Jada Padua v. Frank BisignanoJada Padua v. Frank Bisignano
YVONNE GONZALEZ MALDONADO, United States District Judge:
Plaintiff Jada Padua (“Padua” or “Plaintiff“) brings this action against Frank Bisignano (“Bisignano” or “Defendant“), Chief Executive Officer of Fiserv, Inc. (“Fiserv“), alleging violations of federal and state law arising from her employment. Defendant moves to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to
I. BACKGROUND
The following facts are drawn from the Complaint and are accepted as true for the purposes of this motion. Plaintiff was employed by Fiserv as a senior executive assistant starting in 2021. Bisignano served as the CEO and President of Fiserv during the relevant period.1 Plaintiff alleges that throughout her tenure, she was subjected to a hostile work environment and discriminatory treatment based on her gender and race.
Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Bisignano frequently made disparaging remarks about female employees and created a high-pressure environment that disproportionately targeted minority staff members for criticism. Padua further alleges that after she raised concerns regarding these practices to the Human Resources department in late 2023, her responsibilities were significantly curtailed, and she was eventually terminated in early 2024.
Plaintiff filed the instant action on May 15, 2024, asserting claims for discrimination and retaliation. Defendant moved to dismiss on June 20, 2024, arguing that Plaintiff has failed to plead sufficient facts to establish a plausible claim for relief against Bisignano in his individual capacity.
To survive a motion to dismiss under
However, the court is not required to accept “conclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual conclusions.” Rolon v. Henneman, 517 F.3d 140, 149 (2d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Discrimination Claims
Plaintiff asserts claims for discrimination based on race and gender. To state a prima facie case of discrimination, a plaintiff must show: (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was qualified for the position; (3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) the action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). At the motion to dismiss stage, a plaintiff “is not required to plead a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas, at least as the Second Circuit has interpreted that confidential evidentiary standard.” Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72, 84 (2d Cir. 2015).
Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to identify any specific instances of discriminatory conduct by Bisignano that directly link her termination to her protected characteristics. The Court disagrees. Plaintiff has alleged specific, recurring disparaging remarks made by the Defendant regarding women in leadership positions and a pattern of “aggressive” oversight directed specifically at minority staff members. While discovery may ultimately reveal a non-discriminatory basis for Plaintiff‘s termination, the allegations in the Complaint are sufficient to survive the low threshold required at this stage.
To state a claim for retaliation, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that: (1) she participated in a protected activity; (2) the defendant knew of the protected activity; (3) the defendant took adverse employment action against her; and (4) a causal connection exists between the protected activity and the adverse action. Littlejohn v. City of New York, 795 F.3d 297, 316 (2d Cir. 2015).
Here, Plaintiff alleges that she complained to HR regarding Bisignano‘s conduct in December 2023 and was terminated in February 2024. Defendant contends that the two-month gap is insufficient to establish temporal proximity and that there are no other facts suggesting a retaliatory motive. However, the Second Circuit has “not drawn a bright line to define the outer limits beyond which a temporal relationship is too attenuated to establish a causal relationship.” Gorman-Bakos v. Cornell Coop. Extension of Schenectady Cnty., 252 F.3d 545, 554 (2d Cir. 2001). A two-month gap, combined with the alleged reduction in duties immediately following her complaint, is sufficient to state a plausible retaliation claim.
C. Individual Liability
Finally, Defendant moves to dismiss the claims against Bisignano on the ground that there is no individual liability under the relevant federal statutes. It is well-settled that individuals are not subject to liability under Title VII. Wrighten v. Glowski, 232 F.3d 119, 120 (2d Cir. 2000). However, Plaintiff also asserts claims under the New York State Human Rights Law (“NYSHRL“) and the New York City Human Rights Law (“NYCHRL“). Under the NYSHRL, an individual may be liable if they “actually participate in the conduct giving rise to a discrimination claim.” Feingold v. New York, 366 F.3d 138, 157 (2d Cir. 2004). Because Plaintiff alleges that Bisignano was the primary actor in the discriminatory conduct and the ultimate decision-maker regarding her termination, the individual claims under state and local law may proceed.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant‘s motion to dismiss is GRANTED as to the federal claims asserted against Bisignano in his individual capacity, and DENIED as to the state and local law claims and the underlying factual sufficiency of the discrimination and retaliation allegations. The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to terminate the motion at ECF No. 12.
SO ORDERED.
YVONNE GONZALEZ MALDONADO
United States District Judge
Dated: August 1, 2025
New York, New York
Background
Plaintiff Smith brings this action against her former employer, Aegis Communications Group, LLC (“Aegis“), alleging violations of the
The following facts are undisputed except where otherwise noted. Aegis is a provider of outsourced customer relationship management services. Plaintiff began her employment with Aegis on April 14, 2008, as a customer service representative. Throughout her employment, Plaintiff suffered from various health issues, including chronic asthma and migraine headaches. In late 2008, Plaintiff requested and was granted intermittent FMLA leave for these conditions.
In early 2009, Plaintiff‘s attendance became an issue. Aegis maintains an attendance policy that uses a point system to track unscheduled absences. Under this policy, employees accrue points for absences and tardiness, and reaching certain point thresholds leads to disciplinary action, including termination. Plaintiff received several warnings regarding her attendance points throughout 2009. Plaintiff contends that many of these points were assessed for absences that should have been covered by her FMLA leave.
Legal Standard
Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
In considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view the facts and the inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). The Court does not weigh the evidence or determine the truth of the matter; rather, it determines whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249.
Discussion
Plaintiff‘s Complaint asserts three counts: (I) FMLA Interference; (II) FMLA Retaliation; and (III) ADA Discrimination. Aegis moves for summary judgment on all counts.
I. FMLA Interference
To succeed on an FMLA interference claim, an employee must show that she was entitled to a benefit which the employer denied. Stallings v. Hussmann Corp., 447 F.3d 1041, 1050 (8th Cir. 2006). An employer‘s intent is irrelevant in an interference claim. Id. However, the FMLA is not a strict liability statute. An employee who requests FMLA leave has no greater rights than an employee who does not request leave; thus, an employer may terminate an employee for reasons unrelated to the FMLA. Estrada v. Cypress Semiconductor (Minn.) Inc., 616 F.3d 866, 871 (8th Cir. 2010).
Here, Plaintiff argues that Aegis interfered with her rights by assessing attendance points for leave that was medically certified under the FMLA.1 Aegis responds that Plaintiff failed to properly follow the company‘s call-in procedures for several of the absences in question, which is a prerequisite for FMLA protection under the applicable regulations.
Aegis‘s employee handbook requires employees to call a designated attendance line at least one hour before their shift starts to report an absence. Plaintiff admits that she was aware of this policy. Aegis has produced records showing that on several occasions, Plaintiff either called in late or failed to call the designated line entirely. Because Plaintiff failed to follow the reasonable notice procedures established by Aegis, the Court finds that those absences were not protected by the FMLA as a matter of law. See Bacon v. Hennepin Cnty. Med. Ctr., 550 F.3d 711, 715 (8th Cir. 2008). Consequently, Plaintiff cannot establish that she was denied a benefit to which she was entitled.
II. FMLA Retaliation
FMLA retaliation claims are analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. Phillips v. Mathews, 547 F.3d 905, 912 (8th Cir. 2008). To establish a prima facie case, Plaintiff must show: (1) she exercised rights afforded by the FMLA; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) there was a causal connection between the two. Id.
Even assuming Plaintiff can establish a prima facie case, Aegis has provided a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for her termination: her excessive attendance points under the point-based policy. The burden then shifts to Plaintiff to show that this reason is a pretext for retaliation. Wierman v. Casey‘s Gen. Stores, 638 F.3d 984, 999 (8th Cir. 2011). Plaintiff has failed to produce evidence that Aegis‘s point system was applied inconsistently or that her termination was motivated by her use of FMLA leave rather than her failure to adhere to the attendance policy.
III. ADA Discrimination
Finally, Plaintiff claims she was terminated because of her disability. To establish a prima facie case under the ADA, a plaintiff must show that: (1) she is disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (2) she is a qualified individual; and (3) she suffered an adverse employment action because of her disability. Huber v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 486 F.3d 480, 482 (8th Cir. 2007). Like FMLA retaliation, ADA claims follow the McDonnell Douglas framework.
Assuming Plaintiff‘s asthma and migraines constitute a disability, her claim fails for the same reason as her retaliation claim. Aegis has presented a legitimate reason for termination—the attendance points—and Plaintiff has not offered evidence sufficient to create a jury question as to whether this reason was pretextual. Excessive absenteeism, even if caused by a disability, is a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for termination. Pickens v. Soo Line R.R. Co., 264 F.3d 773, 777 (8th Cir. 2001).
JOHN A. ROSS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
A. Rule 12(b)(1) Standard
A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under
B. Rule 12(b)(6) Standard
The purpose of a motion to dismiss under
Defendants Justice Center and Saint Louis County move to dismiss Plaintiffs official capacity claims against them on sovereign immunity grounds. Sovereign immunity “is a jurisdictional bar that, in the absence of a waiver, precludes any court from entertaining a suit against the State.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166-67 (1985). Under the Eleventh Amendment, “a nonconsenting State is immune from suits brought in federal courts by her own citizens as well as by citizens of another State.” Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 495 U.S. 299, 304 (1990). This immunity applies to state agencies and state officials sued in their official capacity. Id.
In this case, Plaintiff has not identified any waiver of sovereign immunity by the State of Missouri or Saint Louis County. Moreover,
Defendant Judge Gallagher moves to dismiss Plaintiffs claims against him on the basis of absolute judicial immunity. Judges are generally immune from suit for money damages. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991). Judicial immunity is an immunity from suit, not just from ultimate assessment of damages. Id. at 11. There are only two exceptions to judicial immunity: (1) for non-judicial actions, and (2) for actions taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction. Duff v. Steub, 378 F.3d 1136, 1140 (8th Cir. 2004).
Plaintiff allegations against Judge Gallagher all relate to his judicial acts in the course of presiding over Plaintiffs criminal proceedings. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Judge Gallagher made improper rulings, failed to consider certain evidence, and acted in a biased manner. These are quintessential judicial acts. See Robinson v. Freeze, 15 F.3d 107, 108 (8th Cir. 1994). Furthermore, Plaintiff has not alleged any facts suggesting that Judge Gallagher acted in the complete absence of jurisdiction. Consequently, Plaintiffs claims against Judge Gallagher are barred by absolute judicial immunity.
Plaintiff brings claims against “Saint Louis County Justice Center” as a defendant. However, it is well-settled that departments or subdivisions of local government, such as jails or police departments, are not suable entities under
Official capacity claims against a public official are treated as claims against the public entity for which the official is an agent. Elder-Keep v. Aksamit, 460 F.3d 979, 986 (8th Cir. 2006). Thus, Plaintiffs official capacity claims against the individual Defendants are actually claims against Saint Louis County. A local government may be held liable under
To state a claim against Saint Louis County, Plaintiff must allege that a specific “policy or custom [of the County] caused a violation of [his] constitutional rights.” Doe ex rel. Doe v. Sch. Dist. of Norfolk, 340 F.3d 605, 614 (8th Cir. 2003). Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts identifying a specific policy or custom that led to the alleged constitutional violations. Mere conclusory allegations are insufficient. Accordingly, Plaintiffs official capacity claims will be dismissed.
Qualified immunity protects government officials from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). To determine whether an official is entitled to qualified immunity, the Court considers (1) whether the facts alleged, when taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, show the official‘s conduct violated a constitutional right; and (2) whether the right was clearly established. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001).
Plaintiff also asserts various state law claims for negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Under
Having determined that Plaintiffs federal claims should be dismissed, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs state law claims. These claims will be dismissed without prejudice.
For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss will be granted. A separate Order of Dismissal will accompany this Memorandum and Order.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss are GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this action is DISMISSED. Plaintiffs federal claims are dismissed with prejudice, and Plaintiffs state law claims are dismissed without prejudice.
JOHN A. ROSS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE