Laufer v. Doe, 946 N.W.2d 707

Laufer sued Doe alleging herbicide drift from Doe’s spraying damaged Laufer’s crops and sought reimbursement.
Doe moved to dismiss under N.D.C.C. § 4.1-33-18, arguing Laufer failed to give the required certified-mail notice within 28 days.
Laufer argued the pesticide chapter is enforced by the Agricultural Commissioner (so the statute did not apply to his private negligence claim) and alternatively claimed he gave actual notice by phone and that Doe admitted receiving notice in deposition.
The district court dismissed, holding § 4.1-33-18 requires strict compliance with certified-mail notice and actual/telephone notice is insufficient; judgment awarded Doe costs.
On appeal the Supreme Court affirmed: it held the statute applies to any civil action seeking reimbursement for pesticide-related property damage, requires strict compliance (certified mail), telephone notice does not satisfy it, and the award of costs was permissible.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Does N.D.C.C. § 4.1-33-18 apply to a private negligence/property-damage suit?	§ 4.1-33-18 does not apply because enforcement and actions under ch. 4.1-33 are for the Agricultural Commissioner.	The statute applies to any civil action seeking reimbursement for pesticide-related property damage.	Statute unambiguously applies to all civil actions seeking reimbursement for pesticide-caused property damage.
Is certified-mail notice mandatory, or is actual/telephone notice sufficient?	Actual/telephone notice to Doe satisfied the notice requirement; deposition admission proves Doe had notice.	The statute mandates certified-mail notice within the 28-day window; actual notice is insufficient.	"Shall" is mandatory; strict compliance is required; telephone/actual notice is insufficient.
Was the appeal untimely or procedurally defective?	(Laufer) Appeal was timely; procedural defects do not warrant sanctions.	(Doe) Appeal was untimely and the briefs violated appellate rules; requested sanctions.	Appeal was timely; Court declined to impose sanctions despite briefing deficiencies.
Was the award of costs to Doe proper?	Laufer argued court gave no reason and did not find pleadings frivolous.	Doe requested costs and disbursements as prevailing party; submitted affidavit.	Award of $647.07 was permitted under N.D.C.C. §§ 28-26-06 and 28-26-02; trial court did not abuse discretion.

Dickinson Air Serv., Inc. v. Kadrmas, 397 N.W.2d 55 (N.D. 1986) (prior pesticide notice statute applied to negligence and related claims)
Wills v. Schroeder Aviation, Inc., 390 N.W.2d 544 (N.D. 1986) (notice-of-claim requirement applied in negligence contexts)
State v. New Holland, 869 N.W.2d 136 (N.D. 2015) (statutory written-notice requirement interpreted to require strict compliance; actual notice insufficient)
PHI Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Johnston Law Office, P.C., 937 N.W.2d 885 (N.D. 2020) (statutory interpretation principles and plain-language analysis)
Carpenter v. Rohrer, 714 N.W.2d 804 (N.D. 2006) (defining "prevailing party" for award of disbursements)