Dustin Laufer, Plaintiff and Appellant v. Warren G. Doe, Defendant and Appellee
No. 20200001
IN THE SUPREME COURT STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA
2020 ND 159 Filed 07/22/20 by Clerk of Supreme Court
Appeal from the District Court of Adams County, Southwest Judicial District, the Honorable Dann E. Greenwood, Judge.
AFFIRMED.
Opinion of the Court by Crothers, Justice.
Erin L. Melling (argued), and Aaron W. Roseland (on brief), Hettinger, ND, for plaintiff and appellant.
Paul R. Aamodt, Minneapolis, MN, for defendant and appellee.
No. 20200001
Crothers, Justice.
[¶1] Dustin Laufer appeals from a judgment dismissing his complaint alleging property damage caused by Warren Doe’s agricultural chemical application. Laufer argues the district court misapplied the law by dismissing his claim for failing to comply with statutory notice requirements. We affirm, concluding Laufer was required to strictly comply with the notice requirements and the district court did not err by dismissing Laufer’s complaint.
I
[¶2] In November 2018, Laufer sued Doe, alleging Laufer’s crops were damaged when Doe sprayed a neighboring field with herbicide and the herbicide drifted onto Laufer’s land. In October 2019, Doe moved to dismiss the action for failure to comply with
[¶3] Laufer opposed the motion, arguing
[¶4] The district court granted Doe’s motion to dismiss. The court explained the meaning of
II
[¶5] Doe argues the appeal was not timely and should be dismissed. Under
[¶6] Doe also argues Laufer failed to comply with several rules of appellate procedure, including that the notice of appeal did not designate the specific order being appealed, that the preliminary statement of issues was not concise, that the brief did not include citations to the record, and that the brief included typographical errors. He requests sanctions as the Court deems appropriate.
[¶7] Under
III
[¶8] Laufer argues the district court erred in dismissing his claims against Doe. He contends the court misapplied the law and did not adequately explain the basis for its decision.
[¶9] Generally, a district court’s decision granting a motion to dismiss is reviewed de novo. See Hondl v. State, 2020 ND 20, ¶ 5, 937 N.W.2d 564; Hughes v. Olheiser Masonry, Inc., 2019 ND 273, ¶ 5, 935 N.W.2d 530.
A
[¶10] Laufer argues the statutory notice requirement in
[¶11] The interpretation of a statute is a question of law, which is fully reviewable on appeal. Wilkens v. Westby, 2019 ND 186, ¶ 6, 931 N.W.2d 229. In interpreting statutes, this Court has said:
“Our primary goal in statutory construction is to ascertain the intent of the legislature, and we first look to the plain language of the statute and give each word of the statute its ordinary meaning. When the wording of a statute is clear and free of all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit. If, however, the statute is ambiguous or if adherence to the strict letter of the statute would lead to an absurd or ludicrous result, a court may resort to extrinsic aids, such as legislative history, to interpret the statute. A statute is ambiguous if it is susceptible to meanings that are different, but rational. We presume the legislature did not intend an absurd or ludicrous result or unjust consequences, and we construe statutes in a practical manner, giving consideration to the context of the statutes and the purpose for which they were enacted.”
PHI Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Johnston Law Office, P.C., 2020 ND 22, ¶ 10, 937 N.W.2d 885 (quoting State v. G.C.H., 2019 ND 256, ¶ 13, 934 N.W.2d 857). “Statutes relating to the same subject matter shall be construed together and should be harmonized, if possible, to give meaningful effect to each, without rendering one or the other useless.” PHI Fin. Servs., at ¶ 10 (quoting G.C.H., at ¶ 13).
[¶12] Under
[¶13] Section 4.1-33-18, N.D.C.C. provides:
“1. a. Before a person may file a civil action seeking reimbursement for property damage allegedly stemming from the application of a pesticide, the person shall notify by certified mail the pesticide applicator of the alleged damage within the earlier of:
(1) Twenty-eight days from the date the person first knew or should have known of the alleged damage; or
(2) Before twenty percent of the crop or field allegedly damaged is harvested or destroyed.
b. Subdivision a does not apply if the person seeking reimbursement for property damage was the applicator of the pesticide.
2. Upon notifying the applicator as required under subsection 1, the person seeking reimbursement for the alleged property damage shall permit the applicator and up to four representatives of the applicator to enter the person’s property for the purpose of observing and examining the alleged damage. If the person fails to allow entry, the person is barred from asserting a claim against the applicator.”
The plain language of the statute states a person must provide notice to the pesticide applicator by certified mail before the person may file a civil action seeking reimbursement for property damage allegedly stemming from the application of pesticide. The notice requirement applies to any civil action seeking reimbursement for damages caused by application of pesticide. The statute unambiguously is not limited to actions under
[¶14] This Court applied a prior version of the pesticide notice of claim statute to a negligence counterclaim, and to an action for negligence, breach of contract, and breach of express and implied warranties. See Dickinson Air Serv., Inc. v. Kadrmas, 397 N.W.2d 55, 58 (N.D. 1986); Wills v. Schroeder Aviation, Inc., 390 N.W.2d 544, 545-47 (N.D. 1986). The current version of the statute did not change that the requirements of
B
[¶15] Laufer argues the district court erred by determining he did not satisfy the statutory notice requirement. He contends the evidence clearly shows he satisfied the notice requirement by directly communicating with Doe.
[¶16] Section 4.1-33-18(1), N.D.C.C., states a person “shall” notify by certified mail the pesticide applicator of the alleged damage. The word “shall” generally creates a mandatory duty. In re K.V., 2019 ND 255, ¶ 16, 934 N.W.2d 879; Sweeney v. Sweeney, 2002 ND 206, ¶ 17, 654 N.W.2d 407. “If the duty prescribed in the statute is essential to its main objectives, the word ‘shall’ is to be construed as creating a mandatory duty.” Sweeney, at ¶ 17.
[¶17] In interpreting a prior version of the statutory notice requirement, this Court held the requirement is known as a notice-of-claim provision, and it acts as an abbreviated statute of limitations. See Dickinson Air Serv., 397 N.W.2d at 57. The purpose of the notice requirement was to provide the defendant “with the means of ascertaining evidence before time makes his proof difficult or impossible to obtain.” Id. We further said the short notice requirement was necessary due to the nature of the subject matter involved in the statute. Id. Requiring notice by certified mail serves the main objective of the statute, which ensures the defendant is notified in a timely manner so he can inspect the damage allegedly caused by spraying before the evidence becomes impossible to obtain.
[¶18] Use of the word “shall” in
[¶19] In interpreting statutes with similar notice requirements, this Court held strict compliance is required and a defendant’s actual notice of the potential claim is not sufficient. For example,
[¶20] Even if Laufer’s telephone call provided Doe actual information about damages stemming from the chemical application, the call was not sufficient to comply with the notice requirements under
IV
[¶21] Laufer argues the district court erred by ordering him to pay Doe’s litigation costs. He claims the court did not give any reason for awarding the costs and did not determine his pleadings were frivolous.
[¶22] Doe requested the district court dismiss the action with prejudice and enter judgment in his favor for his taxable costs and disbursements. The district court’s order for judgment stated that Doe “be awarded his reasonable costs and disbursements as provided by statute.” Doe filed an affidavit of costs for $647.07, and the court entered judgment for that amount.
[¶23] Under
[¶24] Doe requested $647.07 in costs and disbursements, including $10.00 under
V
[¶25] We affirm the judgment.
[¶26] Daniel J. Crothers
Lisa Fair McEvers
Gerald W. VandeWalle
Jerod E. Tufte
Jon J. Jensen, C.J.