State of North Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee v. G.C.H., Defendant and Appellant
No. 20190136
IN THE SUPREME COURT STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA
Filed 10/29/19
Corrected Opinion Filed 11/1/19 by Clerk of the Supreme Court
2019 ND 256
Crothers, Justice.
Certified question from the District Court of Stutsman County, Southeast Judicial District, the Honorable Cherie L. Clark, Judge.
CERTIFIED QUESTION NOT ANSWERED, SUPERVISORY JURISDICTION EXERCISED. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Opinion of the Court by Crothers, Justice.
Joseph Nwoga, Assistant State‘s Attorney, Jamestown, ND, for plaintiff and appellee.
Ashley Schell, Fargo Public Defender Office, Fargo, ND, for defendant and appellant.
State v. G.C.H.
No. 20190136
[¶1] This case is before the Supreme Court on the Stutsman County district court‘s certified question of law whether a married person under the age of eighteen is a “child” under the Juvenile Court Act. We decline to answer the certified question. However, this is an appropriate case in which to exercise our supervisory jurisdiction and reverse and remand with directions to vacate the judgment and to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
I
[¶2] G.C.H. is charged with five crimes which allegedly occurred when G.C.H. was sixteen and seventeen years old. G.C.H. was married when the alleged crimes occurred and still is married. G.C.H. filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to his age, claiming the proper jurisdiction was in juvenile court. The district court denied the motion, finding G.C.H. was not a child under North Dakota law because he was married. After other proceedings, G.C.H. filed a motion to certify the question to the North Dakota Supreme Court. The district court granted G.C.H.‘s motion and certified the following question:
“Is the Defendant a ‘child’ under
N.D.C.C. § 27-20-04 [sic], who would therefore be under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court requiring the District Court to dismiss the above-referenced cases and refer the cases to Juvenile Court?”
[¶3] G.C.H. argues a married defendant is a “child” under
II
[¶4] G.C.H. argues the requirements of
“(A) There is a question of law involved in the proceeding that is determinative of the proceeding; and
(B) It appears to the district court that there is no controlling precedent in the decisions of the supreme court.”
[¶5] For prong B, G.C.H. relies on the district court‘s statement, “there is a question of law that is determinative of the proceeding and it appears that there is no controlling case law in the decisions of the North Dakota Supreme Court and that there is a question of statutory interpretation.” G.C.H. argues the four cases addressing
[¶6] This Court has discretion to hear certified questions of law by the district court and may refuse to consider a certified question if it is frivolous, interlocutory in nature, or not dispositive of the issues before the district court.
[¶7] Here, neither a negative nor affirmative answer would be dispositive of the case. If G.C.H. is a child under
III
[¶8] Notwithstanding our declination to answering the certified question we conclude this case justifies exercising supervisory jurisdiction. This Court has authority to issue supervisory writs under
[¶9] Here, the issue is whether the district court or juvenile court has subject matter jurisdiction. G.C.H. is currently eighteen years old and time is of the essence. If we do not exercise supervisory jurisdiction, G.C.H.‘s options are to plead guilty or to go to trial in district court. At trial G.C.H. may be acquitted or found guilty. If found guilty, he can appeal the subject matter jurisdiction issue. If we would conclude on appeal that subject matter jurisdiction was improper in the district court, the district court adjudication would be vacated and proceedings would need to start anew in the juvenile court. The juvenile court only has jurisdiction over G.C.H. until he is twenty years old, unless the state intentionally delayed the prosecution to avoid juvenile court jurisdiction.
IV
A
[¶10] G.C.H. argues he is a “child” under
“‘Child’ means an individual who is:
a. Under the age of eighteen years and is not married; or
b. Under the age of twenty years with respect to a delinquent act committed while under the age of eighteen years.”
[¶11] G.C.H. argues
[¶12] The State argues G.C.H. is an adult under
[¶13] Our standard for statutory interpretation is well established:
“Interpretation of a statute is a question of law fully reviewable on appeal. Our primary goal in statutory construction is to ascertain the intent of the legislature, and we first look to the plain language of the statute and give each word of the statute its ordinary meaning.
When the wording of a statute is clear and free of all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit. If, however, the statute is ambiguous or if adherence to the strict letter of the statute would lead to an absurd or ludicrous result, a court may resort to extrinsic aids, such as legislative history, to interpret the statute. A statute is ambiguous if it is susceptible to meanings that are different, but rational. We presume the legislature did not intend an absurd or ludicrous result or unjust consequences, and we construe statutes in a practical manner, giving consideration to the context of the statutes and the purpose for which they were enacted.”
State v. Brown, 2009 ND 150, ¶ 15, 771 N.W.2d 267 (citing In re M.W., 2009 ND 55, ¶ 6, 764 N.W.2d 185 (quoting State v. Fasteen, 2007 ND 162, ¶ 8, 740 N.W.2d 60)). “Statutes relating to the same subject matter shall be construed together and should be harmonized, if possible, to give meaningful effect to each, without rendering one or the other useless.” Brown, at ¶ 15.
[¶14] G.C.H. argues because
[¶15]
[¶16] The parties agree G.C.H. is not a “child” under subsection (a) because he married at sixteen, prior to committing the alleged acts. Therefore, the issue is whether G.C.H. is a “child” under
[¶17] Our interpretation of
“1. ‘Child’ means an individual who is:
a. Under the age of eighteen years, and not married or not a member of the armed services;
b. Under the age of twenty-one years who committed an act of delinquency while a child.”
(1971 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 306, § 1). In 1971, subsections (a) and (b) were not separated
B
[¶18] Section 27-20-02(4)(b), N.D.C.C., has three prongs and the next question is whether G.C.H satisfies them. Under
[¶19] First, the record establishes G.C.H. turned eighteen in March of 2019. Therefore, he is under twenty years old and meets the first prong of
[¶20] Second,
[¶21] Third, the record establishes the delinquent acts allegedly occurred on December 30, 2017, April 3, 2018, June 28, 2018, August 13, 2018 and August 31, 2018. G.C.H. was either sixteen or seventeen during these dates. Therefore, he was under eighteen when he allegedly committed the delinquent acts. G.C.H. meets the third prong of
V
[¶22] The district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over G.C.H. because he is a “child” under
[¶23] Daniel J. Crothers
Lisa Fair McEvers
Jon J. Jensen
Jerod E. Tufte
Gerald W. VandeWalle, C.J.