*1 216.15(8)(a)(8) 216.5, Rights § tion the Iowa Civil Commis- (providing a successful sion given power determine com- complainant may damages, recover includ- plaints alleging discriminatory an unfair or fees”). ing attorney “reasonable There- practice chapter under Iowa Code 216. fore, remand, on the district court shall 216.5(2); § See Iowa Code see also id. hearing conduct a on this issue and deter- 216.2(13) § (defining practice” “[u]nfair appellate mine the amount of attorney fees “discriminatory practice”). In addi- Lynch which Sires is entitled. City v. tion, city may rights create a local civil (Iowa Moines, 236, Des 464 N.W.2d rights commission to protect the of citizens 1990); Co., George See Landals v. A. Rolfes Rights secured the Iowa Civil Act. Id. (Iowa 1990); 898-99 § Thus, 216.19. the Commission in this Lynch Moines, City v. Des authority subject case acted under the 1990). chapter the limitations of not feder- DECISION OF COURT AP- OF Therefore, al law. correctly it determined PEALS VACATED. DISTRICT COURT it had power punitive no to award JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART damages. AND IN REVERSED PART. CASE RE- MANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.
VI. Disposition. Conclusion and There was substantial evidence to sup- justices All concur except CARTER and port the Commission’s finding that Sires WIGGINS, JJ., who part. take no constructively discharged from her employment with VMI. The district court in ruling contrary
erred to the and accord-
ingly part we reverse that of the court’s
judgment. Commission erred resolving am-
biguities job with respect to the duties and
corresponding salary of local leaders Iowa, Appellee, STATE of against Sires. This uncertainty should against have been resolved VMI. As a result, the in failing Commission erred Haywood LEWIS, Appellant. Melvin use salary of the man promot- who was No. 02-1105. ed into position the local leader over Sires to calculate the wages Sires lost as a result Supreme Court of Iowa. of her employer’s discriminatory conduct. Therefore, Feb. 2004. we reverse the district court’s order affirming the Commission’s award of pay
front pay, and back and remand for
entry of an recalculating order these dam-
ages as outlined above.
We otherwise affirm the district court’s
decision, including ruling its that the Com- authority
mission had no punitive award
damages. requests
Sires an award of her attorney appeal.
fees See Iowa Code *3 Gallo, De- Appellate
Linda Del State fender, Lucey, Martha Assistant J. Defender, Appellate appellant. for State Miller, General, Attorney Thomas J. Cmelik, General, Attorney Assistant Kevin Sarcone, County Attorney, P. John Kendell, Gary County Attorney, Assistant appellee. WIGGINS, Justice. *4 by the appeal
This involves a decision court Lewis’s overruling district Melvin suppress obtained motion evidence his fenced through a warrantless search of At porch. and enclosed rear trial, charge was found guilty Lewis marijuana of in violation of possession of 124.401(5) (1999). section On Iowa Code challenges sup- court’s appeal, he the trial ruling impo- as well the court’s pression as of a law initiative sition enforcement $125 which claims is a viola- surcharge, Lewis post tion of the ex facto clauses and state constitutions. We con- federal grant- have clude the district court should suppress. Lewis’s motion to ed or hot rely suspicion cannot reasonable en- as the basis for a warrantless pursuit Thus, backyard. try into Lewis’s fenced trial. for a new we reverse remand Background Proceed- I. Facts ings. program, crime part prevention
As of its ob- Department Moines the Des Police letters owners property tained form areas, follows: crime which read as high Moulder: Dear Chief about the have considerable concern We neighborhood. activities our illegal about especially are concerned We proper- loitering trespassing on our which in this area. Various events ties are neighborhood have occurred area resi- upon rights of infringing dents. you is to authorize
This letter arrest whether these two individuals heard Offi- command, I cer anyone illegally property Coughlin’s who is on the but it is clear they acknowledge did not it. own/manage They located at: contin- proceed ued to porch. the enclosed rear following listing my is a tenants: As these two attempted individuals to en- Apt. Name Address & No. ter porch, the enclosed rear Cough- Officer Melvin Lewis 1600 Forest shouted, “no,” lin entered the fenced back- Moines, Des IA1 yard, and ran to the enclosed rear you any change I will advise ten- The two attempted individuals to enter the needed, my property. If you ants can door, porch’s where Officer phone contact me at numbers listed be- Coughlin recently could smell the odor you your low. Thank assistance. marijuana. smoked Sincerely, Coughlin Officer everyone ordered off Signature Owner’s porch, enclosed rear because he and partner his were outnumbered. He felt it This is located in Officer Michael necessary safety for the officers’ Coughlin’s patrol regular area. Prior to pat handcuff and down the individuals he 24, 2000, July Coughlin Officer contacted *5 ordered off the enclosed porch. rear All tenant, Lewis, and discussed the no- but two individuals followed Officer trespass letter with him. Coughlin’s step commands to down from 24, 2000, July On at around p.m., 9:30 porch. the enclosed rear The two individ- on Coughlin patrol Officer was routine in remaining uals on porch the enclosed rear vehicle, the area. From his he observed tenant, Lewis, were the and his female in people several the fenced companion. Lewis companion and his were porch the enclosed located inside the not the two individuals Cough- who Officer fence at the rear of property. lin saw walking earlier the en- towards fenced porch and enclosed rear porch. closed rear clearly were visible from the street. A Coughlin As Officer partner and his gated completely fence enclosed the back- in process were handcuffing of yard. Coughlin Officer did not see Lewis persons down, patting Sergeant them premises. on the Moran appeared at the Sergeant scene. Coughlin Officer knew the department Moran noticed that two individuals were had a no-trespass letter on file regarding still on the porch. enclosed rear An offi- property. this Coughlin Officer deter- cer at the scene Sergeant informed Moran mined the no-trespass letter was current it was the tenant and his female compan- investigate. and decided to As Officer Sergeant ion. Moran then inquired Coughlin partner and his pulled their anyone whether had checked Lewis and squad driveway, marked car into Lewis’s companion his female weapons. An the officers noticed two individuals stand- officer on the scene in nega- answered ing gate inside the of the Sergeant tive. Moran proceeded to enter “rapidly start walking” towards the en- porch enclosed rear to weap- check for closed rear where there a large ons. He asked Lewis to stand. When group people. Coughlin of Officer stood, exited Lewis Sergeant Moran a bag saw of his vehicle and told the two individuals: marijuana what he believed to be between “Stop, police.” There is no indication as to immediately Lewis’s feet. He placed Lew- 1. The owner of the type. residence handwrote the information. in bold occasions, Sergeant separate searched the district court is- Moran in handcuffs. for his He sued a warrant arrest. The district porch. the enclosed rear the rest of judgment court revoked Lewis’s deferred bag on east end paper a saw days him sixty and sentenced bag opened He jail. court county Additionally, the district marijuana and a bags several of and found $250, pay Lewis to of a ordered fine custody, $5 into The officers took Lewis gun. surcharge, DARE and a law enforce- charged possession $125 him with and the State initiative surcharge. ment The district while marijuana with to deliver intent of Department court also ordered the immediate of a firearm having control Transportation driving to revoke Lewis’s Iowa Code sections violation 124.401(l)(e) appeals. Lewis 124.401(1)(<¾ privileges. and failure affix tax drug stamp violation Scope of II. Review. sections 453B.3 and 453B.12. Iowa Code is- appeal This involves constitutional claim- suppress Lewis filed motion to Therefore, the is de sues. court’s review violated property entrance onto his ing the Reinier, v. novo. State 628 N.W.2d under the Fourth Amendment rights his 2001). an The court makes and article States Constitution United “independent totality evaluation of the I, section 8 Iowa Constitution. as the entire the circumstances shown acted court concluded the officers district Turner, record.” State reasonably attempting to ascertain (Iowa 2001). give “We deference on the whether individuals findings the district court’s fact due to its It further permission had be there. credibility to assess of wit- opportunity at- when two of the individuals concluded nesses, by those but we are not bound *6 officers, to evade Officer tempted the findings.” Id. the reasonably entering acted Coughlin Issues. III. following and these indi- (1) appeal: Lewis raises two issues on Be- porch. to the rear viduals enclosed property search the of Lewis’s whether recently smoked the officer smelled cause by of the evidence the officers and seizure marijuana coming the enclosed rear to the the Fourth Amendment violated justi- exigent existed porch, circumstances I, article States Constitution and United persons the fying the decision secure (2) Constitution; Iowa and 8 of the section porch, rear the area imposition law whether of $125 and to porch, the enclosed enter real' surcharge violated enforcement initiative the individuals on the enclosed check facto of the federal post the ex clauses reasons, the weapons. for For these claims Lew- constitutions. The State state sup- court the motion to district overruled challeng- preserve by not is failed error press. curtilage. onto ing the intrusion trial, jury Lewis of only At convicted Preservation Error. IV. of included possession lesser offense of long of this granted position It has been the marijuana. The court district him we will not decide a case based placed a court that judgment Lewis deferred in the by party failed to not raised a probation. ground informal Lewis on on Kriv Sec. and the court. v. Northwestern sign up probation, for informal district 751, 1189, Co., 1195, proba- Iowa 24 N.W.2d placed court him on formal 237 district (1946). This to constitu proba- applies rule When Lewis violated formal 754 tion. on raised first time on two issues for the by testing positive drugs tional tion 522
appeal.
McCright,
State v.
569
Legg,
N.W.2d reasonable.
633
at 767.
N.W.2d
1997).
(Iowa
605,
Error
has
preservation
prove by
607
State
the burden to
preponderance of the evidence that a
principles
is based on
of fairness. DeVoss
rec-
(Iowa 2002).
State,
ognized exception to the warrant require-
60
648 N.W.2d
It
Cadotte,
applies.
ment
State v.
is unfair for us to consider an issue that
(Iowa
1996),
N.W.2d
abrogated on
parties
give
not
the trial court an
did
Turner,
grounds by
other
State v.
opportunity to consider. Id.
(Iowa 2001).
Exceptions
rec-
motion, resistance,
on the
Based
ognized by this court are searches based
filed,
and briefs
the district court framed
consent,
view,
plain
probable cause cou-
as follows:
issues raised
pled
exigent circumstances,
with
searches
argues
The defendant
arrest,
incident to
and those based on the
legal right
upon
officers had no
to enter
emergency
exception.
aid
State v. Carl-
the property,
to detain
son,
1996);
548 N.W.2d
any
persons
on the
or to Cadotte,
523
driveways
Legg,
private
als to enter unsecured
of
claim. See
Iowa constitutional
to his
n.
Lewis could not have had
at 765
1.
residences.
633 N.W.2d
expectation
privacy
his
reasonable
Legitimate Expectation of Priva-
VI.
Therefore,
driveway.
Fourth Amend-
the
cy.
prohibit
ment did not
the
from en-
the
by
protection provided
Moreover,
tering
driveway.
Lewis’s
the
extended
Amendment has been
Fourth
persons
observations of the
officers’
States, 466
curtilage. Oliver v.
the
United
backyard
fenced
and enclosed rear
Lewis’s
1742,
170, 180,
1735,
104
80
U.S.
S.Ct.
did not violate
Fourth Amend-
porch
the
214,
(1984); Legg,
225
L.Ed.2d
207,
Ciraolo,
v.
476
ment.
U.S.
California
the curti-
recognized
law
at 767. Common
1809, 1812-13,
213-14,
90
106 S.Ct.
inti
the
an area which extends
lage as
(1986).
210, 216-17
L.Ed.2d
That is be-
“sanctity
activity
mate
associated with
legitimate expectation
there is no
cause
of life.”
privacies
home and
of a man’s
meaning
and no search
privacy
within
1742,
Oliver,
180,
at
466
at
104 S.Ct.
U.S.
Fourth
authori-
Amendment when
v.
(citing Boyd
L.Ed.2d at 225
United
80
an
activity occurring
ties can view
524, 532,
States,
616, 630,
116 U.S.
6 S.Ct.
curtilage
public
from a
area. See United
(1886)).
746,
751
extent
“[T]he
L.Ed.
29
Knotts,
276, 282,
v.
103
States
U.S.
that
curtilage
by
factors
determined
1085,
(1983);
1081,
55,
S.Ct.
L.Ed.2d
reason
upon whether an individual
bear
Brown,
730, 740,
v.
Texas
U.S.
may expect
question
area
ably
1535, 1542,
502,
75 L.Ed.2d
512-13
S.Ct.
home itself.”
be treated as the
should
(1983).
conclusion,
We reach
different
294, 300,
Dunn,
States.
480 U.S.
United
however,
respect
with
enter
107 S.Ct.
94 L.Ed.2d
ing the fenced
and enclosed
(1987).
of a
To
the extent
determine
porch.
deter
curtilage, the Dunn Court
home’s
resolved with
question
mined the
should be
adja
was located
factors
to four
These
reference
factors.
to the home. The enclosed rear
cent
(1)
claimed
proximity
“the
the area
are:
backyard.
located in
porch was
the fenced
(2)
home”;
curtilage
“whether
to be
gate completely
with a
enclosed
A fence
is included
an enclosure
the area
within
backyard.
and or windows
Screens
(3)
home”;
nature of
surrounding the
“the
fully
a door
the rear
with
(4)
put”;
the uses to which
area is
entry
onto
At the time
officers’
protect
steps
“the
taken
the resident
using
Lewis was
property,
by people pass
the area
observation
for a
and enclosed rear
1139, 94
Id. at
ing by.”
107 S.Ct.
was no evidence
gathering. There
private
*8
focus is
primary
at 334-35. “[T]he
L.Ed.2d
or en
backyard
to indicate
fenced
those
question
the area
harbors
whether
public
to the
porch
open
rear
was
closed
with domestic
intimate activities associated
gatherings.
a place
public
used as
for
or
Id. at
privacies
and the
of the home.”
life
steps
were
taken to
Although there
no
4,
4,
n.
94 L.Ed.2d
301 n.
107 S.Ct.
by indi
protect the area
observation
n. 4.
at 335
or en
backyard
viduals outside
fenced
area
it
that the
porch,
closed rear
is clear
Applying
factors to
these
intimately
with domestic
house,
was
associated
adjacent
we
driveway
to Lewis’s
home.
privacies
and the
of Lewis’s
driveway
the curti-
life
not within
find
was
en
solicitors,
backyard
fenced
and the
opera
find the
It is common
We
lage.
curtilage
vehicles,
rear
were within
motor
other individu-
closed
tors of
subject
protection
to the
of the Fourth
by Iowa Code sections 562A.19 and
is
Amendment. This
consistent with deci
however,
562A.29.
provisions,
These Code
jurisdictions
sions from other
that have
supersede
do not
the tenant’s constitution-
yard
subject
concluded
fenced
right
al
to be free from unreasonable
protection
Fourth Amendment
as curti-
Baker,
searches. See State v.
lage.
See United States v. Romero-Bus
388, 392
Ct.App.1989) (holding that
(9th
tamente,
1104,
337 F.3d
1107-08
Cir.
defendant’s Fourth
rights
Amendment
2003) (holding
backyard
a small enclosed
were violated when the farmhouse he was
immediately adjacent to defendant’s home
renting
property
was searched with the
qualified
part
curtilage
protected by
as
consent).
owner’s consent but without his
Amendment); Daughenbaugh
the Fourth
In order
for the officers to enter
(6th
594,
Tiffin,
v.
150 F.3d
601-02
Cir.
backyard,
fenced
the State has the burden
1998) (holding backyard qualified
part
as
prove by
a preponderance of the evi-
of curtilage protected by the Fourth
dence a recognized exception to the war-
Amendment);
Jenkins,
United States v.
rant requirement.
(6th Cir.1997)
768,
(hold
124 F.3d
772-73
argues
State
the officers’ action of
ing yard immediately accessible from the
entering
backyard
jus-
Lewis’s fenced
was
house and surrounded on
three sides
First,
tified.
the State asserts Officer
qualified
part
wire fence
curtilage
as
Coughlin
right
had a
approach
the two
protected by
Amendment);
the Fourth
walking
individuals
quickly towards the
Wainwright,
v.
Fixel
492 F.2d
porch and stop
investigatory pur-
them for
(5th Cir.1974) (holding
enclosed
poses
Ohio,
Terry
under
392 U.S.
apartment
of four-unit
qualified
part
as
(1968).
S.Ct.
the Fourth Property Amendment. owners A Stop Investigatory for right have a to enter their premises leased Purposes. Terry, In the United States under certain provided Supreme circumstances as Court held that an may officer
525 area, activity in ports they an of criminal investigatory stop of a brief conduct any complaints regarding did not receive officer has a reason when the individual property. Lewis’s suspicion that criminal articulable able and 21, 88 S.Ct. at afoot. 392 U.S. activity is right Tenants have a to use argues The L.Ed.2d at 906. State any legal property purpose. their No conduct two unknown individuals’ that the quarrel proposition with the person will porch to the enclosed walking quickly having party private at a home and and articulable constitutes a reasonable using guests to accommodate activity criminal is afoot. suspicion that commonplace. Having party at 9:30 the actions of deciding whether Without p.m. evening on a summer should not raise to walking quickly individuals the two living high in any suspicion. Citizens constitute reasonable wards the house right enjoy have the the use crime areas in and suspicion this suspicion, articulable just of their as much as citizens property enough to allow the of itself would not be city living parts other do. The curtilage. The offi to enter the officers only police that drew attention to factor exigent probable needed cause cers party taking place Lewis’s was that it was curtilage with to enter the circumstances high in a crime area. The never Pickett, 573 a warrant. State v. out any illegal observed conduct Lewis’s (Iowa 1997). reason The N.W.2d property. police pulled When suspicion standard able and articulable only driveway, thing they noticed were than cause. “Prob Terry probable is less two individuals the fenced totality if of the cir cause exists able walking quickly towards the enclosed rear by reasonable and cumstances as viewed probable There was no cause to person lead that prudent person would trespass being believe the crime of being or is that a crime has been believe two individuals committed or that these commit and that the arrestee committed walking quickly porch to the enclosed rear committing Bumpus, it.” State v. ted or is Reasonable and articu- trespassers. were 1990). 619, 624 suspicion give did not the officers the lable yard. authority to enter Lewis’s fenced arrived at Lew When the officers appropriate cause is the standard Probable residence, probable not have they did is’s curtilage. Rogers v. for searches of the a crime had been commit cause to believe (4th Pendleton, F.3d Cir. give letter did not no-trespass ted. The 2001). probable cause to believe that the officers B. Hot Pursuit. State in the fenced or the individuals claims when the officers entered trespass were on the enclosed in hot backyard, they simply were letter does not af no-trespass ers. The committing the crime authority pursuit to define of individuals ford the more with official acts. The Iowa of interference “trespass” than the Iowa Code. Code Legg, contends our decisions 716.7 the criminal offense State section defines Pink, 648 as, and State v. being upon the N.W.2d trespass generally, (Iowa 2002), police officers grant of another without his or her authority to enter Lewis’s trespass statute acknowl permission. Pink, police offi backyard. Legg In right grant permis edges the lessee’s be attempted stop the defendants third to be on the leased cers parties sion to 716.7(2)(a). committing § Al both observed they cause were premises. Iowa Code roadways. public violations on numerous re- traffic though received *10 526 765; Pink, roadways, gave probable at which them cause N.W.2d
Legg, 633
cases,
In both
the officers
to believe a crime had been committed.
at 108.
N.W.2d
discussed,
lights of their vehicles. As
there was no
top
previously
activated the
stopped. Legg
probable
contin-
cause to believe a crime was be
defendant
Neither
curb,
weaving
ing
property.
from curb to
committed on Lewis’s
driving,
ued
stop sign. Legg,
quickly walking away
act of
from the
and ran a second
mere
Pink,
sped up.
ignoring
stop
Pink
648 officer and
his directions to
N.W.2d at 765.
Pink
and
drove a
not interfer
Legg
at 108.
under these circumstances is
N.W.2d
trying to elude the
considerable distance
ence with official acts. These individuals
gave
actions
the officers
on
go
officers. These
were free to
about their business
that each defendant also
without
probable
cause
Lewis’s
interfer
interfering
People Lupinacci,
the crime
with ence.
v.
191 A.D.2d
committed
See
771; 589,
633 N.W.2d at
Legg,
(N.Y.App.Div.
official acts.
595 N.Y.S.2d
1993)
Pink,
(holding police
at 109. Both defen-
if
not
648 N.W.2d
were
authorized
defendant,
Legg
to their homes.
went
defendant was
dants drove
detain
free
Pink entered his
garage,
away
arresting
into her
while
walk
from the
officer and
Pink,
765;
at
Legg,
charged
obstructing gov
house.
could not be
with
at
entered
interfering
108.
ernment administration or
with
N.W.2d
Legg,
arrest her.
Legg’s garage
performance
633 an officer
of an official
function);
State,
They entered Pink’s house
N.W.2d at 765.
B.H. v.
505 So.2d
Pink,
him.
a
Typically, courts do not consider police
minimal
without a warrant was a
stairway
entry
curtilage
onto the
a
of home
upon
legitimate
the tenant’s
ex-
intrusion
conducting
purpose
investiga-
routine
and did not violate the
pectation
privacy
tion to be
search under a constitutional
Amendment).
Fourth
Thus,
analysis.
recognized
it is not
as one
recognized exceptions
of our
to the war-
Disposition.
VIII. Conclusion
requirement.
investigation
rant
The
is not
rely on
police
The
cannot
reasonable
normally
typically
a search
it
because
is
for a
suspicion
pursuit
or hot
as the basis
any
confined to those areas where
other
entry
Lewis’s fenced
warrantless
into
approach
visitor to the home could
Thus,
evidence,
all
which
backyard.
However,
speak
occupants.
with the
it
entry, is inad-
flowed from the warrantless
may
police
turn into a search if
venture
dispositive of the
ruling
missible. This
is
curtilage
into an area of the
that is consti-
reverse
appeal.
other issues raised on
We
Nevertheless,
tutionally protected.
even
trial court’s denial of Lewis’s motion to
investigative purposes
this intrusion for
reverse and remand for a
suppress. We
prohibitions
does not violate constitutional
new trial.
if the intrusion was reasonable.
AND
REMAND-
REVERSED
CASE
jurisprudence
Search and seizure
re-
ED.
quires
two-step analysis.
Once an intru-
found,
protected
sion on a
interest
justices
except
All
concur
LARSON
path
police
reasonableness of the
used
JJ.,
CADY,
who dissent.
occupant
particular
to locate the
of the
CADY,
(dissenting).
Justice
point
becomes the critical
in the
residence
analysis.
Naujoks,
See State
majority
I
de-
respectfully dissent.
(2001).
opinion of
termines the
of Lewis’ residence
however,
majority,
properly
fails to
protected
to be a
area under the Fourth
important analysis.
this
consider
I,
Amendment and article
section 8 of the
analysis in
good example
proper
confines its
A
Iowa Constitution
then
Breuer,
analysis
constitutionality of
a ease of
is found
po-
this nature
Breuer,
41. In
went
activity by looking
lice
to see if the
apartment build-
recognized
duplex
conduct fits within one of two
to the defendant’s
driving com-
exceptions
requirement:
ing
investigate
to the warrant
a reckless
recently lodged against the defen-
probable
coupled
exigent
plaint
cause
with
cir-
arrival,
agree
Upon
hot
I
dant.
Id. at 43.
their
pursuit.
cumstances and
approached the front door of the
protected
was a
area and the
*12
police
reasonableness of the
action
Id. After
rang the doorbell.
duplex and
backyard in
case is
going
in
into the
this
police opened
the
receiving
response,
no
supported
by
several
circumstances.
door,
stairway/hallway, and
a
the
entered
Breuer,
First,
entry
in
was related
as
to the defendant’s
the door
knocked on
investigation.
Id. at
legitimate police
to a
After the defendant
unit.
Id.
apartment
high
in a
crime
48. The house was located
door,
the odor of
police smelled
opened his
neighborhood homeowners
area and the
marijuana.
Id. The defendant
burning
with tres-
police
had notified
of trouble
a
possession
of
eventually
was
arrested
property.
passing
loitering
on leased
sup-
sought
to
controlled substance
neighborhood
preven-
of a
crime
part
As a
an unreason-
at trial as
press the evidence
effort,
particular
tion
the owner of the
federal
both state and
able search under
by
police
Lewis authorized
house rented
Id.
provisions.
constitutional
this
any trespassers.
arrest
Armed with
analysis
in Breuer
first
our
began
We
knowledge,
observing
gather-
and after
a
two-step approach required
observing the
in the
of Lewis’
ing
people
of
Id.
45.
Fourth Amendment.
under the
home, police thought they should investi-
if
looked to determine
the defen-
We first
gate
present
to see if Lewis was
and had
priva-
of
legitimate expectation
dant
a
had
Second,
in
gathering.
authorized the
as
and,
so,
if
hallway
in
whether the
cy
Breuer,
know
police did not
Lewis was
protected
into the
area
police intrusion
Instead,
any drug activity.
in
Id.
involved
Although
Id.
we found
was reasonable.
solely
if
investigation
was
to determine
hallway
protected,
area
we never-
occupants
in the
were tres-
intrusion was
police
theless determined
Third,
Breuer,
in
passers.
as
the intrusion
First,
reasons.
reasonable based
three
was minimal. Id. at 49. The area outside
legitimate
to a
the intrusion “was related
generally enjoy
a house does not
the same
objective
gathering
part
of
information as
house,
privacy
level of
as the area inside a
of an
and was not done ran-
investigation”
especially
public
when it is visible from
Second,
police did
domly. Id. at 48.
property,
areas outside the
as
this case.
any prior knowledge
not have
the defen-
course,
Breuer,
Of
one fact
absent
drug activity,
but
dant was involved
case,
police
this
is that
first went
approached
solely
the residence
to investi-
front door to locate the resident before
gate
driving complaint.
the reckless
See
intruding
protected
into the
area. Never-
right
Finally, considering
police
id.
of
theless,
require-
there is no constitutional
approach
person’s private property
ment that
must first knock on the
person concerning
speak with the
going
front door before
into other areas of
entry
particular
into the
investigation, the
curtilage.
emphatically rejected
We
a minimal intru-
protected area constituted
type of claim in Breuer when we said:
this
upon
expectation
sion
the defendant’s
“
any particular
‘[t]he reasonableness
privacy. Id. at 48-49.
necessarily
government activity does not
invariably
or
turn on the existence of
analysis required in
precise
This is the
”
alternative “less intrusive” means.’
majority
this ease.
finds the
Once
(citation
area,
omitted);
protected
to be a
Breuer
Id.
accord State v.
(Iowa 2003)
Jones,
requires a
facts and circum-
review the
(“[Cjonstitutional
investigative
provi-
stances to determine if the
search and seizure
intrusive
by police
require
intrusion
was nevertheless rea-
sions do not
the least
Instead,
they require a
possible.
sonable.
action
‘reasonableness,
approaching
under all
law enforcement
officers
measurement
omitted)).
”) (Citation
only right
person
circumstances.’
to “[go]
about
Moreover,
rejected a
business,”
other courts have
po-
one’s
not evade reasonable
rule that
must knock
hard and fast
119, 125,
investigation.
lice
528 U.S.
making any at-
at the front door before
673, 676,
S.Ct.
L.Ed.2d
occupant
to contact the
of the house
tempt
(2000).
fact,
In
flight
opposite
is the
*13
premises.
location on the
See
at another
business,”
“going
flight
about one’s
and
in
147
Montgomery County,
Alvarez v.
F.3d response
sight
police
to the
can be used
(4th Cir.1998).
an inflexible
358
Such
support
suspicion
to
reasonable
in the con-
contrary
accepted prin-
to the
approach is
high
text of a
neighborhood.
crime
See
ciple that
textual ‘touchstone
“[t]he
124-25,
id. at
120 S.Ct. at
Fourth Amendment
is reasonableness.’”
L.Ed.2d at 576-77.
Jimeno,
Florida v.
500 U.S.
(quoting
Id.
Therefore,
police in
this case could
248, 250,
1801, 1803,
S.Ct.
L.Ed.2d
(1991) (citation
properly
hasty
consider the
movements of
omitted));
accord
Jones,
backyard
the two men into the
part
as
“Supreme
I affirm the decision would
trict court. J.,
LARSON, this dissent. joins OF COURT BOARD
IOWA SUPREME *14 ETHICS AND
PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT, Complainant, WILLIAMS, Respondent.
Valli Jo
No. 03-1702.
Supreme Court Iowa. 25, 2004.
Feb. Bastemeyer
Norman L. G. Charles Moines, Harrington, complainant. Des Williams, Rockford, Illinois, pro Valli Jo se.
WIGGINS, Justice. Supreme
The Iowa Board of Pro- Court (Board) fessional Ethics and Conduct brought complaint against attorney Valli pled guilty Jo after she to inter- Williams transportation state of stolen complaint charged fraud. wire multiple with violations of the Williams Responsibility. Iowa Code of Professional