KIVA KITCHEN & BATH INC., Plaintiff-Appellee v. CAPITAL DISTRIBUTING INC.; John Michael Davis also known as, John Davis also known as, Michael Davis, Defendants-Appellants.
No. 08-20303
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit
April 2, 2009
Flores is correct that the district court erred by relying on the PSR alone as the basis for a
Flores has not raised as an issue, either in his initial brief or in a reply brief, whether his conviction for burglary of a dwelling was a crime of violence under
AFFIRMED.
Mark A. Hendrix, Maddensewell, Dallas, TX, for Defendants-Appellants.
EDITH BROWN CLEMENT, Circuit Judge: *
Kiva Kitchen & Bath Inc. (“Kiva“) sued Capital Distributing Inc. (“Capital“) and Capital‘s owner, John Michael Davis (“Davis,” and together with Capital, the “Capital Defendants“), for various violations of trademark laws. Kiva was awarded statutory damages and attorneys’ fees following a jury trial, and the Capital Defendants appeal.
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Kiva owns four stores that sell high-end kitchen and bath appliances in various Texas cities: AABC Appliance Gallery in Houston, Jarrell Appliance Gallery in Dallas, Stone Appliance Gallery in San Antonio, and McNairs Appliance Gallery in Austin. Capital operates a retail appliance store in Dallas and is thus a direct competitor of Kiva through its Jarrell store. In December 2005, Davis, on behalf of Capital, began registering internet domain names that incorporated the trade names (or similar spellings thereof) of numerous Texas appliance stores, including Kiva‘s.1 Further, the domain names of Capital‘s competitors in Dallas, including Kiva‘s Jarrell store, were forwarded to Capital‘s website—so that an internet user who typed one of the Jarrell domain names in her browser would be redirected to Capital‘s website.
Kiva discovered the registration of its trade names and the use of this forwarding feature in the summer of 2006. In August 2006, Kiva filed this suit against the Capital Defendants2 in Texas federal court, seeking damages and injunctive relief. It brought claims for trademark infringement under the
The district court conducted a six-day jury trial in January-February 2008. The jury found the Capital Defendants liable for trademark infringement with respect to the Jarrell mark and violation of the ACPA with respect to all Kiva domain names, and awarded Kiva compensatory damages in the amount of $257,232. The jury also found that the case was “exceptional” because the Capital Defendants had acted “willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, or deliberately.” It awarded Kiva punitive damages in the amount of $200,000. Finally, the jury found that BMB and McCally were not liable to the Capital Defendants.
In its post-trial briefing, Kiva sought an enhancement of the jury‘s damages award,
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
DISCUSSION
A. Award of Statutory Damages
“A district court‘s damages award is a finding of fact, which this court reviews for clear error.” Jauch v. Nautical Servs., Inc., 470 F.3d 207, 213 (5th Cir.2006). However, “[t]he conclusions of law underlying the award are reviewed de novo.” Id. See also Ford Motor Co. v. Catalanotte, 342 F.3d 543, 545-46 (6th Cir.2003) (“In reviewing the district court‘s award of statutory damages [under the ACPA], we will not disturb the district court‘s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous, but we review any issues of law de novo.“).
Under the ACPA, the prevailing “plaintiff may elect, at any time before final judgment is rendered by the trial court, to recover, instead of actual damages and profits, an award of statutory damages in the amount of not less than $1,000 and not more than $100,000 per domain name, as the court considers just.”
In Jordan v. Time, Inc., 111 F.3d 102, 104 (11th Cir.1997), the plaintiff in a copyright infringement action obtained a jury verdict awarding actual damages and elected instead to recover statutory damages assessed by the district court. Id. The plaintiff appealed the jury‘s award of actual damages, challenging a jury instruction on damage calculations. Id. The court held that the plaintiff‘s timely election to receive statutory damages mooted all questions regarding actual damages, and the plaintiff was therefore precluded from appealing the jury‘s award. Id. Similarly, the plaintiff in Twin Peaks Productions, Inc. v. Publications International, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1380 (2d Cir.1993), had also opted for a statutory award. When the defendants appealed both awards, the plaintiff cross-appealed, seeking an increase in the amount of actual damages. Id. The court refused to address the arguments on cross-appeal, holding that the plaintiff had “given up the right to seek actual damages and [could] not renew that right on appeal by cross-appealing to seek an increase in the actual damages.” Id.
These two cases are not pertinent to the present situation; they merely stand for the proposition that, once a plaintiff elects to recover statutory damages, an appeal to obtain an increase in the actual damages award is not permitted. Clearly, this is not what happened here—Kiva is not appealing the jury award of actual damages,
On the contrary, our review of the case law suggests that a plaintiff is authorized to make an informed election of remedy even after the jury has rendered a verdict, with knowledge of the amount of both awards. See Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 347 n. 5 (1998) (stating that “[t]he parties agree, and we have found no indication to the contrary, that election [of remedies for copyright infringement] may occur even after a jury has returned a verdict on liability and an award of actual damages“); Twin Peaks, 996 F.2d at 1380 (noting that the plaintiff elected a statutory damages award knowing that its amount was lower than the amount of actual damages awarded by the jury because it believed statutory damages were more likely to be sustained on appeal). Further, we see no reason to limit the manner in which a plaintiff may elect statutory damages; in particular, nothing indicates that a request by a plaintiff that the court award the greater of the two remedies is an invalid election.
The Capital Defendants’ challenge to the amount of statutory damages is equally without merit. The district court awarded $500,000 in statutory damages, including $100,000 for each of the three Jarrell domain names and $40,000 for each of the five non-Jarrell domain names. This satisfies the ACPA requirement that the amount of statutory damages be “not less than $1,000 and not more than $100,000 per domain name.”
The alleged lack of damages suffered by Kiva is controverted by the sales data and expert testimony presented by Kiva at trial, which resulted in a jury award of $257,232 in actual damages. Further, the statutory damages provisions in the ACPA are designed not only to “compel[] restitution of profit and reparation for injury” but also “to discourage wrongful conduct.” E. & J. Gallo, 286 F.3d at 278 (quoting F. W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc., 344 U.S. 228, 233 (1952)). In the copyright context, appellate courts have noted that “[i]f statutory damages are elected, the [trial] court has wide discretion in determining the amount of statutory damages to be awarded, constrained only by the specified maxima and minima.” Columbia Pictures Television, Inc. v. Krypton Broad. of Birmingham, Inc., 259 F.3d 1186, 1194 (9th Cir.2001) (quotation omitted). See also Broad. Music, Inc. v. Xanthas, Inc., 855 F.2d 233, 237 (5th Cir.1988).
We agree with the district court that the maximum statutory award for the Jarrell domain names was warranted in light of Davis‘s bad faith intent to divert potential customers to Capital‘s website and because Jarrell is a direct competitor of Capital in Dallas. See, e.g., Citigroup, Inc. v. Shui, 611 F.Supp.2d 507, 513 (E.D.Va.2009) (finding that the defendant‘s violation of the ACPA “ha[d] been established as sufficiently willful, deliberate, and performed in bad faith to merit the maximum statutory award of $100,000 and an award of attorneys’ fees“); Aztar Corp. v. MGM Casino, No. 00-833-A, 2001 WL 939070, at *4-6 (E.D.Va. April 9, 2001) (awarding maxi-
With respect to the non-Jarrell domain names, the district court declined to impose the maximum statutory award, noting that the other stores—which are not located in the Dallas area—do not directly compete with Capital. Instead, it awarded Kiva $40,000 for each non-Jarrell domain name, which is well within the range of statutory damages award for such bad faith violations of the Lanham Act. See PetMed Express, Inc. v. MedPets.Com, Inc., 336 F.Supp.2d 1213, 1221-22 (S.D.Fla.2004) (awarding $50,000 per domain name in statutory damages); E. & J. Gallo, 286 F.3d at 278 (holding that an award of $25,000 per domain name in statutory damages was not clearly erroneous, even though the plaintiff “did not present evidence that it actually lost any business due to [the defendant‘s] actions“).
Accordingly, we hold that the district court properly awarded statutory damages, and that the amount of the award—$500,000—was “just” under the circumstances.3
B. Award of Attorneys’ Fees
This court “review[s] the award of attorneys’ fees under the Lanham Act for abuse of discretion, and the court‘s finding as to whether the case is exceptional for clear error.” Procter & Gamble Co. v. Amway Corp., 280 F.3d 519, 528 (5th Cir.2002).
The prevailing party in a trademark infringement action may be awarded reasonable attorneys’ fees only “in exceptional cases,”
The Capital Defendants neither dispute that the case is exceptional nor challenge the amount of attorneys’ fees assessed by the district court. Rather, they argue that “[b]ecause Kiva did not properly elect statutory damages, and because Kiva did not present evidence with respect to Capital‘s sales attributed to the infringing activity, it cannot be considered
Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not err in awarding Kiva attorneys’ fees.
C. Evidentiary Ruling
This court “review[s] a trial court‘s evidentiary ruling under an abuse-of-discretion standard when the party challenging the ruling makes a timely objection.” United States v. Hawley, 516 F.3d 264, 266 (5th Cir.2008), cert. denied, U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 994, 173 L.Ed.2d 291 (2009).
During trial, Kiva obtained archived copies of Capital‘s website proving that Capital had been using its competitors’ names as meta tags for its website as early as 20024—but the Capital Defendants successfully objected to the introduction of this document into evidence. However, when Davis testified that, to his knowledge, Capital‘s website had never used competitors’ names as meta tags prior to 2005, Kiva‘s attorney was authorized by the court to show Davis the document indicating a 2002 date. Presenting the document to Davis, Kiva‘s attorney asked him if it refreshed his recollection as to what might have been on Capital‘s website at that time, and proceeded to question him on the presence of these meta tags since 2002.
On appeal, the Capital Defendants contend that the admission of Davis‘s testimony to prove the contents of the document violated
Accordingly, the district court did not err in admitting Davis‘s testimony.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
EDITH BROWN CLEMENT
CIRCUIT JUDGE
Alex Tito BENITEZ, also known as Alex Tito Benitez Pineda, Petitioner v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., U.S. Attorney General, Respondent.
No. 08-60390
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit
April 2, 2009
Summary Calendar.
Glen T. Jaeger, Thomas Ward Hussey, Director, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Immigration Litigation, Ben Franklin Station, Washington, DC, Sharon A. Hudson, U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Services, Houston, TX, for Respondent.
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, BARKSDALE and ELROD, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: *
Alex Tito Benitez, a native and citizen of El Salvador, has petitioned this court for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA‘s) order rejecting, as untimely, his appeal of the immigration judge‘s removal decision. He argues that the BIA erred by declining to accept “jurisdiction by certification,” of his untimely appeal, as provided in
We do not decide the jurisdictional issue presented herein because even assuming that jurisdiction exists, Benitez has not adequately briefed his argument that the BIA erred in finding no extraordinary circumstances warranting an untimely appeal. Accordingly, the argument is deemed abandoned. See Soadjede v. Ashcroft, 324 F.3d 830, 833 (5th Cir.2003); Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 224-25 (5th Cir.1993).
PETITION DENIED.
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.