholders, and [that] positive benefits have been shown in academic and nonacademic areas.” The SEHO emphasized that LISD’s failure to diagnose Lauren with autism did not impact her program’s validity. He found that, “[a]lthough the District did not diagnose [Lauren] with autism, the District nonetheless addressed [her] disability needs in her IEP without regard to her diagnosis,” and, further, that “[Lauren’s] IEP is appropriate in all areas … despite the fact that it is not tied to a diagnosis of autism.”
Acсordingly, the SEHO denied Lauren all the specific relief she requested. However, he did order that “an ARD committee be convened and an appropriate IEP be developed with autism added as a disability addressed.” The ARD committee thus convened on September 4, 2015, and added autism eligibility and the autism supplement to Lauren’s plan. See
C.
On July 21, 2015, Lauren filed a complaint in federal district court seeking attorneys’ fees as the “prevailing party” in the administrative hearing. See
On June 29, 2017, the district court granted LISD’s motion and denied Lauren’s motion. Reviewing the hearing officer’s decision under the “virtually de novo” standard, see Adam J. v. Keller Indep. Sch. Dist., 328 F.3d 804, 808 (5th Cir. 2003), the district court concluded that the SEHO had erred in determining the District had violated Child Find but had correctly determined the District had provided Lauren a FAPE.
As to Child Find, the court reasoned that, after receiving notice that Lauren likely had a disability requiring special education, the District evaluated Lauren “on multiple occasions for autism,” thus “compl[ying] with its Child Find obligations.” Failing to diagnose Lauren with autism did not ipso facto violate Child Find because, as the court explained, IDEA itself specifies that “[n]othing in this chapter rеquires that children be classified by their disability,” provided a qualifying child “is regarded as a child with a disability under this subchapter.”
Turning to that issue, the district court agreed that the District had provided Lauren a FAPE. Like the hearing officer, the court concluded that Lauren’s IEP satisfied this Circuit’s four-part analysis. See Michael F., 118 F.3d at 253. Notably, the court found that “LISD developed a program specifically individualized to address [Lauren’s] needs,” and that the Lauren’s IEPs “incorporated the autism supplement and [Applied Behavioral Analysis] therapy methodologies even though the LISD did not diagnose [Lauren] with autism.” The court therefore concluded that the IEP “was reasonably calculated to enable [Lauren] to receive meaningful educational benefits and thus provided her with a [FAPE].” As the court pointed out, its analysis necessarily meant that the SEHO erred by ordering the ARD committee to convene and add autism as a disability to Lauren’s IEP. But this relief was immaterial because, as the court had explained, “the LISD considered the autism supplement and ABA therapy in preparing [Lauren’s] [IEPs] and did not have to make additional changes to … [the IEP] after adding autism eligibility for [Lauren’s] special education.”
Finally, the district court turned to the original impetus for Lauren’s lawsuit—whether she was entitled to attorneys’ fees as a prevailing party in the due process hearing. The court concluded that Lauren was not a prevailing party given its conclusions that “the LISD complied with its Child Find obligations and provided [Lauren] a [FAPE].” The court therefore denied Lauren attorneys’ fees.
Lauren timely appealed. In her apрellate briefing she argues that, given its failure to diagnose her with autism, the District violated Child Find, failed to tailor her IEP, and failed to provide her a FAPE. She thus asks us to reverse, render judgment in her favor, and remand for consideration of her fee request. But at oral argument, Lauren’s arguments dramatically changed course. For the first time, her attorney asserted that the underlying IDEA case is moot, because Lauren “aged out” of eligibility for special education services at the end of the 2015-16 school year. Consequently, Lauren now asks us to vacate the district court’s ruling and remand for consideration of her eligibility for attorneys’ fees in light of the SEHO’s ruling alone.
II.
Whether one is a prevailing party entitled to attorneys’ fees under IDEA is а legal question we review de novo. Gary G. v. El Paso Indep. Sch. Dist., 632 F.3d 201, 206 (5th Cir. 2011) (citing El Paso Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Richard R., 591 F.3d 417, 422-23 (5th Cir. 2009)). Whether a case is moot is a jurisdictional issue a party can raise for the first time on appeal. Brindson v. McAllen Indep. Sch. Dist., 863 F.3d 338, 345 (5th Cir. 2017) (citing Texas Midstream Gas Servs., LLC v. City of Grand Prairie, 608 F.3d 200, 204 (5th Cir. 2010)). Even had it not been raised, we would be “obliged to raise the subject of mootness sua sponte.” Bailey v. Southerland, 821 F.2d 277, 278 (5th Cir. 1987).
III.
A.
“We must address the issue of mootness first, because to qualify as a case for federal court adjudication, a case or controversy must exist at all stages of the
Lauren’s brief asserts she had turned 22 by the end of the 2015-16 school year and so had “aged out” of special education eligibility at that point.4 She thus claims “[a]ll merits issues”—meаning Child Find and FAPE—were mooted in June 2016, “at least a year before the district court reached [its] decision” in June 2017, and that we must therefore vacate the district court’s decision and remand for consideration of attorneys’ fees. Relying principally on our decision in Doe v. Marshall, 622 F.2d 118 (5th Cir. 1980), she asserts her entitlement to fees is “independent” from the merits and so was not mooted by the expiration of Lauren’s eligibility. See Marshall, 622 F.2d at 120 (explaining that mootness “neither precludes nor is precluded by an award of attorneys’ fees … [which] turns instead on a wholly independent consideration: whether plaintiff is a ‘prevailing party’”) (citations omitted). For its part, LISD does not appear to contest that the merits were mooted by Lauren’s turning 22, but it urges us not to allоw Lauren to use mootness as a “sword” to wipe out the district court decision and leave it unable to challenge the SEHO’s decision. Alternatively, relying on the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Board of Education of Oak Park v. Nathan R., 199 F.3d 377 (7th Cir. 2000), LISD argues that a finding of mootness would defeat Lauren’s entitlement to attorneys’ fees.
We hack through this thicket by applying settled principles of justiciability.
First, we agree with Lauren that the parties’ claims regarding Child Find and FAPE became moot when Lauren aged out of eligibility for special education services. As described above, supra I.C, those issues entered this case when, in response to Lauren’s fee demand, LISD counterclaimed (arguing the SEHO erred on Child Find) and Lauren amended her complaint (arguing the SEHO erred on FAPE). But there ceased to be an actual controversy between the parties over those matters when Lauren became ineligible for the special education services required by IDEA. See Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 319 (1988) (holding case was moot because “[r]espondent … is now 24 years old and, accordingly, is no longer entitled to the protections and benefits of the [Education of the Handicapped Act]5, which limits eligibility to disabled children between the ages of 3 and 21”);
Second, we also agree with Lauren that whether she is entitled to attorneys’ fees as a prevailing party is a question independent of whether the Child Find and FAPE claims are moot. “We have held repeatedly that ‘a determination of mootness neither precludes nor is precluded by an award of attorneys’ fees. The attorneys’ fees question turns instead on a wholly independent consideration: whether plaintiff is a ‘prevailing party.’’” Murphy v. Fort Worth Indep. Sch. Dist., 334 F.3d 470, 471 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting Marshall, 622 F.2d at 120); see also, e.g., Staley v. Harris Cty., Tex., 485 F.3d 305, 314 (5th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (same); El Paso Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Berry, 400 Fed. App’x 947, 952, 2010 WL 4459735, at *4 (5th Cir. Nov. 8, 2010) (unpublished) (collecting decisions). We thus reject LISD’s argument that the mootness of the underlying merits automatically defeats any entitlement by Lauren to fees. The Seventh Circuit decision the District relies on, Nathan R., stands for the opposite proposition: the court ruled that it could decide a fee issue in an otherwise moot IDEA case because the fee claim was “related solely to the administrative proceedings.” 199 F.3d at 381. So too Lauren’s fee claim, which depends solely on the SEHO’s decision.
Third, Lauren argues that we cannot review the district court’s decision on prevailing party status because that decision depended on the resolution of the Child Find and FAPE issues which, as already explained, are moot. This presents a difficult
We need not resolve the issue, however. “This Court may affirm on grounds other than those relied upon by the district court when the record contains an adequate and independent basis for that result.” Britt v. Grocers Supply Co., Inc., 978 F.2d 1441, 1449 (5th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted); see also, e.g., Gilbert v. Donahoe, 751 F.3d 303 (5th Cir. 2014) (“Under our precedent, we may affirm on any ground supported by the record, including one not reached by the district court.”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The well-developed record permits us to conclude, based on the SEHO’s decision alone, that Lauren does not qualify as a prevailing party.
B.
“Under the IDEA, ‘a prevailing party is one that attains a remedy that both (1) alters the legal relationship between the school district and the handicapped child and (2) fosters the purposes of the IDEA.” Richard R., 591 F.3d at 421-22 (quoting Jason D.W. ex rel. Douglas W. v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 158 F.3d 205, 209 (5th Cir. 1998)). The remedy must also receive some “judicial imprimatur.” Richard R., 591 F.3d at 422. It is settled that “an administrative hearing officer’s order provides the requisite ‘judicial imprimatur’ for a party to be considered a ‘prevailing party’ for attorneys’ fee purposes[.]” Id. at 422 n.4 (and collecting authorities). Because Lauren bases her fee claim on the SEHO’s decision, she has the necessary imprimatur. We therefore need only consider whether the remedy she received in that decision both altered her legal relationship with LISD and fosters the purposes of IDEA.
As discussed, supra I.B, Lauren argued to the SEHO that the District (1) violated Child Find by failing to diagnose her with autism; (2) failed to conduct an appropriate FIE or IEE; (3) denied her parents meaningful procеss in ARD meetings; and (4) adopted an inappropriate IEP that failed to provide a FAPE. She requested as relief (1) compensatory educational services; (2) an appropriate IEP; (3) reimbursement for private placement if necessary; (4) a “stay-put” order continuing her current placement; and (5) any other relief the
We hold that the SEHO’s order did not make Lauren a prevailing party.
First, we conclude that the SEHO’s order did not work a “‘materiаl alteration’” in Lauren’s legal relationship with LISD. Richard R., 591 F.3d at 422 (quoting Tex. State Teachers Ass’n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 792-93 (1989)) (emphasis added). We have explained in the IDEA context that “‘a plaintiff “prevails” when actual relief on the merits of [her] claim materially alters the legal relationship by modifying the defendant’s behavior in such a way that directly benefits the plaintiff.’” Salley v. St. Tammany Parish Sch. Bd., 57 F.3d 458, 468 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 111-12 (1992)). It would be difficult to characterize the SEHO’s order in those terms. The SEHO ordered only that the ARD committee consider Lauren’s existing IEP in light of the autism strategies in the Texas Administrative Code, an exercise which caused no change to Lauren’s educational plan. That result is doubly unsurprising: first, the SEHO had already found the IEP “appropriate in all areas … despite the fact that it [was] not tied to a diagnosis of autism” (emphasis added), and, second, the evidence showed that the committee had previously considered the same educational strategies and had already implemented several of them in the IEP.9 We recognize that one “does not need to prevail on every issue to become a prevailing party.” Alief, 713 F.3d at 270. But here the one issue on which Lauren prevailed (Child Find) resulted solely in an order that confirmed the validity of all aspects of her existing educational plan (i.e., her FIEs, her IEEs, and her FAPE), and also effected no change to her IEP, which is “the centerpiece of [IDEA’s] education delivery system for disabled children.” Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 994 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Without minimizing the dispute over Lauren’s proper diagnosis, we must conclude that the order hеre is “the type of ‘de minimis’ or ‘technical victory’ that the Supreme Court has found so insignificant as to not create prevailing party status.” Alief, 713 F.3d at 270 (citing Garland, 489 U.S. at 792); see also, e.g., Salley, 57 F.3d at 468 (parents were not prevailing parties where student’s IEP was appropriate and parents’ “sole victory—a finding that [the school] had procedurally violated the Act—did not materially alter the legal relationship between the parties”).
We emphasize that a Child Find violation can qualify a disabled student as a prevailing party under IDEA. Recently we decided in Krawietz v. Galveston Independent School District that a district’s six-month delay in identifying a student as disabled violated Child Find, and that the SEHO’s resulting order qualified the student’s parents as prevailing parties. __ F.3d __, 2019 WL 3965619 at *2-3 (5th Cir. Aug. 17, 2018). But, as Krawietz noted, the SEHO found the Child Find violation “deprived [the student] of a FAPE” and the SEHO’s order—while not granting all requested relief—“was aimed аt making sure that [the student] received a FAPE.” 2018 WL 3965619 at *2, 3. Specifically, the SEHO ordered the district “to provide equitable and compensatory relief … which included training and counseling for both [the student] and her family and transition services to prepare [the student] for adulthood.” Krawietz v. Galveston Indep. Sch. Dist., __ F.Supp.3d __, 2017 WL 1177740, at *7 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 30, 2017). It was thus obvious in Krawietz that the SEHO’s order “materially altered” the relationship between the parties and obtained something from the district that “directly benefited” the student and her family. Farrar, 506 U.S. at 111-12. Here, by contrast, the SEHO’s order resulted in no change to Lauren’s educational plan and, indeed, recognized that Lauren’s IEP was “appropriate in all areas” and already provided her a FAPE.
Second, even assuming the SEHO’s order materially altered the parties’ legal relationship, it would still fail to qualify Lauren as a prevailing party because the remedy does not foster the IDEA’s purposes. “To determine whether particular forms of relief foster the purposes of [IDEA], the critical question is whether a handicapped child receives any appropriate special services necessary to education that the child had not requested prior to the request for a due process hearing.” Angela L. v. Pasadena Indep. Sch. Dist., 918 F.2d 1188, 1195 (5th Cir. 1990). The particular relief here was adding an autism diagnosis to Lauren’s IEP. As explained, however, doing so effected no change to the IEP. Consequently, that relief did not result in Lauren receiving education services she had not already requested prior to thе hearing. Id.
Furthermore, the Child Find provision itself suggests that diagnostic labels alone should not be determinative when considering whether a remedy furthers IDEA’s purposes. While requiring resident disabled children to be “identified, located, and evaluated,”
“The IDEA concerns itself not with labels, but with whether a student is receiving a free and appropriate education.” Heather S. v. State of Wisconsin, 125 F.3d 1045, 1055 (7th Cir. 1997). The order at issue concluded that Lauren’s existing plan provided precisely what IDEA promises—a FAPE—regardless of her diagnosis. We conclude that the order’s alteration of her diagnosis alone did not confer prevailing party status on Lauren. We do not say that one can never achieve prevailing party status by winning an IDEA dispute over a child’s diagnosis. We decide only that the relief here—adding a diagnostic label that effects no change to an already valid special education program—does not confer prevailing party status under IDEA.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment that Lauren is not a prevailing party for attorneys’ fee purposes.