Kober v. BisignanoKober v. Bisignano
Plaintiff Marty Kober applied for social security disability benefits, alleging that he could no longer work due to a heart impairment. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) assigned the case agreed the impairment was severe but concluded that plaintiff could still perform light work with additional climbing, postural, and environmental limitations. In this action for judicial review, plaintiff contends the ALJ failed to adequately explain why he accepted the opinions of the agency‘s medical consultants and erred in finding plaintiff‘s daily activities inconsistent with his allegations of disabling symptoms.
Plaintiff is right. The ALJ did not comply with the regulation applicable to medical opinions,
But the court need not remand whenever an ALJ makes a mistake. See Liapis v. Bisignano, No. 24-3170, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 19667, at *2, 13 (7th Cir. July 6, 2026); Karr v. Saul, 989 F.3d 508, 513 (7th Cir. 2021); McKinzey v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 884, 892 (7th Cir. 2011); Halsell v. Astrue, 357 Fed. Appx. 717, 723-24 (7th Cir. 2009); Reham T. v. Bisignano, No. 24 C 10011, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69446, at *12 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2026). Because the ALJ‘s errors were harmless, and because the decision is otherwise supported by substantial evidence, I affirm the denial of plaintiff‘s application.
I. FACTS AND BACKGROUND
A. Plaintiff‘s Application and Agency Decisions
Plaintiff applied for benefits in June 2023, alleging a disability onset date of November 15, 2021. (Tr. at 168.) The agency determined his “date last insured” (DLI) for purposes of collecting disability insurance benefits was June 30, 2022, meaning plaintiff had to establish disability between November 15, 2021 and June 30, 2022. (Tr. at 204.) Plaintiff alleged that he could no longer work due to a variety of physical and mental impairments, including coronary artery disease, chronic fatigue syndrome, insomnia, and anxiety.1 (Tr. at 208, 266.)
The agency denied the application at the initial level (Tr. at 48, 91) based on the review of medical consultant Pat Chan, M.D., who found plaintiff capable of light work with no further limitations (Tr. at 46), and psychological consultant Jason Kocina, Psy.D., who found insufficient evidence of a mental impairment (Tr. at 45). Plaintiff requested reconsideration (Tr. at 100), but the agency maintained the denial (Tr. at 59, 102) based on the review of Leonard Comess, who found plaintiff capable of light work with occasional climbing of ramps/stairs, frequent balancing, and avoiding concentrated exposure to extreme hot/cold and pulmonary
B. Hearing
On October 9, 2024, plaintiff appeared with counsel for his hearing before the ALJ. The ALJ also called a vocational expert (VE) to give testimony on jobs plaintiff might be able to do. (Tr. at 1653, 1656.)
At the outset of the hearing, the ALJ confirmed the relevant dates: alleged onset date of November 15, 2021, and DLI of June 30, 2022. (Tr. at 1656-57.) Plaintiff testified that he tried to return to work in early 2022 but could not perform his duties. (Tr. at 1658.) The ALJ noted that plaintiff made only about $893 during that time. (Tr. at 1658.) Plaintiff testified to past work as an asphalt plant operator, which involved doing maintenance work on machinery. (Tr. at 1658-59.) His last day of work was in November 2021. (Tr. at 1660.)
Focusing on the relevant period of November 2021 to June 2022, plaintiff testified that he lived in a house with his wife. His wife usually drove him to appointments, although he did drive at times. (Tr. at 1663.) He noted sleep problems affecting his reaction time. (Tr. at 1664.) Plaintiff testified that he did not do much during this period; he did not cut the grass or shovel snow, although on one occasion he borrowed a neighbor‘s UTV to plow. (Tr. at 1665.) He could prepare some meals, depending on how he felt. (Tr. at 1666.) He did not go out to visit friends or family. (Tr. at 1666.) Plaintiff testified that he frequently took Nitro during this time, almost every day (Tr. at 1667); he also wore Nitro patches (Tr. at 1664). His doctor had recently increased his medication. (Tr. at 1664.) Plaintiff also testified to difficulty sleeping during the relevant period due to anxiety. (Tr. at 1668.) He took medications to help with sleep. (Tr. at
The VE classified plaintiff‘s past work as “maintenance mechanic helper,” heavy generally, medium as plaintiff performed it, with an SVP of 4. (Tr. at 1673.) The ALJ then asked a hypothetical question, assuming a person of plaintiff‘s age, education and experience, limited to light work, never climbing ladders or scaffolds, occasionally climbing ramps or stairs, occasionally stooping, kneeling, crouching and crawling, frequently balancing, avoiding concentrated exposure to extreme temperatures, pulmonary irritants and poorly ventilated areas, avoiding moderate exposure to hazards, and able to understand, remember and carry out simple instructions. (Tr. at 1673-74.) The VE testified such a person could not perform plaintiff‘s past work but could do other jobs, such as sales attendant, counter attendant, and cashier II. (Tr. at 1674.) Reducing the exertional level to sedentary, with all of the other limitations, the person could work as a food and beverage order clerk, charge account clerk, and sorter. (Tr. at 1674-75.) A need for two additional 30-minute breaks, in addition to normal breaks, would be work preclusive (Tr. at 1675), as would two or more absences per month (Tr. at 1676). The VE indicated that employers tolerate 10% time off task and 12 absences per year. (Tr. at 1676.)
C. ALJ‘s Decision
On November 22, 2024, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision. (Tr. at 60.) Following the familiar five-step evaluation process,2 the ALJ determined at step one that plaintiff did not
Prior to step four, the ALJ determined that plaintiff had the RFC to perform light work, except he could never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; occasionally climb ramps and stairs; occasionally stoop, kneel, crouch and crawl, and frequently balance; should avoid concentrated exposure to extreme cold and heat, pulmonary irritants such as fumes, odors, dust and gases, and exposure to poorly ventilated areas; should avoid even moderate exposure to hazards such as moving machinery and unprotected heights; and could understand, remember, and carry out simple instructions. In making this determination, the ALJ considered plaintiff‘s alleged symptoms and the medical opinion evidence. (Tr. at 67.)
In considering the symptoms, the ALJ followed the two-step process set out in the regulations, under which it must first be determined whether there is an underlying medically
At the hearing, plaintiff testified that he tried to go back to work in 2022, but he could only work for a few days and could not handle his job duties. His past employment included work in asphalt maintenance. Since he stopped working, he had been living in the same house with his wife. When he went to doctor appointments, she generally drove him. He drove at times but had issues with sleep and reaction times. He stated that he wore Nitro patches and had taken cardiovascular medications that had been changed and increased to try to help his cardiac symptoms. He generally did not do chores around the house but could prepare some meals depending on how he felt. He stated that he generally did not talk to friends or family, and that he lived in a rural area. He took Nitro once or twice a day. He also had sleep issues, with anxiety every night, waking up and unable to go back to sleep. He was on multiple medications to help with sleep, but he continued to have issues and felt tired during the day. (Tr. at 68.)
The ALJ found that plaintiff‘s medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms. However, plaintiff‘s statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of these symptoms were not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record. (Tr. at 68.)
The ALJ reviewed plaintiff‘s treatment records, which documented a history of coronary artery disease, with stent placement. (Tr. at 68, citing Tr. at 400.) An April 2021 stress test
The ALJ saw no evidence of a significant increase in treatment corresponding to the November 15, 2021 alleged onset date. (Tr. at 69.) In December 2021, plaintiff presented to the emergency department for evaluation of right sided chest pain. He noted that he went for a walk the day before and had chest pain, and woke up in the middle of the night with shortness of breath, nausea, and other symptoms. (Tr. at 69, citing Tr. at 479.) The provider found acute coronary syndrome unlikely and recommended follow-up with his primary cardiologist to discuss other antianginals. (Tr. at 69, citing Tr. at 486.) Later in December 2021, plaintiff returned for follow-up when he reported feeling good with no hospitalization since the last visit; his anxiety was better controlled. He had shortness of breath when he got up, but this improved and went away. (Tr. at 69, citing Tr. at 315.) He was stable from a cardiac standpoint. (Tr. at 69, citing Tr. at 319.) Plaintiff‘s medications were adjusted in February 2022, when examination findings were generally normal other than distant soft S1 and S2 heart sounds. (Tr. at 69, citing Tr. at 811.) A March 2022 echocardiogram revealed left ventricular systolic function in low normal, ejection fraction estimated at 50%, and normal left ventricle size and
In June 2022, plaintiff presented to urgent care with reports of chest pain after lifting boxes. His blood pressure was elevated, but a stress test showed no evidence of active ischemia, and ejection fraction was 58%. Chest x-ray was normal, and echocardiogram showed preserved ejection fraction of 55% with no significant valvular disease. Plaintiff was discharged home on Imdur. (Tr. at 69, citing Tr. at 715.) He returned for follow-up a few days later, reporting that he got short of breath if he tried to exert himself quickly, but otherwise he was able to walk two miles a day if he paced himself without any concerning symptoms. (Tr. at 69, citing Tr. at 716.) He reported headaches on Imdur, which was discontinued. (Tr. at 69, citing Tr. at 718.) Later in June 2022, plaintiff reported that his medication was working well. He reported that he could slowly work up to 2 miles but got short of breath after exerting himself 100 feet rapidly, and he had to pace himself to walk longer distances. (Tr. at 69, citing Tr. at 399.) He was generally assessed as stable and continued on medications. (Tr. at 69, citing Tr. at 402.)
In July 2022, plaintiff reported a return of anginal symptoms; he reported feeling well in the past on Prasugrel and wished to return to that medication. (Tr. at 69, citing Tr. at 714.) He was also to trial Diltiazem for coronary artery spasm. (Tr. at 69, citing Tr. at 714-15.) In October 2022, plaintiff denied any chest pain, difficulty breathing, or other concerns, and examination findings were generally normal. (Tr. at 69, citing Tr. at 390-91.) In April 2023, plaintiff reported that he was not feeling well with nausea, increased anxiety, and not sleeping well. (Tr. at 69,
In June 2023, plaintiff was treated at the emergency department for chest pain. He reported that he was mowing the lawn and his symptoms became so severe that he came to the emergency department for further evaluation. (Tr. at 70, citing Tr. at 436.) He had elevated blood pressure at 171/100 but otherwise normal examination findings. (Tr. at 70, citing Tr. at 442.) Laboratory tests were unremarkable, and chest x-ray did not show any acute findings. (Tr. at 70, citing Tr. at 443.) Admission for stress test was recommended, and the test was negative for any acute myocardial infarction. (Tr. at 70, citing Tr. at 442, 450.) His condition improved, and he was discharged home medically stable. He was restarted on Ranexa due to his significant history of coronary artery disease. (Tr. at 70, citing Tr. at 450.)
At follow-up visits in July through September 2023, plaintiff had some continued symptoms but was exercising at least 10 miles a day between walking and biking. (Tr. at 70, citing Tr. at 829-57.)3 In September 2023, plaintiff reported memory and attention issues. (Tr. at 70, citing Tr. at 1116.) Mini mental status examination was performed, and he was started
In January 2024, plaintiff presented to the emergency department with reports of chest pain. Troponin levels were normal, echocardiogram showed normal findings with ejection fraction of 61%, and stress test was negative for evidence of myocardial ischemia or infarction. Plaintiff was discharged home, and at follow-up he reported feeling a lot better with no new concerns. (Tr. at 70, citing Tr. at 1145.) Plaintiff also received treatment for shortness of breath in January 2024, when it was noted that he had viral illness and felt more fatigued than normal. (Tr. at 70, citing Tr. at 1549.) At a follow-up in February 2024, his symptoms had improved. (Tr. at 70, citing Tr. at 1620.) In February 2024, his cardiac symptoms were at baseline with some shortness of breath on exertion. (Tr. at 70, citing Tr. at 1575.) At follow-up in July 2024, plaintiff reported shortness of breath on exertion occasionally and some other symptoms. (Tr. at 70 citing Tr. at 1584.)
In August 2024, plaintiff presented to the emergency department with reports of chest pain after walking around Walmart. He reported that he took Brilinta and aspirin daily and had not missed any doses. (Tr. at 70, citing Tr. at 1528.) Plaintiff underwent myocardial perfusion stress test without concerning findings. (Tr. at 70, citing Tr. at 1544.) Medications were prescribed to help with insomnia, and his cardiac medications were adjusted. (Tr. at 70, citing Tr. at 1544, 1609.) His medications were again adjusted at follow-up later in August 2024. (Tr. at 70, citing Tr. at 1595.)
The ALJ concluded that plaintiff‘s alleged symptoms were not consistent with and supported by the evidence of record. While plaintiff had some limitations, the treatment record
Plaintiff also testified to sleep difficulties, and the treatment records did indicate that he received medication for insomnia, with reported memory and concentration issues. (Tr. at 71, citing Tr. at 1116.) At times, plaintiff reported that he was sleeping well on medication. (Tr. at 71, citing Tr. at 1633.) Nevertheless, the ALJ limited his exposure to hazards and included other environmental limitations due to his sleep issues and possible side effects from medications. Plaintiff had received medication management for depression and anxiety, but psychiatric findings were consistently normal, with appropriate behavior, mood and affect, and
The ALJ then turned to the medical opinion evidence, noting that under the regulations he could not defer or give any specific evidentiary weight, including controlling weight, to any medical opinion, including those from treating sources. The ALJ stated:
I have fully considered the medical opinions and prior administrative medical findings as follows: DDS physician opinions limiting the claimant to light exertional work with postural and environmental limitations (Exhibit 1A; 3A) is generally persuasive and consistent with the residual functional capacity assessment as they are findings of disability reviewers who have supported their opinions with evidence of record.
(Tr. at 71, citing Tr. at 42-47, 49-58.)
The ALJ noted that plaintiff‘s providers made various statements on disability that were not generally persuasive. For instance, in April 2011, one of plaintiff‘s providers opined that plaintiff was calculated to have permanent partial disability of 75% of the hand. (Tr. at 71, citing Tr. at 286.) However, this opinion was given 10 years prior to the alleged onset date, and plaintiff was able to work for many years after the opinion was given. Plaintiff also qualified for permanent disabled parking, but this was not a function-by-function finding on disability. (Tr. at 71, citing Tr. at 192.) In February 2024, plaintiff was released from the hospital with restrictions of no lifting more than 10 pounds with the right arm for three to five days, but this was not a permanent or long term restriction and therefore was not included in the RFC assessment. (Tr. at 71, citing Tr. at 1199.)
Based on the foregoing, I find the claimant has the above residual functional capacity assessment, which is supported by the medical findings, nature and frequency of treatment, the claimant‘s activities, opinion evidence and other factors discussed above. I have accommodated the claimant‘s impairments by limiting him to a range of light exertional work set forth above. To the extent the claimant alleges greater limitations, the alleged symptoms are not consistent with and supported by the evidence of record.
(Tr. at 71-72.)
At step four, the ALJ determined that plaintiff could not perform his past relevant work. (Tr. at 72.) At step five, however, the ALJ determined that plaintiff could do other jobs, as identified by the VE, including sales attendant, counter attendant, and cashier II. (Tr. at 72-73.) The ALJ accordingly found plaintiff not disabled and denied his application. (Tr. at 73.)
On June 25, 2025, the Appeals Council denied plaintiff‘s request for review of the ALJ‘s decision. (Tr. at 1.) This action followed.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
The court reviews an ALJ‘s decision to determine whether it applies the correct legal standards and is supported by “substantial evidence.” Summers v. Berryhill, 864 F.3d 523, 526 (7th Cir. 2017). Failure to apply the correct legal standard requires remand, unless the error is harmless. Karr, 989 F.3d at 513.
Factual findings must be supported by “substantial evidence,” which means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 103 (2019). The ALJ has the duty to weigh the evidence, resolve material conflicts, make independent findings of fact, and determine the case
This does not mean the court simply rubber-stamps the ALJ‘s decision. Padua v. Bisignano, 145 F.4th 784, 789 (7th Cir. 2025). The ALJ must build an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to his conclusion. Id. But this articulation requirement is minimal; an “ALJ need not address every piece or category of evidence identified by a claimant, fully summarize the record, or cite support for every proposition or chain of reasoning.” Warnell v. O‘Malley, 97 F.4th 1050, 1053 (7th Cir. 2024). All that is required is that the ALJ provide an explanation for how the evidence leads to his conclusions that is sufficient to allow the reviewing court to assess the validity of the agency‘s ultimate findings and afford the claimant meaningful judicial review. Id. at 1054. And on appeal, it is not enough for the claimant to criticize the ALJ‘s decision about his functional capacity to work; he must point to evidence compelling the conclusion that the adverse disability decision lacks substantial support in the record. Morales v. O‘Malley, 103 F.4th 469, 470 (7th Cir. 2024).
B. Plaintiff‘s Claims
1. Agency Medical Consultants’ Opinions
The regulations require an ALJ to consider all medical opinions in the case record.
As indicated above, in the present case, the ALJ stated:
I have fully considered the medical opinions and prior administrative medical findings as follows: DDS physician opinions limiting the claimant to light exertional work with postural and environmental limitations (Exhibit 1A; 3A) is generally persuasive and consistent with the residual functional capacity assessment as they are findings of disability reviewers who have supported their
opinions with evidence of record.
(Tr. at 71.)
This is insufficient. Merely stating that the consultants supported their opinions with evidence, without discussing the relevance of that evidence or explaining how it bolsters the opinions, does not adequately address the “supportability” factor. And the “consistency” factor requires an evaluation of how consistent the opinion is with the other evidence of record, not with the ALJ‘s previously determined RFC. Finally, to the extent the ALJ‘s comment that the consultants are “disability reviewers” was meant to imply they understand the disability program‘s policies and evidentiary requirements, reference to this ancillary factor cannot compensate for failure to address the two primary factors. See Liapis, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 19667, at *9 (finding ALJ erred by discussing the discretionary factors but failing to explain how he considered the supportability and consistency factors).
So the administrative law judge‘s opinion is vulnerable. But that is nothing new. See Stephens v. Heckler, 766 F.2d 284, 287 (7th Cir. 1985). No principle of administrative law or common sense requires us to remand a case in quest of a perfect opinion unless there is reason to believe that the remand might lead to a different result.
Fisher v. Bowen, 869 F.2d 1055, 1057 (7th Cir. 1989).
Failure to comply with
The nature of this error must be placed in context. RFC is an issue for the ALJ alone—not any doctor—to decide. Thomas v. Colvin, 745 F.3d 802, 808 (7th Cir. 2014). In determining RFC, the ALJ considers the entire record; he is not required to rely entirely on a particular physician‘s opinion or choose between the various opinions in the record. See Pufahl v. Bisignano, 142 F.4th 446, 458 n.18 (7th Cir. 2025) (citing Schmidt v. Astrue, 496 F.3d 833, 845 (7th Cir. 2007)).
In the present case, the ALJ considered the entire record, including plaintiff‘s medical history, effectiveness of treatment, reports of daily activities, effects of symptoms, medical source statements, and work attempts. See SSR 96-8p, 1996 SSR LEXIS 5, at *13-14 (listing evidence the ALJ should consider in determining RFC). After considering this evidence, the ALJ fashioned an RFC more restrictive than the agency medical consultants recommended.5 In other words, the ALJ‘s insufficient evaluation of the consultants’ opinions did not cause him to omit additional limitations those consultants endorsed. Nor is this a case where the ALJ adopted the agency consultants’ views over the more restrictive opinion(s) from the claimant‘s treating provider(s).6 See Best v. Berryhill, 730 Fed. Appx. 380, 382 (7th Cir. 2018) (“There is no error when there is ‘no doctor‘s opinion contained in the record [that] indicated greater limitations than those found by the ALJ.‘“) (quoting Rice v. Barnhart, 384 F.3d 363, 370 (7th Cir. 2004)). Finally, plaintiff develops no argument that the ALJ‘s
Plaintiff notes that the consultants’ findings were the only opinions the ALJ deemed persuasive. (Pl.‘s Br. at 12.) But plaintiff identifies no other relevant opinions the ALJ discounted in favor of the consultants’ views. In reply, plaintiff contends that the consultants’ opinions “influenced” the RFC finding (Pl.‘s Rep. Br. at 2-3), but he provides no reason to believe that remand to say more about the supportability and consistency of these opinions would lead to a different RFC.7 See Schomas v. Colvin, 732 F.3d 702, 707 (7th Cir. 2013)
2. Daily Activities
In determining whether a claimant is disabled, the ALJ must consider all of the claimant‘s symptoms, including pain, and the extent to which those “symptoms can reasonably be accepted as consistent with the objective medical evidence and other evidence.”
At the second step, the ALJ must evaluate the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of the alleged symptoms based on the entire record, considering the objective medical evidence; the claimant‘s daily activities; factors that precipitate and aggravate the symptoms;
As indicated above, the ALJ followed the two-step process here. In the course of making his step two finding, the ALJ noted various activities, including references to plaintiff working 70 hours per week in 2022, taking a road trip, spending time at a friend‘s house, shopping at Walmart, mowing his lawn, and exercising. While the ALJ did not make the common mistake of equating these activities with the demands of full-time work, see Bjornson v. Astrue, 671 F.3d 640, 647 (7th Cir. 2012) (noting the critical differences between activities of daily living and activities in a full-time job), he never specifically explained how they undermined plaintiff‘s claims about the severity and limiting effects of his symptoms. See Cullinan v. Berryhill, 878 F.3d 598, 603 (7th Cir. 2017) (“[T]he ALJ did not explain why doing these household chores was inconsistent with Cullinan‘s description of her pain and limited mobility. Nor is any inconsistency obvious, so the ALJ did not substantiate the finding that Cullinan‘s daily activities reveal any exaggeration of Cullinan‘s limitations.“); Villano v. Astrue, 556 F.3d 558, 562 (7th Cir. 2009) (“Although [the ALJ] briefly described Villano‘s testimony about her daily activities,
Plaintiff also challenges the significance of these references. For instance, he states that the February 2022 notation that he worked 70 hours per week appears to have been copied and pasted from a 2021 (pre-DLI) note, and the ALJ should not have relied on this vestigial reference in making his finding.9 (Pl.‘s Br. at 13-14.) As for the road trip, the ALJ never said what plaintiff did on the trip that contradicted his allegations. (Pl.‘s Br. at 15, citing Murphy v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 811, 817 (7th Cir. 2014) (“Given the limited information available on the record, such a vacation as described by Murphy would not be inconsistent with her symptoms to the point where her credibility would be diminished.“).) Plaintiff spent time with a friend, but that is not inconsistent with disabling symptoms. (Pl.‘s Br. at 16, citing Mason v. Barnhart, 325
Again, however, flaws of this sort may be harmless. So long as the ALJ provides other reasons supported by the record, improper reliance on daily activities does not require remand. See, e.g., Rennaker v. Saul, 820 Fed. Appx. 474, 480 (7th Cir. 2020) (“[T]he ALJ‘s mistake was harmless because the ALJ did not rely on Rennaker‘s daily activities to the exclusion of other evidence; nor did he equate these activities with competitive work.“); Richards v. Berryhill, 743 Fed. Appx. 26, 29 (7th Cir. 2018) (“The ALJ‘s consideration of Richards‘s activities of daily living is shaky, but he sufficiently supported the credibility determination with other ‘specific reasons supported by the record.‘“) (quoting Pepper v. Colvin, 712 F.3d 351, 367 (7th Cir. 2013)); Stenholtz v. Saul, No. 20-cv-1254, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 215271, at *70 (E.D. Wis. Nov. 8, 2021) (“The ALJ likely should have said more about plaintiff‘s limitations in what were already rather limited activities. But any error was harmless, as the ALJ cited several other factors in determining RFC.“); see also Halsell, 357 Fed. Appx. at 722-23 (“Not all of the ALJ‘s reasons must be valid as long as enough of them are[.]“).
As summarized above, the ALJ cited other substantial evidence in support of his finding, including the objective medical evidence (e.g., ejection fraction at 50% or above,10 normal chest x-rays, unremarkable laboratory tests, negative stress tests, generally normal examination
Plaintiff challenges none of these other findings. Nor does he allege the ALJ overlooked other favorable evidence in making these findings. Accordingly, any error in relying on daily activities was harmless.11 See Tutwiler v. Kijakazi, 87 F.4th 853, 859 (7th Cir. 2023) (“Although the ALJ might have erred in his analysis of some factors, enough of them had adequate supporting evidence for this court to uphold his credibility determination.“); Schrank v. Saul, 843 Fed. Appx. 786, 789 (7th Cir. 2021) (“Even if the ALJ‘s other reason for discounting Schrank‘s testimony . . . was not substantiated by the record, we would not reverse the credibility determination as long as the ALJ provided at least one reason to support the finding[.]“); Bates
III. CONCLUSION
The ALJ should have articulated how he considered the supportability and consistency factors in assessing the agency consultants’ opinions. He also should have explained how the daily activities he cited undermined plaintiff‘s statements. But there is no reason to believe remand for a more fulsome discussion of this evidence would lead to a different result. The ALJ cited substantial evidence supporting his conclusion that plaintiff remained able to work, including the relatively benign objective test results, generally normal examination findings, effectiveness of medications, and consistency of treatment before and after the alleged onset date. The record contains no medical opinion supporting greater limitations during the relevant period than found by the ALJ, and plaintiff points to no other medical evidence that compels a different RFC. See Morales, 103 F.4th at 471 (“Nowhere does [plaintiff] identify what evidence the ALJ overlooked or discounted, nor does [he] explain how the RFC determination should have been different.“).
THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the ALJ‘s decision is affirmed, and this case is dismissed. The clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly.
Dated at Milwaukee, Wisconsin this 21st day of July, 2026.
/s/ Lynn Adelman
LYNN ADELMAN
District Judge