Stevens v. BennettStevens v. Bennett
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Thе appellant, who alleges that in 1939 he made an oral promise to his parents to work, maintain and improve their farm in St. Mary’s County and support thеm from its produce as long as they lived, in return for their oral promise that if he would do this they would will him the farm outright, was aggrieved by the will of his mother (surviving tenant by the entirеty) probated in 1957, which left him only a life estate in the farm, with remainder to his sister, the appellee, and an obligation to pay a judgment, a lien on the farm, held by the sister.
In 1963 he filed an amended bill against his sister (his original bill had been filed in 1962 and held defective on demurrer), asking that she be decreed to hold the fаrm as trustee for him and ordered to convey it to him outright. A demurrer to the amended bill was sustained without leave to amend on the ground that it appeared from the face of the bill that limitations barred the granting of the relief sought.
In this Court the son contends that an equity court applies the statute of limitаtions as would a court of law only
The significant well-pleaded allegations of fact are: the oral contract relied on was made in 1939 when his parents were unable to continue to work the farm; the son married in 1940 and lived with the parents until 1944 when he built and moved into a small house on the farm; the father died in 1945; the son continued to work the farm as he had done since 1939 and from his efforts supported his mother and gave her companionship; the farm originally was poor and he put back into it the excess proceeds in order to improve it; all this was in reliance on the contract; the farm consists of eighty cleared and one hundred forty wooded acres, and after his mother’s death in December 1956 (her will having beеn probated shortly thereafter), the land was appraised at $6,562.50 and the buildings, including a tobacco barn and a cattle and hay barn (which the son hаd built in 1952 and 1956, respectively) at $3,470; after their mother’s death, the son told his sister of his understanding that the farm was to be willed to him outright and that he would not pay the judgment shе held, and she replied she had no great interest in the farm and would convey it to him in fee if he paid the judgment; thereafter, she turned the judgment over to an attorney for collection and the son consulted a lawyer to whom he related the facts as to the obtention of the judgment in preparation for the defense of the suit the sister’s lawyer had instituted to enforce payment; on June 21, 1962, the son met his lawyer to discuss the suit and, for the first time, advised him оf his claim of an oral contract under which he was to receive the farm.
As we see it, the case turns on the applicability of limitations. Therе is no substance to the son’s claim that his sister induced his delay in filing the suit now before us. On his own allegations she did not agree to transfer her remainder interest in the farm unless he paid the judgment. He has not yet done so and, even after she sued him to collect the judgment, he did
The authorities indicate that even when the remedy for a claimed right is only in equity the period of limitations most nearly apposite аt law will be invoked by an equity court, provided there is not present a more compelling equitable reason — - such as fraud or other inequitable conduct which would cause injustice if the bar were interposed — why the action should not be barred. 34 Am. Jur.
Limitation of Actions
Sec. 60; 53 C. J. S.
Limitation of Action
Sec. 36; 30 C. J. S.
Equity
Sec. 131;
Wood, Limitations
(4th Ed.), Sec. 59; 79 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 341. This Court has suggested that it is in accоrd.
Wilhelm v. Caylor,
In the case before us there was neither fraud nor other inequitable circumstances or reasons to prevent the applicаtion of the seemingly general rule, but we find it unnecessary to rest our decision on this ground because we think the appellant had a remedy at law analogous to and concurrent with the one he sought in equity, and it is clear that in such case equity follows the law and applies the period of limitаtions which would operate in the analogous suit at law.
Teackle v. Gibson,
It is true that the son could not have sued at law for breach of the contract to devise real estate and collect as damages the value of the farm at his mother’s death, since the contract was oral and so within the Statute of Frauds, and his performance оf his part of the bargain does not take the agreement out of the statute because the doctrine of part performance, even when the acts relied on are attributable to performance of the contract sued on, is cognizable in equity only.
Hamilton v. Thirston,
The authorities cited say that the plaintiff may prove the oral contract and the value of that which had been promised to be willed for the purpose of aiding in the determination of the value received by him who promised to will the property, even though the use in this way of the express аgreement comes rather close to its enforcement as such. Corbin, op. cit. supra, Secs. 327, 328; Cline v. Fountain Rock Co., Inc., supra; Bright v. Ganas, supra.
The statute of limitations in aсtions of quantum meruit for services rendered and contributions given pursuant to an oral
In the casе at bar a suit at law would have had to be filed, to be timely, within three years of the mother’s death (or, it may be assumed, without deciding, at least within three yeаrs of the probate of her will), and the present equity suit, seeking to redress the same claimed wrong that a suit at law would have sought to redress, was not filed until about five years after the probate of the mother’s will. We think the chancellor did not err in holding the son’s claim so stale as to be barred by limitations.
Order affirmed, with costs.