Larenzo Irvin v. Tyler Richardson, et al.; Derrick Jerome Bates v. Tyler Richardson, et al.
No. 19-2364; No. 19-2610
United States Court of Appeals For the Eighth Circuit
December 16, 2021
Submitted: June 15, 2021; Appeals from United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa - Cedar Rapids
Submitted: June 15, 2021
Filed: December 16, 2021
Before LOKEN, KELLY, and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.
In these
I. Background
At 3:21 p.m. on April 24, 2016, a Cedar Rapids police dispatcher issued an alert for “a disturbance with a weapon” at “Higley
Officer Richardson responded, arriving at the scene minutes later. Driving on Higley Avenue towards the intersection of Higley and Wellington, he saw a black man enter a corner house, called out to him, but the man did not respond. Officer Richardson then saw a woman flagging him down and stopped to speak with her. The woman was the 911 caller, but that was not confirmed until after the officers’ encounter with Irvin and Bates. In a ten-second exchаnge, the woman told Richardson that someone had gone around the corner wearing “white and black pants.” Richardson asked, “white shirt, black pants?” and she responded, “er, white and blue.” Officer Richardson then drove to the intersection and turned right onto Wellington. He saw two people -- later identified as Bates and Irvin -- walking away from him along the left side of the street. The dashcam video shows Bates wearing a red shirt and black pants and Irvin wearing a blue shirt and blue pants.1
Officer Richardson got out of his car and yelled, “Stop. Stop.” Irvin and Bates turned their heads, then stopped. Richardson said, “Yeah, you guys.” Bates replied, “No, we didn‘t do nothing.” Riсhardson yelled, “Stop right now! Stop!” and drew his gun, pointed it at Irvin and Bates, and ordered them to get on the ground. Officer Jupin, whose squad car had arrived from the opposite direction, drew his gun and did the same. Irvin and Bates slowly got down on their knees. Richardson yelled, “Face down!” Richardson handcuffed Irvin. Jupin handcuffed Bates. A pat-down determined that neither was armed.
Handcuffed and seated on the ground, 16-year-old Irvin remained quiet. Bates, 33 years old, became agitated, speaking loudly and expressing anger that the officers had pulled their guns on him. Jupin stayed with Irvin and Bates while Richardson went a block away and talked to a heavyset black man in a white t-shirt the officers spotted while detaining Irvin and Bates. Richardson ordered the man to stop and put his hands on a stone wall next to the sidewalk. The man complied. Richardson patted him down for weapons, found none, and soon released him.
Other officers arrived, giving Officer Jupin an opportunity to interview a bystander who witnessed the earlier disturbance. The witness said neither Bates nor Irvin was involved. Jupin returned to Irvin and Bates, who had been handcuffed for approximately 12 minutes, uncuffed them, and told them they were free to go. Irvin and Bates remained at the scene. Fifteen minutes later, Richardson arrested Bates for interference with official acts in violation of
Irvin and Bates filed administrative complaints with the Cedar Rapids Police Department, which ruled them unfounded, and these
“We review de novo the district court‘s grant of summary judgment based on qualified immunity.” Robbins v. City of Des Moines, 984 F.3d 673, 677-78 (8th Cir. 2021), quoting Duffie v. City of Lincoln, 834 F.3d 877, 881 (8th Cir. 2016). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to Irvin and Bates, giving them the benefit of all reasonable inferences. Edwards v. Byrd, 750 F.3d 728, 731 (8th Cir. 2014). “Summary judgment is proper if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1042 (8th Cir.) (en banc) (cleaned up), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 978 (2011).
Qualified immunity shields government officials from civil damage liability for a discretionary act that “does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Qualified immunity is an immunity from suit, not merely a defense to liability. The Supreme Court has “stressed the importance of resolving immunity questions at the earliest possible stage in litigation.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009) (quotation omitted). To avoid pretrial dismissal, a plaintiff must present facts showing the violation of a constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of the defendant‘s act. Id. at 232-33, 236.
II. Discussion
A. The Investigative Stop of Irvin and Bates. A police officer “may, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspiсion that criminal activity is afoot.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000), citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). In conducting a Terry stop, the officer may make a protective pat-down search if the officer “has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person may be armed and presently dangerous.” United States v. Davison, 808 F.3d 325, 329 (8th Cir. 2015) (citations omitted). Reasonable suspicion is a fact-specific inquiry, determined by the totality of the circumstances, taking account of an officer‘s deductions and rational inferences resulting from relevant training and experience. United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273-74 (2002). It requires “some minimal level of objective justification,” but a series of acts may be “innocent if viewed separately, but . . . taken together warrant [ ] further investigation.” United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 9-10 (1989) (cleaned up). We review the determination of reasonable suspicion de novo, “tak[ing] care both to review findings of historical fact only for clear error and to give due weight to inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges and local law enforcement officers.” Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996).
When the issue is whether a
The district court concluded that Officer Richardson had reasonable suspicion to stop and detain Irvin and Bates to determine whether they were involved in an unlawful firearm display during a public disturbance minutes earlier at a location they were walking away from. “Considering that [Bates] and Irvin were found in the vicinity to which Officer Richardson was dispatched and directed, that Irvin‘s clothing reasonably matched the description Officer Richardson had of one of the three males, and that [Bates] could have been the third male for whom no description was provided, the Court finds that Officer Richardson could reasonably believe that [Bates] and Irvin were involved in the incident that Officer Richardson was dispatched to investigate.” This reasoning is consistent with numerous Eighth Circuit decisions concluding that “a person‘s temporal and geographic proximity to a crime scene, combined with a matching description of the suspect, can support a finding of reasonable suspicion.” United States v. Quinn, 812 F.3d 694, 698 (8th Cir. 2016); see Pollreis v. Marzolf, 9 F.4th 737, 744-45 (8th Cir. Aug. 16, 2021); United States v. Dupree, 202 F.3d 1046, 1047-49 (8th Cir. 2000); United States v. Juvenile TK, 134 F.3d 899, 903 (8th Cir. 1998).
In contending the district court erred in concluding the officers had reasonable suspicion, Irvin and Bates argue that neither man matched the description Officer Richardson received from dispatch or the description provided by the woman on the street of the person suspected of criminal activity -- the “heavier set” black male in a white t-shirt who “displayed a 10-32 [gun]” during a reported street disturbance. We reject this contention. First, while the investigating officers’ primary focus was understandably the gun, the reported disturbance potentially involved violations of numerous Iowa criminal offenses -- disturbing the peace,
Second, even limiting our focus to more serious gun offenses, Officer Richardson had descriptions of two of the three men. Irvin arguably fit one of the descriptions; Bates did not but the third participant had not been described. Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed Material Facts in Support of [their] Motion for Summary Judgment included, citing Jupin and Richardson affidavits:
12. As police officers, when Jupin and Richardson respond to a disturbance in which one person is reported as having a firearm, they bear in mind the possibility
that others involved may also have a firearm.
Irvin and Bates both admitted this statement, so it is not an issue on appeal. Thus, the fact that neither Irvin nor Bates matched the description of the man who displayed a gun during the disturbance is not of critical importance.
The information that Officer Richardson received from the woman on the street sufficiently corroborated the dispatch he was investigating because she (1) was within a couple blocks of the reported disturbance; (2) flagged Officer Richardson down, indicating she was looking for or expecting police to arrive; (3) described a similar disturbance and (4) provided a description of one suspect similar to the dispatch report. Moments later, Richardson obsеrved Irvin and Bates walking in the direction the woman indicated. Irvin‘s clothing matched the description of one suspect from the dispatch report and the vague description the woman provided. We must consider the information Richardson received and his observations as a whole, rather than as discrete, disconnected occurrences. See, e.g., Waters, 921 F.3d at 736. We agree with the district court that the officers had reasonable suspicion -- at a minimum arguable reasonable suspicion -- and therefore are entitled to qualified immunity. See Dupree, 202 F.3d at 1049.
B. Did the Terry Stop Become an Arrest Without Probable Cause? A lawful Terry stop “may become an arrest, requiring probable cause, ‘if the stop lasts for an unreasonably long time or if officers use unreasonable force.‘” United States v. Newell, 596 F.3d 876, 879 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 864 (2010). Irvin and Bates argue that, even if the stop was lawful, Officers Richardson and Jupin turned the Terry stop into an unlawful arrest when they used unreasonable force by pointing their guns at Irvin and Bates and handcuffing them. When the officers stopped Irvin and Bates, “they were authorized to take such steps as were reasonably necessary to protect their personal safety and to maintain the status quo during the course of the stop.” Hensley, 469 U.S. at 235.
“It is well established . . . that when officers are presented with serious danger in the course of carrying out an investigative detention, they may brandish weapons . . . .” United States v. Fisher, 364 F.3d 970, 973 (8th Cir. 2004). Likewise, police officers may reasonably handcuff a suspect in the course of a Terry stop to protect officer safety and maintain the status quo. United States v. Smith, 645 F.3d 998, 1002 (8th Cir. 2011) (collecting cases).
Here, the officers were investigating a disturbance involving a handgun. Although neither officer observed Bates or Irvin with a gun, they “lacked the personal knowledge to rule out [Irvin and Bates] as suspects.” Pollreis, 9 F.4th at 748. Nor did the officers “point a gun at a compliant suspect for an unreasonably long period of time after [they had] taken control of the situation.” Id. at 747. Though Irvin and Bates acknowledged Officer Richardsоn‘s initial command to “Stop,” they continued walking away despite repeated commands to stop. They finally stopped but did not immediately comply with a command to “Get on the ground now.” Their actions did not negate the risk that one or both might be armed and dangerous. In response to this refusal to cooperate with a lawful directive to stop and to answer reasonable questions, Officer Richardson and then Officer Jupin drew their guns, pointed them in Irvin and Bates‘s direction, and then handcuffed the two when they finally lay on the ground. Although Irvin acted calmly throughout the stop, Bates was agitated and argumentative. In these circumstances, the force used by the officers did
Irvin and Bates further argue that the officers turned the Terry stop into an arrest by extending the detention for an unreasonably long time. We disagree. In assessing this issue, the Supreme Court “examine[s] whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain the [suspects].” United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985). “[A] suspect‘s actions may contribute to the added delay about which he complains.” Id. at 688. “There is no bright line rule.” United States v. Morgan, 729 F.3d 1086, 1090 (8th Cir. 2013).
Here, Officers Richardson and Jupin actively investigated the disturbance after detaining Irvin and Bates, delayed by their refusal to cooperate. When backup arrivеd, Richardson interviewed a cooperative third individual and searched the area for a weapon. Jupin contacted a witness, who said that Irvin and Bates were not involved in the reported disturbance. Jupin promptly removed the handcuffs and told Irvin and Bates they were free to go, ending their detention. The entire encounter lasted approximately 13 minutes. We agree with the district court that Irvin and Bates “were detained no longer than was necessary for the officers to pursue their investigation” and therefore the lawful Terry stop “did not evolve into an arrest.” The circumstances here are readily distinguishable from thе handcuffing and extended detention in our recent, divided panel opinion in Haynes v. Minnehan, No. 20-1777 (8th Cir. Sep. 21, 2021).
For these reasons, we affirm the district court‘s grant of qualified immunity dismissing these Fourth Amendment claims.
C. The Separate Arrest of Bates. Irvin and Bates asserted
1. Section
The district court concluded that Officer Richardson had probable cause to arrest Bates for interference with official acts:
Even if the initial words, “stop, stop,” are viewed as a request, when [Bates] . . . continued to wаlk away, Officer Richardson subsequently yelled, “Stop, right now! Stop!” [Bates] . . . continued to take a few more steps and also hesitated
to get to the ground as [he was] repeatedly ordered to do. Under these circumstances, it was reasonable for Officer Richardson to conclude that [Bates was] interfering with Officer Richardson‘s official acts.
The court cited State v. Sullivan, No. 08-0541, 2009 WL 250287, at *2 (Iowa App. Feb. 4, 2009), for the proposition that a defendant “need not use force to be guilty of Interference with Official Acts.” The court acknowledged that the Supreme Court of Iowa held in State v. Lewis, 675 N.W.2d 516, 526 (Iowa 2004), that “[t]he mere act of quickly walking away from the officer and ignoring his directions to stop under these circumstances is not interference with official acts.” In an earlier case, the Supreme Court of Iowa reversed a
Given these controlling Supreme Court of Iowa authorities, we conclude the district court erred in granting summary judgment dismissing this state law claim. The Iowa Court of Appeals concluded in Sullivan that ”Smithson and Lewis stand for the proposition that a single instance of mere failure to cooperate cannot serve as the basis for a charge of interference with official acts.” 2009 WL 250287, at *4. Though not controlling precedent, that provides guidance here. The relevant facts are simply too uncertain and contested to conclude, as a matter of law, that Officer Richardson had probable cause to arrest Bates for “knowingly resist[ing] or obstruct[ing]” Richardson in the performance of his official duties. On appeal, defendants argue that Richardson is immune from liability under Iowa statutory immunities for so-called discretionary functions,
2. Turning to Bates‘s
D. The Monell Claims. A municipality and policymakers such as Chief Jerman are subject to
The district court granted summary judgment dismissing the individual capacity claims аgainst Chief Jerman and the official capacity claims against Jerman and the City because, absent a constitutional violation by the police officers, these defendants “cannot be held liable” for failure to train their officers. See, e.g., Sinclair v. City of Des Moines, 268 F.3d 594, 596-97 (8th Cir. 2001). We agree. What remains on appeal are the Monell claims based on Officer Richardson‘s arrest of Bates for violating
On the issue of ratification, the district court concluded, “[b]ecause neither Officer Richardson nor Officer Jupin committed any unlawful acts, Chief Jerman did not ‘ratify’ any unlawful actions by his alleged failure to adequately investigate the April 24, 2016 incidеnt.” This reasoning no longer applies to Bates‘s Monell claims based on his actual arrest. Even if Bates prevails on this false arrest claim against Officer Richardson, rigorous standards of culpability and causation will apply to whether Chief Jerman‘s after-the-fact determination was actionable ratification of a constitutional violation. See Waters, 921 F.3d at 743. But ratification issues are fact intensive. We decline to resolve these Monell issues as a matter of law on this summary judgment record and therefore include these issues in reversing the grant of summary judgment dismissing Bates‘s separate false arrest claims.
III. Conclusion
In Irvin‘s appeal, No. 19-2364, we affirm the judgment of the district court. In Bates‘s appeal, No. 19-2610, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
KELLY, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in the reversal of summary judgment on Bates‘s claims related to his separate arrest, but I otherwise dissent.
Viewing the record in the light most favorable to Irvin and Bates, Officers Richardson and Jupin lacked reasonable suspicion to stop and detain them. The dispatcher relayed an anonymous 911 call, but did not provide any information indicating the basis of the caller‘s knowledge. The only corroboration identified is the information Officer Riсhardson received from the woman on the street. But at the time of the stop, Officer Richardson did
Even setting aside the reliability оf the tip, neither Bates nor Irvin matched the description of the person who displayed the firearm -- a heavyset man in a white t-shirt. See Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 401 (2014) (“Even a reliable tip will justify an investigative stop only if it creates reasonable suspicion that ‘criminal activity may be afoot.‘” (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968))). An objectively reasonable officer could see, in daylight, that Irvin was wearing a blue shirt and Bates a bright red one -- and that neither could be described as “heavyset.”
That Irvin and Bates may have matched the race and gender of the suspect and that they were in the same general location identified by the caller are not enough to raise a reasonable suspicion that either of them was the person who displayed a firearm. Cf. Bell v. Neukirch, 979 F.3d 594, 604-06 (8th Cir. 2020) (finding no probable cause where both the plaintiff and suspect were “black male juveniles wearing white t-shirts,” but the plaintiff was taller and had different colored shorts and socks than the suspect).
Moreover, even if an officer could have reasonably believed that Irvin was the person described as wearing “all blue” and that Bates was the third, undescribed person, there was no reason to suspect that either of them was engaged in criminal activity. See United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981) (“[The] demand for specificity in the information upon which police action is predicаted is the central teaching of this Court‘s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.” (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 n.18)). The only suspicious activity the 911 caller described was that a heavyset man in a white t-shirt displayed a gun. There was no reason to believe any other person had a weapon, concealed or not, and a suspicion otherwise was nothing more than a hunch. While the 911 caller reported an argument where one man displayed a gun, she reported no threats, assaults, or shots fired. And when Officer Richardson turned the corner, the reported crime had ended, and neither Irvin nor Bates was behaving in a manner as to indicate they were armed or were engaged in -- or about to engage in -- criminal activity. Cf. Wilson v. Lamp, 901 F.3d 981, 987 (8th Cir. 2018) (explaining that “[c]ompanionship alone cannot justify a frisk” under Terry).3
Viewing the facts in Irvin and Bates‘s favor, a reasonable jury could find that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to stop and detain them.4
Applying the same standard, the Terry stop in this case -- even if it was lawful
suspicions; (4) the erratic behavior of or suspicious movements by the persons under observation; and (5) the need for immediate action by the officers and lack of opportunity for them to have made the stop in less threatening circumstances.“).
Here, the two officers were not outnumbered. Bates and Irvin were walking casually along the street at a normal to slow pace, and neither was acting nervously, erratically, or suspiciously; nor did they show signs of being armed. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Bates and Irvin, they acknowledged Officer Richardson‘s initial command by saying they hаd not “done anything,” indicating to the officer they were not the people he was looking for. And any initial hesitation to “get on the ground” must be viewed in their favor: that they misunderstood the situation, a conclusion a reasonable jury could reach after viewing the video of the stop. The reported criminal activity -- displaying a gun in public -- was not ongoing, so Officers Richardson and Jupin also did not need to take immediate action. Morever, while the two men were handcuffed, Bates heard the officers communicate by radio that they had seen someone matching the suspect‘s description and asked them: “The lady . . . just said it wasn‘t us. Why . . . is we still cuffed?” Yet Officers Richardson and Jupin continued to keep Irvin and Bates in handcuffs, prolonging the seizure until after the officers finished interviewing other individuals in the area. On these facts, there was nothing to suggest that the officers were in “serious danger,” Fisher, 364 F.3d at 973, or that their safety was compromised.5
Because I would find that the officers lacked reasonable and articulable suspicion to detain Bates and Irvin, I would also
III.
With the contours of these rights sufficiently clear6 and viewing all of the facts in the light most favorable to Bates and Irvin, I believe that Officers Richardson and Jupin are not entitled to qualified immunity at this stage of the proceeding.7