Lamone v. SchlakmanLamone v. Schlakman
H. Mark Stichel (Kelcie L. Longaker, Gohn Hankey Stichel & Berlage, LLP of Baltimore, MD), on brief, for Appellees.
Greene, J.
This case involves a challenge under the election law article to a candidate’s qualifications to appear on the ballot. See
Appellees initially challenged Mr. Sparaco’s qualifications in court by filing on August 25, 2016 an action against the State Board of Elections in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, seeking an injunction “prohibiting ... [the] State Board from violating Maryland Law” and other relief. The federal court dismissed Appellees’ lawsuit out of hand because then counsel had not been admitted to practice before the federal court.
On September 20, 2016, Appellees then filed the instant action in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County against Linda H. Lamone and Armstead B. C. Jones, Jr., in their
On September 22, after notifying the Boards’ counsel, Appellees submitted an ex parte request for an immediate temporary restraining order. See
Issue
Appellants have advanced the following question for our review:
For the reasons set forth below, we agree that the temporary restraining order was granted in error. Appellees’ state court challenges to the State Board’s and City Board’s actions were untimely and are barred by laches. Moreover, Appellees have not demonstrated any basis for relief on the merits under any theory of action or avenue for relief. The City Board’s certification of Mr. Sparaco as a qualified candidate, and the State Board’s listing of his candidacy, complied with the provisions of the Election Law Article.
Background
The operative facts are not in dispute.3 Ian Schlakman was the Green Party candidate for the District Twelve Councilmanic seat on the Baltimore City Council. Frank W. Richardson and Dan Sparaco were independent candidates for the same vacancy. By February 3, 2016, Appellees Schlakman and Richardson had each filed a declaration of intent or certificate of candidacy with the Baltimore City Board of Elections, filings that were required of them as part of the process by which each would qualify for a place on the ballot for the District Twelve seat. See generally
Anticipating a run for the District Twelve seat, Dan Sparaco formed a candidate committee in September 2015, and filed his campaign finance report with the State Board of Elections on January 13, 2016. See
On July 11, 2016, Mr. Sparaco filed with the City Board his declaration of intent to seek nomination by petition for the District Twelve seat. On August 2, the City Board approved the petition signatures that had been submitted by Mr. Sparaco, and certified his candidacy pursuant to
On August 25, 2016, Appellees filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, seeking to enjoin
Appellees’ federal suit was dismissed on September 20 because their former attorney was not admitted to the bar of that court. The district judge ordered all pleadings stricken, noting that the clerk had not been authorized to accept any previous filings, and prohibited the clerk from receiving the complaint and “all subsequent filings.” See
The action before us was docketed on September 20 in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County.6 Appellees contested the Boards’ actions pursuant to
On September 22, 2016, the Circuit Court issued the temporary restraining order that is the subject of this appeal. The court found that there were “no material facts in dispute.” The court also concluded:
3. [The] Court finds that Plaintiffs, registered voters and candidates for the Baltimore City Council in Councilmanic District No. 12, have raised a substantial question concerning whether Defendants are violating Maryland law by their including the name of Dan Sparaco as a candidate for Baltimore City Council in Councilmanic District No. 12 on ballots to be distributed to voters for the 2016 General Election. [The] Court further finds that the Defendants’ actions, unless restrained, may act in contravention of the Plaintiffs’ claimed rights before this Court has had the opportunity to determine those rights and effectively moot this case. [The] Court finds that this outcome would harm Plaintiffs’ legitimate interests. The Court further finds that this harm will be immediate, substantial, and irreparable.
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5. Accordingly, Linda H. Lamone, in her official capacity as State Administrator, Maryland State Board of Elections, and Armstead B. C. Jones, Sr., in his official capacity as Election Director, Baltimore City Board of Elections (collectively “Defendants”) are ORDERED to remove the name of Dan Sparaco from any and all ballots to be distributed to
voters in Baltimore City Councilmanic District No. 12 for the General Election and ENJOINED from distributing to voters any ballot containing the name of Dan Sparaco as a candidate for election in the 2016 General Election. FURTHER, those working under Defendants’ direction and in concert with them shall be and hereby are ENJOINED temporarily to take any action to frustrate or impede this relief.
This appeal and our grant of certiorari followed. Schlakman, 450 Md. at 214, 147 A.3d at 393 (2016).
Discussion
Standards of Review
We review the Circuit Court’s decision to issue a temporary restraining order for an abuse of discretion. See Schisler v. State, 394 Md. 519, 534, 907 A.2d 175, 185 (2006). See generally LeJeune v. Coin Acceptors, Inc., 381 Md. 288, 300-01, 849 A.2d 451, 458-59 (2004) (reviewing a preliminary injunction). To the extent the Circuit Court’s exercise of discretion is based on an interpretation of law, that aspect of the ruling below is reviewed de novo, because “even with respect to a discretionary matter, a trial court must exercise its discretion in accordance with correct legal principles.” LeJeune, 381 Md. at 301, 849 A.2d at 459 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see Cabrera v. Penate, 439 Md. 99, 106, 94 A.3d 50, 54 (2014) (de novo review of circuit court’s interpretation of Election Law Article). We review the factual findings of the lower court for clear error. See Toms v. Calvary Assembly of God, Inc., 446 Md. 543, 551, 132 A.3d 866, 871 (2016) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
The above standards of review govern appellate review of all interlocutory injunctions. Cf. Fritszche v. Md. State Bd. of Elections, 397 Md. 331, 340, 916 A.2d 1015, 1020 (2007) (addressing four factors to determine whether TRO should issue); Schisler, 394 Md. at 534, 907 A.2d at 175 (applying the four factors in review of TRO); In re Kimmer, 392 Md. 251, 260 n. 13, 896 A.2d 1006, 1012 n. 13 (2006)
Timeliness of Challenge
Appellees sought review of the City Board’s actions pursuant to
Title 6 of the Election Law Article governs petitions, including petitions in support of a candidate’s nomination. See
§ 6-209. Judicial Review.
(a) In general—
(1) A person aggrieved by determinations made under § 6-202, § 6-206, or § 6-208(a)(2) of this subtitle may seek judicial review:
(i) in the case of a statewide petition, a petition to refer an enactment of the General Assembly pursuant to Article XVI of the Maryland Constitution, or a petition for a congressional or General Assembly candidacy, in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County; or
(ii) as to any other petition, in the circuit court for the county in which the petition is filed.
(2) The court may grant relief as it considers appropriate to assure the integrity of the electoral process.
(3) Judicial review shall be expedited by each court that hears the cause to the extent necessary in consideration of the deadlines established by law.
(b) Declaration relief.—Pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act and upon the complaint of any registered voter, the circuit court of the county in which a petition has been or will be filed may grant declaratory relief as to any petition with respect to the provisions of this title or other provisions of law.
By its terms,
§ 6-210. Schedule of process.
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(e) Judicial review—(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, any judicial review of a determination, as provided in § 6-209 of this subtitle, shall be sought by the 10th day following the determination to which the judicial review relates.
(2)(i) If the petition seeks to place the name of an individual or a question on the ballot at any election, except a presidential primary election, judicial review shall be sought by the day specified in paragraph (1) of this subsection or the 63rd day preceding election, whichever day is earlier.
(ii) If the petition seeks to place the name of an individual on the ballot for a presidential primary election in accordance with § 8-502 of this article, judicial review of a determination made under § 6-208(a)(2) of this subtitle
shall be sought by the 5th day following the determination to which the judicial review relates.
Although the City Board certified Mr. Sparaco’s petition pursuant to then
Section 12-202 of the Election Law Article governs judicial challenges to certain irregularities in relation to an election; it provides “judicial redress for any act or omission that violates the Election Law Article[.]” Ross v. State Board of Elections, 387 Md. 649, 667-68, 876 A.2d 692, 703 (2005). It “is the mechanism for challenging the qualifications of a candidate seeking election[.]” Cabrera v. Penate, 439 Md. at 109, 94 A.3d at 56.
Section 12-202 provides:
§ 12-202. Judicial challenges.
(a) In general.—If no other timely and adequate remedy is provided by this article, a registered voter may seek judicial relief from any act or omission relating to an election, whether or not the election has been held, on the grounds that the act or omission:
(1) is inconsistent with this article or other law applicable to the elections process; and (2) may change or has changed the outcome of the election.
(b) Place and time of filing.—A registered voter may seek judicial relief under this section in the appropriate circuit court within the earlier of:
(1) 10 days after the act or omission or the date the act or omission became known to the petitioner; or (2) 7 days after the election results are certified, unless the election was a gubernatorial primary or special primary election, in which case 3 days after the election results are certified.8
Relying on
Seeking to avoid procedural default, Appellees insist that the filing of their federal action “within 10 days of their becoming aware” of the allegedly improper certification of Mr. Sparaco as a candidate for the District Twelve seat tolled the running of the Section 12-202(b)(1) limiting period. Appellees accordingly urge this Court to credit their filing in the United States District Court under the savings provision of
[L]aches is an inexcusable delay, without necessary reference to duration, in the assertion of a right, and unless mounting to the statutory period of limitations, mere delay is not sufficient to constitute laches, if the delay has not worked a disadvantage to another.
Salisbury Beauty Schools v. State Board of Cosmetologists, 268 Md. 32, 63, 300 A.2d 367, 385 (1973). The following observation by this Court in Stevens v. Bennett, 234 Md. 348, 199 A.2d 221 (1964) comes to mind:
The authorities indicate that even when the remedy for a claimed right is only in equity the period of limitations most nearly apposite at law will be invoked by an equity court, provided there is not present a more compelling equitable reason—such as fraud or other inequitable conduct which would cause injustice if the bar were interposed—why the action should not be barred. 34 Am. Jur. Limitation of Actions Sec. 60; 53 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 36; 30 C.J.S. Equity § 131; Wood, Limitations (4th Ed.), Sec. 59; 79 U. op PA. L. Rev. 341. This Court has suggested that it is in accord. Wilhelm v. Caylor, 32 Md. 151, 157-158 [ (1870)]. Judge Henderson, for the Court, said in Berman v. Leckner,
188 Md. 321, 328, 52 A.2d 464, 467 [ (1947) ]: “There is no doubt that limitations will apply by analogy, to proceedings in equity as well as to actions at law, particularly where the jurisdiction is concurrent.”
Stevens, 234 Md. at 351, 199 A.2d at 223-24.9
This Court has “consistently ... adhered to the principle that there is no inflexible rule as to what constitutes, or what does not constitute, laches; hence, its existence must be determined by the facts and circumstances of each case.” Ross, 387 Md. at 669, 876 A.2d at 704 (citations, internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). As noted above, a statutory limitations period, such as that provided by
We shall hold that Appellees’ judicial challenge is barred as a matter of law by laches. Even granting, arguendo, that they did not learn of the City Board’s certification of Mr. Sparaco’s candidacy until August 15, 2016, their challenge under
At the outset, we discern no basis on this record to hold that Appellees’ obligation to file in the appropriate circuit court, as instructed by
Rule 2-101. Commencement of action.
(a) Generally. A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with a court.
(b) After Certain Dismissals by a United States District Court or a Court of Another State. Except as otherwise provided by statute, if an action is filed in a United States District Court or a court of another state within the period of limitations prescribed by Maryland law and that court enters an order of dismissal (1) for lack of jurisdiction, (2) because the court declines to exercise jurisdiction, or (3) because the action is barred by the statute of limitations required to be applied by that court, an action filed in a circuit court within 30 days after the entry of the order of dismissal shall be treated as timely filed in this State.
For the reasons stated at today’s teleconference, Plaintiffs’ Complaint is STRICKEN and DISMISSED without prejudice. Plaintiffs’ counsel has failed to comply with Local Rule 101.1(b)(i) and (ii) in that she is not a member of the bar of this Court and an active member in good standing has not moved for her admission pro hac vice. Accordingly, the Clerk of the Court was prohibited from accepting Plaintiffs’ Complaint and all subsequent filings.
Because
We turn to Appellees’ claim that because they also sought a writ of mandamus, the limitations period set forth in
Appellees have offered no valid explanation as to why they waited until September 20 to cause their judicial challenge to be docketed in the Circuit Court. To be sure, they attempted to file in the United States District Court, and this effort was both unsuccessful, because counsel had not been admitted to practice there, and did not comport with the explicit requirement of
With respect to prejudice, Appellants point out that the delay in not filing until September 19, or September 20 when Appellees’ case was docketed by the clerk, preceded “only days before the scheduled mailing of absentee ballots to military and overseas voters.” Appellees counter that they filed this action before any ballots had been sent out, and speculate that “even if those ballots had been mailed they would have been few in number.”
to have abused the discretionary powers reposed in them.” Goodwich v. Nolan, 343 Md. 130, 146, 680 A.2d 1040, 1048 (1996) (footnote, citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Certainly, mandamus is often applied in election cases, and the remedies sought through mandamus are often congruent with the equitable relief sought in elections cases.
We are not convinced that the equities favor Appellees in light of their eleventh hour challenge. Although Appellees filed their action in the Circuit Court seven weeks before the General Election, the election process had begun in earnest. Moreover, even though Appellees claim not to have become aware of Mr. Sparaco‘s candidacy until August 15, 2016, when he dismissed his federal lawsuit, the State Elections Board had by that time listed him as an “active” candidate on August 2. By August 4, Mr. Sparaco had provided enough signatures to be placed on the ballot. On August 31, his name was included on proofs of the 2016 General Election ballot which were posted on the State Board‘s website. In their answer to the complaint, Appellees indicated:
The defendants admit that federal law requires that, if an absentee military or overseas citizen voter has requested mail delivery of an absentee ballot for the 2016 general election before September 24, 2016, the deadline for mailing such ballots is September 24. The defendants further state that the State Board had arranged to have absentee ballot packages assembled and mailed on September 21-22 and that counsel for the plaintiffs had been advised of that schedule.
In view of this, the following observation by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit is apposite. Affirming the denial of a preliminary injunction sought by Ralph Nader to compel the State of Illinois to place his name on the Presidential ballot, the court noted:
By waiting as long as he did to sue, and despite the strenuous efforts by the district court and this court to expedite the litigation, Nader created a situation in which any remedial order would throw the state‘s preparations for the election into turmoil. Absentee ballots have already been mailed to voters who will be overseas on election day, see
42 U.S.C. § 1973ff-2(e)(2) , and the remaining absentee ballots will be mailed on September 23.
Nader v. Keith, 385 F.3d 729, 736 (7th Cir. 2004). We could not agree more with the observation by the Ohio Supreme Court in Blankenship v. Blackwell, 103 Ohio St.3d 567, 817 N.E.2d 382, 387 (2004), when that Court emphasized that “[o]ur consistent requirement that expedited election cases be filed with the required promptness is not simply a technical nicety.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
We cautioned in Ross that we would not craft a per se rule to apply laches where an election challenge falls outside the limitations period set by the statute. Ross, 387 Md. at 671, 876 A.2d at 705. We shall not do so here. Nevertheless, the delay occasioned by Appellees’ failure to file in the Circuit Court until their case was docketed on September 20, coming as it does over a month after August 15, 2016, the date that they maintain was their first notice of Mr. Sparaco‘s certification, comes close to that mark. Appellees have not explained this delay, or explained why they did not institute a parallel action in the Circuit Court within the time limits mandated by
Although we conclude that Appellees’ circuit court challenge to the Boards’ actions is barred as untimely and foreclosed by the operation of laches, we also conclude, in the alternative, that their entitlement to the relief they sought fails because Appellees cannot succeed on the merits, regardless of their theory of action or the nature of the remedy they seek. A temporary restraining order will be set aside if the party seeking such interlocutory relief will not succeed on the merits of the dispute. Fuller v. Republican Cent. Committee of Carroll Cnty., 444 Md. 613, 635, 120 A.3d 751, 764 (2015). A fair reading of the Election Law Article reveals that Mr. Sparaco was not required to file either a declaration of intent or certificate of candidacy on February 3, 2016, as Appellees insist.
The Election Law Article
The principles of statutory interpretation are well-established:
We have stated the controlling principles of statutory construction so often that only the briefest exposition is necessary. Our predominant mission is to ascertain and implement the legislative intent, which is to be derived, if
possible, from the language of the statute (or Rule) itself. If the language is clear and unambiguous, our search for legislative intent ends and we apply the language as written and in a commonsense manner. We do not add words or ignore those that are there. If there is any ambiguity, we may then seek to fathom the legislative intent by looking at legislative history and applying the most relevant of the various canons that courts have created.
Downes v. Downes, 388 Md. 561, 571, 880 A.2d 343, 349 (2005) (citations omitted); see Drew v. First Guar. Mort. Corp., 379 Md. 318, 327, 842 A.2d 1, 6 (2003) (ascertaining legislative intent is the principal goal of statutory interpretation). We examine the legislation as a whole, reviewing the language and context of the provisions at issue. As we recently emphasized:
We, however, do not read statutory language in a vacuum, nor do we confine strictly our interpretation of a statute‘s plain language to the isolated section alone. Rather, the plain language must be viewed within the context of the statutory scheme to which it belongs, considering the purpose, aim, or policy of the Legislature in enacting the statute. We presume that the Legislature intends its enactments to operate together as a consistent and harmonious body of law, and, thus, we seek to reconcile and harmonize the parts of a statute, to the extent possible consistent with the statute‘s object and scope. . . . In every case, the statute must be given a reasonable interpretation, not one that is absurd, illogical or incompatible with common sense.
CashCall, Inc. v. Md. Comm‘r of Fin. Regulation, 448 Md. 412, 431, 139 A.3d 990, 1002 (2016) (quoting Gardner v. State, 420 Md. 1, 8-9, 20 A.3d 801, 806 (2011)).
The parties vigorously dispute the meaning of those provisions of the Election Law Article that pertain to the filing of certificates of candidacy and declarations of intent by prospective candidates who seek a nomination by petition. Appellees insist that the recent amendments to the Election Law Article, specifically
For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the plain language of the Election Law provisions at issue supports Appellants’ view that a candidate such as Mr. Sparaco was not required to make the required filings until the first Monday in August preceding the General Election.13 We therefore agree with Appellants and explain.
For present purposes, the operative provisions of the Election Law Article are set forth within Subtitles 3 and 7 of Title 5 of the statute. Title 5 broadly governs candidates. Subtitle 3,
Subtitle 3 governs the substantive elements of a prospective candidate‘s certificate of candidacy, such as the information to be provided, how and where that certificate must be filed, and other requirements such as a filing fee and financial disclosures.
§ 5-301. In general.
(a) In general.—An individual may become a candidate for a public or party office only if:
- the individual files a certificate of candidacy in accordance with this subtitle; and
- the individual does not file a certificate of withdrawal under Subtitle 5 of this title.
Section 5-303 addresses filing deadlines, as Appellees maintain, and indeed relevantly provides for a pre-primary filing deadline:
§ 5-303. When filed.
(a) In general.—Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) of this section:
- in the year in which the Governor is elected, a certificate of candidacy shall be filed not later than 9 p.m. on the last Tuesday in February in the year in which the primary election will be held; and
- for any other regularly scheduled election, a certificate of candidacy shall be filed not later than 9 p.m. on the Wednesday that is 83 days before the day on which the primary election will be held.
This
§ 5-701. In general
Nominations for public offices that are filled by elections governed by this article shall be made:
- by party primary, for candidates of a principal political party;
- by petition, for candidates not affiliated with any political party; or
- in accordance with the constitution and by-laws of the political party, for candidates of a political party that does not nominate by party primary.
§ 5-703. Nomination by petition.
(a) Scope.—Except for a candidate for a nonpartisan county board of education, this section applies to any candidate for public office subject to this title.
(b) In general.—A candidate for public office may be nominated by petition under this subtitle if the candidate is not affiliated with any political party.
(c) Declaration of intent.—(1) A candidate for public office who seeks nomination by petition shall file a declaration of intent to seek nomination by petition.
(2) The declaration of intent shall be filed with the board at which the candidate files a certificate of candidacy under Subtitle 3 of this title.
(3) The declaration of intent shall be filed as follows:
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(ii) in a year in which the President and Mayor of Baltimore City are elected, by the date and time specified for a candidate to file a certificate of candidacy;
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(d) Certificate of Candidacy.—(1) A candidate for public office who seeks nomination by petition shall file a certificate of candidacy not later than 5 p.m. on the first Monday in August in the year of the general election for the office.
Appellees aver that Mr. Sparaco‘s filing deadline for the certificate of candidacy, and thus the declaration of intent, must be dictated by
Essentially, Appellees brush aside the clear language of
(2) Except for the time of filing, the certificate of candidacy of a candidate who seeks nomination by petition shall comply with the requirements for a certificate of candidacy under Subtitle 3 of this title.
(f) Time and place for filing signatures.—(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, a petition that contains the required number of signatures specified under subsection (e)(1) of this section shall be filed with the appropriate board by 5 p.m. on the first Monday in August in the year in which the general election is held.
(2) In a special election to fill a vacancy in the office of Representative in Congress, a petition that contains the required number of signatures shall be filed with the State Board by 5 p.m. on the day of the special primary election.15
Moreover, the interplay between the two Subtitles is further demonstrated by
(d) Petition candidates.—A candidate who seeks nomination by petition shall file a certificate of candidacy as provided in
§ 5-703 of this title.
In sum, while Subtitle 3 outlines certain formal requirements for all candidates, petition candidates must meet the filing deadline set forth in Subtitle 7. Mr. Sparaco met that deadline.
Although the language of the statute is clear, a brief view of legislative history of relevant provisions of the Election Law Article provides a context for our holding and confirms our interpretation of the statute. We have said that “the resort to legislative history is a confirmatory process; it is not undertaken to contradict the plain meaning of the statute.” Mayor & City Council of Balt. v. Chase, 360 Md. 121, 131, 756 A.2d 987, 993 (2000). See also Comm‘r of Fin. Regulation v. Brown, Brown, & Brown, P.C., 449 Md. 345, 361, 144 A.3d 666, 676 (2016).
The 1982 Amendments to the Election Law are instructive. In 1981, the Election Law dictated an early filing deadline for all but write-in candidates, and provided that
[e]xcept for certificates of candidacy filed by write-in candidates and as otherwise provided herein [factors not relevant here], certificates of candidacy shall be received and filed in the office of the appropriate board not later than nine p.m. on the Monday which is ten weeks or seventy days before the day on which the primary election should be held under the primary election law.
In 1982, the General Assembly amended
§ 4A-3. When filed.
Except for certificates of candidacy filed by petition or write-in candidates and as otherwise provided herein, certificates of candidacy shall be received and filed in the office of the appropriate board not later than nine p.m. on the Monday which is ten weeks or seventy days before the day on which the primary election should be held under the primary election law.17
In crafting the 1982 Amendments to the relevant provisions of the Election Law, which adjusted the filing deadline for petition candidates to be closer to the General Election, the General Assembly considered correspondence from both the Attorney General and the Assistant Attorney General who was the Legislative Counsel to the General Assembly, who each cautioned that early, pre-primary, filing deadlines in certain cases were viewed suspiciously by the federal courts. Attorney General Stephen H. Sachs informed Governor Harry Hughes that House Bill 1616 would amend the relevant provisions of the Election Law, so the statute would be consistent with rulings by the federal courts. He wrote:
[House Bill 1616] would require candidates seeking nomination by petition in presidential election years to file their certificate of candidacy by the first Monday in August. This is consistent with the decision in Anderson v. Morris, 500 F.Supp. 1095 (D. Md. 1980), aff‘d 636 F.2d 55 (4th Cir. 1980)[.]
The only petition candidates required to comply with a pre-primary filing deadline are those running for office in years when a gubernatorial election is held . . . .
Although the United States Supreme Court will once again be considering the constitutionality of pre-primary filing deadlines for independent candidates, see Anderson v. Celebrezze, 664 F.2d 554 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. granted 456 U.S. 960, 102 S.Ct. 2035, 72 L.Ed.2d 483 (1982), existing case law would support the constitutionality of a July filing deadline for nonpresidential candidates. See Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 91 S.Ct. 1970, 29 L.Ed.2d 554 (1971).
Memorandum from Attorney General Stephen H. Sachs to Governor Harry Hughes (May 12, 1982) (maintained in Legislative Bill File—House Bill 1616, 1982). An earlier memorandum, from the Counsel to the General Assembly to the Administrator of the State Administrative Board of Election Laws, was blunt:
In light of the prevailing precedent in this federal circuit, it is my view that the requirement imposed by the proposed amendments to House Bill 1616 [that would have mandated a pre-primary filing date for declarations of intent for petition candidates] would be unconstitutional, at the very least, as applied to petition candidates in presidential elections years obliged to file a “declaration of intent” by early March.
Maryland‘s filing deadline for independent candidates has been the subject of frequent litigation over the years . . . . And it can be fairly stated that the State has not fared well in convincing federal courts in this circuit to uphold an early March filing deadline that is uniform for independents and party candidates alike.
* * *
[B]arring unforeseen developments, I do not see how the State can continue to defend in this circuit an early March filing deadline for independent candidates, be it a filing deadline for certificates of candidacy or declarations of intent.
Memorandum from Robert A. Zarnoch, Assistant Attorney General, Counsel to the General Assembly, to Willard A. Morris (March 22, 1982) (maintained in Legislative Bill File—House Bill 1616, 1982).
The legislative history of the 2015 amendments to the Election Law Article does not support Appellees’ reading of the statute. Prior to the 2015 amendments,
Bill Summary. In addition to modifying the primary election date in a presidential election year, the bill also:
* * *
- modifies the deadline for a declaration of intent to be filed by a candidate who seeks nomination by petition or by a nonprincipal political party in a presidential election year to coincide with the deadline for filing a certificate of candidacy.
Maryland General Assembly, Department of Legislative Services, Fiscal and Policy Note (Revised) - SB 204 at 2 (May 7, 2015). Indeed, as noted above, the deadlines for both declarations of intent and certificates of candidacy now “coincide.” The deadline for filing declarations of intent for these types of candidates is by 5 P.M. on the first Monday in August as stated in
Conclusion
The operative language of the Election Law Article is clear. A candidate who seeks nomination by petition is not required to file a certificate of candidacy or declaration of intent by February 3, 2016. The City and State Boards properly certified and listed Mr. Sparaco as a qualified candidate for the District 12 Council seat. Given the clear language of the Election Law Article, we hold that the filing deadline for Mr. Sparaco was set forth in
For the above reasons, on October 18, 2016, we vacated the temporary restraining order under review, and remanded the case to the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County with directions to dismiss the underlying action.
Notes
§ 6-208. Certification.
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(b) Certification.—If the chief election official determines that a petition has satisfied all requirements established by law relating to that petition, the chief election official shall certify that the petition process has been completed and shall:
(1) with respect to a petition seeking to place a name of an individual or a question on the ballot, certify that the name or question has qualified to be placed on the ballot[.]
SeeRule 15-504. Temporary restraining order.
(a) Standard for Granting. A temporary restraining order may be granted only if it clearly appears from specific facts shown by affidavit or other statement under oath that immediate, substantial, and irreparable harm will result to the person seeking the order before a full adversary hearing can be held on the propriety of a preliminary or final injunction.
(b) Without Notice. A temporary restraining order may be granted without written or oral notice only if the applicant or the applicant’s attorney certifies to the court in writing, and the court finds, that specified efforts commensurate with the circumstances have been made to give notice. Before ruling, the judge may communicate informally with other parties and any other person against whom the order is sought or their attorneys.