*1 intent, to business.” The district effect the district court’s go back into this prevent pronouncement to Míreles from condition the oral sought court thus must driving encompass off-highway commercial truck be read to this again using his Therefore, drug trafficking. driving as well. activities as cover for we find that pronouncements the oral and written Nothing suggests in the record are regulating respect. at all concerned with also reconcilable this non-commercial activities. Mireles’s
Therefore, driving” “truck the term V. only commercial judgment written covers reasons, For the foregoing we AFFIRM. then, activity. judgment, The written does pronouncement not conflict with the oral regard. condition in this special although next
Míreles pronounce- in the oral
special condition only Míreles is a “truck applies
ment when driver,” the
driver” or a “wrecker condi- judgment applies tion in written when Mí- America, UNITED STATES passenger.” a “driver or a reles is either Plaintiff-Appellee, is not Although “passenger” the term present pronouncement, in the oral we find discrepancy merely ambigui- MARTINEZ-VEGA, that this is Sergio Guadalupe ty by looking that can resolved to the Defendant-Appellant. be of the district court. As noted intent No. 05-41498. above, it is clear from the record of the Appeals, oral that the district court United Court of pronouncement States Fifth sought prevent trafficking Míreles from Circuit. truck
drugs engaged while commercial Nov. driving It not uncommon in activities. driving
commercial truck for two drivers Therefore, each other. spell be used light purpose,
when read in of its oral
special pronounce- condition applies
ment also to Míreles both as a passenger.
driver and as a
Finally, Míreles contends that the writ-
ten condi- special broadens the supervised
tion for release because it does reporting
not restrict and consent to requirements highway
search truck Although pronouncement
driving. the oral
refers to it as the “commercial activities on condition,
highways” language should narrowly be construed as Míreles
suggests. By necessity, engaged a truck activity
in commercial must also travel on highway. give
other streets to reach a To *2 (argued),
Paula Offenhauser Camille Turner, Attys., Lee Asst. U.S. James Houston, TX, for U.S.
Marjorie
Meyers,
A.
Fed. Pub. Def.
Crooks,
Timothy
Asst. Fed. Pub.
William
Sokolow,
Def.,
Molly E.
H. Michael
Odom
Houston, TX, Martinez-Vega.
(argued),
for
hearing, Appellant responded affirmatively
“every-
to the court’s
thing in
correct?” After a
BARKSDALE,
acceptance
responsibility,
reduction for
BENAVIDES
Before
OWEN,
Appellant’s sentencing range
37 to
Judges.
*3
Ap-
months. The district court sentenced
BENAVIDES,
Judge:
Circuit
to
pellant
appeals.
37 months. He now
this direct crimi-
principal
issue on
appeal,
For the first time on
Ap
nal
is whether the district court
appeal
pellant challenges the 16-level enhance
assessing
in
a 16-level en-
plainly erred
ment, arguing that the district court rec
to
sentence based
Appellant’s
hancement
does
prior
ord
not establish
his
sexual
prior
that Appellant’s
on the determination
conviction
a
assault
crime of violence
a
conviction for sexual assault was
state
2L1.2(b)(l)(A)(ii).
§
Before an ap
sentencing
crime of violence under
the
pellate court can correct an error not
error,
Finding
plain
no
we
guidelines.
(1)
(2)
below,
error;
raised
there must be
AFFIRM.
(3)
plain;
that is
and
that affects substan
Olano,
rights.
tial
United States v.
507
Martinez^
Appellant Sergio Guadalupe
725, 732-34,
1770, 1777-78,
113 S.Ct.
in
guilty
illegal reentry
to
Vega pleaded
(1993). If
pre
3. To be
reliance on
conviction constitutes a crime
Appellant
we
failed
because
conclude
has
error.
of violence
Ochoa-Cruz,
is clear
and obvious
test,
satisfy
plain
not
error
need
Here,
he old, he has not years four which
she was
done, admitting he is not the same as assaulting four-year-old
was convicted of seen, the record
child. As we have that was convicted of
conviction reflects than
sexually assaulting younger a child he was not convicted of
seventeen but assaulting a child than
sexually Martinez^-Vega’s
fourteen. Because offense, included
guilty plea to the lesser government required was never greater offense.
prove the certainly may district court consider by MartinezAVega that he
any admission sexually daughter assault his
did fact deciding old in
when she was four departure is warrant- upward
ed, cannot but such an admission be
basis for an enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii). SMITH, E. Petitioner-
Charles
Appellant, *7 QUARTERMAN, Director,
Nathaniel Department
Texas of Criminal Jus-
tice, Divi- Correctional Institutions
sion, Respondent-Appellee.
No. 05-70045. Appeals,
United States Court
Fifth Circuit.
Nov.
